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Last updated 01/05/2007 06:50:29 +0100
மாவட்ட மட்டத்தில் அதிகாரத்தை பகிர்வதன் மூலம் பிரச்சினைக்கு தீர்வு-
சுதந்திரக் கட்சியின் யோசனையில் தெரிவிப்பு
வீரகேசரி நாளேடு
மாவட்ட அலகின் மூலம் அதிகாரத்தை பகிர்ந்து இனப்பிரச்சினைக்குத்தீர்வு காணும்
யோசனையினை ஸ்ரீலங்கா சுதந்திரக்கட்சி நேற்று முன்வைத்துள்ளது. இத்திட்டத்தின்
கீழ் மாவட்டங்கள் தோறும் ஜனாதிபதியினால் முதலமைச்சர்கள் நியமிக்கப்படுவார்கள்.
ஒவ்வொரு மாவட்ட சபைகளுக்கும்
மூன்று நிறைவேற்றுக்குழு நியமிக்கப்படும். இதில் நிதிக்குழு முதலமைச்சரின்
கீழ் இயங்கும் என்றும் சுதந்திரக்கட்சியின் யோசனையில் தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது.
இனப்பிரச்சினை தீர்வுக்காண ஸ்ரீலங்கா சுதந்திரக்கட்சியின் தீர்வுத்திட்ட
யோசனையினை நேற்றுமாலை கொழும்பு மாநகர சபை மைதானத்தில் நடைபெற்ற பொதுஜனஐக்கிய
முன்னணியின் மேதின கூட்டத்தில் கட்சியின் பொதுச் செயலாளரும் அமைச்சருமான
மைதிரிபால சிறிசேன வெளியிட்டுவைத்தார்.
சுதந்திரக்கட்சியினால் வெளியிடப்பட்ட தீர்வுத் திட்டயோசனை ஜனாதிபதி மஹிந்த
ராஜபக்ஷவிடமும் சர்வகட்சி குழுவிடமும் சமர்ப்பிப்பதற்காக பிரதமர் ரட்ணசிறி
விக்ரமநாயக்கவிடம் பொதுஜன ஐக்கிய முன்னணியின் செயலாளரும் அமைச்சருமான சுசில்
பிரமேஜயந்தவினால் கையளிக்கப்பட்டது.
ஸ்ரீலங்கா சுதந்திரக்கட்சியின் தீர்வு யோசனையில் மேலும்
தெரிவிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளதாவது:
அதிகாரத்தைப் பகிர்வதன் மூலம் தீர்வு காணப்படும்.
அதிகாரத்தை விரிவாக பகிர்வதற்கு புதிய அலகாக மாவட்ட முறை
பிரேரிக்கப்பட்டுள்ளது. இரண்டு மாவட்டங்கள் ஒன்றிணைக்கப்பட்டு ஒரு அலகு
உருவாக்கப்படும். இந்த இரண்டு மாவட்டங்களும் ஒரே பூகோள மைய பிரதேசத்தில்
அமைந்திருத்தல்வேண்டும். அம்மாவட்டங்களில் வசிக்கும் மக்கள் விருப்பப்படி இது
ஒன்றிணைக்கப்படும்.
அதிகாரப்பரவலாக்கலின் போது பாராளுமன்றத்தின் நிறைவேற்று அதிகாரமும்
நீதிமன்றத்தின் அதிகாரமும் பாதுகாக்கப்படும்.
புத்தமதம்
புத்தமதத்திற்கு ஒரு இடத்தை பெற்றுக்கொடுப்பதோடு, புத்தசாசனம்
அரசாங்கத்தினால் பாதுகாக்கப்படும். அத்தோடு தற்போது உள்ள அரசியலமைப்பின்
பிரகாரம் இதர மதங்களுக்கு வழங்கப்பட்டுள்ள உரிமைகள் பாதுகாக்கப்படும்.
அரசியலமைப்பு
பாராளுமன்ற அரசியலமைப்பு முறை மீண்டும் நிறுவுவதற்கு சுதந்திரக் கட்சி
முன்நிற்கின்றது. நிறைவேற்று அதிகாரம் கொண்ட ஜனாதிபதி முறையை இல்லாதொழித்து
பிரதமருக்கு அமைச்சரவை அதிகாரத்தை வழங்குவதற்கு கட்சி மாற்றுயோசனை ஒன்றை
முன்வைத்துள்ளது. நிறைவேற்று அதிகாரம் முறை ஒழிப்பது தொடர்பாக தேசிய இணக்கத்தை
ஏற்படுத்த முடியாவிட்டால் நிறைவேற்று அதிகாரத்தில் மறுசீரமைப்பதற்கும்
நடவடிக்கைகளை மேற்கொள்ள முடியும். அதிகார பகிர்வு
அதிகாரபகிர்வு தொடர்பாக ஐந்து விடயங்கள் முன்வைக்கப்பட்டுள்ளன. மாவட்டத்தில்
இரண்டு மாவட்டங்கள் ஒன்றிணைக்கப்படல். அவ்வாறு ஒன்றிணைக்கப்படும் மாவட்டங்கள்
பூகோள ரீதியில் ஒன்றாக இருக்கவேண்டும். அத்தோடு, பிரதேசங்களுக்கு
தொடர்பிருக்கவேண்டும்.
அந்த மாவட்ட மக்களின் விருப்பத்தின் பேரிலேயே மாவட்டங்கள் இணைக்கப்படும்.
அதோடு மாவட்டங்களில் வாழ்கின்ற சிறுபான்மை மக்கள் மீது விசேட கவனம்
செலுத்தப்படும்.
FM 3-24:
America's new master plan for Iraq
Divide and rule -
America's plan for Baghdad
Robert Fisk:
Revealed: a
new counter-insurgency strategy to carve up the city into sealed areas.
The tactic failed in Vietnam. So what chance does it have in Iraq?
Published: 11 April 2007
Faced with an ever-more
ruthless insurgency in Baghdad - despite President George Bush's "surge"
in troops - US forces in the city are now planning a massive and highly
controversial counter-insurgency operation that will seal off vast areas
of the city, enclosing whole neighbourhoods with barricades and allowing
only Iraqis with newly issued ID cards to enter.
The campaign of "gated communities" - whose genesis was in the Vietnam War
- will involve up to 30 of the city's 89 official districts and will be
the most ambitious counter-insurgency programme yet mounted by the US in
Iraq.
The system has been used - and has spectacularly failed - in the past, and
its inauguration in Iraq is as much a sign of American desperation at the
country's continued descent into civil conflict as it is of US
determination to "win" the war against an Iraqi insurgency that has cost
the lives of more than 3,200 American troops. The system of "gating" areas
under foreign occupation failed during the French war against FLN
insurgents in Algeria and again during the American war in Vietnam. Israel
has employed similar practices during its occupation of Palestinian
territory - again, with little success.
But the campaign has far wider military ambitions than the pacification of
Baghdad. It now appears that the US military intends to place as many as
five mechanised brigades - comprising about 40,000 men - south and east of
Baghdad, at least three of them positioned between the capital and the
Iranian border. This would present Iran with a powerful - and potentially
aggressive - American military force close to its border in the event of a
US or Israeli military strike against its nuclear facilities later this
year.
The latest "security" plan, of which The Independent has learnt the
details, was concocted by General David Petraeus, the current US commander
in Baghdad, during a six-month command and staff course at Fort
Leavenworth in Kansas. Those attending the course - American army generals
serving in Iraq and top officers from the US Marine Corps, along with,
according to some reports, at least four senior Israeli officers -
participated in a series of debates to determine how best to "turn round"
the disastrous war in Iraq.
The initial emphasis of the new American plan will be placed on securing
Baghdad market places and predominantly Shia Muslim areas. Arrests of men
of military age will be substantial. The ID card project is based upon a
system adopted in the city of Tal Afar by General Petraeus's men - and
specifically by Colonel H R McMaster, of the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment
- in early 2005, when an eight-foot "berm" was built around the town to
prevent the movement of gunmen and weapons. General Petraeus regarded the
campaign as a success although Tal Afar, close to the Syrian border, has
since fallen back into insurgent control.
So far, the Baghdad campaign has involved only the creation of a few US
positions within several civilian areas of the city but the new project
will involve joint American and Iraqi "support bases" in nine of the 30
districts to be "gated" off. From these bases - in fortified buildings -
US-Iraqi forces will supposedly clear militias from civilian streets which
will then be walled off and the occupants issued with ID cards. Only the
occupants will be allowed into these "gated communities" and there will be
continuous patrolling by US-Iraqi forces. There are likely to be pass
systems, "visitor" registration and restrictions on movement outside the
"gated communities". Civilians may find themselves inside a "controlled
population" prison.
In theory, US forces can then concentrate on providing physical
reconstruction in what the military like to call a "secure environment".
But insurgents are not foreigners, despite the presence of al-Qa'ida in
Iraq. They come from the same population centres that will be "gated" and
will, if undiscovered, hold ID cards themselves; they will be "enclosed"
with everyone else.
A former US officer in Vietnam who has a deep knowledge of General
Petraeus's plans is sceptical of the possible results. "The first loyalty
of any Sunni who is in the Iraqi army is to the insurgency," he said. "Any
Shia's first loyalty is to the head of his political party and its
militia. Any Kurd in the Iraqi army, his first loyalty is to either
Barzani or Talabani. There is no independent Iraqi army. These people
really have no choice. They are trying to save their families from
starvation and reprisal. At one time they may have believed in a unified
Iraq. At one time they may have been secular. But the violence and
brutality that started with the American invasion has burnt those liberal
ideas out of people ... Every American who is embedded in an Iraqi unit is
in constant mortal danger."
The senior generals who constructed the new "security" plan for Baghdad
were largely responsible for the seminal - but officially "restricted" -
field manual on counter-insurgency produced by the Department of the Army
in December of last year, code-numbered FM 3-24. While not specifically
advocating the "gated communities" campaign, one of its principles is the
unification of civilian and military activities, citing "civil operations
and revolutionary development support teams" in South Vietnam, assistance
to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq in 1991 and the "provincial
reconstruction teams" in Afghanistan - a project widely condemned for
linking military co-operation and humanitarian aid.
FM 3-24 is harsh in its analysis of what counter-insurgency forces must do
to eliminate violence in Iraq. "With good intelligence," it says,
"counter-insurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while
keeping other vital organs intact." But another former senior US officer
has produced his own pessimistic conclusions about the "gated"
neighbourhood project.
"Once the additional troops are in place the insurrectionists will cut the
lines of communication from Kuwait to the greatest extent they are able,"
he told The Independent. "They will do the same inside Baghdad, forcing
more use of helicopters. The helicopters will be vulnerable coming into
the patrol bases, and the enemy will destroy as many as they can. The
second part of their plan will be to attempt to destroy one of the patrol
bases. They will begin that process by utilising their people inside the
'gated communities' to help them enter. They will choose bases where the
Iraqi troops either will not fight or will actually support them.
"The American reaction will be to use massive firepower, which will
destroy the neighbourhood that is being 'protected'."
The ex-officer's fears for American helicopter crews were re-emphasised
yesterday when a military Apache was shot down over central Baghdad.
The American's son is an officer currently serving in Baghdad. "The only
chance the American military has to withdraw with any kind of tactical
authority in the future is to take substantial casualties as a token of
their respect for the situation created by the invasion," he said.
"The effort to create some order out of the chaos and the willingness to
take casualties to do so will leave some residual respect for the
Americans as they leave."
FM 3-24: America's new masterplan for Iraq
FM 3-24 comprises 220 pages of counter-insurgency planning, combat
training techniques and historical analysis. The document was drawn up by
Lt-Gen David Petraeus, the US commander in Baghdad, and Lt-Gen James Amos
of the US Marine Corps, and was the nucleus for the new US campaign
against the Iraqi insurgency. These are some of its recommendations and
conclusions:
* In the eyes of some, a government that cannot protect its people
forfeits the right to rule. In [parts] of Iraq and Afghanistan... militias
established themselves as extragovernmental arbiters of the populace's
physical security - in some cases, after first undermining that
security...
* In the al-Qa'ida narrative... Osama bin Laden depicts himself as a man
purified in the mountains of Afghanistan who is inspiring followers and
punishing infidels. In the collective imagination of Bin Laden and his
followers, they are agents of Islamic history who will reverse the decline
of the umma (Muslim community) and bring about its triumph over Western
imperialism.
* As the Host Nation government increases its legitimacy, the populace
begins to assist it more actively. Eventually, the people marginalise
insurgents to the point that [their] claim to legitimacy is destroyed.
However, victory is gained not when this is achieved, but when the victory
is permanently maintained by and with the people's active support...
* Any human rights abuses committed by US forces quickly become known
throughout the local populace. Illegitimate actions undermine
counterinsurgency efforts... Abuse of detained persons is immoral, illegal
and unprofessional.
* If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the
people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the
insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post
operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace and contact
maintained.
* FM 3-24 quotes Lawrence of Arabia as saying: "Do not try to do too much
with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it
perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for
them."
* FM 3-24 points to Napoleon's failure to control occupied Spain as the
result of not providing a "stable environment" for the population. His
struggle, the document says, lasted nearly six years and required four
times the force of 80,000 Napoleon originally designated.
* Do not try to crack the hardest nut first. Do not go straight for the
main insurgent stronghold. Instead, start from secure areas and work
gradually outwards... Go with, not against, the grain of the local
populace.
* Be cautious about allowing soldiers and marines to fraternise with local
children. Homesick troops want to drop their guard with kids. But
insurgents are watching. They notice any friendships between troops and
children. They may either harm the children as punishment or use them as
agents.
Huge protest
in Iraq Demand US Withdraw
By EDWARD WONG,
NEW YORK TIMES
BAGHDAD, April 9 — Tens of thousands of protesters loyal to Moktada al-Sadr,
the Shiite cleric, took to the streets of the holy city of Najaf on Monday
in an extraordinarily disciplined rally to demand an end to the American
military presence in Iraq, burning American flags and chanting “Death to
America!”
Residents said that the angry, boisterous demonstration was the largest in
Najaf, the heart of Shiite religious power, since the American-led
invasion in 2003. It took place on the fourth anniversary of the fall of
Baghdad, and it was an obvious effort by Mr. Sadr to show the extent of
his influence here in Iraq, even though he did not appear at the rally.
Mr. Sadr went underground after the American military began a new security
push in Baghdad on Feb. 14, and his whereabouts are unknown.
Mr. Sadr used the protest to try to reassert his image as a nationalist
rebel who appeals to both anti-American Shiites and Sunni Arabs. He
established that reputation in 2004, when he publicly supported Sunni
insurgents in Falluja who were battling United States marines, and quickly
gained popularity among Sunnis across Iraq and the region. But his
nationalist credentials have been tarnished in the last year, as Sunni
Arabs have accused Mr. Sadr’s militia, the Mahdi Army, of torturing and
killing Sunnis.
Iraqi policemen and soldiers lined the path taken by the protesters, and
there were no reports of violence during the day. The American military
handed security oversight of the city and province of Najaf to the Iraqi
government in December, and the calm atmosphere showed that the Iraqi
security forces could maintain control, keeping suicide bombers away from
an obvious target. In March, when millions of Shiite pilgrims flocked to
the holy cities of the south, Iraqi security forces in provinces adjoining
Najaf failed to stop bombers from killing scores of them.
Vehicles were not allowed near Monday’s march, and Baghdad had a daylong
ban on traffic to prevent outbreaks of violence.
During the protest in Najaf, Sadr followers draped themselves in Iraqi
flags and waved them to symbolize national unity, and a small number of
conservative Sunni Arabs took part in the march.
“We have 30 people who came,” said Ayad Abdul Wahab, an agriculture
professor in Basra and an official in the Iraqi Islamic Party, a leading
fundamentalist Sunni Arab group. “We support Moktada in this
demonstration, and we stress our rejection of foreign occupation.”
He and his friends together carried a 30-foot-long Iraqi flag.
In the four years of war, the only other person who has been able to call
for protests of this scale has been Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s
most powerful Shiite cleric, who, like Mr. Sadr, has a home in Najaf.
The protest was in some ways another challenge to the Shiite clerical
hierarchy, showing that in the new Iraq, a violent young upstart like Mr.
Sadr can command the masses right in the backyard of venerable clerics
like Ayatollah Sistani. Mr. Sadr has increasingly tapped into a powerful
desire among Shiites to stand up forcefully to both the American presence
and militant Sunnis, and to ignore calls for moderation from older
clerics.
Lt. Col. Christopher Garver, an American military spokesman in Baghdad,
said that American officers had helped officials in Najaf plan security
for the event, but that the Iraqis had taken the lead.
Colonel Garver and other American officials tried to put the best possible
light on the event, despite the fiery words. “We say that we’re here to
support democracy,” he said. “We say that free speech and freedom of
assembly are part of that. While we don’t necessarily agree with the
message, we agree with their right to say it.”
The protest unfolded as heavy fighting continued in parts of Diwaniya, a
southern city where American and Iraqi forces have been battling cells of
the Mahdi Army since Friday. Mr. Sadr issued a statement on Sunday calling
for the Mahdi militiamen and the Iraqi forces there to stop fighting each
other, but those words went unheeded. Gun battles broke out on Monday, and
an American officer said at a news conference that at least one American
soldier had been killed and one wounded in four days of clashes.
That fighting and the protest in Najaf, as well as Mr. Sadr’s mysterious
absence, raise questions about how much control he actually maintains over
his militia. Mr. Sadr is obviously still able to order huge numbers of
people into the streets, but there has been talk that branches of his
militia have split off and now operate independently. In Baghdad, some
Mahdi Army cells have refrained in the last two months from attacking
Americans and carrying out killings of Sunni Arabs, supposedly on orders
from Mr. Sadr, but bodies of Sunnis have begun reappearing in some
neighborhoods in recent weeks.
The protest in Najaf was made up mostly of young men, many of whom drove
down from the sprawling Sadr City section of Baghdad, some 100 miles
north, the previous night. They gathered Monday morning in the town of
Kufa, where Mr. Sadr has his main mosque, and walked a few miles to
Sadrain Square in Najaf. Protesters stomped on American flags and burned
them. “No, no America; leave, leave occupier,” they chanted. At Sadrain
Square, the protesters listened to a statement read over loudspeakers that
was attributed to Mr. Sadr.
“Oh Iraqi people, you are aware, as 48 months have passed, that we live in
a state of oppression, unjust repression and occupation,” the statement
read. “Forty-eight hard months — that make four years — in which we have
gotten nothing but more killing, destruction and degradation. Tens of
people are being killed every day. Tens are disabled every day.”
Mr. Sadr added: “America made efforts to stoke sectarian strife, and here
I would like to tell you, the sons of the two rivers, that you have proved
your ability to surpass difficulties and sacrifice yourselves, despite the
conspiracies of the evil powers against you.”
An Interior Ministry employee in a flowing tan robe, Haider Abdul Rahim
Mustafa, 23, said that he had come from Basra “to demand the withdrawal of
the occupier.”
“The occupier supported Saddam and helped him to become stronger, then
removed him because his cards were burned,” he said, using an Arabic
expression to note that Saddam Hussein was no longer useful to the United
States. “The fall of Saddam means nothing to us as long as the alternative
is the American occupation.”
Estimates of the crowd’s size varied wildly. A police commander in Najaf,
Brig. Gen. Abdul Karim al-Mayahi, said there were at least half a million
people. Colonel Garver said that military reports had estimates of 5,000
to 7,000. Residents and other Iraqi officials said there were tens of
thousands, and television images of the rally seemed to support their
estimates.
The colonel declined to give any information on the whereabouts of Mr.
Sadr, though American military officials said weeks ago that they believed
he is in Iran. Mr. Sadr’s aides declined to say where he is, but
previously they have said he remained in Iraq.
In Diwaniya, hospital officials said their wards were overwhelmed by
casualties. There was a shortage of food and oxygen, and ambulances were
being blocked from the scene of combat, said Dr. Hamid Jaati, the city’s
health director. The main hospital received 13 dead Iraqis and 41 injured
ones over the weekend, he added.
The fighting started Friday after the provincial council and governor
called for the Iraqi Army and American forces to take on the Sadr
militiamen. The governor and 28 of 40 council members belong to a powerful
Shiite party called the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq, which is the main rival to the Sadr organization. Sadr officials
have accused the party of using the military to carry out a political
grudge, but the governor, Khalil Jalil Hamza, denied that on Monday.
In Diyala Province, northeast of Baghdad, a suicide car bomb killed three
civilians and wounded four others on Sunday night, police officials said
Monday. Also in Diyala, a local politician was fatally shot on Monday in
Hibhib, and three bodies were found in Khalis.
Iraqi employees of The New York Times contributed reporting from Najaf and
Diwaniya.