1965 Chronology of Cambodian
History Abbreviations on
this page
Bundy informs Pres. Johnson about Prince Sihanouk’s letter to the editor, in which the Prince claimed that Cambodia’s stability and neutrality was in spite of US, Thai, and South VN attempts to subvert it. Jan. 14, 1965 US Amb. Bowles and Cambodian Amb. to India, Nong Kimny,
meet to discuss US-Cambodia relations. [21] Jan. 27, 1965 US State Dept. telegram to US Embassy in India about report of Amb. Bowles conversation with Nong Kimny. March 1-9, 1965 April 15, 1965 US and UK officials meet to discuss Cambodia at the White House. [Memo of Conversation] April 18, 1965 Secretary Rusk asks Amb. Taylor by telegram to raise
with South VN FM Pham Hut Quat the question of a Cambodian conference as a
possible means of initiating a settlement between North and South VN. [21] April 21, 1965 Bundy sends memo to Secretary
Rusk concerning the handling of Cambodian Conference Proposal. April 30, 1965 US Pres. Johnson talks on the phone with Bundy
concerning the bombing of a Cambodian village. [Transcript] May 1, 1965 US airplanes bomb villages in
the area known as "Parrot Beak" along Cambodia-South Vietnam
border. US President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy) sends memo to President Johnson concerning Prince Sihanouk's
announcement, “You
may have seen in the morning news that the Cambodians have broken diplomatic
relations with us. Our people are not surprised. The initial recommendation
for a prompt apology on the accidental air attack was based on a hope that it
might marginally affect this Cambodian decision, but my own judgment is that
relations were about to break anyway. Moreover, it is good that the
Cambodians have put the burden equally on Newsweek and on the air attacks.
This Cambodian decision makes a proposed apology irrelevant. We will deal
with the air matter by saying that it is still under investigation. We will
further say that this break of relations does not affect our position on a
Cambodian conference (we have no relations at all with North Vietnam and
China, who would also be in such a conference). Finally, we will say that we
are still reviewing the question whether we wish to keep a consulate in Phnom
Penh, which the Cambodians have apparently suggested. More generally, if we
get any flak on this air accident, now or later, we will point out in reply
that Cambodia has provided a variety of facilities for the Viet Cong over a
long period of time and is therefore in a poor position to criticize a single
Air Force error, however tragic it is for those who were hit.” [21] Pol Pot, secretary general of
the Workers Party of Kampuchea, arrives in Hanoi.25 Aug. 12, 1965 Aug. 16, 1965 James C. Thomson, Jr., National Security Council Staff,
sends memo to Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs concerning the uncovering of Son Ngoc Thanh in Saigon, “…has accidentally
uncovered anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serei leader Son Ngoc Thanh somewhere in
Saigon, now wants to establish a dialogue. State is properly skittish as this
guy has the political future of Harold Stassen but drives Sihanouk crazy. We
are permitting one or two more "contacts" with him--but we may be
risking a further Cambodia blow-up (our relations with Sihanouk are currently
euphoric relative to the recent past).” [21] Aug. 31, 1965
Cambodia deposited with UN her
accession relating to (1) Optional Protocol Concerning Acquisition of
Nationality [7311] and (2) Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes [7312]. Sept. 23, 1965 Bundy sends memo to President Johnson, “The departure of Sihanouk
from Cambodia for three months will likely mean a lull in Cambodian
diplomatic initiatives. However, he will probably continue his soundings in various
capitals, notably Moscow and Peiking, regarding international guarantees of
Cambodia's territory. He is currently undergoing medical treatment in France.
The French report some Cambodian annoyance with the Chinese for frequently
ignoring their position and making them feel their small power status. Paris
warns, however, that this doesn't imply any willingness on the part of the
Cambodians to move closer to the West. They still see in the Chinese their
only friend in a hostile regional sea.” [21] Oct. 1, 1965 Chinese PM Zhou and Pham Van
Dong meet in Beijing to discuss
the war in Vietnam and possible expansion to Cambodia and Laos. Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to Secretary
of Defense McNamara regarding the studies that conclude the Vietcong use
Cambodia for a source of supply, sanctuary and temporary military facilities. Nov. 20, 1965 US Pres. Johnson talks by
phone with Secretary McNamara concerning the North VN and Vietcong’s use of
Cambodian territory. On the same day, State Dept. telegram
to its Embassy in Vietnam concerning the authorization for operations in Laos
and Cambodia. Nov. 21, 1965 Assistant Secretary Bundy sends note to US Permanent Rep. to the UN Goldberg concerning the approaching of US and South VN military operations to Cambodian border. Dec. 1, 1965 The US Office of Current Intelligence issues a memo concerning Cambodia’s foreign policy. Dec. 3, 1965 Bundy informs Secretary of State Rusk about the US/South VN action against VC/PAVN forces in Cambodia. Dec. 9, 1965 US Commander in Vietnam, Westmoreland, telegram the Commander-in-Chief - Pacific, Sharp, regarding the cross border military operations. Dec. 11, 1965 US State Dept. telegram to the Embassy in Vietnam regarding the authorization for operations involving Cambodia. Dec. 14, 1965 US State Dept. telegram to inform Secretary Rush at Paris about possible ICC role in Cambodia. Dec. 18, 1965 US Sen. Mike Mansfield sends memo to
Pres. Johnson concerning his 16 countries and territories visit including
Cambodian. Dec. 23, 1965 Memo of conversation between USSR Ambassador Anatoliy F.
Dobrynin and US Dept. of State Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on
Hot Pursuit, “I gave
the Ambassador a copy of our press release on the question of actions our
troops were authorized to take in self-defense along the Cambodian border. I
said that I thought the American press had great exaggerated and distorted
the significance of this development. Dobrynin said, from the statement in
the press release, what did this really mean, that our troops would be making
deep incursions into Cambodia or bombing Cambodian targets? I replied in the
negative and said that this was actually confined to situations in which
there was a real need to shoot back in self-defense in order to preserve the
lives of our troops involved. Dobrynin asked how he should report this. Was
this an official statement? I replied that it was purely an informal
explanation of our policy but that I could tell him, for his own information
that it was done at the suggestion of the Secretary. He expressed his
appreciation and said that he had been confused, and he thought that the
diplomats in Washington with whom he had discussed the matter, had also
misunderstood what was involved.” [21] Dec. 27, 1965 Washington informs
Bangkok and Saigon of US concern about both countries support of the Khmer
Serei. [21] Dec. 28, 1965 US issue an intelligence memo concerning Cambodia’s
relationship with the Vietcong, “The problem of Cambodia's relationship with the Viet Cong centers on
two broad but related aspects. One is Sihanouk's foreign policy and how it
has been influenced by the growth of the Communist movement in South Vietnam.
The other is the use by the Viet Cong of Cambodian territory as a source of
supply, sanctuary, and political comfort. A thorough review of intelligence
from all sources confirms that the Viet Cong have procured supplies in and
through Cambodia but shows that the volume of such supplies has been small in
comparison with Viet Cong requirements and in comparison with what they have
received through Laos, by direct sea infiltration, and from within South Vietnam.
It is clear that with the complicity of local Cambodian officials the Viet
Cong have found safe haven in many areas along the Cambodian border. The
Communists have also established small but useful clandestine facilities on
Cambodian territory. From all indications these facilities have played only a
small part in the over-all Communist effort in South Vietnam. A substantial
body of evidence indicates, however, that the Cambodian Government is not a
witting or willing accomplice in Viet Cong operations in Cambodia.
Intelligence reports confirm that Sihanouk is increasingly concerned over
charges that Cambodia is being used by the Viet Cong. These reports reveal
that although Phnom Penh has tried to take measures to curb such use, its
ability to police the 600-mile border with South Vietnam is extremely
limited.” [21] Dec. 29, 1965 McNamara sends letter to Rusk regarding the problem of Vietcong's supplies through Cambodia. Dec. 30, 1965 US President Johnson talks by phone with Under Secretary
of State Ball about Cambodian situation; memo of the conversation, “Pres said he had been
worried about the Cambodian situation for some time--our harassing their
border. Pres said Ball in talking to Mansfield should ask him to tell
Sihanouk that he had reported to the President and the President reciprocated
Sihanouk's good wishes. He is to tell Sihanouk that we are very anxious to
have no border disturbances and we wish he would make a study of these raids
that are being initiated within his borders so that our people would not
pursue them. Ball said he would see what we could get back to Sihanouk. Pres
said we should put it on Sihanouk that he should stop these raids from being
initiated and that we don't want to go across his borders. Pres said
Mansfield is Sihanouk's biggest sponsor and he is a hero to Mansfield. Pres
[said] Mansfield should tell Sihanouk that he gave a full three-hour report
to the President and told him how great Sihanouk is. We should try in this
way to get a little closer to Sihanouk.” [21]
Abbreviations on
this page US and Australian officials meet
to discuss
situation in Cambodia. Jan. 5, 1966 James C. Thomson sends memo to Bundy concerning Cambodia Conference, “Although I understand that State as a whole remains very leery of resurrecting any Cambodia conference proposal, Allen Whiting suggests that we over here might want to consider such a move. The circumstances have altered considerably since Sihanouk's turn down of the previous conference proposal. Cambodia is more gravely threatened than ever before--by a pincer movement with MACV on Cambodia's eastern frontier and the Thai/GVN-supported Khmer Serei on the western frontier. Sihanouk is properly scared. It would be far less likely for him to shoot down the proposal under the present circumstances. Our interests here are two-fold and clear: first and more narrowly, to get the Thai and GVN to call off their dogs--an effort in which we have been so far markedly unsuccessful; but second and more important, to get the right people to a conference where the long-sought corridor conversations can finally take place. In short, there is more reason than ever for a Cambodia conference, both in terms of the heightened threat to Cambodia's security and in terms of our intensified quest for negotiations. So why not add this item to our current push? (Get the British and Soviets to take the initiative summoning such a conference.)” [21] Jan. 17, 1966 George Ball, Acting Secretary
of State, sends letter
to McNamara concerning the Vietcong use of Cambodian to support its force in
South VN. Jan. 20, 1966 Cambodia places
with UN her ratification concerning Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of
the Charter of the United Nations. Jan. 30, 1966 Sihanouk, in a
speech, charges that the Thai statements of widespread Khmer Serei popularity
in Cambodia was a view held by the US and asks the US Congress to send some
of its members to conduct an on-the-spot investigation. On the same day, Senator Hayden receives
an invitation from the Cambodian National Assembly to send a delegation to
investigate Khmer Serei versus Sihanouk popularity and charges of Cambodian
sanctuary for the Vietcong. [21] March 3, 1966 US Joint Chiefs of
Staff sends memo
to McNamara regarding measures to decrease infiltration into South VN from
Cambodian via waterways. March 11, 1966 R.W. Komer, President's Deputy Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, sends memo to President Johnson, “…On delving further into
this, I have discovered a royal snafu. First, Hayden, Fulbright and Aiken all
referred this matter to the Vice President, as the titular presiding officer
of the Senate. The Vice President was about to sign letters to Fulbright,
Aiken and Mansfield pointing out that the Cambodians had withdrawn the
invite. We have held this up. Second, while Washington, Bangkok, Saigon, and
even Peiking all interpreted the Cambodian radio broadcast of 24 February (an
attack on Symington's criticism of VC use of Cambodia) as stating that the
Cambodian government withdrew the invitation addressed by its Parliament to
three U.S. Senators, a red-faced State Department, checking the French text
yesterday, found out that the French word used also means
"reminds." They then went back this morning to the Cambodian
original and found that the verb is in fact "reminds." Thus the
invite still stands. Third, FE in State still feels strongly that we should
not pick up the invitation because (a) the Thais and GVN would be sore as
hops; (b) it would give Sihanouk another propaganda victory; (c) Fulbright
says his committee is too busy to travel; and (d) the Mansfield expedition to
Cambodia demonstrates how little can be accomplished through such contacts.
Others, including Harriman (I am told), believe that it might be better
simply to defer this matter and play for time, perhaps returning an interim
answer that the Congress is too busy at this moment. They see merit in
keeping open at least a tenuous channel to the Prince. Queries: Should we
leave this to the Vice President, or do a letter on your behalf? On the
merits, would you prefer a soft deferral or a polite turndown?” [21] March 12, 1966 R.W. Komer sends memo to President Johnson concerning the
congressmen to Cambodia, “I won't bother you any further on this; it can be easily handled in
the following way if you approve. 1. I've called Senator Aiken. He was most
understanding when I explained how State and I had misinformed you. In fact,
he was so pleasant that I told him how I was recommending we handle the
matter. He completely agreed, and feels it makes great good sense not to slam
the door on Sihanouk. 2. I've cleared with State a soft reply which neither
rejects the Cambodian invite of three Congressmen nor accepts it--but simply
pleads the press of Hill business at this time. This leaves us maximum
flexibility and offends nobody. 3. It seems to me better if the Vice
President formally answers the Hill inquiries and, as President of the
Senate, signs the letter to his Cambodian counterpart. This leaves you above
the play. If you agree, I will so recommend to the Vice President.” [21] April 2, 1966 Bundy sends memo to
Rostow regarding presidential inquiry about emissary to Cambodia. April 18, 1966 Director Trueheart informs
Bundy of some possible effects of Cambodian recognition of North VN political
representation. May 16, 1966 Cambodian representative to
the UN, Huot Sambath, files a complaint with the UN Security Council,
charging that Thai forces had shelled and attacked Cambodian positions around
Preah Vihear from Apr. 14 to 22. The most serious attack was on Apr. 19 when
Cambodian defenders repulsed more than 1000 attackers, inflicting more than
300 casualties. May 28, 1966 R.W. Komer sends memo to President Johnson concerning
Cambodia, “Your
comment to the NSC staff that you were not entirely satisfied with our
current "hard line" toward Cambodia crystallized some of my
thinking too. Requests from our embattled field commanders that we bomb
Cambodia or at least drop leaflets leave me cold--they would have far too
little effect to outweigh the political uproar they would cause. Hence State
is quite right in turning off these "gung ho" suggestions. On the
other hand, there ought to be imaginative ways of putting a quiet squeeze on
Sihanouk via economic means and psywar. Intelligence reports suggest economic
distress in Cambodia, growing disaffection with Sihanouk's
policies--including his diversion of rice from Cambodian mouths to those of
the VC and Hanoi. Meanwhile much Delta rice from the supposedly best-pacified
area of Vietnam is rumored to be flowing to Cambodia. I am working on a rice
strategy to cut back this flow, as well as eventually reduce the amount of
rice we have to ship in. We are also taking a look at preclusive buying of
Cambodian rice through third parties, so as to reduce the flow to our
enemies. Surely we can out-buy Hanoi and Peking. I'm also pressing for quick
study of other means of quiet economic warfare against Cambodia, as probably
more effective and less politically risky than the warlike gestures proposed
from Saigon. The above will take time but we'll keep the needle in.” [21] May 28, 1966 Special Assistant Komer sends memo to
Pres. Johnson regarding Cambodia. June 12, 1966 Vietcong representatives in Phnom Penh is reportedly told
Cambodian Government that its support is required to fight and win decisively
the war in 1966. Prince Sihanouk
agrees to sell needed rice to the Vietcong. [21] June 13, 1966 Pentagon approve the recommendation by Joint Chief to organize, train, and equip an indigenous force of intelligence agents, reconnaissance teams, and reaction teams for possible future employment in cross-border operation into Cambodia. [21] June 21, 1966 Assistant Rostow sends memo to
Rusk concerning possible approaches to the Cambodia problem. June 25, 1966 Rostow sends note to
Pres. Johnson about the visit of Italian Abm. To Cambodia. June 29, 1966 Acting Secretary Ball sends memo to
Pres. Johnson regarding action being taken on Cambodia. July 1, 1966 Acting Secretary Ball sends memo to
Pres. Johnson regarding possible visit by Eugene Black to Cambodia. July 8, 1966 Rostow sends memo to
President Johnson concerning US next moves on and Eugene Black Mission to
Cambodia Aug. 4, 1966 US Embassy in India telegram
to the State Dept concerning US-Cambodian relations. PRC PM Zhou Enlai advises Pham
Van Dong, in their meeting in Beijing, to make full use of the road via
Cambodia as well as the sea route.
The Chinese also agree to Vietnamese request for reinforcement of
forces for air defense, defense of railways, land roads, and aid to build
roads. [25] Sept. 1966 Sept. 12, 1966 Harriman and French Amb. Charles Lucet meets to discuss Cambodia. Sept. 20, 1966 William Jorden, National Security Council Staff, sends memo to Rostow, Pres.’s Johnson Special Assistant, concerning Cambodia. Sept. 24, 1966 US Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to
McNamara concerning Cross-Border Operation. Sept. 30, 1966
Cambodia joins
the Asia Development Bank. John Roche, US President's Special Assistant, sends memo
to President Johnson, “The
Baguio Conference might offer a fresh opportunity for reconciliation with
Prince Sihanouk. --Sihanouk, caught between Thai and Vietnamese ambitions,
thought that he could get guarantees from the Chicoms. --It now appears that
he feels he took out insurance with a bankrupt firm, and might be willing to
shift his account. --Sihanouk is more reliable than a canary in a coal-mine
when it comes to indicating changes in the power atmosphere in Southeast
Asia. He is in motion away from the Chicoms. But, he has to have guarantees.
And the State Department does not want to create ripples in Bangkok by
raising the question. Might it not be possible at Baguio to formulate a
multilateral statement that the powers there convened will respect the
sovereignty of their neighbors, whether present or not, whether Communist,
neutralist, or free world in alignment? This would do much to establish the
broad, principled goals of the "pacific powers." --It would provide
a formula fully in accord with your Vietnamese policy, namely, a
stabilization of frontiers in Asia with no "wars of liberation"
launched from either side. --It would undermine the inevitable attack on the
Baguio Conference as a "council of war." --It would supply a basis
for reopening our direct contacts with Sihanouk from which might come a
strengthening of the I.C.C. and a Cambodia neutral against the VC and PAVN.” [21] US Commander in VN, Westmoreland, send telegram to Commander in Chief - Pacific, Sharp, concerning the increase use of Cambodia by North VN and Vietcong. Oct. 6, 1966 US intelligence services issues a report of estimation of the internal political prospects and the international orientation of Cambodia over the next year or so. Oct. 22, 1966 Philippine and US officials meet to discuss US
relations with Cambodia. Oct. 31, 1966 US Embassy in the Philippines sends telegram to the
Department of State, “…1.
I spoke to President Marcos today about his aide-memoire on Cambodia
addressed to President Johnson and he confirmed that he had received a verbal
message from Prince Sihanouk through Phil Ambassador in Phnom Penh stating
Sihanouk's desire to normalize relations with U.S. message asked Marcos to
discuss matter with President Johnson but said that if anything leaked out
he, Sihanouk, would deny making any overtures. 2. Marcos says he believes that U.S. should convey to Sihanouk
through Marcos its regret over alleged mistake bombings and offer to send
them team to investigate. Repeat this is Marcos's idea and not Sihanouk's.
Marcos further suggested that investigating team once in Cambodia would be
able to check on North Vietnamese and Viet Cong hostile establishments for
actions inside Cambodian territory. 3. All this seems rather far fetched to
us and I conveyed to Marcos Secretary's comments on Sihanouk. However, Marcos
told me he hopes to serve as intermediary between U.S. and Cambodia just as he
claims he did between Malaysia and Indonesia. Once Marcos receives message
from us to Sihanouk that we regret the bombings he will transmit it through
his Ambassador in Phnom Penh and will then await Sihanouk's reaction to our
further expression of willingness to send investigating team. If Sihanouk
agrees, Marcos would then announce here our regrets and Sihanouk's
willingness to accept investigating team. 4. I understand Cambodian Charge to
Manila was called back suddenly to Phnom Penh on October 27th, the day of
President Johnson's departure. 5. Will respond to your query on
Johnson-Marcos communiqué U.S. state visit in septel.” [21] Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to McNamara concerning actions to deal with Vietcong and North VN use of Cambodian territory. Dec. 21, 1966
Abbreviations on
this page
US intelligence services release a special national intelligence estimate “Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort”. March 24, 1967 US State Dept. sends telegram to its embassy in Australia concerning the forthcoming visit by Australian PM Holt to Phnom Penh. April 1967 April 4, 1967 National Assembly
holds an urgent session and after heated debates passes a resolution giving
Sihanouk special powers. 25 April 10, 1967 Chinese PM Zhou
Enlai and Pham Van Dong meet in Beijing to discuss issues related to the war
in Vietnam. [Conversation relate to Cambodia] April 11, 1967 Chinese and
Vietnamese communist meet again; Samlaut uprising is discussed. [Conversation] April 14, 1967 Bundy sends a briefing memo to Secretary Rusk regarding his discussion of Cambodia with Australian FM Hasluck. April 21, 1967 US, New Zealnd, and Australia official meet to discuss
Cambodia. April 30, 1967 Lon Nol resigns his premiership,
citing injuries from a car accident. May 1, 1967 Chairman of the Cambodian Study Group, Unger, sends an action memo to Under-Secretary of State, Katzenbach, regarding to initial report by the joint State-Defense-CIA Study Group for Cambodia. May 3, 1967 Penn Nouth is appointed Prime
Minister to head an emergency government. May 22, 1967 Pentagon authorizes limited cross-border operations into
the northeast corner of Cambodia, using US-South VN Special Forces,
code-named “Daniel Boone”. June 6, 1967
Nguyen Huu Tho, NLF president,
respond favorably by letter to Prince Sihanouk’s appeal for the recognition
and respect of Cambodia’s territorial integrity. June 8, 1967
North VN PM Pham Van Dong
makes a declaration of recognizing Cambodian independence, neutrality,
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The declaration makes in response to Prince Sihanouk’s appeal for the
recognition and respect of Cambodia’s territorial integrity. June 15, 1967 Country Director for Burma and Cambodia, Ewing, sends memo to
Bundy concerning statement of respect for Cambodia’s present frontiers. June 19, 1967 William Jorden sends memo to
Read, Executive Secretary of the State Dept., regarding Cambodia’s
territorial integrity. Aug. 11, 1967
Cambodia accepts
the Protocol for the Further extension of the Period of Validity of the
Convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons. Sept. 11, 1967 Aldrich, Assistant Legal Adviser, sends memo to Bundy concerning proposals to inhibit NVA/VC exploitation of Cambodian territory. Sept. 14, 1967 Habib, Dep. Assistant Sec. of State for East Asian Affair, sends an action memo to Katzenbach regarding Cambodian policy and JCS proposal to extend Daniel Boone Operations. Oct. 5, 1967 Warnke, Assistant Sec. of Defense for international
Security Affairs, sends memo to
McNamara regarding Daniel Boone Operation. Nov. 29, 1967 US State Dept. telegram to its embassy in Australia regarding transmission to Cambodian Government note and evidence concerning VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory. Dec. 4, 1967 US deliver note to the Cambodian Foreign Ministry
expressing its deep concern over VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory and offer
US support for a more effective ICC monitoring of border activity. [21] Dec. 5, 1967 US Commander in Vietnam, Westmoreland, telegram to JCS regarding his discussion with Admiral Sharp about enemy situation and recommendation for actions to be taken. On the same day, at a cabinet meeting, Cambodia issue is discussed. Dec. 6, 1967 US Chairman of JCS, Wheeler, telegram to Westmoreland regarding decision of the cabinet meeting. Dec. 8, 1967 US State Dept. telegram to its embassy in Australia regarding military operation into northeast tip of Cambodia. Dec. 12, 1967 Marshall Wright, National Security Council Staff, sends memo to Rostow asking “What to do about Cambodia”. Dec. 14, 1967 US intelligence services issue a special national intelligence estimate “Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort”. Dec. 15, 1967 US Amb. at Large Harriman sends memo to Pres. Johnson concerning that violation of Cambodian borders. Dec. 20, 1967 Cambodian Gove. flatly reject US contention that VC and
NVA make extensive use of Cambodian territory. The rejection is in response
to US Dec. 4 note. [21] Dec. 26, 1967 Gen. Westmoreland telegram to Chairman of JCS, Wheeler, regarding military operations in the Tri-border area of Cambodia. Dec. 27, 1967 Rostow informs Pres. Johnson, who is in Texas, about situation in Cambodia. [Telegram] Dec. 29, 1967 Pres. Johnson is informed
by Rostow of his message dispatched to Amb. Bowles to ask Indian Gove. to
make a maximum effort through the ICC to end Communist use of Cambodian
territory and Secretary Rusk’s recommendations on follow-up actions to the
Sihanouk interview with Washington Post.
Abbreviations on
this page US Pres. Johnson is informed of Amb. Bowles' mission to Cambodia. [Telegram] Jan. 4, 1968 Jan. 7, 1968 Bowles telegram
to the State Dept. regarding a course of action to be taken on Cambodia. US Embassy in India inform
State Dept. concerning Amb. Bowles’s mission to Cambodia. Jan. 10, 1968 Legal Adviser Meeker sends a memo to
Secretary Rusk regarding possible US statement on territorial integrity of
Cambodia. Jan. 31, 1968 Penn Nouth becomes Prime
Minister (01/31/68-08/14/69). Feb. 27, 1968 Executive Secretary of the State Dept., Read, sends memo to
Rostow concerning Australian declaration on Cambodia’s border and its
implication for the US. March 7, 1968 CIA issues an intelligence report indicating the Vietnamese Communists continue to use Cambodian territory for tactical sanctuary, for base areas, for the infiltration of personnel, and as a source of rice, medicines, and sundry supplies. [21] March 19, 1968 US Embassy in Vietnam telegram to the State Dept. concerning SEA Coordinating Committee recommendations. April 1, 1968 A US Navy P-3 Orion patrol aircraft is shot down by two Cambodian patrol boats in the Gulf of Siam, killing all crew members. [21] May 25, 1968 Cambodian Navy captures a Philippine tugboat 1 mile inside Cambodian territory on the Mekong River and detains 8 Filipino and 2 US Army crewmembers. [21] May 27, 1968 Assistant Secretary Bundy sends an action memo to Secretary Rusk regarding special fire authority against VC/NVA in Cambodia. May 28, 1968 US Pres. Johnson and Australian PM meet to discuss situation with respect to NVA in Cambodia and the problem that the two countries face. [21] June 8, 1968 The eight Filipinos, tugboat crew detained by Cambodian Navy on May 25, are released. [21] June 10, 1968 The two US Army tugboat crew, who were detained by Cambodian Navy on May 25, are released. [21] June 19, 1968 Chinese PM Zhou
Enlai and PLAF Dep. Commander Pham Hung meet in Beijing to discuss varieties
of issues including weapons to Khmer communist. [Memo of
conversation] July 8, 1968 State Dept. telegram to its Embassy in Vietnam regarding Cambodia. July 17, 1968 Cambodian Navy seizes a US Army utility landing craft, which strayed into Cambodian waters on Mekong River, and detains 11 Americans and one RVN policeman. US express regrets and ask for return of vessel and personnel on board. Prince Sihanouk threatens to try the men under Cambodian law. [21] July 22, 1968 Cambodia rejects
US explanation of inadvertent intrusion and characterizes the penetration as
deliberate act of provocation.
Cambodia also indicates an intention to try the detained crew and
confiscate the vessel. [21] July 25, 1968 Prince Sihanouk, in a speech to National Congress, says the men detained on July 17 would be interned till end of hostilities and their craft confiscated. [21] July 26, 1968 The State Dept. telegram to its Embassy in India regarding Cambodian detention of US soldiers. On the same day, Cambodia grants access by the Australians to visit the detained. July 29, 1968 Dep. Assis. Secretary Brown sends an action memo to Secretary Rusk regarding problem of release seized craft and crew in Cambodia. July 30, 1968 At a regular Pres. Johnson's cabinet meeting, course of actions are considered against Cambodia. [Memo of meeting] Aug. 1, 1968 US Senator Mike Mansfield write letter to Secretary of State Rusk regarding his view on Cambodia. Sept. 4, 1968 US Pres. Johnson is informed about Eugene Black's visit to Cambodia from Sept.11-13. Sept. 5, 1968 Secretary Rusk sends Pres. Johnson his instructions to Eugene Black. Sept. 6, 1968 US Joint Chief of Staff, in an attempt to pressure Cambodia to release US soldiers, propose plans for harassment of commercial traffic to and from Cambodian on the Mekong and Bassc Rivers. The JCS also suggest using Market Time ships to capture Cambodian naval craft that are violating South VN territorial waters in the Gulf of Siam. [21] Sept. 16, 1968 Rostow sends memo to Pres. Johnson regarding result of Eugene Black visit to Cambodia. Sept. 24, 1968 CIA prepares a memo on
the subject of Cambodian border problem. Sept. 23, 1968
Agreement
on administrative arrangements for the PREK THNOT power and irrigation
development project is opened for signature at UN headquarters in New
York. Cambodia signs on Nov.13, 1968.
Sept. 30, 1968 Assistant Secretary of Defense
Warnke sends memo
to Dep. Sec. Of Defense Nitze concerning the treat pose ny VC/VNA use of
Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and source of supply. Oct. 10, 1968 Rusk sends letter to Secretary
of Defense Clifford sharing his view that it would premature to resort now to
military or other direct pressures on Cambodia for the release of 11 US
soldiers. [21] Marshall Wright sends memo to
Rostow pertaining to Cambodia. Oct. 28, 1968 Rostow informs
Pres. Johnson with regard to Prince Sihanouk's appointment of Thay Sok as
custodian of the Cambodian Embassy building in Washington. Nov. 5, 1968 Nov. 7, 1968 Chairman of the JCS telegram
to Commander in Chief - Pacific, McCain, regarding actions against Cambodian. Nov. 17, 1968 Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong
meet in Beijing to discuss war and Chinese aid to the war effort in Vietnam.
[Conversation related to Cambodia] Nov. 19, 1968 Cambodian FM Norodom Phurissia,
in a conversation with French Amb. Dauge, indicates that Cambodians would
release US detainees if Sihanouk received personal message addressed to him
from Pres. Johnson and that Sihanouk sincerely desire to improve relations
with US. [21] Nov. 26, 1968 US Embassy in France telegram
to the State Dept. informing it of French Amb.'s conversation with Prince
Sihanouk in regard to US-Cambodia relations. Dec. 3, 1968 US Chairman of JCS sends memo
to Dep. Under Sect. Of Defense Nitze concerning Daniel Boone Operations. Dec. 5, 1968 US Embassy in Moscow telegram to
the State Dept. in regard to possible reestablishment of US-Cambodian
relations. Dec. 12, 1968 Bundy, Assistant Sec. Of
State, sends action memo to
Katzenback, Under Sec. Of State, concerning Defense Department request for
new Daniel Boone Operational authority. Dec. 17, 1968 Secretary Rusk instructs Amb.
Bowles not to take further actions in regard to US-Cambodian differences. On
the same day, Rusk also telegrams
to US Embassy in France with Pres. Johnson's message to Prince Sihanouk. Dec. 18, 1968 C-in-C Pacific McCain telegram
to the Chairman of JCS in regarding to co-relation among South VN, Cambodia
and Laos. Dec. 21, 1968 State Dept. telegram to
its Embassy in Vietnam concerning military operations in South VN near
Cambodian border. Dec. 23, 1968 Prince Sihanouk announces the
release of 11 US soldiers and 1 South VN detained since July 17 when their
landing craft entered Cambodian waters and was captured by the Cambodian
Navy. [21] Dec. 29, 1968 McCain telegram
to Wheeler concerning the effects of neutralization of Cambodia.
Abbreviations on
this page
Cambodia accepts
the Plant Protection Agreement for the Southeast Asia and Pacific Region. Feb. 9, 1969 Feb. 24, 1969
Cambodia deposits with UN her
instruments of ratification relating to (1) Convention concerning the
employment of woman during the night [587], Convention concerning the night work of young persons
employed in industry [589], Convention concerning the use of white lead in painting [596], and Convention concerning forced or compulsory labor [612]. March 21, 1969
Cambodia and Japan signs an agreement
concerning a donation towards the execution of the Prek Thnot power and
irrigation development project. April 15, 1969
US recognize the sovereignty,
independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, two years
after Prince Sihanouk made an appeal. Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong
meet in Beijing to discuss various issues; regarding to Cambodia, Zhou Enlai
says: "New developments have been seen in Indochina. We have to
acknowledge that Nixon is more intelligent than Johnson. He established
diplomatic relations with Cambodia
and recognized Cambodia's
borders with the neighboring countries. As far as the situation in Cambodia is concerned, we are not as
optimistic as you are. Even though [Sihanouk] carries out a policy of
double-dealing, he is tilting to the right. The US also knows that China is
supplying materiel to forces in South Vietnam via Cambodia and that the NLF armed forces are using part of
Cambodian territory for their operations."25 May 8, 1969 May 24, 1969
PM Lon Nol meet officially
with North VN’s representative, Nguyen Thuong, and the NLF delegate, Nguyen
Van Hieu in an unsuccessful attempt to deal with the NVA/VC problem. July 24, 1969
International Health
Regulations is adopted by the 22nd World Health Assembly at
Boston, USA; it come into force for Cambodia on Jan. 1, 1971. [10921] June 29, 1969
Nguyen Tan Phat, prime
minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam,
pays a 6-days official visit to Phnom Penh. June 30, 1969
Cambodia
and Netherlands exchanges letters
constituting an agreement concerning the Netherlands contribution to the Prek
Thnot Power and Irrigation Development Project. July 31, 1969 Aug. 1, 1969 Penn Nouth resigns his
premiership for health reason. Aug. 11, 1969
Cambodia deposits with UN her
instruments of ratification relating to agreement concerning subscriptions to
newspapers and periodicals [8853]; postal money orders and postal travelers’ cheques [8848]; cash-on-delivery items [8850]; and collection of bills, drafts, etc. [8851]. Sept. 1969 Deputy PM Sirik Matak takes
over as acting Prime Minister. Sept. 3, 1969 Ho Chi Minh died; Prince
Sihanouk departs for Hanoi to attend his funeral. Oct. 2, 1969
Prince Sihanouk, citing
financial difficulties and inactivity, terminates the mandate of the
International Control Commission (ICC); its members are asked to depart
Cambodia by the end of the year. Nov. 20, 1969
Cambodia and Denmark sign an agreement
concerning a loan for the economic development of Cambodia. Nov. 25, 1969
Cambodia and Singapore sign an
agreement
concerning Trade and Economic Co-operation. Dec. 27, 1969 Sangkum Reash Niyum hold its
National Congress, which supports Prince Sihanouk's rejection of government
measures to de-nationalize the bank and the import and export sector. Dec. 31, 1969
Cambodia joins
the International Monetary Fund. |
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