Chronology of Cambodian History

Telegram From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas

Washington, December 29, 1967.

CAP 671237. Herewith Sec. Rusk's recommendations on followup actions to the Sihanouk interview.

The full Washington Post text of Sihanouk's interview with Karnow is attached. The highlights are as they appeared from yesterday's excerpts, but I believe you will wish to read the whole to get its tone--which seems to us reasonable and wholly remarkable from this source. On the other hand, we must always remember that the Prince can reverse himself on a moment's notice, and that Hanoi and others may well put tough pressures on him in the light of the interview.

I propose the following actions, in which Secretary Nitze concurs:

1. We should avoid all public comment, saying merely that we are studying the interview carefully and that our basic position has been made clear over a long period. We should get hold of Senator Mansfield and Governor Harriman to be sure that they avoid comment also. It would be potentially disastrous if we present any appearance of "crowing" or regarding Sihanouk as now "in the bag." Moreover, any comment by us would only increase rather than dampen speculation in what may be a critical next few days.

2. We should use the interview at once to step up the pressure on the Indians, Soviets, and Poles. Harriman yesterday sent the advance text to Dobrynin, and the latter will doubtless already have reported it fully. But we should follow up at both ends with all three governments. I have already talked to Mike Pearson, who is totally aboard and has Canadian pilots and crews ready to man the helicopters for the ICC. Ambassador Thompson would see Gromyko again.

3. We should get the Australians to instruct their Ambassador in Phnom Penh to see Sihanouk at once:

A. To confirm Sihanouk's willingness to accept an emissary from us, and to suggest Ambassador Bowles specifically and as soon as possible.

B. To inform Sihanouk that we welcome the sentiments expressed in the interview concerning the ICC, and that we are calling these sentiments urgently to the attention of the Indians, Soviets, and Poles, as we have already done with the Canadians. Note: We would not have the Australians say anything about Sihanouk's remarks distinguishing uninhabited and inhabited areas.

4. DOD is taking immediate steps to insure that the two helicopters we have already offered are immediately available for delivery in Cambodia.

5. With respect to ground rules for our forces in Viet-Nam, we will make no significant change for the present in the so-called Daniel Boone operations, which call for a carefully controlled program of reconnaissance on a very limited scale. At the same time, we would send out a military message to Saigon to caution all elements to refrain from any speculation that Sihanouk's remarks are changing our standing instructions in any respect. The danger here is that people down the line in the military may jump to the conclusion that Sihanouk is as good as inviting us in so long as we stay in uninhabited areas. Whatever he in fact means, speculation in this direction can only harm our attempt to get the ICC going and to organize a Bowles (or Harriman or Mansfield) mission to Cambodia.

I recommend your approval of these actions.

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