Chronology of Cambodian History
Action Memorandum
From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Brown)
to Secretary of State Rusk
Washington, July 29, 1968.
SUBJECT
Problem of Release of LCU 1577 and Personnel Detained in Cambodia
While press reaction has been notably scarce in quantity
and mild in tone so far on the LCU detention, we are aware that this could
change at almost any moment and that continued detention of the men may rouse
Congressional and public sentiment, particularly because of the apparent
similarity to the Pueblo case. We are therefore proceeding as quickly and
quietly as possible to obtain the release of the 11 detained Americans.
Actions Taken
Immediately following the receipt of information through
COMUSMACV that the LCU 1577 had been seen by the RVN outpost to have entered
Cambodian territory, we dispatched via the Australians an urgent message to
the RKG regretting this inadvertent intrusion into Cambodian territory and
saying that we would be grateful to the RKG for the return of the vessel and
the personnel on board. We also said that we were making every effort to
prevent the recurrence of such an intrusion. Our message has so far had no
positive result. On July 22 the Cambodians rejected our explanation and
indicated an intention to try the men and confiscate the vessel. (In a
message of July 20 through the French Embassy they had officially informed us
of the entry.) Although their propaganda has been offensive in language, it
has been low keyed (delivered for the most part in the Cambodian language by
Sihanouk) and the RKG's formal communication rejecting our explanation was
correct in tone. While the Cambodians have now (July 26) granted access by
the Australians to visit the detained personnel (who have been found in
satisfactory condition and are being provided by the Australians with sundry
supplies), we doubt that further representations in a standard framework
would be effective.
We have prepared a further note to the RKG confirming the
innocent mission of the LCU and, by citing operational and loading data,
stressing the inadvertent nature of the intrusion and the navigational error
which caused it. We have cabled an advance text to the Australian Ambassador
in Phnom Penh and as soon as we have confirmation from Saigon that the GVN
concurs, at least informally, we shall add a paragraph inviting FARK officers
to visit Viet-Nam and inspect operational and loading data we have cited. We
shall then authorize Deschamps to pass this note to the RKG./4/
We have considered a number of courses of action which we
might take in view of the apparent unwillingness so far of the Cambodians to
release the men. The rationale of these recommendations is that we should
move fast and hard diplomatically at first and that the tone of our representations
should combine "politesse" and firmness. If and when Sihanouk
wishes to release them he will be able to find an acceptable channel in one
or the other of our recommendations, although he may of course come up with
one of his own which we can accept. It is our intention to have him
understand the seriousness with which we view this matter. We would hope to
come out of this affair not only with the men (and the LCU) but also with
Sihanouk reappraising his involvement with the VC/NVA and their flagrant (in
contrast to our mistaken) violations of his neutrality.
On July 25, you sent a message to Canberra asking Mr.
Hasluck to go to Phnom Penh to make clear to the RKG our concern over this
incident in the light of increasing VC/NVA activities in Cambodia and our
hope for a prompt and amicable solution. Hasluck replied with a counter
suggestion that his Ambassador sound out "elder statesman" Penn
Nouth in Phnom Penh.
We explored the possibility of the Under Secretary
approaching Ambassador Nong Kimny in New Delhi on the matter, but the absence
of the latter from his post has closed this channel.
We considered asking the French to think about how they
might influence Sihanouk to release the men but suspended consideration for
the time being. We felt that if we involved the French and subsequently found
ourselves obliged to take some action they would not approve, the reaction
would be adverse to our interests. We feel the possibility of French
intervention should continue to be held in abeyance.
We have considered the wisdom of intercession by a
prominent American public figure acceptable to Sihanouk. Mr. Macomber has
discussed this matter with Senator Mansfield. Senator Brooke might be another
possible candidate.
We might also consider requesting informal intervention
with RKG by former Secretary Acheson who has a special position of favor in
Phnom Penh due to his successful representation of Cambodian interests in the
Preah Vihear temple case at the ICJ. An approach by him could be informal, as
private as possible, and along the line that releasing the men immediately
would be in the best interest of Cambodia, and that this could be done
without prejudice to negotiations for the release of the LCU which could be
pursued subsequently in a less tense atmosphere.
We might also consider allowing Sihanouk to save face by
agreeing to a controlled submission of the matter to a Cambodian court.
The RKG has told us that it intends to submit the vessel
and crew to "treatment provided by Cambodian law." (RKG note, July
22, 1968.) During the Tugboat Bream episode the French lawyer for the
Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh provided some information on relevant
Cambodian law. He posited three conceivable charges: 1) illegal
entry--maximum sentence 12 months imprisonment and/or fine of 4000 riels
($114); 2) carrying of arms--maximum punishment, one month's imprisonment
and/or fine of 1200 riels ($34); 3) espionage--maximum sentence, death
(lesser sentences in extenuating circumstances at judge's discretion). While
the gamut of punishments is wide, the Cambodian prosecutor, of course, can
charge or decline to charge crimes as he thinks appropriate. If the RKG
wishes, as is possible that it does, to dispose of the problem of captured
Americans expeditiously, yet without compromising on its own sovereignty, it
might be amenable to trial of the officer-in-charge of the vessel on (say)
illegal entry and to persuade the judge to set the punishment at a fine which
the United States could pay on behalf of the officer. Although we would
prefer that only the officer-in-charge be made to stand trial, we might
consent to trial of the full complement of men if the trial were expeditious.
We might also accept a prison sentence for the officer or men which would be
suspended or completely off-set by a short period of detention while awaiting
trial. Under the circumstances, we should consider accepting as a practical
matter, RKG retention of the LCU, although this might be the subject of a
later USG claim against the RKG.
In practice, the USG has paid fines on behalf of captains
of American fishing boats seized on the high seas by Ecuador, which claims a
territorial sea of 200 miles; and we have accepted fines paid by the GUSSR on
behalf of captains of Soviet intelligence collecting trawlers which have been
seized in Alaskan waters.
Contingency Actions
If we determine that we need to move into a stiffer
position, it would be essential for us to have a full and frank discussion on
the matter with the Australians before any action is taken. The Australians
as our representatives in Cambodia are deeply involved in the whole affair,
and we must guard against any move on our part which might take them unawares
and put them in an impossible position.
We should avoid any public threats of stiff action against
Cambodians. If we find it necessary to take such actions, we should do so
without verbal threats and let the actions speak for themselves. Such actions
might include:
1. Tourists. We
might discourage Americans against tourist travel to Cambodia on the grounds
that it is dangerous and we could neither protect them against detention nor
intervene for them. We estimate if this warning were effective, it would cost
the Cambodians, initially, about one-fourth their tourist trade or about $1
million annually. And other tourists might be deterred by our action.
(Cambodia's budget is equivalent to about $200 million per year.)
2. Mekong Traffic.
Tighten supervision of river traffic by GVN agencies, with American advice
and discreet supervision ostensibly to enforce GVN customs, sanitation and
navigation rules and regulations but incidentally to slow down traffic to
Phnom Penh. This could be done progressively or abruptly, concentrating on
POL and other key cargoes in ways that would virtually suspend river traffic.
3. Naval
Reciprocity. Exploit Market Time operations in the Gulf of Siam to
apprehend any Cambodian naval craft suspected of violating Vietnamese
territorial waters with a view of negotiating an exchange for LCU 1577.
4. Reconnaissance.
Increase Dorsal Fin, Daniel Boone, and related air and ground operations.
5. Attacks on VC/NVA
facilities in Cambodia.
All of these means except the first (warning to tourists)
would be likely to inspire Sihanouk to characterize them as examples of a
great power's attempt to crush a small power, and as proof that the US is
indeed Cambodia's enemy as he has alleged, and is cooperating with Cambodia's
enemy, SVN, to strangle Cambodia's economy. They are at least as likely to
lead Sihanouk to punish the crew as to release them.
We therefore do not recommend serious consideration of any
of these measures as yet, but see merit in some contingency planning so that
we can be sure as to exactly what pressure measures could be employed, should
we later decide to use them.
Recommendations:(There is no indication on the source text whether Rusk
approved or disapproved these recommendations.)
1. That we ask Mr. Acheson whether, if requested, he would
be willing to make an informal approach to the RKG.
2. That we sound out Deschamps on the feasibility of
application of the "Russian Fishing Boat" approach.
3. That we prepare a draft instruction discouraging
tourist travel to Cambodia for eventual release at an appropriate time.
4. That we request DOD to draft contingency plans for:
A. Tightened supervision of Mekong traffic.
B. Exploitation of Market Time to apprehend Cambodian
Naval craft with a view to negotiating an exchange for LCU 1577.
C. Increased air and ground reconnaissance operations.
D.
Attacks on VC/NVA facilities in Cambodia.
Information
Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs (Brown) to Secretary of State Rusk
Washington, July 29, 1968.
SUBJECT
General Cambodian Posture
Over the past six months, following the Bowles Mission,
events have been working gradual changes in the attitude of the Cambodian
Government on issues that affect its basic posture toward the US and
therefore, by extension, the outlook for a post-war settlement in Southeast
Asia. Distrust has developed over Vietnamese and Chinese involvement in a
domestic insurgency which the RKG, despite rather extraordinary efforts, has
not been able to bring under control.
Sihanouk's awareness of the Communists' use of his
territory and their exploitation of his people has been signaled in various
ways. His own words make clear his feeling of the gravity of the situation
and his assessment that internal Communist subversion, externally supported,
is his number one problem. His recent special broadcast to the nation on July
8 was notably vigorous in its warning of the dangers of deceitful friendship
on the part of the Chinese Communists.
The recent shift in the Cambodian cabinet with the
elevation of Lon Nol to the position of First Deputy Prime Minister hints a
stiffening of the Government in its anti-Left posture. It also suggests,
through the departure of Son Sann, some disputes within Sihanouk's official
family over the current state of affairs.
The Paris talks, at which the RKG, despite certain
disclaimers, will most likely wish to have the ear of the Free World for
Cambodian views on any general settlement of the Southeast Asian conflict,
has important relevance to Cambodian developments. Sihanouk, in other words,
is acting, or reacting, with a canny eye both on the war and on the peace
talks. His peculiar position makes it essential that he be able to come to
terms with whatever pattern develops out of the present complexities for the
future of Southeast Asia and that he be able to live within it and maintain
the identity of his nation. This of course helps to explain his almost
paranoid and continuing insistence on the importance of otherwise rather
meaningless governmental statements respecting and recognizing Cambodia's
territorial integrity "within its present frontiers."
Despite a notable undercurrent of changing attitudes,
Cambodian propaganda (which means Sihanouk's official statements) continues
to be aligned against the US and our allies in Southeast Asia. In a curious
contradiction, Sihanouk can revel in the luxury and perhaps temporary comfort
obtained from his denunciations of the US, since he in fact is not
fundamentally apprehensive of US intentions with respect to his country,
while he is afraid of the Chinese and is the heir of a long tradition of
Cambodian/Vietnamese hostility. His deep and abiding fear is of a Vietnamese-Thai
squeeze that would in effect liquidate his kingdom.
There seems to be no doubt that Sihanouk has become
increasingly concerned over the past six months at VC/NVA violation of his
neutrality. While we have no official word from him as to his reaction to the
information we have forwarded him in pursuance of the Bowles-Son Sann
communiqué, we do know that he has in fact taken some steps against the VC on
the basis of information we have furnished. For the first time of which we
are aware, Cambodian publications have reported within the past month the
expulsion of Viet Cong forces, by name, from Cambodia. However, the Cambodian
Government continues to charge us with border violations and on occasion has
called on the International Control Commission to confirm such violations,
while saying nothing of VC/NVA use of their territory.
In this complex situation, we are confronted with a
problem which involves on the one hand the good faith before the world of our
respect for a small nation's territorial integrity, and on the other hand
grave threats to the security of our forces in Viet-Nam.
The whole form and fabric of Southeast Asia in the
post-war world is involved. Cambodia is seeking accommodation with the powers
concerned, maintaining room to maneuver, and always working to pick the
winner and hence guarantee its own existence.
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Source:
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