Chronology of Cambodian History
Memorandum From
Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson
Washington, September 5, 1968.
SUBJECT
Mr. Eugene Black's Mission to Cambodia
For your meeting with Mr. Black this afternoon at 5:30, I
attach summary instructions on which I recommend your approval, and your use
as a talking paper with Mr. Black. (Tab A.)
These instructions cover only the Cambodian portion of Mr.
Black's trip. As you know, he will also be making a major speech in Japan,
and will be calling in Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, and in Manila to touch
base with the Asian Development Bank people. You may wish to discuss with him
a personal message to the Japanese on the need for them to do more in Asia--a
theme he will be hitting hard in his speech in any event--and you may also
wish to discuss with him just how he should handle our continuing intentions
toward regional assistance in Southeast Asia, together with the unfortunate
failure of the Senate to act on the authorization of special funds for the
ADB.
Dean Rusk
Tab A
PRINCIPAL
INSTRUCTIONS FOR
MR. EUGENE BLACK'S VISIT TO CAMBODIA
September 11-14, 1968
The major reason for including Cambodia in your itinerary
is to bring home to Prince Sihanouk our grave concern over VC/NVA use of his
territory, including the question of a more effective International
Commission for Supervision and Control. It would be unrealistic to expect a
significant reorientation of Cambodian policy as a result of your visit. We
should keep our expectations within the limits of Cambodian capabilities rather
than anticipate any sweeping or decisive Cambodian action against the VC/NVA.
Our interest will be served to the extent we can persuade Sihanouk to
increase Cambodia's own efforts to harass the VC/NVA and to press for a more
effective ICC operation.
In stressing our deep concern over the abuse of Cambodian
neutrality, you should make emphatically clear that neither the President nor
the American people entertain the slightest hostility toward Cambodia, or
wish for Cambodia anything but the preservation of its independence and
neutrality. You should be prepared to stress that the President has exercised
every restraint possible, and that the United States continues to act in
accordance with the spirit and letter of the Bowles communiqué in January. Stressing
that the United States has no desire to see the Viet-Nam war extended into
Cambodia, you should nevertheless underline the fact that as long as the war
continues there will be a danger of border incidents despite our best efforts
to prevent them.
It is almost certain that the Cambodians will raise the
question of an American statement expressing respect and recognition for
Cambodia's sovereignty within its present frontiers. Having made clear our
concern with the problem of VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory, you may inform
Sihanouk that the United States Government would consider making such a
statement whenever this move could significantly enhance the prospects for a
lasting improvement in U.S./Cambodian relations. You should explore whether
in fact Sihanouk is prepared for resumption of diplomatic relations on a
serious and responsible basis. And you should make clear that our willingness
to make such a declaration and to resume relations would of course be greatly
influenced by the Cambodian attitude on border problems and VC/NVA
activities.
On the question of a declaration, you may pursue the
discussion to the point of making clear the precise form of declaration we
would be prepared to make, but you should avoid a final commitment unless
further instructed.
Your visit should not involve a discussion of the captured
LCU and its crew, an issue which it is hoped will be disposed of before your
arrival in Phnom Penh.
Your own special background as the President's Special
Representative for Southeast Asian Economic Matters will signal to the
Cambodians your interest in discussing the future development of the Mekong
basin. You may affirm United States support for regional programs such as
that of the Mekong Committee.
Memorandum From the
President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson
Washington, September 5, 1968.
SUBJECT
Your meeting with Eugene Black, 5:30 p.m. Today
Attached is a memorandum from Secretary Rusk which
constitutes both summary instructions for Black's Cambodia mission and
talking points for your meeting with Black this afternoon.
I have one serious reservation to the instructions, which
state (page 3) "Your visit should not involve a discussion of the
captured LCU and its crew." If the Cambodians are still holding the crew
at the time of the visit, I think it will be impossible for Black to ignore
that issue completely. To do so would give a false signal to Sihanouk that
the issue is of no real interest to you. It would also be extremely difficult
to defend publicly a complete failure to use this opportunity to obtain the
release of the prisoners. Finally, there is a good chance that Sihanouk will
choose to release the prisoners to Black.
I suggest, therefore, that the instructions be revised to
call for Black to express your concern at the continued detention of the LCU
crew and your hope that Prince Sihanouk will be able quickly to remove this
prickly issue by releasing the crew. The instructions should also authorize
Black to accept the prisoners from the Cambodian Government should the offer
be made.
Otherwise, the instructions are probably adequate. (Black
will have detailed background papers which put flesh on these rather minimal
instructions.) In your conversation with Mr. Black I suggest you make the
following points:
--we know that Sihanouk cannot entirely stop Communist use
of his territory.
--we hope, however, that he can be persuaded to increase
Cambodia's harassment of Communist misuse of Cambodian territory.
--we hope that Sihanouk can actively press for a more
effective International Control Commission role in identifying violations of
Cambodian neutrality.
--neither you nor the American people have the slightest
hostility toward Cambodia and will continue to act with the greatest possible
restraint.
--however, the increasing Communist use of Cambodian
territory constitutes a serious problem which cannot be ignored and which
endangers both the Cambodian and U.S. Governments desire that Cambodia be
insulated from the Vietnam fighting.
--that is the reason why you attach great importance to
the hope that Prince Sihanouk will be able to take effective steps to inhibit
significant Communist military activities on Cambodian soil.
One special problem which you might wish to mention to
Black is our Daniel Boone operation in Cambodia. In a diplomatic note this
week Sihanouk equated Communist military activities in Cambodia with the
occasional "special forces type" incursions by U.S. forces. He will
probably make the same point to Black and I do not think you would want Black
to hear of these operations first from Sihanouk. I suggest you mention them
briefly and point out that their sole purpose and reason are to develop
intelligence on Communist military activities in Cambodia. As to the rest of
the trip, I concur in Secretary Rusk's suggestion that you discuss with Black
an oral personal message to the Japanese on the need for them to do more in
Asia. You might also mention to Black that both the Thai and the Vietnamese
will be rather prickly about the Cambodian conversations but that we will
provide guidance for him on this matter after we have the report of his
conversations in Cambodia.
I recommend that you approve the attachment to Secretary
Rusk's memorandum as Mr. Black's instructions, with a revision to provide for
Black's raising the problem of the LCU prisoners and accepting their release
if Sihanouk makes the offer.(Johnson approved and a
note on the source text indicates that Rostow was notified on September 5.)
Walt
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