Chronology of Cambodian History
Memorandum From
William J. Jorden of the National Security Council Staff to the President's
Special Assistant (Rostow)
Washington, September 20, 1966.
SUBJECT
Cambodia
I had an interesting talk yesterday with Ambassador Noel
Deschamps, the Australian envoy in Cambodia. He is on two months leave.
The more interesting points were:
1. The most significant development in Cambodia in recent
months has been the drift away from Red China. It is the product of several
things: Peking's taking Sihanouk for granted; its rejection of his plan to
beef up the ICC to oversee his borders; its repudiation of the Geneva
Agreements, which Sihanouk sees as a bulwark to his country's position.
2. The deGaulle visit was a plus in one important respect:
France has replaced Communist China as Cambodia's "best friend."
This relates to (1) above.
3. Sihanouk's principal interest in life is getting the
broadest possible international recognition of and support for his borders.
(We ought to keep this in mind when and if Harriman ever gets to Phnom Penh.)
4. It was the handling of the recent border
incident--rather than the incident itself--that pushed Sihanouk into
cancelling the Harriman trip. On a more recent incident--which occurred just
before Deschamps' departure--Sihanouk was asked about it; he replied:
"That kind of thing happens in war." (I would suggest that
Sihanouk's volatility gives no assurance he might not go through the roof on
the next one!)
5. Deschamps thinks chances are good that we can send an
official visitor to Cambodia in the next few months. Sihanouk is in a mood to
welcome such a visit. He wants us to recognize his borders and intercede with
the Thai and Vietnamese to do likewise.
6. Sihanouk's main enemies are the Vietnamese and the
Thai. He dislikes and distrusts both, the Thai more than the Vietnamese. He
is probably less concerned with the latter--for the moment--because they are
involved in trouble at home, and Viet-Nam is not unified.
7. Sihanouk would look on Vietnamese unification as a
disaster for him. He therefore tends to favor a victory for the South that
would leave the country divided, rather than victory for Ho Chi Minh.
8. Internally, Cambodia is doing fairly well in terms of
political stability. No major discontent. Sihanouk works hard and constantly
at keeping his people happy. The economy is poor--but discontent is low
because the people generally don't know how bad off they are. No serious
problem of communist subversion.
9. Australia enjoys probably the best relations of any
nearby power, despite its involvement with us in Viet-Nam. Sihanouk says he
judges Australia--and others--by the way they treat him and his country, and
not by what they do elsewhere.
10. Sihanouk has said a number of complimentary things
about General Ky, and Deschamps thinks it not impossible that Sihanouk would
welcome a friendly gesture from the Saigon Government, especially some kind
of agreement on the borders. He is ready to abandon Cambodian claims to
disputed islands in return. (The islands in question are really meaningless
for both countries.)
Summary:
Sihanouk is a diplomatic challenge of the first order. The President's
instinct in trying to get something moving with Cambodia is absolutely
correct.
Source: US Department of State
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XXVII
Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs
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