Chronology of Cambodian History

Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

New Delhi, January 12, 1968, 1523Z.

8395. Bowles Mission.

1. Our discussions in Phnom Penh terminated this morning (Jan 12) with formal signing of joint communiqué and expressions of mutual respect and goodwill.

2. Three objectives were accomplished:

A. Sihanouk has reaffirmed in a formal written message to chairman of ICC his request for strong, vigorous, adequately equipped commission with authority to operate mobile inspection teams and fixed inspection posts backed by helicopter observation. I was assured that Prince's message will be delivered today.

B. Sihanouk specifically asked us to supply him on regular basis with whatever information we may have on suspected locations of VC/NVA units on Cambodian soil. He promised promptly to inform ICC, to order his own troops to make full inspection and to move whatever intruders may be discovered off Cambodian soil.

C. Sihanouk has expressed desire to re-establish normal relations with USG and when this has been accomplished to permit US Military Attaché to visit any part of his country as an additional safeguard.

3. As quid pro quo, Son Sann, Chairman of Cambodian delegation, requested from USG "flat assurances" that there be no further "aggression or intrusion" on Cambodian soil by Americans and/or South Vietnamese. He supported his case with an emotional enumeration of Cambodian casualties and property damage. At one point Son Sann stated that Cambodian Government could not agree to deliver Prince's message to ICC until we reached agreement on this point.

4. We firmly rejected this request emphasizing that the vigorous ICC operation which RKG had requested was primarily to help Cambodia maintain its neutrality and sovereignty. Cambodia was on the edge of a bitter war and we could not guarantee that there would be no incidents. We could and would, however, state as we have before that we deeply regret any incidents that may have occurred in the past and assure the RKG that USG had no intention or desire to infringe on Cambodian territory. Hot pursuit, we said, is not an issue. After considerable discussion, Son Sann and his delegation accepted our position.

5. The negotiations were conducted in atmosphere of great cordiality. At no time was there any sign of contentiousness. It was obvious that the Prince and his associates were anxious to find common ground, and were pleased that we were prepared to cooperate.

6. Throughout discussions the Prince and his ministers placed primary and indeed sole emphasis on Cambodian national integrity. I came away deeply convinced, as on previous visits to Cambodia, that Sihanouk's decisions and attitudes, however bizarre, are shaped by intense and deeply rooted nationalism in which ideology has little or no part. The Prince stressed again and again that his is a small country caught in the middle of an unpredictable international conflict and that Cambodia must strive to maintain maximum degree of goodwill not only toward its neighbors, but particularly toward great powers, USSR, China and USA.

7. Nevertheless, I came away convinced that for whatever reason, approach of Cambodian Govt to these negotiations reflects significant change in emphasis in its foreign policy. On several occasions the Prince, Son Sann, Gen. Nhiek Tioulong and others expressed their "dislike and suspicion all Vietnamese, North or South, blue or red." The Prince went so far as to say facetiously that the longer the Vietnamese people fight each other the more secure Cambodia will be in the years ahead. There was no similar reference to the Thais.

8. One contributing factor in this significant shift of attitudes may be the Prince's concern with the recent arrogant and contemptuous behavior of the North Vietnamese, NLF and Chinese representatives in Phnom Penh. The Prince told me that reps of all three groups had rudely rejected his invitations to various state functions in honor of President Tito during his forthcoming visit to Cambodia next week. We also heard reports of other recent NLF and North Vietnamese slights to the Prince.

9. Throughout negotiations there were frequent references by Cambodian delegation to desirability further talks and the hope that our present discussions could be beginning of continuing dialogue. After dinner given for us January 9, Son Sann took me aside to express hope that we can develop mutually acceptable basis for resumption of normal relationship. Son Sann took occasion at opening of meeting following day to reiterate his hope that [garble--Ambassadors?] could soon be officially accredited representation in both capitals.

10. I emphasized on each occasion that while I had no authority to negotiate on this subject. I would like to know their minimum requirement in regard to Cambodian border question that I could pass on to President and the Secretary. Sonn Sann described the language included in present agreements with Germans, Indians, Filipinos, and soon, he anticipated, with Japanese. At lunch on January 11, Sihanouk again brought up subject stating that USG Embassy in Cambodia would give us opportunity to see for ourselves what is going on along Cambodian borders; he added that "your Military Attaché will be allowed to go anywhere he wishes."

11. Just before leaving for the airport I called Son Sann aside to ask if RKG was as seriously interested in representation question as he had indicated, pointing out there were certain difficulties on both sides. Again, Son Sann asserted that the quicker USG and RKG find a basis to establish normal relations the better he and Prince would like it.

12. I understand and appreciate difficulties we face in finding language in regard to boundary question which would be satisfactory to US and to Cambodia; I also recognize likely objections by Thais and Vietnamese. However, while I believe that we should proceed with caution, I am convinced that we should make a determined effort to develop a mutually satisfactory formula. An official American presence in Cambodia would do much to maintain and promote friendly attitudes and contribute significantly towards our objectives in the area.

13. I might add that I am fully conscious of mercurial and unpredictable characteristics of the Prince. In any dealings with Cambodia we must expect sudden switches and caustic and unfair criticism. However, we should not let Sihanouk's intemperate and sometimes childish outbursts deter us from the main business at hand: to keep Cambodia neutral, to keep the Viet Cong and NVA out of its territory and, with an eye to the future, to improve our own relations with this small but important country.

14. In regard to immediate business of strengthening the ICC, I believe that major question mark is attitude of Soviets, Poles and Indians. In two discussions with Indian ICC Chairman, Paranjpe, in Phnon Penh, he expressed personal conviction that problem of what nation or body accepts helicopters can be worked out. It was his hope that adverse Russian and Pole comments were designed to protect their relationship with NVN and to avoid appearance of being less aggressive than China.

15. If this turns out to be wishful thinking and Soviets dig in their heels, they will undoubtedly create difficulties for us with the Indians. Before I left Delhi, Kaul assured me that GOI was in agreement with US that no change of ICC policy was needed: It was purely a matter of more effectively carrying out present policy; therefore, a majority vote was all that would be required. However, Mrs. Gandhi may be influenced toward a more negative position by Moscow.

16. At background press conference tonight, I shall do what I can to box in Indians and Soviets so that if there is hold-up in implementation of ICC program worked out in Phnom Penh, their responsibility will be clear.

Bowles

Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

New Delhi, January 12, 1968, 1653Z.

Unnumbered. To the President and Secretary of State.

1. By the time you receive this cable you should have on your desks all our reports from Phnom Penh including my personal estimate of the situation. The purpose of this special message is to express my conviction that we should do whatever we reasonably can to re-establish normal diplomatic relations with Cambodia. There are a number of advantages:

A. A small but experienced US Mission in Phnom Penh would help to hold the line in regard to the agreement we have just reached and perhaps gradually open door for broader understanding and ultimately even cooperation.

B. Cambodia's apparent willingness to establish normal relations with USG would be clear signal that Sihanouk, an astute Asian political leader, no longer assumes that the Communists may force the US out of East Asia.

c. The restoration of normal relations with Cambodia would also have reassuring effect not only on our friends and neutrals overseas but on the American people.

d. Sihanouk's change of direction would arouse bitter attacks by Chinese, NLF and NVN and possibly Soviets which would further promote favorable US image as a nation eager for peace.

2. At present the administration is often charged, however unreasonably, with a rigid and uncompromising view in regard to negotiations in Southeast Asia. This criticism could be significantly eased if we could announce in reasonably near future that we have not only reached an understanding with Sihanouk in regard to the ICC role in curbing Viet Cong-NVN infiltration but also have restored normal diplomatic relations with Cambodia.

3. On several occasions the Prince, Son Sann, and the C-in-C General Nhiek Tioulong, as well as others, urged me to maintain close contact with Cambodian Ambassador Nong Kimny in New Delhi. With your approval it should be possible for me over next few weeks quietly to determine basis on which normal relations could be established. If understanding is reached through Nong Kimny, I could return to Phnom Penh and complete negotiations with the Prince.

4. I realize that such a move would be frowned on both in Bangkok and Saigon. However, I cannot see why we should allow two countries which are totally dependent on USG for their survival to veto a policy decision which would significantly promote national interests of USG as well as their own security.(Printed from an unsigned copy.)

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