Chronology of Cambodian History
Memorandum From
James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the
President's Special Assistant (Rostow)
Washington, July 8, 1966.
SUBJECT
Next Moves on Cambodia
Chet Bowles has now talked to Cambodia's Ambassador to
India (New Delhi's 336 attached). The conversation contained no surprises,
but the key will be Sihanouk's reaction. Despite Chet's doubts, State's
analysts believe that Nong Kimny will view the Bowles approach as a
deliberate, non-casual démarche and will report it in full to the Prince. So
we should be prepared for some repercussions--favorable or otherwise--through
FBIS, a return visit by Nong Kimny, or some other channel.
Meanwhile, as you know, the British have delivered a note
from Stewart to Gromyko requesting reconsideration of the Soviet refusal to
support the expansion of the ICC in Cambodia and proposing talks on the
Cambodia problem in Geneva, Moscow, or elsewhere. Wilson's visit may reveal
the Soviet response.
These two developments seem to argue for a further
postponement of decision on an early visit by Eugene Black to Cambodia. It
would certainly be a mistake to risk a Cambodian turn-down until we learn of
Sihanouk's reaction to the New Delhi conversation.
A third aspect of the Cambodian scenario is the proposed
senatorial mission. The Vice President has received a very responsible letter
from the President of the Cambodian National Assembly indicating willingness
to receive three senators once Congress is out of session. Some of the
Committee members, however, are apparently willing to consider a trip before
the adjournment of Congress if the Executive Branch urges such a move (an
urging that could not easily be kept quiet). State and Carl Marcy would like
some guidance from us on this matter.
My own view is that the ideal arrangement would be for an
earlier senatorial visit (perhaps late August or the Labor Day period) to be
followed by a Eugene Black visit in October. The senators could carry a
letter from the President and create a friendly atmosphere without going into
substance. Black, however, carries with him the flavor of American money; he
is therefore more potentially embarrassing to the Prince (who is currently
far out on a limb in rejecting American funds) unless the way has been
carefully cleared by preliminary visitors.
I don't know whether we can sell such a timetable either
to the Congress or to the President, much less Cambodia. But I think it is
worth a try--and I sympathize to some extent with State's desire not to press
the Prince too hard at a time when he is gradually shifting his position of
his own accord.
I attach some draft language which you might want to use
in presenting this problem to the President.
I also attach a memo from State in response to my Cambodia
paper which I have held here for two reasons--first, because it was already
out of date on arrival as a result of further developments on the ICC, and
second because it was overtaken by the Eugene Black project and the
instructions to New Delhi.
A final word on Bowles' comments regarding the resumption
of diplomatic relations: they make a good deal of sense (and are obviously
influenced by Herb Spivack, who knows Cambodia well); they could serve as
good basis for substantive discussions if the Prince is responsive.
Source: US Department of State
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XXVII
Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
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