Membership Badge Showcase                                                                    Chronology of Cambodian History, 1965-1969

 

 

1965 Chronology of Cambodian History

Abbreviations on this page



Jan. 6, 1965

 

Bundy informs Pres. Johnson about Prince Sihanouk’s letter to the editor, in which the Prince claimed that Cambodia’s stability and neutrality was in spite of US, Thai, and South VN attempts to subvert it.

 

Jan. 14, 1965

 

US Amb. Bowles and Cambodian Amb. to India, Nong Kimny, meet to discuss US-Cambodia relations. [21]

 

Jan. 27, 1965

 

US State Dept. telegram to US Embassy in India about report of Amb. Bowles conversation with Nong Kimny.

 

March 1-9, 1965

Prince Sihanouk hosted the Indochina People's Conference to condemn United States activities in Southeast Asia.

March 8, 1965

The first U.S. Marine Infantry landed in South Vietnam.

April 1965

The Pentagon approves U.S. "self-defense" penetration of Cambodia.

 

April 15, 1965

 

US and UK officials meet to discuss Cambodia at the White House. [Memo of Conversation]

 

April 18, 1965

 

Secretary Rusk asks Amb. Taylor by telegram to raise with South VN FM Pham Hut Quat the question of a Cambodian conference as a possible means of initiating a settlement between North and South VN. [21]

 

April 21, 1965

 

Bundy sends memo to Secretary Rusk concerning the handling of Cambodian Conference Proposal.

April 28, 1965

Demonstrators again attacked U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh.

 

April 30, 1965

 

US Pres. Johnson talks on the phone with Bundy concerning the bombing of a Cambodian village. [Transcript]

 

May 1, 1965

 

US airplanes bomb villages in the area known as "Parrot Beak" along Cambodia-South Vietnam border.

May 3, 1965

Prince Sihanouk, Chief of State, announces the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States.

 

US President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) sends memo to President Johnson concerning Prince Sihanouk's announcement, “You may have seen in the morning news that the Cambodians have broken diplomatic relations with us. Our people are not surprised. The initial recommendation for a prompt apology on the accidental air attack was based on a hope that it might marginally affect this Cambodian decision, but my own judgment is that relations were about to break anyway. Moreover, it is good that the Cambodians have put the burden equally on Newsweek and on the air attacks. This Cambodian decision makes a proposed apology irrelevant. We will deal with the air matter by saying that it is still under investigation. We will further say that this break of relations does not affect our position on a Cambodian conference (we have no relations at all with North Vietnam and China, who would also be in such a conference). Finally, we will say that we are still reviewing the question whether we wish to keep a consulate in Phnom Penh, which the Cambodians have apparently suggested. More generally, if we get any flak on this air accident, now or later, we will point out in reply that Cambodia has provided a variety of facilities for the Viet Cong over a long period of time and is therefore in a poor position to criticize a single Air Force error, however tragic it is for those who were hit.” [21]

June 1965

 

Pol Pot, secretary general of the Workers Party of Kampuchea, arrives in Hanoi.25

 

Aug. 12, 1965

Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand signed a power-exchange agreement as part of Lower Mekong Basin development project.

 

Aug. 16, 1965

 

James C. Thomson, Jr., National Security Council Staff, sends memo to Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs concerning the uncovering of Son Ngoc Thanh in Saigon, “…has accidentally uncovered anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serei leader Son Ngoc Thanh somewhere in Saigon, now wants to establish a dialogue. State is properly skittish as this guy has the political future of Harold Stassen but drives Sihanouk crazy. We are permitting one or two more "contacts" with him--but we may be risking a further Cambodia blow-up (our relations with Sihanouk are currently euphoric relative to the recent past).” [21]

 

Aug. 31, 1965

 

Cambodia deposited with UN her accession relating to (1) Optional Protocol Concerning Acquisition of Nationality [7311] and (2) Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes [7312].

 

Sept. 23, 1965

 

Bundy sends memo to President Johnson, “The departure of Sihanouk from Cambodia for three months will likely mean a lull in Cambodian diplomatic initiatives. However, he will probably continue his soundings in various capitals, notably Moscow and Peiking, regarding international guarantees of Cambodia's territory. He is currently undergoing medical treatment in France. The French report some Cambodian annoyance with the Chinese for frequently ignoring their position and making them feel their small power status. Paris warns, however, that this doesn't imply any willingness on the part of the Cambodians to move closer to the West. They still see in the Chinese their only friend in a hostile regional sea.” [21]

Oct. 1965

Prince Sihanouk visits the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - North Korea.

 

Oct. 1, 1965

Cambodia announced that she would boycott all the main committees of the UN General Assembly in protest against the alleged ineffectiveness of the organization.

Oct. 9, 1965

 

Chinese PM Zhou and Pham Van Dong meet in Beijing to discuss the war in Vietnam and possible expansion to Cambodia and Laos.

Nov. 12, 1965

 

Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to Secretary of Defense McNamara regarding the studies that conclude the Vietcong use Cambodia for a source of supply, sanctuary and temporary military facilities.

 

Nov. 20, 1965

 

US Pres. Johnson talks by phone with Secretary McNamara concerning the North VN and Vietcong’s use of Cambodian territory. On the same day, State Dept. telegram to its Embassy in Vietnam concerning the authorization for operations in Laos and Cambodia.

 

Nov. 21, 1965

Pentagon approves "hot pursuit" penetration of Cambodia.

 

Assistant Secretary Bundy sends note to US Permanent Rep. to the UN Goldberg concerning the approaching of US and South VN military operations to Cambodian border.

 

Dec. 1, 1965

 

The US Office of Current Intelligence issues a memo concerning Cambodia’s foreign policy.

 

Dec. 3, 1965

 

Bundy informs Secretary of State Rusk about the US/South VN action against VC/PAVN forces in Cambodia.

 

Dec. 9, 1965

 

US Commander in Vietnam, Westmoreland, telegram the Commander-in-Chief - Pacific, Sharp, regarding the cross border military operations.

 

Dec. 11, 1965

 

US State Dept. telegram to the Embassy in Vietnam regarding the authorization for operations involving Cambodia.

 

Dec. 14, 1965

 

US State Dept. telegram to inform Secretary Rush at Paris about possible ICC role in Cambodia.

 

Dec. 18, 1965

 

US Sen. Mike Mansfield sends memo to Pres. Johnson concerning his 16 countries and territories visit including Cambodian.

 

Dec. 23, 1965

 

Memo of conversation between USSR Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin and US Dept. of State Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on Hot Pursuit, “I gave the Ambassador a copy of our press release on the question of actions our troops were authorized to take in self-defense along the Cambodian border. I said that I thought the American press had great exaggerated and distorted the significance of this development. Dobrynin said, from the statement in the press release, what did this really mean, that our troops would be making deep incursions into Cambodia or bombing Cambodian targets? I replied in the negative and said that this was actually confined to situations in which there was a real need to shoot back in self-defense in order to preserve the lives of our troops involved. Dobrynin asked how he should report this. Was this an official statement? I replied that it was purely an informal explanation of our policy but that I could tell him, for his own information that it was done at the suggestion of the Secretary. He expressed his appreciation and said that he had been confused, and he thought that the diplomats in Washington with whom he had discussed the matter, had also misunderstood what was involved.” [21]

 

Dec. 27, 1965

 

Washington informs Bangkok and Saigon of US concern about both countries support of the Khmer Serei. [21]

 

Dec. 28, 1965

 

US issue an intelligence memo concerning Cambodia’s relationship with the Vietcong, “The problem of Cambodia's relationship with the Viet Cong centers on two broad but related aspects. One is Sihanouk's foreign policy and how it has been influenced by the growth of the Communist movement in South Vietnam. The other is the use by the Viet Cong of Cambodian territory as a source of supply, sanctuary, and political comfort. A thorough review of intelligence from all sources confirms that the Viet Cong have procured supplies in and through Cambodia but shows that the volume of such supplies has been small in comparison with Viet Cong requirements and in comparison with what they have received through Laos, by direct sea infiltration, and from within South Vietnam. It is clear that with the complicity of local Cambodian officials the Viet Cong have found safe haven in many areas along the Cambodian border. The Communists have also established small but useful clandestine facilities on Cambodian territory. From all indications these facilities have played only a small part in the over-all Communist effort in South Vietnam. A substantial body of evidence indicates, however, that the Cambodian Government is not a witting or willing accomplice in Viet Cong operations in Cambodia. Intelligence reports confirm that Sihanouk is increasingly concerned over charges that Cambodia is being used by the Viet Cong. These reports reveal that although Phnom Penh has tried to take measures to curb such use, its ability to police the 600-mile border with South Vietnam is extremely limited.” [21]

 

Dec. 29, 1965

 

McNamara sends letter to Rusk regarding the problem of Vietcong's supplies through Cambodia.

 

 

Dec. 30, 1965

 

US President Johnson talks by phone with Under Secretary of State Ball about Cambodian situation; memo of the conversation, “Pres said he had been worried about the Cambodian situation for some time--our harassing their border. Pres said Ball in talking to Mansfield should ask him to tell Sihanouk that he had reported to the President and the President reciprocated Sihanouk's good wishes. He is to tell Sihanouk that we are very anxious to have no border disturbances and we wish he would make a study of these raids that are being initiated within his borders so that our people would not pursue them. Ball said he would see what we could get back to Sihanouk. Pres said we should put it on Sihanouk that he should stop these raids from being initiated and that we don't want to go across his borders. Pres said Mansfield is Sihanouk's biggest sponsor and he is a hero to Mansfield. Pres [said] Mansfield should tell Sihanouk that he gave a full three-hour report to the President and told him how great Sihanouk is. We should try in this way to get a little closer to Sihanouk.” [21]

 


1966 Chronology of Cambodian History

Abbreviations on this page

 

Jan. 4, 1966

 

US and Australian officials meet to discuss situation in Cambodia.

 

Jan. 5, 1966

 

James C. Thomson sends memo to Bundy concerning Cambodia Conference, “Although I understand that State as a whole remains very leery of resurrecting any Cambodia conference proposal, Allen Whiting suggests that we over here might want to consider such a move. The circumstances have altered considerably since Sihanouk's turn down of the previous conference proposal. Cambodia is more gravely threatened than ever before--by a pincer movement with MACV on Cambodia's eastern frontier and the Thai/GVN-supported Khmer Serei on the western frontier. Sihanouk is properly scared. It would be far less likely for him to shoot down the proposal under the present circumstances. Our interests here are two-fold and clear: first and more narrowly, to get the Thai and GVN to call off their dogs--an effort in which we have been so far markedly unsuccessful; but second and more important, to get the right people to a conference where the long-sought corridor conversations can finally take place. In short, there is more reason than ever for a Cambodia conference, both in terms of the heightened threat to Cambodia's security and in terms of our intensified quest for negotiations. So why not add this item to our current push? (Get the British and Soviets to take the initiative summoning such a conference.)” [21]

 

Jan. 17, 1966

 

George Ball, Acting Secretary of State, sends letter to McNamara concerning the Vietcong use of Cambodian to support its force in South VN.

 

Jan. 20, 1966

 

Cambodia places with UN her ratification concerning Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations.

 

Jan. 30, 1966

 

Sihanouk, in a speech, charges that the Thai statements of widespread Khmer Serei popularity in Cambodia was a view held by the US and asks the US Congress to send some of its members to conduct an on-the-spot investigation.  On the same day, Senator Hayden receives an invitation from the Cambodian National Assembly to send a delegation to investigate Khmer Serei versus Sihanouk popularity and charges of Cambodian sanctuary for the Vietcong. [21]

 

March 3, 1966

 

US Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to McNamara regarding measures to decrease infiltration into South VN from Cambodian via waterways.

 

March 11, 1966

 

R.W. Komer, President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, sends memo to President Johnson, “…On delving further into this, I have discovered a royal snafu. First, Hayden, Fulbright and Aiken all referred this matter to the Vice President, as the titular presiding officer of the Senate. The Vice President was about to sign letters to Fulbright, Aiken and Mansfield pointing out that the Cambodians had withdrawn the invite. We have held this up. Second, while Washington, Bangkok, Saigon, and even Peiking all interpreted the Cambodian radio broadcast of 24 February (an attack on Symington's criticism of VC use of Cambodia) as stating that the Cambodian government withdrew the invitation addressed by its Parliament to three U.S. Senators, a red-faced State Department, checking the French text yesterday, found out that the French word used also means "reminds." They then went back this morning to the Cambodian original and found that the verb is in fact "reminds." Thus the invite still stands. Third, FE in State still feels strongly that we should not pick up the invitation because (a) the Thais and GVN would be sore as hops; (b) it would give Sihanouk another propaganda victory; (c) Fulbright says his committee is too busy to travel; and (d) the Mansfield expedition to Cambodia demonstrates how little can be accomplished through such contacts. Others, including Harriman (I am told), believe that it might be better simply to defer this matter and play for time, perhaps returning an interim answer that the Congress is too busy at this moment. They see merit in keeping open at least a tenuous channel to the Prince. Queries: Should we leave this to the Vice President, or do a letter on your behalf? On the merits, would you prefer a soft deferral or a polite turndown?” [21]

 

March 12, 1966

 

R.W. Komer sends memo to President Johnson concerning the congressmen to Cambodia, “I won't bother you any further on this; it can be easily handled in the following way if you approve. 1. I've called Senator Aiken. He was most understanding when I explained how State and I had misinformed you. In fact, he was so pleasant that I told him how I was recommending we handle the matter. He completely agreed, and feels it makes great good sense not to slam the door on Sihanouk. 2. I've cleared with State a soft reply which neither rejects the Cambodian invite of three Congressmen nor accepts it--but simply pleads the press of Hill business at this time. This leaves us maximum flexibility and offends nobody. 3. It seems to me better if the Vice President formally answers the Hill inquiries and, as President of the Senate, signs the letter to his Cambodian counterpart. This leaves you above the play. If you agree, I will so recommend to the Vice President.” [21]

 

April 2, 1966

 

Bundy sends memo to Rostow regarding presidential inquiry about emissary to Cambodia.

 

April 18, 1966

 

Director Trueheart informs Bundy of some possible effects of Cambodian recognition of North VN political representation.

 

May 16, 1966

Thai PM charges that Cambodian guerrilla had planted land mines in Thailand, killing at least 20 people.

May 19, 1966

 

Cambodian representative to the UN, Huot Sambath, files a complaint with the UN Security Council, charging that Thai forces had shelled and attacked Cambodian positions around Preah Vihear from Apr. 14 to 22. The most serious attack was on Apr. 19 when Cambodian defenders repulsed more than 1000 attackers, inflicting more than 300 casualties.

 

May 28, 1966

 

R.W. Komer sends memo to President Johnson concerning Cambodia, “Your comment to the NSC staff that you were not entirely satisfied with our current "hard line" toward Cambodia crystallized some of my thinking too. Requests from our embattled field commanders that we bomb Cambodia or at least drop leaflets leave me cold--they would have far too little effect to outweigh the political uproar they would cause. Hence State is quite right in turning off these "gung ho" suggestions. On the other hand, there ought to be imaginative ways of putting a quiet squeeze on Sihanouk via economic means and psywar. Intelligence reports suggest economic distress in Cambodia, growing disaffection with Sihanouk's policies--including his diversion of rice from Cambodian mouths to those of the VC and Hanoi. Meanwhile much Delta rice from the supposedly best-pacified area of Vietnam is rumored to be flowing to Cambodia. I am working on a rice strategy to cut back this flow, as well as eventually reduce the amount of rice we have to ship in. We are also taking a look at preclusive buying of Cambodian rice through third parties, so as to reduce the flow to our enemies. Surely we can out-buy Hanoi and Peking. I'm also pressing for quick study of other means of quiet economic warfare against Cambodia, as probably more effective and less politically risky than the warlike gestures proposed from Saigon. The above will take time but we'll keep the needle in.” [21]

May 27, 1966

Commander of US forces in South VN Maj. Gen. Stanley Larsen claims about 10,000 North VN troops are massing in Cambodia for a possible drive into South VN. U.S. State and Defense Department denies any knowledge of the build-up.

 

May 28, 1966

 

Special Assistant Komer sends memo to Pres. Johnson regarding Cambodia.

May 29, 1966

Cambodian government issues a statement denying any foreign troops stationing on Cambodian territory and charges that the US is using the claim to cover-up it operations against Cambodia. The statement issue in response to the allegation by US military commander on May 27.

 

June 12, 1966

 

Vietcong representatives in Phnom Penh is reportedly told Cambodian Government that its support is required to fight and win decisively the war in 1966.  Prince Sihanouk agrees to sell needed rice to the Vietcong. [21]

 

June 13, 1966

 

Pentagon approve the recommendation by Joint Chief to organize, train, and equip an indigenous force of intelligence agents, reconnaissance teams, and reaction teams for possible future employment in cross-border operation into Cambodia. [21]

 

June 21, 1966

 

Assistant Rostow sends memo to Rusk concerning possible approaches to the Cambodia problem.

 

June 25, 1966

 

Rostow sends note to Pres. Johnson about the visit of Italian Abm. To Cambodia.

 

June 29, 1966

 

Acting Secretary Ball sends memo to Pres. Johnson regarding action being taken on Cambodia.

 

July 1, 1966

 

Acting Secretary Ball sends memo to Pres. Johnson regarding possible visit by Eugene Black to Cambodia.

 

July 8, 1966

 

Rostow sends memo to President Johnson concerning US next moves on and Eugene Black Mission to Cambodia

Aug. 3, 1966

The official Cambodian news agency announces the U.S. air attacks against Cambodian border villages of Anglong Trach and Thlok Trach on July 31 and Aug 2, killing at least 3 persons and wounding 9.  The August 2nd incident was witnessed by representatives of the 3-nation International Control Commission (Poland, Canada and India) and the press, who were on their way to the area to inspect damage inflicted in previous alleged attacks.

 

Aug. 4, 1966

 

US Embassy in India telegram to the State Dept concerning US-Cambodian relations.

Aug. 6-8, 1966

Polish government confirmed the U.S. air attacks on Thlok Trach on Aug. 6 and claimed the attack endangers the safety of the members of the International Control Commission. It also insisted the village was inside Cambodia. On Aug. 8 Canadian observers partially support the Polish's claim but said none of the commission members had been endangered by the attack.

Aug. 12, 1966

A spokesman at the U.S. embassy in Saigon acknowledged the attacks had occurred as charges but claims that all "maps available to us show that the 2 targets are in South Vietnam." The following day, Prince Sihanouk - Cambodian head of state - attacked the U.S. claim that Thlok Trach was in South Vietnam. He complained that U.S. maps also falsely placed other Cambodian border villages and islands inside South Vietnam. As a result of the border incidents, Prince Sihanouk announced he would not meet with U.S. Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell Harriman, which was scheduled for Sept. Mr. Harriman was to come to Phnom Penh to confer with Prince Sihanouk on U.S.-Cambodian diplomatic relations, which was severed by Cambodia in May 1965.

Aug. 19, 1966

South Vietnamese government said it regretted the attack on Thlok Track but claimed that a 1964 Cambodian map supported South Vietnam's claim to the village.

Aug. 23, 1966

 

PRC PM Zhou Enlai advises Pham Van Dong, in their meeting in Beijing, to make full use of the road via Cambodia as well as the sea route.  The Chinese also agree to Vietnamese request for reinforcement of forces for air defense, defense of railways, land roads, and aid to build roads. [25]

 

Sept. 1966

Khmer Communists under Sarloth Sar (Pol Pot) renames their organization once again from Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK) to
Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK).

Sept. 2, 1966

French Pres. Charles de Gaulle and Prince Sihanouk sign a joint communiqué in Phnom Penh, calling on world powers to join in a pledge of nonintervention in the internal affairs of Vietnam.

Sept. 11, 1966

General election is held. It is the first election in which Sangkum Reash Niyum does not pre-select its candidates.

 

Sept. 12, 1966

 

Harriman and French Amb. Charles Lucet meets to discuss Cambodia.

 

Sept. 20, 1966

 

William Jorden, National Security Council Staff, sends memo to Rostow, Pres.’s Johnson Special Assistant, concerning Cambodia.

 

Sept. 24, 1966

 

US Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to McNamara concerning Cross-Border Operation.

 

Sept. 30, 1966

 

Cambodia joins the Asia Development Bank.

 

John Roche, US President's Special Assistant, sends memo to President Johnson, “The Baguio Conference might offer a fresh opportunity for reconciliation with Prince Sihanouk. --Sihanouk, caught between Thai and Vietnamese ambitions, thought that he could get guarantees from the Chicoms. --It now appears that he feels he took out insurance with a bankrupt firm, and might be willing to shift his account. --Sihanouk is more reliable than a canary in a coal-mine when it comes to indicating changes in the power atmosphere in Southeast Asia. He is in motion away from the Chicoms. But, he has to have guarantees. And the State Department does not want to create ripples in Bangkok by raising the question. Might it not be possible at Baguio to formulate a multilateral statement that the powers there convened will respect the sovereignty of their neighbors, whether present or not, whether Communist, neutralist, or free world in alignment? This would do much to establish the broad, principled goals of the "pacific powers." --It would provide a formula fully in accord with your Vietnamese policy, namely, a stabilization of frontiers in Asia with no "wars of liberation" launched from either side. --It would undermine the inevitable attack on the Baguio Conference as a "council of war." --It would supply a basis for reopening our direct contacts with Sihanouk from which might come a strengthening of the I.C.C. and a Cambodia neutral against the VC and PAVN.” [21]

Oct. 2, 1966

 

US Commander in VN, Westmoreland, send telegram to Commander in Chief - Pacific, Sharp, concerning the increase use of Cambodia by North VN and Vietcong.

 

Oct. 6, 1966

 

US intelligence services issues a report of estimation of the internal political prospects and the international orientation of Cambodia over the next year or so.

 

Oct. 22, 1966

Gen. Lon Nol is confirmed as Prime Minister by the new National Assembly dominates by the rightist.

 

Philippine and US officials meet to discuss US relations with Cambodia.

 

Oct. 31, 1966

 

US Embassy in the Philippines sends telegram to the Department of State, “…1. I spoke to President Marcos today about his aide-memoire on Cambodia addressed to President Johnson and he confirmed that he had received a verbal message from Prince Sihanouk through Phil Ambassador in Phnom Penh stating Sihanouk's desire to normalize relations with U.S. message asked Marcos to discuss matter with President Johnson but said that if anything leaked out he, Sihanouk, would deny making any overtures.  2. Marcos says he believes that U.S. should convey to Sihanouk through Marcos its regret over alleged mistake bombings and offer to send them team to investigate. Repeat this is Marcos's idea and not Sihanouk's. Marcos further suggested that investigating team once in Cambodia would be able to check on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong hostile establishments for actions inside Cambodian territory. 3. All this seems rather far fetched to us and I conveyed to Marcos Secretary's comments on Sihanouk. However, Marcos told me he hopes to serve as intermediary between U.S. and Cambodia just as he claims he did between Malaysia and Indonesia. Once Marcos receives message from us to Sihanouk that we regret the bombings he will transmit it through his Ambassador in Phnom Penh and will then await Sihanouk's reaction to our further expression of willingness to send investigating team. If Sihanouk agrees, Marcos would then announce here our regrets and Sihanouk's willingness to accept investigating team. 4. I understand Cambodian Charge to Manila was called back suddenly to Phnom Penh on October 27th, the day of President Johnson's departure. 5. Will respond to your query on Johnson-Marcos communiqué U.S. state visit in septel.” [21]

Dec. 19, 1966

 

Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to McNamara concerning actions to deal with Vietcong and North VN use of Cambodian territory.

 

Dec. 21, 1966

Cambodia breaks off diplomatic relations with South Korea.



1967 Chronology of Cambodian History

Abbreviations on this page



Jan. 26, 1967

 

US intelligence services release a special national intelligence estimate “Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort”.

 

March 24, 1967

 

US State Dept. sends telegram to its embassy in Australia concerning the forthcoming visit by Australian PM Holt to Phnom Penh.

 

April 1967

Samlaut uprising begin.

 

April 4, 1967

 

National Assembly holds an urgent session and after heated debates passes a resolution giving Sihanouk special powers. 25

 

April 10, 1967

 

Chinese PM Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong meet in Beijing to discuss issues related to the war in Vietnam. [Conversation relate to Cambodia]

 

April 11, 1967

 

Chinese and Vietnamese communist meet again; Samlaut uprising is discussed. [Conversation]

 

April 14, 1967

 

Bundy sends a briefing memo to Secretary Rusk regarding his discussion of Cambodia with Australian FM Hasluck.

 

April 21, 1967

 

US, New Zealnd, and Australia official meet to discuss Cambodia.

 

April 30, 1967

 

Lon Nol resigns his premiership, citing injuries from a car accident.

 

May 1, 1967

 

Chairman of the Cambodian Study Group, Unger, sends an action memo to Under-Secretary of State, Katzenbach, regarding to initial report by the joint State-Defense-CIA Study Group for Cambodia.

 

May 3, 1967

 

Penn Nouth is appointed Prime Minister to head an emergency government.

 

May 22, 1967

 

Pentagon authorizes limited cross-border operations into the northeast corner of Cambodia, using US-South VN Special Forces, code-named “Daniel Boone”.

June 1967

Cambodia establishes relations with Vietnamese Communist National Liberation Front (NLF), the political arm of Vietcong.

June 1, 1967

Operation Daniel Boone begins.

 

June 6, 1967

 

Nguyen Huu Tho, NLF president, respond favorably by letter to Prince Sihanouk’s appeal for the recognition and respect of Cambodia’s territorial integrity.

 

June 8, 1967

 

North VN PM Pham Van Dong makes a declaration of recognizing Cambodian independence, neutrality, sovereignty and territorial integrity.  The declaration makes in response to Prince Sihanouk’s appeal for the recognition and respect of Cambodia’s territorial integrity.

 

June 15, 1967

 

Country Director for Burma and Cambodia, Ewing, sends memo to Bundy concerning statement of respect for Cambodia’s present frontiers.

 

June 19, 1967

 

William Jorden sends memo to Read, Executive Secretary of the State Dept., regarding Cambodia’s territorial integrity.

 

Aug. 11, 1967

 

Cambodia accepts the Protocol for the Further extension of the Period of Validity of the Convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons.

Aug. 27, 1967

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) opens its embassy in Phnom Penh.

 

Sept. 11, 1967

 

Aldrich, Assistant Legal Adviser, sends memo to Bundy concerning proposals to inhibit NVA/VC exploitation of Cambodian territory.

 

Sept. 14, 1967

 

Habib, Dep. Assistant Sec. of State for East Asian Affair, sends an action memo to Katzenbach regarding Cambodian policy and JCS proposal to extend Daniel Boone Operations.

 

Oct. 5, 1967

 

Warnke, Assistant Sec. of Defense for international Security Affairs, sends memo to McNamara regarding Daniel Boone Operation.

Nov. 2-8, 1967

Jacqueline Kennedy, widow of assassinated U.S. President John F. Kennedy, visits Cambodia.

 

Nov. 29, 1967

 

US State Dept. telegram to its embassy in Australia regarding transmission to Cambodian Government note and evidence concerning VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory.

 

Dec. 4, 1967

 

US deliver note to the Cambodian Foreign Ministry expressing its deep concern over VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory and offer US support for a more effective ICC monitoring of border activity.  [21]

 

Dec. 5, 1967

 

US Commander in Vietnam, Westmoreland, telegram to JCS regarding his discussion with Admiral Sharp about enemy situation and recommendation for actions to be taken.  On the same day, at a cabinet meeting, Cambodia issue is discussed.

 

Dec. 6, 1967

 

US Chairman of JCS, Wheeler, telegram to Westmoreland regarding decision of the cabinet meeting.

 

Dec. 8, 1967

 

US State Dept. telegram to its embassy in Australia regarding military operation into northeast tip of Cambodia.

 

Dec. 12, 1967

 

Marshall Wright, National Security Council Staff, sends memo to Rostow asking “What to do about Cambodia”.

 

Dec. 14, 1967

 

US intelligence services issue a special national intelligence estimate “Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort”.

 

Dec. 15, 1967

 

US Amb. at Large Harriman sends memo to Pres. Johnson concerning that violation of Cambodian borders.

 

Dec. 20, 1967

 

Cambodian Gove. flatly reject US contention that VC and NVA make extensive use of Cambodian territory. The rejection is in response to US Dec. 4 note. [21]

 

Dec. 26, 1967

 

Gen. Westmoreland telegram to Chairman of JCS, Wheeler, regarding military operations in the Tri-border area of Cambodia.

 

Dec. 27, 1967

 

Rostow informs Pres. Johnson, who is in Texas, about situation in Cambodia. [Telegram]

 

Dec. 29, 1967

 

Pres. Johnson is informed by Rostow of his message dispatched to Amb. Bowles to ask Indian Gove. to make a maximum effort through the ICC to end Communist use of Cambodian territory and Secretary Rusk’s recommendations on follow-up actions to the Sihanouk interview with Washington Post.



1968 Chronology of Cambodian History

Abbreviations on this page

 

Jan. 3, 1968

 

US Pres. Johnson is informed of Amb. Bowles' mission to Cambodia. [Telegram]

 

Jan. 4, 1968

Cambodia receives major shipment of PRC military equipment.

 

Jan. 7, 1968

 

Bowles telegram to the State Dept. regarding a course of action to be taken on Cambodia.

Jan. 8-12, 1968

US Amb. India, Chester Bowles visits Cambodia to explore restoration of relations between Cambodia and the United States and ways to limit Communist use of the border area.

 

US Embassy in India inform State Dept. concerning Amb. Bowles’s mission to Cambodia.

 

Jan. 10, 1968

 

Legal Adviser Meeker sends a memo to Secretary Rusk regarding possible US statement on territorial integrity of Cambodia.

Jan. 17, 1968

Communist Party's new Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) begins its guerrilla warfare against the Phnom Penh government.

Jan. 30, 1968

Vietnamese Communists launches their Tet offensive in South Vietnam.

 

Jan. 31, 1968

 

Penn Nouth becomes Prime Minister (01/31/68-08/14/69).

Feb. 1968

Formal Khmer-Soviet arms agreement signed.

 

Feb. 27, 1968

 

Executive Secretary of the State Dept., Read, sends memo to Rostow concerning Australian declaration on Cambodia’s border and its implication for the US.

May 1, 1968

Gen. Lon Nol, who resigned from his premier post a few months earlier, re-enters the cabinet as third vice-chairman of the council of ministers and defense minister.

 

March 7, 1968

 

CIA issues an intelligence report indicating the Vietnamese Communists continue to use Cambodian territory for tactical sanctuary, for base areas, for the infiltration of personnel, and as a source of rice, medicines, and sundry supplies. [21]

 

March 19, 1968

 

US Embassy in Vietnam telegram to the State Dept. concerning SEA Coordinating Committee recommendations.

 

April 1, 1968

 

A US Navy P-3 Orion patrol aircraft is shot down by two Cambodian patrol boats in the Gulf of Siam, killing all crew members. [21]

 

May 25, 1968

 

Cambodian Navy captures a Philippine tugboat 1 mile inside Cambodian territory on the Mekong River and detains 8 Filipino and 2 US Army crewmembers. [21]

 

May 27, 1968

 

Assistant Secretary Bundy sends an action memo to Secretary Rusk regarding special fire authority against VC/NVA in Cambodia.

 

May 28, 1968

 

US Pres. Johnson and Australian PM meet to discuss situation with respect to NVA in Cambodia and the problem that the two countries face. [21]

 

June 8, 1968

 

The eight Filipinos, tugboat crew detained by Cambodian Navy on May 25, are released. [21]

 

June 10, 1968

 

The two US Army tugboat crew, who were detained by Cambodian Navy on May 25, are released. [21]

 

June 19, 1968

 

Chinese PM Zhou Enlai and PLAF Dep. Commander Pham Hung meet in Beijing to discuss varieties of issues including weapons to Khmer communist. [Memo of conversation]

 

July 8, 1968

 

State Dept. telegram to its Embassy in Vietnam regarding Cambodia.

 

July 17, 1968

 

Cambodian Navy seizes a US Army utility landing craft, which strayed into Cambodian waters on Mekong River, and detains 11 Americans and one RVN policeman.  US express regrets and ask for return of vessel and personnel on board.  Prince Sihanouk threatens to try the men under Cambodian law. [21]

 

July 22, 1968

 

Cambodia rejects US explanation of inadvertent intrusion and characterizes the penetration as deliberate act of provocation.  Cambodia also indicates an intention to try the detained crew and confiscate the vessel. [21]

 

July 25, 1968

 

Prince Sihanouk, in a speech to National Congress, says the men detained on July 17 would be interned till end of hostilities and their craft confiscated. [21]

 

July 26, 1968

 

The State Dept. telegram to its Embassy in India regarding Cambodian detention of US soldiers.  On the same day, Cambodia grants access by the Australians to visit the detained.

 

July 29, 1968

 

Dep. Assis. Secretary Brown sends an action memo to Secretary Rusk regarding problem of release seized craft and crew in Cambodia.

 

July 30, 1968

 

At a regular Pres. Johnson's cabinet meeting, course of actions are considered against Cambodia. [Memo of meeting]

 

Aug. 1, 1968

 

US Senator Mike Mansfield write letter to Secretary of State Rusk regarding his view on Cambodia.

 

Sept. 4, 1968

 

US Pres. Johnson is informed about Eugene Black's visit to Cambodia from Sept.11-13.

 

Sept. 5, 1968

 

Secretary Rusk sends Pres. Johnson his instructions to Eugene Black.

 

Sept. 6, 1968

 

US Joint Chief of Staff, in an attempt to pressure Cambodia to release US soldiers, propose plans for harassment of commercial traffic to and from Cambodian on the Mekong and Bassc Rivers.  The JCS also suggest using Market Time ships to capture Cambodian naval craft that are violating South VN territorial waters in the Gulf of Siam. [21]

 

Sept. 16, 1968

 

Rostow sends memo to Pres. Johnson regarding result of Eugene Black visit to Cambodia.

 

Sept. 24, 1968

 

CIA prepares a memo on the subject of Cambodian border problem.

 

Sept. 23, 1968

 

Agreement on administrative arrangements for the PREK THNOT power and irrigation development project is opened for signature at UN headquarters in New York.  Cambodia signs on Nov.13, 1968.

 

Sept. 30, 1968

 

Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke sends memo to Dep. Sec. Of Defense Nitze concerning the treat pose ny VC/VNA use of Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and source of supply.

 

Oct. 10, 1968

 

Rusk sends letter to Secretary of Defense Clifford sharing his view that it would premature to resort now to military or other direct pressures on Cambodia for the release of 11 US soldiers. [21]

Oct. 15, 1968

 

Marshall Wright sends memo to Rostow pertaining to Cambodia.

 

Oct. 28, 1968

 

Rostow informs Pres. Johnson with regard to Prince Sihanouk's appointment of Thay Sok as custodian of the Cambodian Embassy building in Washington.

 

Nov. 5, 1968

Richard Nixon is elected President of the United States.

 

Nov. 7, 1968

 

Chairman of the JCS telegram to Commander in Chief - Pacific, McCain, regarding actions against Cambodian.

 

Nov. 17, 1968

 

Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong meet in Beijing to discuss war and Chinese aid to the war effort in Vietnam. [Conversation related to Cambodia]

 

Nov. 19, 1968

 

Cambodian FM Norodom Phurissia, in a conversation with French Amb. Dauge, indicates that Cambodians would release US detainees if Sihanouk received personal message addressed to him from Pres. Johnson and that Sihanouk sincerely desire to improve relations with US. [21]

 

Nov. 26, 1968

 

US Embassy in France telegram to the State Dept. informing it of French Amb.'s conversation with Prince Sihanouk in regard to US-Cambodia relations.

 

Dec. 3, 1968

 

US Chairman of JCS sends memo to Dep. Under Sect. Of Defense Nitze concerning Daniel Boone Operations.

 

Dec. 5, 1968

 

US Embassy in Moscow telegram to the State Dept. in regard to possible reestablishment of US-Cambodian relations.

 

Dec. 12, 1968

 

Bundy, Assistant Sec. Of State, sends action memo to Katzenback, Under Sec. Of State, concerning Defense Department request for new Daniel Boone Operational authority.

 

Dec. 17, 1968

 

Secretary Rusk instructs Amb. Bowles not to take further actions in regard to US-Cambodian differences. On the same day, Rusk also telegrams to US Embassy in France with Pres. Johnson's message to Prince Sihanouk.

 

Dec. 18, 1968

 

C-in-C Pacific McCain telegram to the Chairman of JCS in regarding to co-relation among South VN, Cambodia and Laos.

 

Dec. 21, 1968

 

State Dept. telegram to its Embassy in Vietnam concerning military operations in South VN near Cambodian border.

 

Dec. 23, 1968

 

Prince Sihanouk announces the release of 11 US soldiers and 1 South VN detained since July 17 when their landing craft entered Cambodian waters and was captured by the Cambodian Navy. [21]

 

Dec. 29, 1968

 

McCain telegram to Wheeler concerning the effects of neutralization of Cambodia.



1969 Chronology of Cambodian History

Abbreviations on this page



Jan. 27, 1969

 

Cambodia accepts the Plant Protection Agreement for the Southeast Asia and Pacific Region.

 

Feb. 9, 1969

Gen. Creighton Abrams, Commander of U.S. forces, Vietnam, requests B-52 bombing attack on a Communist base camp inside Cambodia.

 

Feb. 24, 1969

 

Cambodia deposits with UN her instruments of ratification relating to (1) Convention concerning the employment of woman during the night [587], Convention concerning the night work of young persons employed in industry [589], Convention concerning the use of white lead in painting [596], and Convention concerning forced or compulsory labor [612].

March 17, 1969

Pres. Richard Nixon approves Gen. Adram’s request for B-52 bombing attack on a Communist base camp inside Cambodia.

March 18, 1969

US B-52s begin secret bombing raids on Vietnamese communist bases inside Cambodia.

 

March 21, 1969

 

Cambodia and Japan signs an agreement concerning a donation towards the execution of the Prek Thnot power and irrigation development project.

 

April 15, 1969

 

US recognize the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, two years after Prince Sihanouk made an appeal.

April 20, 1969

 

Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong meet in Beijing to discuss various issues; regarding to Cambodia, Zhou Enlai says: "New developments have been seen in Indochina. We have to acknowledge that Nixon is more intelligent than Johnson. He established diplomatic relations with Cambodia and recognized Cambodia's borders with the neighboring countries. As far as the situation in Cambodia is concerned, we are not as optimistic as you are. Even though [Sihanouk] carries out a policy of double-dealing, he is tilting to the right. The US also knows that China is supplying materiel to forces in South Vietnam via Cambodia and that the NLF armed forces are using part of Cambodian territory for their operations."25

 

May 8, 1969

NLF/Vietcong representation in Phnom Penh is raised to embassy level. On the same day, Cambodia agrees to diplomatic relations with the communist East Germany.

May 9, 1969

West Germany Foreign Minister Willy Brandt recalls Bonn's ambassador to Cambodia in response to Cambodia's recognition of East Germany. West Germany closes its embassy in Phnom Penh on June 4.

 

May 24, 1969

 

PM Lon Nol meet officially with North VN’s representative, Nguyen Thuong, and the NLF delegate, Nguyen Van Hieu in an unsuccessful attempt to deal with the NVA/VC problem.

June 11, 1969

Prince Sihanouk announces state of war in eastern Cambodia between Khmer army and Vietnamese Communists.

Cambodia & US announce resumption of diplomatic relations. The US State Dept. announces the appointment of Lloyd M. Rives as charge d'affaires to Cambodia. Meanwhile, the Cambodia appoints Thai Sok, who is already in Washington, as her charge d'affaires.

 

July 24, 1969

 

International Health Regulations is adopted by the 22nd World Health Assembly at Boston, USA; it come into force for Cambodia on Jan. 1, 1971. [10921]

 

June 29, 1969

 

Nguyen Tan Phat, prime minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam, pays a 6-days official visit to Phnom Penh.

 

June 30, 1969

 

Cambodia and Netherlands exchanges letters constituting an agreement concerning the Netherlands contribution to the Prek Thnot Power and Irrigation Development Project.

July 9, 1969

Cambodia and Great Britain exchanges notes of an agreement concerning an interest free loan for the Prek Thnot Power and Irrigation Development Project. Great Britain loaned Cambodia 420,000 pound for the Prek Thnot Project.

 

July 31, 1969

Prince Sihanouk threatens to resign as Head of State if he does not get the full cooperation from his ruling Sangkum party in coping with the country's severe economic and political problems. He voices his threat in a speech to the Sangkum congress in which he attributed the country's financial crisis to a severe drought, defoliation by the US, smuggling, and insecurity created by the Khmer Rouge.

 
Aug. 1969

US diplomatic mission arrive in Phnom Penh.

 

Aug. 1, 1969

 

Penn Nouth resigns his premiership for health reason.

 

Aug. 11, 1969

 

Cambodia deposits with UN her instruments of ratification relating to agreement concerning subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals [8853]; postal money orders and postal travelers’ cheques [8848]; cash-on-delivery items [8850]; and collection of bills, drafts, etc. [8851].

Aug. 13, 1969

Gen. Lon Nol is elected Prime Minister. The General replaced Samdech Penn Nouth, who retired because of ill health. Lon Nol, elected by a 72-0 parliamentary vote, had been deputy Prime Minister and defense minister in the outgoing cabinet.

 

Sept. 1969

 

Deputy PM Sirik Matak takes over as acting Prime Minister.

 

Sept. 3, 1969

 

Ho Chi Minh died; Prince Sihanouk departs for Hanoi to attend his funeral.

Sept. 25, 1969

Cambodia and People's Republic China sign an agreement concerning trade and payment.

 

Oct. 2, 1969

 

Prince Sihanouk, citing financial difficulties and inactivity, terminates the mandate of the International Control Commission (ICC); its members are asked to depart Cambodia by the end of the year.

 

Nov. 20, 1969

 

Cambodia and Denmark sign an agreement concerning a loan for the economic development of Cambodia.

 

Nov. 25, 1969

 

Cambodia and Singapore sign an agreement concerning Trade and Economic Co-operation.

 

Dec. 27, 1969

 

Sangkum Reash Niyum hold its National Congress, which supports Prince Sihanouk's rejection of government measures to de-nationalize the bank and the import and export sector.

 

Dec. 31, 1969

 

Cambodia joins the International Monetary Fund.

 

All Rights Reversed 

| GO TO HOMEPAGE | PREVIOUS PAGE | NEXT PAGE | Sign Quest-book |



 

 

Hosted by www.Geocities.ws

1