Chronology of Cambodian History
Telegram From the
Department of State to the Embassy in India
Washington, December 17, 1968, 1818Z.
288251. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary.
1. The action reported in your 23889, I regret to say,
cuts across the channel and the action which we have had in mind vis-à-vis
Cambodia, and leaves out of account the difficult military situation which
has caused us to hold up on that action. Under the circumstances, I believe
it would be best if you let your initiative lie and said nothing further to Nong
Kimny for the moment.
2. The background is that we have received a series of
reports from the French and Australians, including a number of direct
quotations of senior RKG officials--all in the direction of indicating that
the LCU prisoners (and, we hope, the more recent helicopter crewman as well)
would be released if we were to send a message from the President about doing
our best to avoid action in Cambodia. Responsive to these reports, we have in
fact been holding a draft message of the type apparently indicated.
3. However, military indicators in South Vietnam, in the
last ten days, have given us grave concern. It has been clearly evident for
some time that an exceptionally large number of NVA/VC forces are located in
the Cambodian border areas, and the more recent evidence suggests strongly
that these areas may become the principal launching bases for very sharp
attacks in the area west of Saigon and conceivably into Saigon itself. If
this should occur, we would plainly face the most difficult action decisions
concerning Cambodia, and the coincidence of a Presidential message and
subsequent essential military actions might be the reverse of helpful in
terms of working toward a better relationship with Sihanouk.
4. This is the situation at the present time, of
which--for obvious reasons of sensitivity--we have not believed it wise to
keep you informed. We are continuing to keep the situation under the closest
possible scrutiny and will now wish to consider whether something should be
said quietly to Nong Kimny if and when we decide to act. However, I repeat
that you should not seek further contact with Nong Kimny; if he should run
into Spivack or yourself and ask, you should say simply that we are following
the situation closely, that our basic policies remain unchanged, and that we
hope to be able to move in a direction that will further an improvement in
our relations with Cambodia. You should not mention any of the plans or
considerations covered in paras 2 and 3 above.
Rusk
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