Chronology of Cambodian History

Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Saigon, December 5, 1967, 0815Z.

MAC J00 40588. 1. (TS) Admiral Sharp and I have discussed the enemy situation in the tri-border area and he concurs that action as recommended below should be taken.

2. (TS) We are receiving increasing hard intelligence of enemy force concentrations in the Cambodian "peninsula" of the tri-border area west of Dak To. Generally, the observed NVA presence encompasses all of the Cambodian peninsula north and east of YB6200. We have firm indications that the 1st NVA Div HQ is now located at YB675110, with the 32d, 66th and 174th Regts dispersed throughout the peninsula recovering from the severe beating given them over the past few weeks.

3. (TS) Reports state that enemy units are not disposed in an alert or defensive posture; rather, they are utilizing their Cambodian sanctuary to rest, regroup and reconstitute openly and unmolested. There is no evidence of heavy bunker construction, we believe that the motorable road and bridges at YB736212 and YB736208 are of prime importance to the NVA in the movement of supplies out of Base Area 609 into South Vietnam.

4. (TS) The situation as outlined above, presents a unique opportunity for pursuit by fire. The area is remote; the border is ill-defined; there are no known civilians in the area or Cambodian presence; the delivery of fire easily concealed from scrutiny; and more significantly, the enemy's dangerous activities fulfill all the criteria for substantiating the hot pursuit concept. Strike Teams on Station will provide for observation of fire and reports of enemy locations, reaction and subsequent movement.

5. (TS) Request earliest approval to attack this concentration of enemy force by fire employing B-52 strikes for sustained period of at least 72 hours, high intensity TAC air strikes are particularly urged since exposure of this action would be minimal, and this weapons system will provide maximum surprise and shock effect. B-52 strikes only at night would be acceptable.

6. (TS) There are two aspects of this request which I recognize as sensitive. First, the timing may be considered poor because of the efforts which we are right now making to confront Sihanouk with evidence of NVA use of Cambodia. Secondly, B-52 strikes will leave a clear signature in Cambodian territory. However, I feel strongly that the opportunity which exists is sufficiently important that it should be exploited now, and if necessary explain our actions as hot pursuit by fire in an uninhabited area. The key point is to strike this concentration expeditiously and with full force if we are to gain maximum advantage.

7. (U) Amb. Bunker has read this message and concurs.

214. Notes of Meeting

Washington, December 5, 1967, 1:18-2:37 p.m.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cambodia.]

Secretary McNamara said two cables came in from General Westmoreland concerning possible campaigns in Laos and Cambodia.

General Wheeler said that there are 5,000 troops and supplies in the Tri-Border area. There are three regiments and bridges which are important to the resupply of the enemy operating out of Cambodia. The first North Vietnamese division withdrew. Its headquarters is a mile from the border and 15 miles from Dakto.

General Wheeler said the enemy is not to go in. They are refitting and replenishing their manpower.

We propose the use of B-52s and tactical aircraft for 72 hours. The B-52s could operate at night.

General Wheeler said that General Westmoreland discussed this operation with Ambassador Bunker. Ambassador Bunker concurs.

General Wheeler pointed out that there is no question that all of this is in Cambodia.

"We have known for two years that these people have been there."

Secretary McNamara said this action raises very serious political problems which outweigh the military gains. Secretary Rusk said he would draw a distinction between operations in Laos and operations in Cambodia. He said he would also draw a distinction between full-scale operations and a raid.

Secretary Rusk said that if we hit the enemy in Cambodia and possibly kill Cambodian personnel, this may give them reasons to commit their forces against us.

Secretary McNamara said that the President could veto a "stop the bombing" resolution in the United Nations because of world and domestic reaction. The Secretary said the action against Cambodia would destroy us in the U.N.

In addition, the Secretary said that the U.S. cannot run B-52s around the clock without public knowledge of that.

Dick Helms said he would like to look at this before making a recommendation. Secretary Rusk asked if U.S. forces were going on with night and day raids against infiltration routes used by the regiment which is being brought into South Vietnam.

General Wheeler said yes, to the best of our ability. General Wheeler said the proposal was to use a South Vietnamese Airborne Brigade in area 607 to destroy troops and ammunition. He said it is occupied by supply centers and troops. He said the raid would take three days and would involve 1,500 to 1,600 South Vietnamese troops along with about 30 U.S. advisors.

Secretary McNamara said the Laos situation is different. He said the border is ill-defined. He said the chances of getting caught are much different.

Secretary Rusk said there is not a fraction of as much a problem in Laos as there is in Cambodia.

Secretary McNamara said he recommended going ahead with the Laos operation. Secretary Rusk agreed.

The President approved.

215. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, December 5, 1967, 4:15 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Cambodia. Top Secret; Extremely Sensitive.

Mr. President:

Herewith a possible agenda for the conduct of the meeting at 6:00 p.m. today on the question of bombing Communist troops in Cambodia.

1. What military results can be expected from the 72-hour air offensive? (Gen. Wheeler)

2. How do the forces now regrouping in Cambodia relate to those believed to be coming down the Laos trails? (Gen. Wheeler) (See Tab B)

3. What is the state of our approach through the Australians to Sihanouk on the use of his territory by the Communists? (Sec. Rusk)

4. Is it certain that the 72-hour attack would leak? (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)

5. What would Sihanouk's reaction be to this attack? (Sec. Rusk)

6. What will be the reaction in the U.S. if it becomes known that we are permitting Cambodian territory to be used as a sanctuary for the rest and re-fit of enemy forces? (Sec. Rusk and Sec. McNamara)

WWR comment: My own judgment is:

--It would be bad to make this attack at a time when the Australians have just (yesterday) put the evidence before the Cambodians; but

--Given the likely intensity of the conflict in the weeks and months ahead along the Cambodian frontier, we shall not be able to live with this sanctuary;

--Therefore, you may wish to decide that, in turning down Westy on this occasion, it is essential that we make it clear to Sihanouk that we cannot live with these arrangements and he had better do something about them.

Walt

Notes of Meeting

Washington, December 5, 1967, 6:02, 7:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Clark Clifford
Abe Fortas
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson

Secretary Rusk traced the history of diplomatic relations with Cambodia, pointing out that formal diplomatic ties were broken in late 1964-early 1965.

Walt Rostow said Sihanouk broke relations when it looked as though the U.S. would lose the war in South Vietnam.

Secretary Rusk said Cambodia is getting some Chinese aid. As of late, relations between the two countries have improved.

General Wheeler pointed to a map showing the area in which his intelligence shows there are 5,000 enemy troops. Included in this area are three infantry regiments, one division headquarters, and considerable supplies. "These are the troops who were defeated at Dakto. They are licking their wounds and getting re-equipped and having their manpower replenished.

The President asked how soon the decision is required.

General Wheeler said he believes the enemy will be in this area for the rest of this week--possibly longer. He said he feels the enemy will come out of Cambodia and attack our men. He said the 304th division is moving down through Laos now.

The President asked if this operation would involve any invasion of men.

General Wheeler said no, that it would be limited to B-52 strikes along with tactical air.

The President asked how many enemy would be killed.

General Wheeler said that General Westmoreland hopes for 10 percent casualties and very substantial damage to the logistical support. Based on the 5,000 troop figure, this would mean approximately 500 killed and damage to supply depots, and to troop housing.

The President asked how do we get intelligence indicating this concentration.

General Wheeler said the intelligence came from the following sources:

--radio detection
--informers
--intercepts
--reconnaissance photographs
--information of the residuals left over from the Dakto battle

The President asked for the size of the area.

General Wheeler said the area is 15 miles wide at its widest point.

The President asked would the operation leak out.

Both Secretary Rusk and General Wheeler said there was no question about it. There would be leaks from the South Vietnamese troops, and, of course, Hanoi would definitely announce it.

The President asked if General Wheeler was implying that there could be 25,000 North Vietnamese troops in the total area potentially surrounding about 5,000 U.S. troops.

General Wheeler said this was possible but not probable since the enemy would not take a chance of concentrating that many men.

The President asked how long can we let Sihanouk get away with giving the enemy this type of protection.

Secretary Rusk said we have tried all along to limit this war. "The action which General Westmoreland is proposing would be a significant act of war against Cambodia. This would change the entire character of the war. If Cambodia is attacked, they may ask the Chinese to side with them. Then we will really have a new war on our hands.

"If we take this action it would be absolutely essential to consult the Congress and our allies. I know that Australia and New Zealand would be against it although Thailand, Korea and the Philippines would probably go along.

"If we could knock out 10 percent of this force why can't we do the same thing with the enemy divisions which we have clearly indicated in South Vietnam?

"It would be a major political burden for us to bear with a minimum military gain toward ending the war."

General Wheeler said the big difference between the enemy troops in South Vietnam and those in Cambodia is clear. He said that the enemy in South Vietnam digs in well, takes cover when B-52s approach and are constantly on alert, and they did not expect any attacks against them.

General Wheeler said there is no information about how many enemy have been killed by the B-52 strikes in South Vietnam but he has reason to believe there have been sizable losses because of the B-52s.

The President said: "Aware as I am of the mistakes Generals have made in the past, I place great confidence in General Westmoreland. Both him and Ambassador Bunker have recommended this action.

"We must tell Cambodia that we will not continue to permit them to house and protect these killers. Do we have to continue to live with this for the duration of the war?"

Secretary Rusk said: "This problem is not really different from the one of mining Haiphong. We run the risk of enlarging the war."

The President said: "I see this differently from mining Haiphong or bombing the ports."

Secretary McNamara said: "This is analogous to a land invasion above the DMZ. This is not the most effective way to do it.

"This raises a basic issue of our policy, and I have thought that this would be the issue to face us in the coming year for sometime.

"I believe, Mr. President, that it is most unwise to expand the war beyond the South Vietnamese borders. My arguments are as follows:

--"This action would further divide this nation.
--"This action would further increase our problems in the United Nations.

"Because of these two points, I would strongly recommend against this proposal."

General Wheeler said: "I would not disagree with the importance Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara place on this issue. The real question we face is how long we can tolerate these people operating from a sanctuary. I take issue with Bob. Above the DMZ, we can bomb and use artillery against their positions. We cannot use our fire power in Cambodia.

"The Joint Chiefs do not want to widen the war either. We only wish Cambodia would be neutral--honest to God neutral, too. Anyone else would not permit enemy troops to use their territory for sanctuaries."

Secretary Rusk: "I would have thought that Westy would have drug his shirt-tail along the Cambodian border and drawn the enemy fire. Then the rules would permit him to shoot back across the border when fired upon."

General Wheeler read a section of General Westmoreland's letter.

Secretary Rusk: "I also think that this action would make liars out of all of us who have been saying repeatedly that Bob McNamara's departure would have no effect on the conduct of the war. We have said his leaving does not mean any change. If we undertook this action, it would raise a credibility gap of proportions we could not stand."

Secretary McNamara: "As you know, Mr. President, I am opposed to this action, but if the decision were to hedge on what Dean has just said I would want you to go ahead and take it."

The President: "I have never thought that the departure of anybody would make us do or not do anything. I think all of us agree that we'll do all we can to win the war. We will do what we need to do."

Secretary McNamara: I am scared to death. I am scared of a policy based on an assumption that by going somewhere else we can war the war.

"The war cannot be won by killing North Vietnamese. It can only be won by protecting the South Vietnamese so they can build and develop economically for a future political contest with North Vietnam."

Secretary Rusk: It may be that our main job is building a security in the center of the country. I have often wondered why we concentrate more on Conthien and along the borders.

General Wheeler said that Route 9 is the only route across the northern neck of Vietnam. He said moving back from Conthien would be giving up Route 9 to the enemy.

Secretary Rusk said he was surprised that Ambassador Bunker concurred with this recommendation.

The President asked General Wheeler why General Westmoreland did not take the advice Secretary Rusk suggested--that is, to sweep down the border of Cambodia.

Secretary McNamara said that this action would not draw much fire. He said the North Vietnamese do not fire across the border.

Walt Rostow said in the rhythm of things it would take months rather than weeks to rebuild after a defeat such as the one they sustained. He said we do have some time on our hands.

General Wheeler said you cannot count on that.

Walt Rostow said the political significance of this act is so great that we must ask some military questions:

What is the quality of the targeting data?

What would be the pattern of the men during a 72-hour attack by air as proposed.

Rostow said the most important need is to make an issue of Sihanouk's neutrality.

The President said that the issue of neutrality being made a major question appeals most to him. He said he thought we should go back to Bunker and ask him to elaborate on the reasons why he agreed with General Westmoreland's recommendation. In addition, we should ask General Westmoreland to go into more detail about his recommendation--particularly the question raised of enemy digging in as soon as the first bomb hits and scattering.

The President asked if all the Joint Chiefs agreed with this recommendation.

General Wheeler said that this recommendation is part of the four months' program for the conduct of the war and how to get it over quicker.

The President said we must let Sihanouk know we will not tolerate this action any longer.

The President also said he wanted Westmoreland to explore other means of getting at the enemy.

"I do not took forward to the day when somebody will say that General Westmoreland asked for this action and we refused it and then a lot of American boys were killed as a result. As I see it, this act could result in Cambodia declaring war against us and in their inviting the Chinese in."

Walt Rostow said he did not think Cambodia would bring the Chinese in.

Secretary McNamara said this is not an isolated action. It is a basic change of policy.

He said there is a lot that can be done short of a B-52 strike. While I recognize this is a good way to fight a conventional war, this is not a conventional war. It is unconventional, and we must use unconventional means.

Justice Fortas: Based on that which I have heard tonight, there is an overwhelming case against this action. The issue is the whole question of what you do about sanctuaries. It seems we should communicate with Sihanouk. Domestically, we should surface the use of Cambodia as a sanctuary. The sooner this is surfaced the better. The sooner the American people know about this the better.

The President asked what about another try at getting Ambassador Harriman to see Sihanouk. "We must protest this to the world."

Clark Clifford: General Westmoreland's recommendation does not make sense to me. You have a certain number of square miles in which 5,000 men are located. The General asked for a B-52 strike. The enemy are scattered all over the countryside when the first bomb hits the ground. I think it is more valuable to fly photo plans over the area, get good quality pictures, and have them reproduced and released. We need to build up a strong case to proceed to remove this sanctuary. I would be unalterably opposed to the action.

The President: Then we should go back to General Westmoreland and tell him we do not see the justification on an immediate decision on this. Ask for more details from him and also ask for more information from Bunker on why he supports this decision. Tell them all the reasons why we don't see this as a good decision. In addition, we should point out to the Australians that the Cambodians are permitting the North Vietnamese to use this as a sanctuary. They should protest the action through their diplomatic mission in Cambodia.

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