Chronology of Cambodian History

Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Habib) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)

Washington, September 14, 1967.

SUBJECT
Cambodian Policy

Problem

Enemy use of Cambodia over the past year has continued to increase and has become a mounting source of frustration to the US commitment in Viet-Nam. Since July, the Joint State/Defense/CIA Interagency Study Group on Cambodia has considered a series of proposals aimed at alleviating the problem. The Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee (SEACOORD), meeting in Saigon in August, drafted some recommendations which encompassed a new, tougher, overall approach to the Royal Cambodian Government (RKG). CINCPAC also has offered a program which calls for a more intensive political and military offensive, as well as a number of requests for enlarged military operations inside the Cambodian border.

The proposals prescribe actions intended to impel a more forthcoming and cooperative response from Prince Sihanouk with respect to VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory. They call for greater dissemination of information on enemy use of Cambodia, the initiation of a propaganda campaign, and the expansion of reconnaissance missions across the Cambodian border. Running through these proposals is the assumption that if political measures fail to resolve the problem, then more direct action might be required.

Discussion

Cambodia's relations with Communist China have cooled markedly and there are definite indications of a Cambodian crackdown on internal communist activity. Although we do not know all the whys- and-wherefores, these developments suggest that the politico-diplomatic approach to the problem is still useful. It would be unwise, however, to conclude that more political pressures upon the Prince by itself can force him to change his tune and to become more cooperative. Our leverage is still small.

And yet, the time has come when the US should pursue its political and diplomatic approaches more systematically, more actively and more extensively.

We should do what we have been doing but more aggressively. We should present by official means the evidence on which we base our deep concern--to the Cambodian Government, to the ICC, and to other selected addressees including the Geneva Co-Chairmen. For too long we have left the explanation of the border problem to the distortions of Cambodian propagandists.

Inevitably these actions will leak and will arouse some public stir, since Sihanouk can be expected to make a public rebuttal and countercharge. And the Soviets might react similarly. But if our case is presented objectively, without accusations of Cambodian complicity, Sihanouk might be persuaded to take some steps to protect his eroding claim of neutrality. He might, for example, be more helpful to the ICC investigations, or modify his catechism of complaints before the UN. In seeking to make our case, however, we should not dilute the credibility of our evidence (which is not the most convincing) by launching a propaganda campaign as suggested by SEACOORD and CINCPAC.

As for future military operations, whether reconnaissance or direct action, the pivotal consideration is the magnitude of threat to US objectives that derives from enemy use of Cambodia as sanctuary: does the problem warrant direct action that would widen the war.

After reviewing the results of intensive intelligence collection of the past six months, the sanctuary problem would not appear to have vital significance to the successful pursuit of our overall objectives. In view of our desire to avoid expanding the war, and in the light of the non-critical nature of the Cambodian sanctuary problem, no direct military action appears justifiable, either now or in the foreseeable future.

The sanctuary problem does, however, pose a threat to allied forces in the border area and we should agree to authorize the extension of cross border reconnaissance patrols. This will provide our forces with the kind of tactical intelligence needed to defend against possible attack from across the border; and it will help us to determine any significant changes in the importance of the problem. Beyond this essentially defensive step, we can live with the situation at its present level.

Recommendations (Katzenbach approved all recommendations on September 16.)

1. On past occasions we have informed the Cambodian Government, in notes delivered by the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh of our concern over the violation of Cambodia's neutrality by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese armies. Also in notes to the Cambodian Government we have at various times expressed our willingness to support ICC investigations of this situation. We have also informed the Cambodian Government of our readiness to meet any place, any time to discuss this issue and to work out mutually acceptable ways of dealing with it. These official expressions of our concern should be continued.

2. The USIB has noted two papers prepared on VC/NVA use of Cambodia as a safehaven area for bases and infiltration. We should transmit the complete versions to Canada, Australia, Great Britain, and transmit a sanitized version to Japan, India and other selected countries. Our intent is to make clear to other governments the basis for our concern and hopefully to encourage their emissaries to express our concern to their diplomatic colleagues. To be effective this course of action will require persistent follow-through. To this end instructions should be sent to our posts in Saigon, Vientiane and Bangkok which place upon the SEACOORD Working Group the responsibility for prompt reporting of relevant and timely evidence of VC/NVA use of Cambodia.

3. We have tried intermittently to communicate with the Cambodian Government through third parties such as Japan and India. These efforts have not proven very fruitful and they do not look promising. Nevertheless, we should renew the efforts and instruct our ambassadors in Tokyo, New Delhi, Singapore, etc. of our wish to carry on this course of action.

4. The ICC investigations similarly have not proven useful and they will not become so unless there is a radical change in the policy of the Indian and Polish Governments. Even so it is desirable that we continue to put our version of the facts before this forum and establish that we have exhausted all possible avenues. Accordingly, this particular exercise should be continued.

5. We have not up to now, made much use of the United Nations as a forum of expressing the United States' case, believing it ill-advised to engage in a public dog-fight with Prince Sihanouk by attempting to answer his charges, before the United Nations, of US/Viet-Nam aggressions against his territory. Even so we should anticipate the day when the United States may be called upon to reply formally. Also we should anticipate the day when a White Paper might be called for. To these ends the Department of State should undertake a special effort to compile the required documentation in appropriate form.

6. Finally, I call your attention to a separate memorandum (Tab 2) regarding a proposed expansion of reconnaissance activities in Cambodia. In sum, it provides that military actions across the border exclude everything except essential defensive measures presently authorized and certain additional reconnaissance missions inside Cambodia.

Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs (Habib) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)

Washington, September 14, 1967.

SUBJECT
JCS Proposal to Extend Daniel Boone Operations

Attached at Tab A is the draft authorization message for expanding Daniel Boone operations inside Cambodia geographically, numerically, and mechanically.(Tabs A-C are attached, but not printed.) The presently authorized area is in the extreme Northeast (marked in red on map at Tabs B and C). The JCS recommend 1) an extension of the area in a 20 km swath along the border to the Gulf of Siam; 2) an increase from 10 to 30 operations per month from the Lao border to Lo Go (marked in green on map at Tab B); 3) additional operations on a case-by-case basis South of Lo Go (marked in black on map at Tab B); and 4) the use of helicopters for insertion and extraction of the reconnaissance teams.

While I agree in the need for increased reconnaissance along the Cambodian border, the attached proposal would, if accepted, almost certainly expose our operations inside Cambodia and might result in direct combat between Cambodian forces and the US-led Daniel Boone teams.

The use of helicopters multiplies the risk of detection several times. They are highly visible and audible and would attract the attention of defenders, whether Cambodian or Communist Vietnamese. They are also vulnerable to ground fire, and if shot down, would provide tangible proof of allied violation of Cambodian territory.

The risk of exposure and combat with Cambodian forces is also greatly increased by operations in the area south of Route 13. From that point, population density increases and the character of the population changes from predominantly nomadic Montagnard to predominantly Cambodian farmer, who has been told to defend his home against allied "aggressors", and who in many cases has been provided with the weapons to do so. This area also contains a greater number of Cambodian military units.

Recommendations (Katzenbach approved both recommendations on September 16.)

I recommend for the foregoing reasons that you approve the following guidelines for Daniel Boone:

A. Use of helicopters is excluded from Daniel Boone operations except in emergency extractions and in cases where it can be shown that their use is essential.

Source: US Department of State

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XXVII
Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs