"Sri Lanka’s security is India’s responsibility"  
India would extend its fullest support to Sri Lanka to resolve its ethnic issue said Ms. Nirupama Rao, High Commissioner of India. She said India considered that National security of Sri Lanka was a responsibility of India and India would do everything possible to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. The Indian High Commissioner made these observations when she met Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake yesterday.  
Ms. Nirupama Rao Indian High Commissioner (27th November,2005 - 03.30 S.L.T)  
                                                                        

Indian troops train with United States Army in Hawaii
Dated 18/9/2006, India Defence

Forty Indian soldiers in jungle camouflage descend on a mock village in the central Oahu mountains, hunting for insurgents. American officers watch for lessons they can apply when leading their own soldiers through the same course on a US Army training ground.

The troops are in the island for the biggest joint drills the Indian and US armies have had to date, the latest sign of growing military relations between the two nuclear powers.

The bilateral exercise, called "Yudh Abhyas," or "Training for War" in Hindi, started four years ago with a handful of Indian and US soldiers. It has since ballooned to involve hundreds of troops, including 140 Indians who flew to Hawaii, which hosts the US Pacific Command whose reach extends to their homeland.

"It's a tremendous expansion," said Col Dinesh Singh, of the Indian army's 3rd Battalion, 9th Gurkha Rifles. He added the exercises were now teaching platoons from the two nations how to talk to each other in the field, moving beyond the basics of training individual soldiers.

"We work on larger issues at this stage. We're trying to work on commonalities," Singh said. "If you're talking about interoperability, this is the basic thing. We should be able to understand each other's actions."

Analysts say the United States is eager to deepen military ties with India to learn some of the counter-insurgency methods India's military has cultivated during its long battle against Muslim separatists in Kashmir.

The Americans also want India's large navy to help patrol the seas for terrorists and pirates, analysts say.                                                                

FROM CONFLICT TO CONVERGENCE 
India and Israel Forge a Solid Strategic Alliance 
By Martin Sherman The Jerusalem Post Feb 28, 2003

India and Israel used to be rivals during the Cold War, but the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of global terror have generated what seems like a solid strategic alliance. 

Last week's press announcement regarding an agreement for the supply of advanced Israeli avionic systems for the Indian air force's new MiG-27 combat aircraft threw into sharp relief just how dramatically the ties between the two countries have progressed since their early days of independence. 

Just over half a century ago, two ancient peoples managed to cast off the bonds of British colonial rule and assert political independence. 

At their inception, the newly born states could hardly have been more dissimilar. The one, India, was a giant subcontinent with an enormous and impoverished indigenous population. The other, Israel, was minuscule in size but eager to augment the sparse numbers of its domestic populace by large-scale immigration from countries as diverse as Morocco and Austria. 

Moreover, despite the fact that both opted for heavily state-controlled economies in their early years, the divergence between the two countries appeared to grow over time. Israel gradually began to adopt an orientation increasingly conducive to free trade and private enterprise; India, on the other hand, continued to maintain its emphasis on centralized control and an aspiration for economic autarchy. 

On the political and diplomatic front, Israel and India were estranged for several decades, with the former aligned firmly with the United States, while the latter opted to maintain close links with the Soviet Union. 

This significant disparity between the two countries hardly boded well for mutual cooperation between them. However, since the onset of the 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet bloc and the accelerating liberalization of the Indian economy, considerable - even dramatic - changes began to take place, bringing with them a marked convergence of Indo-Israeli interests. 

The culmination of this process took place in 1992 when full diplomatic relations were established between Jerusalem and New Delhi. The developments on the diplomatic front were paralleled by those on the economic one. With the policy of economic liberalization, instituted in 1991, India and its newly accessible markets emerged as an increasingly coveted objective for many of the world's largest corporations. This process was accompanied by a growing interest in economic opportunities in India on the part of the Israeli business sector, and a burgeoning volume of trade between the two countries. 

However, it is in the sphere of security that convergence of interests the two countries is most obvious. Both India and Israel face serious threats, internally and externally. Both countries face, and have faced in the past, the risk of military confrontation with dictatorial regimes, armed with weapons of mass destruction along their borders. 

Among India's potential (and indeed current) antagonists are countries and organizations which may pose a threat to Israel in time to come, or are likely to ally themselves with Israel's adversaries in some future conflict. In both countries there lurk dangers of dissident action by large domestic ethno-religious minorities, fueled by a growing fundamentalism in neighboring states. In many respects, therefore, Israeli and Indian interests appear highly compatible. 

The case for a close Indo-Israeli relationship is indeed compelling. Across a wide range of fields the two countries can both complement and supplement each other. 

On the level of civilian commerce, there has already been considerable success. Bilateral trade has increased dramatically since the early Nineties - growing fivefold from barely $200 million in 1992 to more than $1 billion by 2000. 

Although India is commonly seen as a largely labor intensive economy offering competitively-priced skilled manpower as its major asset, and Israel as an advanced knowledge-based economy, this view only partially captures the real picture. For while it is undoubtedly true that India still has many of the attributes of a developing country, in several fields, such as IT and computer science, it is on the cutting edge of technological advancement, with its own space program, ballistic missile project, and nuclear capabilities. 

On the diplomatic front, although New Delhi is still somewhat reticent in its support for Israel - due mainly to concern about the reaction of India's large Muslim minority and dependence on Arab oil - some signs in the opposite direction have been evident. The most prominent was during the 2001 Durban conference on racism, when India helped thwart Arab attempts to insert virulent censure of Israel in the conference's final resolution. 

Then-foreign minister Shimon Peres had warm words for India's action, praising it for its help in "tipping the scales on the side of justice." 

For India, Israel and its affiliated lobbies in Washington can be a useful instrument, for promoting New Delhi's case on the Pakistani issue. This was a topic raised in a recent trilateral meeting held this month in New Delhi, attended by Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs (JINSA), the influential Washington-based think tank, former Israeli intelligence chiefs and Indian security and defense experts. 

In the realm of security, the ties between Israel and India are booming. Israel appears to have become India's second largest arms supplier after Russia. Israel has provided India with sea-to-sea missiles, radar and other surveillance systems, border monitoring equipment, night vision devices, and the upgrading of India's Soviet-era armor and aircraft. 

Moreover, in marked contrast to Washington's vigorous opposition to the supply of Phalcon reconnaissance aircraft from Israel to China, the U.S. is apparently favorably disposed to the delivery of such planes to India. In December 2002 Defense Minister George Fernandes announced in the Indian parliament that India and Israel are planning to jointly produce and market an Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH). Overall, contracts of over U.S. $3 billion for the supply of military equipment and know-how are said to be in the pipeline. 

Given Israel's minuscule territorial dimensions, there is growing awareness of the crucial strategic significance of the marine - and submarine - theater for the country's national defense. The range and destructive power of modern weaponry in the hands of Israel's enemies make most of Israel's land based strategic installations vulnerable to a long-range first strike. Thus, the deployment of sea-borne second-strike capability - an essential factor for effective deterrence of such a possible first strike - is emerging as a strategic imperative for Israel. 

In this regard, the Indian Ocean, as location for a logistic infrastructure, facilitating the deployment and maintenance of this capability could well assume vital importance. This is particularly pertinent since advances in satellite surveillance techniques, and the dominant Arab presence along most of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean - and ever more inhospitable Europeans along the northern ones - make this an increasingly problematic environment for the Israeli Navy. 

Of course, for the establishment and operation of such a maritime venture, cooperation with the Indian Navy would be vital. In this regard, it is especially significant that in 2000, Israeli submarines reportedly conducted test launches of cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in the waters of the Indian Ocean of the Sri Lanka coast. 

There are also persistent reports of mutual Indo-Israeli desire to collaborate on the development of a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, based on the Israeli Arrow technologies. 

As both countries face the specter of a possible missile attack from dictatorial, and often less than predictable regimes, this desire is eminently understandable. 

However, as the Arrow is a joint Israeli-U.S. enterprise, approval from Washington is necessary for the prospective venture to go ahead. As yet, such approval has not been forthcoming - due to fears of escalating tensions in the already flammable Indo-Pakistani confrontation. 

Nonetheless, Israel is said to have already provided India with the Green Pine radar used in the Arrow system - with U.S. consent. 

The region spanned by Israel and India include many of America's most implacable enemies. Nothing, therefore, seems more reasonable or more pressing than for Washington to cultivate countervailing centers of power with allies who genuinely and autonomously embrace similar values of liberal pluralism. 

The political milieu of both India and Israel is one that might have been expected to be highly conducive to dictatorship. However, the fact that dictatorship has not taken root in either country bears eloquent testimony to their deep-rooted commitment to the principles of liberty, tolerance and an open civil society. This should serve to bolster U.S. confidence as to the long-term durability of India and Israel as reliable allies, which should translate into a lenient and forthcoming American attitude to technological transfers. 

For Washington must seriously address the question of who will dominate the Indian Ocean, the eastern approaches to Europe, and south and central Asia - powers committed to policies of moderation, restraint and the preservation of stability; or those committed to fundamentalist fanaticism and violent radicalism. In this regard it is significant that a recent CIA publication asserted that "Although stability has long been a goal of the [USA], after September 11th, it has become our key objective." 

An alliance between India and Israel, openly endorsed by the U.S., would create a potent stabilizing force in the region, which together with like-minded regimes such as Turkey, could contribute significantly towards facing down the forces of radical extremism so hostile to American interests in Western and Central Asia and beyond. 

There are however considerations beyond regional stability that make a vibrant Indo-Israeli axis a clear U.S. interest. For example, in the newly emerging balance of geo-strategic power, the growing Chinese challenge to U.S. primacy will almost inevitably dictate the need for a regional counterweight to Chinese domination. 

In this regard, a powerful, progressive India bolstered by Israeli technological expertise appears the most plausible and practical alternative. Several weeks after 9/11, prominent Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland wrote in an article, "A Test of True allies": "India and Israel are the most vibrant democracies in a vast swath of countries from North Africa through the Himalayas that should now be seen as a single strategic region. Jerusalem and New Delhi are also end points of the U.S. campaign [against terror]." 

He went on to warn that the U.S. should resist pressure from the bureaucracy of falling into "one of the fundamental mistakes of the Cold War, which was to convert tactical relationships with dictators into ideological, strategic alliances." 

Hoagland's final words seem appropriate here: "Dictators snap the whip and seem to make things happen quickly. But they own only the moment. That is why they clutch the present so fiercely. The future belongs to democratic leaders, who can build and sustain consensus and commitment to ideas and values. They are Bush's true allies, however difficult dealing with them can be at a moment of crisis." 

The economic and political success of the American-Jewish community is well known. Far less known are the impressive accomplishments of the Indian community in the U.S. 

Only recently the Indian government began to recognize the latent potential of their kin-folk abroad. In September 2000, the Government of India launched a High Level Committee to prepare a comprehensive report on the Indian Diaspora, to inform the Indian public of the achievements of the Indian Diaspora and to propose a new policy framework to leverage these invaluable human resources This major initiative revealed: The per capita income of the [Indo-American] community is currently estimated at $60,093 compared to the average per capita income of $38,885. 

High levels of education have enabled the Indo-Americans to become a very productive segment of the U.S. population. More than 87 percent of the Indo-Americans have completed high school while 62% have some college education compared to just over 20% for the [overall] U.S. population. 

The estimated annual buying power of Indian Americans in the U.S. is around $20 billion. 

As a result of these factors, together with the growing commercial interest in investment in India, the India caucus in the House of Representatives now numbers 118, indicating an impressive accumulation of political influence. 

Gerald Segal, late Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) referred to India and Israel as kin democracies "confronting insurgence." 

This view was echoed by India's Home Minister and deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani. On a FOX Television interview he stated: "terrorism insofar as we've seen it on 11th September ... has a common source, and that common source has described the United States, Israel and India as its three main enemies. 

Perhaps one of the most ironic illustrations of how the fates of the two nations have intertwined in the fight against common threats occurred on September 11, 2001 itself. 

At the time, a high level Israeli security delegation led by then head of the National Security Council Maj. Gen. Uzi Dayan was on a visit to India to discuss future cooperation in dealing with threats from terrorism, and other developments in the Middle East and South Asia. 

During the course of meetings on the afternoon of that fateful day with his Indian counterpart Brajesh Mishra, word came of the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 

The discussion reportedly ended so that both sides could watch television together as the events in America unfolded. 

Indo-U.S. relations have undoubtedly developed tremendously since the days of the Cold War when India was more closely aligned with the Soviet Union. Indeed, apart from a short period of tension following the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, there has been an almost uninterrupted development of the bond between New Delhi and Washington. 

Almost paradoxically, the events of 9/11, which should have brought the parties even closer together, have given rise to an issue of dispute. This focuses on American policy towards Pakistan. Indian sources warn repeatedly that the U.S. policy of cultivating Pakistan and the Musharraf regime is both short-sighted and counter-productive. They point out that it was the Pakistani intelligence services (ISI) that created the Taliban and that they now continue to cultivate and collaborate with Taliban and al-Qaida elements. 

According to the Indians, the U.S. action in Afghanistan has not resolved the problem, but merely displaced it - to a possibly more difficult and dangerous location. Russian sources tend to echo Indian concerns and identify Pakistan as the most worrying epicenter of terror and fundamentalist fanaticism today. Voices in the U.S. support the Indian position. One Washington-based researcher states that: "Musharraf used his alliance with radical Muslim clerics to ... form a powerful and destructive military-mosque nexus that helped transform Pakistan into a magnet for radical Islamic terrorists in the region and around the world." 

Jim Hoagland of The Washington Post also strongly backs the Indian position and cautions against the dangers of Bush being "urged by the bureaucracy to concentrate on the short-term advantages of a Faustian bargain with the Pakistani ruler" and observes that "that bargain's shortcomings [have] become apparent. The promise by Pakistan's intelligence services to foment uprisings in southern Afghanistan and to arrange defections from the Taliban and bin Laden's network have fallen flat, even as Bush heaps more economic aid and political forgiveness on Musharraf." 

Martin Sherman is Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University and a contributing expert at the Ariel Center for Policy Research and a senior research fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, both also in Israel. Sherman acted as a ministerial advisor in the 1991-2 Shamir government

U.S. Acknowledges India as Regional Force
Pledge to Share Civilian Nuclear Technology Follows Military Cooperation, Indian Navy Growth
Cooperation between Washington and New Delhi reached new heights on July 19, when President Bush announced his intention to provide civilian nuclear technology to the world’s most populous democracy. While the announcement came in for criticism by the arms control community and will necessitate a congressional ok. The White House was quick to note that India’s civilian nuclear programs are already open to international inspection and the country has a spotless record on proliferation. It is understood that the deal will also help reduce India’s dependence on imported energy sources; a driving factor in India’s relationship with Iran.

President Bush toasts Prime Minister Singh during the State Dinner.The grand reception given Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in mid-July by the Bush Administration, including the first State Dinner since the President’s reelection last year and only his fifth since taking office, suggests that the White House wishes to secure a firm partnership with the dynamic country of more than one billion persons. India may also prove to be a strategic counterweight to China’s growing global might. 

While the recent elevation of the U.S.-India relationship may be centered on India’s burgeoning energy needs and its concomitant dependence on imported energy sources, it remains a relationship built upon the solid foundation of cooperative military ventures conducted since the Cold War’s demise opened the door for New Delhi to reassess its strategic position both regionally and globally. 

U.S.-India Military Cooperation 

The United States and India have cooperated with one another in the military realm since the late 1980s. In recent years, maritime piracy, terrorism and India’s links to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for example, have brought about unprecedented levels of international cooperation in order to police the world’s oceans. One driver for this cooperation has been the U.S.-devised and -led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a cooperative international program designed to prevent rogue states from receiving materials and equipment used to construct weapons of mass destruction. While India is not yet a PSI participant, Washington has been keen to get New Delhi to sign on. Indian participation is important as the Indian navy has the operational capability to make its presence felt in the most vulnerable regions of the Pacific Ocean such as the Straits of Malacca, a 500-mile long route between Malaysia and Indonesia. For more on possible Indian naval counter-terrorism and anti-piracy operations in the Malacca Straits region

India's Kalpakkam nuclear power plant.India and the United States have engaged in joint naval cooperation since the mid 1990s most recently completing the Malabar 04 joint exercises in October 2004. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was in India in early December 2004 discussing a range of issues with Prime Minister Singh and Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee. Rumsfeld told reporters, “The defense relationship is a strong one and something we intend to see is further knitted together as we go forward in the months and years ahead.” 

Blue Water Fleet and Shipbuilding Expansion 

India’s relatively recent acquisitions and modernizations are indications of their commitment to a “blue water” navy. India has commissioned new frontline warships such as the INS Brahmaputra, a Delhi-class missile frigate with major high-technology components manufactured in India. In April 2000, the Indian Navy commissioned a 24,000 ton fleet replenishment tanker, the INS Aditya. This tanker, which can double as a command platform, is a necessary component for a naval force to operate for long periods of time on the open ocean. 

The INS Brahmaputra, a Delhi-class missile frigate.
The navy has also refitted and modernized the INS Viraat, previously India’s only aircraft carrier, with close-in weapon systems (CIWS) for defense against sea-skimming cruise missiles, improved radar and electronic-warfare equipment, and a new communications suite. 

The navy also acquired the former Soviet aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov as well as two Russian Akula II fast attack nuclear submarines. The Gorshkov deal was finalized in 2004 after years of haggling. Reportedly, the ship will undergo an extensive refit costing some $800 million to include modifications to allow the operation of the Mig-29 Fulcrum’ naval fighter, 30 of which India will take delivery of as part of the carrier purchase. Also reportedly purchased were six Kamov-31 attack and reconnaissance anti-submarine helicopters, torpedo tubes, missile systems and gun units, costing an additional $700 million. It is estimated that the ship will enter service in 2008 as the INS Vikramaditya. 

India also has vast plans for keeping its shipbuilding facilities up to date. Dedicating $110.6 million of the 2005 defense budget to this purpose, India’s domestic shipbuilding facilities will be much better equipped to deal with the 19 warship orders placed over the last two years. Despite this, the Indian navy will have a difficult time keeping an adequate number of ships in their fleet as the current shipbuilding rate is but two-and-a-half per year while the navy’s retirement rate is six per year. The newly allocated money will help equalize the countries shipbuilding capabilities with the navy’s demand for new warships. 

India’s Strategic Imperative 

India seems to have several reasons for its naval expansion. In an interview with Bharat Rakshak (www.bharat-rashak.com), a consortium of Indian military web sites, former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Madhvendra Singh said, “Today, a navy is not just for safeguarding your borders. It is also an instrument of state policy. There are common concerns like terrorism, protection of sea lines of communication, piracy and transportation of weapons of mass destruction. With the growing concern about international terrorism, it is necessary that on account of its unique location, size and potential in the Indian Ocean, India plays a more meaningful role.” 

Two Indian navy Shishumar-class submarines.India has long desired the capability to secure its exclusive economic zone, which extends 200 nautical miles from the coastline, as well as key trade routes around the Indian Ocean. The Indian economy is one of the largest in the world and is the second largest GDP among emerging countries based on purchasing power parity. India’s textile industry is the single highest foreign exchange earner and accounts for 20 percent of India’s industrial output and about 30 percent of India’s exports. The consequences of a disruption in maritime shipping could be devastating to this industry. India therefore will look to take responsibility for ensuring free passage of goods through the Indian Ocean. 

The World Energy Outlook 2002 conducted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) concluded that by the year 2030, India would have a 94 percent oil import dependency. The IEA is an international energy policy advisor serving its 26 member countries, including the U.S. Due to its dependency on imported energy sources, India faces very real risks of having that supply disrupted. U.S. overtures to share non-military nuclear technology to boost electricity production in India can be understood in this light. 

U.S.-India Cooperative Naval Exercises 

India has pursued a cooperative relationship with the United States Navy and has entertained invitations from regional states to patrol vulnerable shipping lanes in southeast Asia. In the modern age, the U.S. Navy has been the only substantial naval force in the Indian Ocean. 

Indian reporters speak with a U.S. sailor during the Malabar 04 exercises.One of the most recent joint military exercises between the United States and India occurred in October 2004. These exercises, known as Malabar 04, involved close to 2,000 U.S. and Indian naval personnel and took place off the southwest coast of India.

Participating in the exercises from the U.S. Navy were the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG 63), the Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided-missile frigate USS Gary (FFG 51), the Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Alexandria (SSN 757), and P-3C maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. The Indian navy participated with the destroyer INS Mysore, the frigate INS Brahmaputra, the tanker INS Aditya and the Shishumar-class submarine the INS Shankul. The Shankul , a locally-constructed German Type 1500 submarine, is equipped with eight 21-inch torpedo tubes, anti-ship mines and has a crew of 40. 

The 24,000 ton fleet replenishment tanker INS Aditya.The 2004 exercises were the sixth of their kind between the Indian and United States navies. What began as simple communications checks and basic maneuvers quickly became full-scale “war-at-sea” exercises. Other exercises during Malabar 04 included small boat transfers, maneuvering as a group, nighttime underway replenishments, and visit, board, search and seizure drills. U.S. Navy public affairs noted that Malabar 04 was designed to “increase the interoperability between the two navies while enhancing the cooperative security relationship between India and the United States.” 

After practicing boarding operations and search and seizure techniques learned from the U.S. Navy, the Indian navy have considerably improved its skills at fighting the growing scourge of maritime piracy and terrorism. India took a further step when it commenced joint exercises with the Japanese Coast Guard. Termed Sahyog Kaijan 2004, the exercises involved a mock hijacking of a merchant vessel. India and Japan share a common strategic ground with regard to their dependence on oil shipping routes in the Persian Gulf. 

India-Israel Military Ties Continue to Grow 
Troop Training to Supplement Arms Sales 

Israel is expected to train four battalions of nearly 3,000 Indian soldiers for specialized anti-insurgency strikes, adding to their training in desert, mountain, jungle, and counter-hijacking and hostage crisis situations. New Delhi's turn to Jerusalem for combat soldier expertise is due, in part, to disappointing results in border clashes with Pakistani forces and to last year's suicide attack by Muslim terrorist infiltrators on Indian Parliament members. Among the many tasks expected of them, the newly trained Indian troops are expected to stop infiltration by Pakistani terrorists into India via the contested Kashmir region, according to the Jerusalem Post, Feb. 3, 2003. 

Presumably to equip these soldiers, India recently concluded a $30 million agreement with Israel Military Industries (IMI) for 3,400 Tavor assault rifles, 200 Galil sniper rifles, as well as night vision and laser range finding and targeting equipment. The purchase seems to demonstrate a broadening of the defense trade relationship beyond Indian purchase of Israeli high-tech electronic systems. For decades, New Delhi has bought most of its Air Force and Army hardware from Russia. To pay for all of this, the Indian defense budget has grown considerably and is expected to reach $100 billion in the next decade. 

Indo-Israeli trade is on the rise climbing from about $250 million annually to more than $1.15 billion in the most recent years and the defense sector has seen the most rapid growth. 

Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) services several large contracts with the Indian Air Force (IAF) including the upgrading of the IAF's Russian-made MiG-21 ground attack aircraft, sales of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and laser-guided bombs. Negotiations reportedly are in advanced stages for Israel to provide state-of-the-art fire control systems and thermal imagers for the Indian Army's Russian-made T-72 tank fleet. 

Indian defense officials acknowledged the acquisition of two Israeli Elta Green Pine long-range radar systems, a component of the Arrow Ballistic Missile Defense System, according to the International Herald Tribune, Feb.10, 2003. The same paper reports that India is negotiating the purchase the sophisticated airborne early-warning and control Phalcon system in a bid to bolster the country's defenses against missilesÑa deal that requires approval from the U.S. due to sanctions imposed on India in 1998 as a result of the country's Pokhran nuclear tests. 

Israeli-Indian-U.S. strategic talks have also begun on the sale of the complete Arrow missile defense system to New Delhi. A 2001 Pentagon review concluded that the defensive nature of the Arrow system exempts it from sales restrictions imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an international agreement designed to stop the spread of offensive missile technology. 

Along with its military needs however, the burgeoning Indian economy has led to keen competition for India's growing civilian aircraft market as well, where demand is expected to soar in the coming years. Europe's Airbus consortium recently won out over the Boeing Co. for the $1.7 billion contract to supply 28 commercial jets to Indian Airlines and the international flagship carrier Air India. The largest Indian aerospace firm, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), joined hands with IAI for the joint marketing of the HAL-built Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH). 

During February's Aero India 2003, the international aerospace exposition in Bangalore, HAL officials announced an agreement to integrate IAI's avionics into the ALH platform and to market the ALH globally. Also at the expo, IMI exhibited its anti-tank anti-personnel (ATAP) cluster bomb, designed to strike infantry and armored vehicles. Its sub-munitions include a self-destruct mechanism to minimize the risk to friendly forces and civilians entering the area after an attack, resulting in a significant upgrade for both Indian defensive and commercial operations. 

By JINSA Editorial Assistant Amrith K. Mago 

FOREIGN POLICY
Indian betrayal 
JOHN CHERIAN 

India announces its pro-American orientation once again by voting, at the IAEA meet in Vienna, in favour of reporting Iran to the United Nations Security Council on its nuclear programme. 

HERWIG PRAMMER / REUTERS 

At the beginning of the IAEA Board session in Vienna on February 2. 

AFTER three days of discussions, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board finally voted to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council on its nuclear programme. Twenty-seven out of the 35 countries on the board voted for the resolution. Not surprisingly, India was among them. Cuba, Venezuela and Syria voted against the resolution and Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya and South Africa abstained. 

The vote was taken after Washington reluctantly agreed to put in a clause in the resolution to make West Asia "a nuclear weapons-free zone". The resolution expressed "serious" concern about Iran's nuclear programme and said that it may not be "exclusively for peaceful purposes". The resolution requested IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei to "report to the Security Council" steps Iran needed to take to dispel suspicions about its nuclear programme. 

The Indian government had bargained for a quick vote in the February 2 meeting on the question of referring Iran to the Security Council. The disinformation campaign launched by the Bush administration in the world media gave the impression that the overwhelming majority in the IAEA Board was in favour of the move. Russia and China, which had abstained in the vote against Iran in October, had signalled that this time around they would vote with the United States, France, Britain and Germany. 

The Indian government, which had come under considerable criticism domestically for voting against Iran the last time around, was ostensibly sitting on the fence this time. Prime Minster Manmohan Singh had expressed the hope that the dispute would be resolved without the matter being taken to the Security Council. He, however, went on to add that India's vote would depend on the text of the draft resolution. He again denied at a press conference that his government was under pressure from the West: "There is no question of bending... But we are also very keen to have strategic nuclear cooperation so that our energy security can get an added edge." Prior to the vote, senior Indian Foreign Office officials had, however, indicated that the country's vote would once again be with the West. 

The majority of the countries representing the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the IAEA Board did not blindly offer their support to Washington's position. Interestingly, India, which is a founder member of NAM, seems to be more keen on distancing itself from the organisation. It was Malaysia that chaired the meeting of NAM member-countries on the sidelines of the IAEA meeting at Vienna. The majority of NAM members either sided with Iran or abstained in the vote. 

Egypt, with the support of NAM, had spearheaded the move to link Iran's referral to the Security Council to the long-standing demand that the whole of West Asia be declared a "nuclear weapons-free zone". This was an implicit demand that the West should ask its ally in the region, Israel, to get rid of its nuclear arsenal. NAM countries as well as independent observers of the international scene have all been pointing at the double standards involved in the current exercise to blackmail Teheran into giving up its right to engage in peaceful nuclear activities. 

Washington, despite the majority of IAEA Board members being in favour of such a resolution, refused to be flexible. Even the European states on the IAEA Board are not averse to this move. France had played a key role in helping Israel develop its nuclear weapons at the Dimona nuclear facility. Arab countries as well as Iran fear nuclear blackmail from the West and Israel. French President Jacques Chirac recently stated that using nuclear weapons to combat terrorism is justified. Every other day, senior Israeli officials threaten to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. 

Javed Veaidi, the deputy head of Iran's National Security Council, said in the first week of February when the IAEA meet was on that if his country were referred to the Security Council, the proposal to move Iran's uranium enrichment programme to Russia would stand cancelled. Senior Iranian officials have once again said that they are willing to negotiate directly with Washington on the nuclear issue. Ali Larijani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator in Vienna, sent a written communication stating that any referral of Iran to the Security Council "would be the final blow to the confidence of Iran" in the IAEA. 

Former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said that referring Iran to the Security Council would be an "act of injustice and cruelty" that would undermine the credibility of organisations such as the U.N. Russian and Chinese officials have once again reiterated that they are against economic sanctions being imposed on Iran by the Security Council on the nuclear issue. Russia and China continue to insist that reporting Teheran to the Security Council does not automatically mean the imposition of sanctions. 

After the latest turn of events, the Security Council will have to wait first for ElBaradei's comprehensive report on Iran's nuclear programme. The report will be presented in the first week of March. ElBaradei said in the first week of February that he had been told by the major powers that sanctions on Iran were not on the cards. "All of them are saying that this is simply a continuation of diplomacy," he added. ElBaradei told the IAEA Board that Iran had one more month to extend full cooperation to the international community. He told the media in Vienna that "we are reaching a critical phase, but it is not a crisis". 

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had vowed to resist pressure from the West. At a rally in the town of Bushehr on February 1, he stressed that on the nuclear issue, his country would resist until it fully achieved its rights. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki had warned the IAEA that if Iran were hauled to the Security Council, the country would immediately stop cooperating with the U.N. inspectors and "eject" them from the country. Teheran has also indicated that it will consider seriously the option of walking out from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accelerating work on its nuclear projects. The Iranians have reasons to be angry. President George W. Bush had, in his State of the Union address in February, virtually called on the Iranian people for help in effecting a "regime change" in Teheran. 

The way India voted in Vienna will have serious repercussions in domestic politics. The U.S. Ambassador to India, David Mulford, is known for his blunt manner of speaking. He seems to have forgotten basic diplomatic norms in the course of an interview he gave to the Press Trust of India (PTI) in the last week of January. The interview was given at a time when there was a national debate on the "Iran" issue and the India-U.S. nuclear deal. The Left parties as well as many of the other leading Opposition parties have been openly critical of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government's handling of the two issues. Many of the parties supporting the UPA government had even threatened to consider withdrawing support to the Congress-led government on the issue. 

Mulford, in his interview, "made an observation" that if India did not vote with the West on Iran at the IAEA Board meeting, then "the effect on members of Congress with regard to this civil nuclear initiative will be devastating". Mulford was referring to the opposition in the U.S. Congress to the nuclear cooperation deal signed between India and the U.S. He emphasised that if India did not vote with Washington and the European Union-3 countries (Germany, Britain and France), Congress "will simply stop considering the matter" and the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal "will die in the Congress". 

In the course of the interview, Mulford also said that India's plans to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities were in fact "inadequate". He said that Washington wanted more of India's facilities to be classified as civilian so that they were subject to inspection. As recent events have shown, the Indian government has given the "deal" its highest priority. It is only the criticism from the Left parties and the debate that it triggered that has made the government a little cautious in its headlong rush to embrace the Bush administration. 

In the face of the protests from almost all major political parties, the government had no other option but to summon the American Ambassador and officially convey the government's displeasure. Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran told Mulford that his remarks were inappropriate. The U.S. State Department claimed that the American Ambassador's statement had been taken "out of context". The American reaction came in the wake of the domestic uproar. Mulford had in the same week demanded that India open up unconditionally to foreign direct investment. 

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) as well as the Bharatiya Janata Party has demanded the recall of the Ambassador. The CPI(M) Polit Bureau, in a statement, termed Mulford's comments as "a serious affront to India and its sovereignty". The CPI(M) said that the government should issue a categorical statement that India would not countenance a reference to the Security Council on the Iran nuclear issue. The party also demanded that the UPA government make public all details about the proposal regarding the separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities. Surprisingly, the BJP, which is known for its pro-American orientation, has called for an all-party meeting to discuss Indo-U.S. relations. 

Another illustration of the American imperial overreach was the U.S. State Department's "aide memoire" to the Indian government to protest against the decision to allow Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Videsh to purchase a stake in a Syrian oilfield along with a Chinese company. The Bush administration has included Syria, along with Iran, in its black list. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had earlier advised New Delhi publicly to desist from going ahead with the gas pipeline project with Iran. It may not be a coincidence hence that India's outspoken Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar was shifted out of the high-profile Ministry recently. Murli Deora, who is known for his pro-business and pro-American proclivities, has replaced him. From available indications, the Iran gas pipeline has already been put on the back burner. In any case, Iran may not be in a mood to oblige India after the latest vote in Vienna.

Southern Indian army chief begins Sri Lanka visit
Press Trust of India Colombo, November 30|18:35 IST

The chief of India's southern army command today called on Sri Lankan army commander and discussed matters of concern and exchanged views of bilateral of interest, the defence minsitry here said. 
Lt Gen B S Takhar is on a five-day visit to Sri Lanka. According to the Defence Ministry, Takhar and Shantha Kottegoda "discussed matters of concern and exchanged views on bilateral matters of interest."

The Indian commander also called on Sri Lanka's Chief of defence staff, Daya Sandagiri, a naval officer, the Ministy said in a statement.

The visit comes amid changes in the military leadership in Sri lanka following the victory of President Mahinda Rajapakse who is expected to make several changes in the military top brass.

India steps up security for missions in Bangladesh
Indo-Asian News Service New Delhi, November 30, 2005|13:07 IST

India has stepped up security at its missions in Bangladesh following militant threats to Western embassies and is framing a long-term strategy to insulate itself from a new wave of Al-Qaeda-inspired terror threatening that country.

"There is now a greater preparedness to deal with these terrorist threats. We have been putting in place a series of steps since the Aug 17 serial bombings in Dhaka," a top official in New Delhi said.

The Indian mission in Dhaka was put on high alert after a militant group claiming allegiance to the Al-Qaeda threatened on Sunday to blow up Western missions in Dhaka, including that of the US and Britain.

Security was also stepped up at India's assistant high commissions in Chittagong and Rajshahi.

Refusing to disclose specific steps on the ground that they would impinge on national security, the official said: "We have stepped up security in our high commission. There is no threat to us as such, but we are tightening security to be on safer side."

The threats could not be taken lightly as some terrorists were spreading anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh, he remarked.

"We are working on a long-term strategy to deal with this new brand of terrorism that has struck Bangladesh," one official said.

This strategy could include a move to strengthen democratic institutions in Bangladesh through steps taken along with the US. India and the US -- which is the largest foreign investor in Bangladesh -- plan to intensify their efforts to promote democracy in the region under the Global Democracy Initiative.

In a fresh spell of terror attacks on Tuesday, six people were killed and 65 wounded by suspected suicide bombings in the capital Dhaka and the port city of Chittagong.

The attacks have been attributed to militants who want to convert Bangladesh into an Islamic state based on sharia (Muslim law).

The August 17 strike, when some 500 small bombs went off across Bangladesh within half an hour, bore all the hallmarks of an Al-Qaeda operation, said intelligence officials. The bombings also highlighted the threat to India's security interests in the region, they said.

This new brand of fundamentalist terrorism inspired by the Al-Qaeda was steadily increasing in Bangladesh with the active patronage of the ruling establishment, the officials said.

The ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Prime Minister Khaleda Zia had aligned with fundamentalist outfits like the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islami Oikya Jote (United Islamic Front), they pointed out.

Indo-Lanka defence pact soon: Natwar 
DH News Service Colombo: Saturday, June 11, 2005

India has offered the Sri Lankan army an air defence system to strengthen the Lankan air force. 

Visiting External Affairs Minister of India Natwar Singh said here on Friday that the proposed Defence Co-operation Agreement between Sri Lanka and India “is in the process of being finalised”. 

“India and Sri Lanka already have extensive cooperation in the defence field. The Defence Co-operation Agreement is in the process of being finalised. 

There are certain procedures to be followed and the process is underway,” Mr Natwar Singh told reporters here on Friday after the end of the sixth session of the India-Sri Lanka Joint Commission. 

Mr Natwar Singh on Friday morning co-chaired along with his Sri Lankan counterpart Lakshman Kadirgamar the sixth session of the India-Sri Lanka Joint Commission, where both the countries have entered into two bilateral agreements, on Small Development Projects and an exchange programme for educational development. 

Answering a question pertaining to the proposed defence agreement, Mr Natwar Singh, who arrived in Colombo on Thursday on a three-day official visit, said, “The Defence Co-operation Agreement would be a framework for co-operation avoiding the regular exchanges between our defence establishments, training of personnel and capacity building. 

“This is a continuous process”. 

Claiming that the government of India maintained “an abiding interest in the security of Sri Lanka and remains committed to its sovereignty and territorial integrity”, the visiting Foreign Minister said India is always supportive “of seeking a comprehensive negotiated settlement acceptable to all communities and reflecting the pluralistic nature of Sri Lankan society within the framework of a united and democratic Sri Lanka”. 

Speaking at the joint press conference, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar confirmed that India has offered an air defence system to strengthen the Sri Lankan air force after reports of the illegal acquisition of air capabilities by Tamil Tiger rebels. 

“Yes, certainly, this is very much under discussion. We will accept it yes. We are looking into ways and means as to when it can be done,” Mr Kadirgamar said, there was no time frame set for the acquisition of such a system from India. 

President Chandrika Kumaratunga will host a dinner on Saturday in honour of the visiting Indian foreign minister, who has already held talks with Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse. 

During his stay in Colombo Mr Natwar Singh is also scheduled to meet leader of the Opposition Ranil Wickremesinghe and other representatives of political parties, including the four-party Tamil National Alliance (TNA) before leaving Colombo on Saturday. 

Indo-Lanka Defence Agreement draft finalised 
[October 20, 2004 - 8.45 GMT] 

The Governments of Sri Lanka and India yesterday finalized the draft of the proposed Indo-Lanka Defence Agreement.

Some of the fields that would be included in the agreement are military training, exchange of military intelligence and information and maritime surveillance to prevent illegal activities affecting both countries

A five member Indian delegation led by Additional Secretary to the Indian Defence Ministry Ranjith Issar arrived in Sri Lankan yesterday to finalize the draft which was on hold for more than a year

All Lankan eggs in Indian basket? 
The Island :10 November 2004

"The joint Indo- Sri Lanka statement issued after the visit of President Chandrika Kumaratunga to New Delhi and the proposed Defence Co-operation Agreement together with complementary agreements such as on Pallaly Airport are being hailed in all quarters here, except by the LTTE. There is much satisfaction because such Indo-Lanka co-operation, it is considered, would be a positive deterrent to LTTE terrorism breaking out again and would help resolve the 20 year- old North-East conflict. 

The basic assertions of the Indo-Lanka joint statement reveals that there are no fundamental changes in India’s Sri Lanka policy and it is a reiteration of the former Indian position, even when relations were at their worst. India being committed to the unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, their support for a negotiated settlement and opposition to terrorism in all its manifestations, have been stated in documents exchanged between the two countries much earlier and even quite recently. What is new is the warmth, friendship, and commitment of both countries to these stated objectives which are being bolstered by the economic and trade ties such as the Free Trade Agreement and more such agreements on economic co-operation in the offing.

The Indo- Sri Lanka Defence Co- operation is being welcomed even by those who opposed the hegemonic features in the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987 because of the militaristic threat of the LTTE in the North-particuarly in the Jaffna peninsula. The Sri Lanka government is trapped in its own peace process from opposing the LTTE’s military build up. The LTTE, all concerned are aware, has been building up its military cadres and re-arming by smuggling of arms during the entire period of this cease- fire. 

A recent report by the prestigious London based International Institute of Strategic Studies has said that the LTTE has even acquired a light aircraft. On the other hand the ‘international community’ involved in our ‘peace process’ does nothing to halt this military build up and will howl if Sri Lanka commences rapid arming of its forces. America helps in training the armed services and perhaps may even provide some military intelligence but the European nations involved are doing nothing to prevent contributions flowing in from their countries into the LTTE war chest.

Thus, India whose security is being threatened on the Southern flank by this terrorist organisation is the only foreign power that will be committed to take on the LTTE militarily as it did in the late 1980s. As the former Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes has said: the security concerns of Sri Lanka are the security concerns of India as well.

But all this places Sri Lanka firmly in the Indian sphere of influence circumscribing its defence strategies and limiting its foreign policy options. It will no longer be have the freedom of action as it did as an independent, non aligned nation when it permitted Pakistani troops to pass through Sri Lankan ports from the west wing of Pakistan to the east wing during the Bangladesh war. According to reports there appear to be some hiccups about the agreement on the Pallaly Airport because the Indian government wants to limit its use to Sri Lankan and Indian Forces only. While such limitations will not be desirable in normal times, does Sri Lanka now have another option than to grant India’s request?

Former Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made no bones about hiding Indian hegemonic desires in South Asia and used the Sri Lanka Tamil insurgency to make Colombo toe the New Delhi line. While Indians did realise its folly of using terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy and fought LTTE terrorism later on, today’s situation is that Sri Lanka has to depend on India to save its territorial integrity.

Perhaps, as some Indian political strategists maintain, no country is fully sovereign and certainly small countries such as Sri Lanka can enjoy only limited sovereignty.

But can Sri Lanka place all its eggs in the Indian basket? New Delhi’s Sri Lanka policy is also conditioned by the so-called Southern option—- central coalition governments depending heavily on support of South Indian parties, particuarly from Tamil Nadu. What would happen if a pro- LTTE Tamil Nadu party begins to rock an Indian coalition government?

What is required now is astute political leadership although the present incumbents are light years away from it. The only option available appears to be the Superpower or Hyperpower as it is now called. India too has its limitations when it comes to relations with the United States. Could our leaders be smart enough to use Lanka-US relations to influence India to our advantage? This will indeed be a long shot considering what President Ronald Reagan’s trouble- shooter General Walters told Colombo newsmen in 1987: ‘You settle your problems with India, we will not interfere.’ 

Right now, there appears to be no option but to place all Lankan eggs in the Indian basket."

Making conditions right for Indo-Lanka collaboration 
Jehan Perera from Colombo 

The visit of Pakistan?s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz to Sri Lanka came a less than a fortnight after two Pakistani naval ships docked in Colombo harbour on a goodwill visit. The timing of these visits may be coincidental. Mr Aziz?s visit was in his capacity as Chairman of SAARC, a position currently held by Pakistan. He is presently on a visit of several South Asian countries, including India. But the fact that the two Pakistani visits come shortly after the visit by President Chandrika Kumaratunga to New Delhi where she met with Indian leaders including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh brings the proposed Indo-Lanka Defence Agreement into focus. The question is against whom is this agreement targeted. Mr Aziz for his part diplomatically declined to comment on this issue when in Sri Lanka.
Signing a Defence Agreement with India appears to be one of the few matters on which there is bipartisan political agreement in Sri Lanka. Former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe also canvassed the matter with his Indian counterpart, former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. An Indo-Lanka Defence Agreement was part of the grand design of an ?international safety net? that the former Prime Minister sought to put in place as a countervailing factor to the concessions he was making to the LTTE on the ground. However, the LTTE reacted very negatively to what it perceived to be a grand coalition of world powers that would throttle it and render it impotent in the end. They helped to precipitate the downfall of Mr Wickremesinghe?s government. LTTE breaches of the Ceasefire Agreement severely eroded the former government?s credibility as one that could safeguard the integrity of the country.
The proposed Indo-Lanka Defence Agreement seeks to bring India?s military dealings with Sri Lanka under one framework. It seeks to systematise the military training, sale of military equipment and sharing of information that already take place between the two countries. India is now by far the biggest trainer of Sri Lankan military personnel. The proposed defence agreement would, however, see an increased role for India as a supplier of military equipment to Sri Lanka. But perhaps the most significant aspect is that the combined impact of formalising the Indo-Lanka military cooperation would be that Sri Lanka would enter into the realm of having a ?special relation? with India that would clearly bring the country within the Indian sphere of control. This could be a blow to Sri Lanka?s traditional defence-related allies in the region, of which Pakistan and China take the leading place.
General belief
So far the only publicly pronounced unhappiness shown by any party to the proposed Indo-Lanka Defence Agreement has come from the LTTE and Tamil political parties. During the tenure of former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, the LTTE?s chief ideologue, Dr Anton Balasingham, voiced his apprehension that ?A military pact with India would encourage the Sinhalese political leadership to take a hardline belligerent attitude towards the Tamils and eventually destroy the mutual trust between the estranged communities which is a crucial factor necessary for the consolidation and promotion of peace.? In his recently published book, Dr Balasingham has spelled out the LTTE?s belief in their cat and mouse relationship with India.
The mainstream Tamil media, which has been closely echoing the LTTE?s views on matters that affect the overall strength of the Tamil polity in Sri Lanka, have also taken a strong stand against the signing of the Indo-Lanka Defence Agreement. One newspaper editorialised that ?India would have to clarify whether the pact was aimed at scuttling the struggle of Sri Lanka?s Tamils for substantial autonomy based on their right to self-determination.? Another commentator accused India of ?fishing in troubled waters of Sri Lanka to establish its economic and military hegemony over the entire island.? This Tamil apprehension is that the defence agreement would lead to a strengthening of the Sri Lankan government?s military capacity and hence reduce its willingness to yield or be politically accommodative to the LTTE?s negotiating position.
Most Sri Lankans, on the other hand, do see India as a bulwark against the LTTE and against Tamil separatism. It is believed that India would never permit the division of Sri Lanka into two states because this could inspire similar separatist sentiments in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu state. India has had, and will continue to have, its separatist movements in a number of states, such as Nagaland, and they will continue to be resisted regardless of the status of Sri Lanka. There is also a need to be sensitive about India?s domestic pressures that can lead to India ignore appeals from its troubled neighbours. Both the government and people of Tamil Nadu have in the not-so-distant past been openly supportive of the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka. As the well-known maxim of international relations goes, states do not have permanent friends but only permanent interests.
In this context the memory of the dramatic events of May 2001 cannot be far from the minds of Sri Lankans who uphold the territorial unity of the country and oppose the division of the island on an ethnic basis. It was in that fateful month that the biggest military base in the Jaffna peninsula was overrun by the LTTE who then made their way to the outskirts of Jaffna city itself. The Indian response to the Sri Lankan government?s appeal for military assistance was lukewarm and was to offer humanitarian assistance to evacuate the troops. In the end it was military equipment from Pakistan that tilted the balance and enabled the Sri Lankan army to turn back the LTTE and hold on to the northern capital. If, in the realm of inter-personal relations a friend in need is a friend in deed, it would be Pakistan that would count as nearest to a friend of the Sri Lankan state in that time of need. India has not yet publicly explained the constraints that held it back from acceding to the Sri Lankan request for military assistance.
Caution warranted
India?s constraints as a military ally would be only one reason why Sri Lanka should be judicious in signing a defence agreement with India when it has no external enemies. A comparison with other defence-related agreements that India has signed, such as with its other neigbours, Bhutan and Nepal, would reveal that India tends to demand a high price in terms of exclusive relations. Sri Lanka has only to look at its own Indo-Lanka Peace Accord that was signed in 1987. Letters exchanged between the leaders of the two governments summarised Indian concerns about Sri Lanka?s independent foreign policy where it touched on India?s geopolitical concerns. They stated that ?both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities prejudicial to each other?s unity, territorial integrity and security.? Indian concerns at that time pertained to the use of Sri Lanka?s ports and airwaves by foreign powers.
The issue of Indian conditionalities when it comes to the signing of military-related agreements has surfaced once again over the repairing of military airport within the military complex at Palaly in the Jaffna peninsula. Media reports indicate that the Sri Lankan government has been considering an Indian request to grant India sole user rights of that airport along with Sri Lanka, therefore creating a special relationship that would exclude all other countries. In return India has offered to repair the airport as a gift from India. The Sri Lankan experience in May 2001 raises the question whether accepting such a condition would be in the best interests of Sri Lanka. Also as a democratic government that seeks a negotiated settlement of the ethnic conflict there is a need for the government to seriously consider the protests that emanate from Tamil society as they are a part of the polity whose sentiments need to be respected.
On the other hand, there are important reasons why India would wish to be more involved in Sri Lanka?s peace process, which is heavily internationalised at present, with the US, Japan and the EU playing important roles in it in addition to the Norwegian facilitators. It is reasonable for India, as the big power of the region, to be apprehensive about the entry of so many other big powers into a region it considers its own backyard. However, if India is to play a constructive role in Sri Lanka, it should find itself a role that would be welcomed by all sections of the polity, by ensuring a win-win solution for every one of them. Unfortunately this is the genius that India has failed to show in the past in its dealings with Sri Lanka. The still-evolving Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement could be the centre-piece of a new relationship based on mutual benefit. 

A document of deviation 
JOHN CHERIAN 

The Framework Defence Agreement between New Delhi and Washington signals India's continuing shift towards a U.S.-led unipolar world and the UPA government's violation of the Common Minimum Programme. 
Front Line :Volume 22 - Issue 16, Jul 30- Aug 12, 2005

THAT the special relationship between New Delhi and Washington was being elevated to an even higher level by the Indian government became amply clear with the signing of the Framework Defence Agreement. The 10-year agreement was signed during the visit of Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Washington on June 28. "The United States and India have entered a new era," said a statement issued after the signing of the agreement, which came three months after Washington announced its intention to help India become a "major world power". The two countries had signed the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP) Programme in January 2004. 

Before his departure to the U.S., the Defence Minister had told the media that his visit was a routine one. However, he returned with the agreement on "strategic partnership". The Left parties were stringent in their criticism of the agreement. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) said that the agreement was fraught "with serious consequences for India's strategic and security interests" and would have a "direct bearing" on India's foreign policy. 

Not surprisingly, the only major political party to support the agreement openly was the Bharatiya Janata Party. In fact, Jaswant Singh, External Affairs Minster in the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government and currently a senior spokesperson for the party on foreign affairs, claimed much of the credit for the agreement. He said that the agreement was merely "paperwork" implementing the understanding his government had reached with the U.S. "What Pranab Mukherjee has done is to ink a document" to take the present government on "the path that the NDA had first embarked on," Jaswant Singh told the media. 

It is evident that a lot of diplomatic spadework, much of it in a cloak-and-dagger fashion, was done prior to Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Washington. Prakash Karat, general secretary of the CPI(M), told Frontline that the agreement was signed in a "stealthy manner". He pointed out that the Defence Minister who had said that he was on an "exploratory visit", came back with a full-fledged agreement. "The agreement does not augur well. It ties India to the strategic goals of the United States in the region," Prakash Karat said. 

In retrospect, the Indian side seemed keen to sign on the dotted line in order to guarantee the "success" of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington a few weeks later. The agreement, a detailed and comprehensive document, talks "about transforming" the relationship between the two countries on the basis of "shared national interests". It lays great emphasis on the two countries being among the "largest" democracies in the world. The Bush administration wants India to play a key role in its mission to spread "democracy". 

The U.S. seeks to impose Western-style democracy on the resource-rich states of West Asia and Central Asia. Using the "democracy card", it seeks to undermine Moscow's influence in East Europe and Central Asia. In capitals such as Moscow and Beijing, "democracy" has become a buzzword for "destabilisation" of their governments. What they most dread at this juncture are more "democratic revolutions", supervised from Washington, like the "rose" and "orange" revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, which brought pro-Western governments to power. 

THE opening paragraph of the agreement talks of "the vital importance of political and economic freedom, democratic institutions, the rule of law, security, opportunity around the world". Manmohan Singh also struck to the script written in Washington by constantly emphasising on "shared democratic values" and "civilisational" bonding between India and the U.S., during his visit. 

The more substantive part of the agreement deals with defence cooperation. The first defence cooperation agreement between the two countries was signed 10 years ago, when the Congress had a monopoly of power at the Centre. The new agreement notes that in the past 10 years Indo-U.S. defence relationship had "advanced in a short time to unprecedented levels of cooperation unimaginable in 1995". The agreement goes on to state that the new defence relationship "will be an element of the broader U.S.-India strategic partnership". Its other key point pertains to the goal of "defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism". More controversially, the agreement states that the defence establishments of the two countries will "collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interests". 

Prakash Karat pointed out that under the terms of the agreement, both the military establishments have agreed "to collaborate in multinational operations when it is in their common interest". There is no mention that such multilateral operations will be under the auspices of the United Nations. "It opens the way for Indian participation in American-led military operations", he said. It is no secret that the American establishment views China as the main threat in the region. "The primary U.S. strategic goal is to isolate China," Karat said. 

The CPI(M) leader said that the Bush administration was also keen to rope in India into its missile defence system programme for Asia. The American game plan for the Asian region has become even more blatant after the release of the Pentagon annual report on China in the third week of July. The report stresses that China has long-term ambitions to extend its influence across Asia and its leaders and it "may be tempted to resort to force or coercion more quickly" to advance its security interests or resolve disputes. 

The agreement states that the defence establishments of the two countries "will expand collaboration relating to missile defence". The NDA was among the first to welcome Washington's decision to scrap the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and replace it with the missile defence programme. "The offering of the Patriot missile system to India is a bait," Prakash Karat said. It is well known that the U.S. Missile Defence System is targeted against China. It is no surprise that its most enthusiastic backers are Japan and Taiwan, the two closest allies of the U.S. in the region. The CPI(M) in its statement said that the agreement came at a time when the U.S. was actively working to prevent China from enhancing its defence potential. "What is unstated in this agreement is the U.S. aim of containment of China, using India as a counter-weight," the statement said. 

Prakash Karat warned that the U.S. offer for co-production of defence equipment was a ploy to open the lucrative Indian defence market to the American military industrial complex. The Bush administration is especially keen to sell F-16s to India. "There is no talk of sharing high technology," Karat said. Under the terms of the agreement, the two sides have also envisaged joint patrolling of important sea-lanes such as the Malacca Straits. Karat said that it was the prerogative of Asian states to cooperate to ensure the security of maritime trade in the region. "Malaysia and Indonesia are against the concept of joint patrolling." The member-countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have said that they would jointly ensure the security of the sea-lanes and are against outside powers stepping in. Karat feels that the eagerness of the U.S. to involve the Indian Navy in the joint patrols is part of the larger game plan of drawing India into the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Japan and Australia are enthusiastic backers of the PSI in Asia. 

Karat emphasised that there was no mention of "collaboration with the U.S. on this scale" in the Common Minimum Programme (CMP), to which the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government is committed. He said that the CMP highlighted the need to pursue an independent foreign policy and promote multi-polarity in international relations. "The Congress-led government may end up dovetailing our military capabilities with that of the Americans," he said. 

Left leaders have cautioned the government not to go beyond the "framework" stage of the agreement. 

DIPLOMATS belonging to several developing countries are surprised by the Indian government's haste in initialling the defence agreement with the U.S. "After this India will not be welcome in groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The agreement goes against the principles of the Non-aligned Movement," said a senior diplomat based in New Delhi. He said the agreement, besides bypassing the U.N., supported the concept of "preventive action" propounded by the neo-conservative Bush administration. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has in fact demanded that Washington set a date for dismantling its military bases in Central Asia. 

Pranab Mukherjee insists that the agreement was designed merely to fill up "critical gaps" in technology. In an interaction with the media he said that the UPA government continued to follow an independent foreign policy and that the agreement "to widen Indo-U.S. friendship in the important sector of defence" was also part of this policy. "Through this framework agreement, we have expanded and widened the relationship. Nobody is forcing us to do something." Pranab Mukherjee said that the Congress government headed by P.V. Narasimha Rao in the early 1990s started the policy of strengthening relations with the U.S. 

Manmohan Singh told the media team accompanying him on his Washington visit that India's national interests would not be compromised. Reacting to the criticism from the Left parties, he said that he and the Congress were not willing to "take lessons in patriotism" from other parties. 

The present leadership in the Congress has few foreign policy differences with the BJP. In fact, some influential policy-makers in the present government are of the view that the NDA government's cosying up with Washington and Tel Aviv when it was in power was only a continuation of the foreign policy initiated by the Congress in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War.

Decoding the India-U.S. defence tie-up 
Sandeep Dikshit  (The Hindu Tuesday, Jul 05, 2005)

Was the agreement on defence cooperation suddenly sprung on Pranab Mukherjee when he arrived at the Pentagon? This is a question that needs to be answered. 

DID DEFENCE Minister Pranab Mukherjee and senior Defence Ministry officials mislead the media and the country about the significance of their American visit, which ended in the signing of the "New framework for the Indo-U.S. defence relationship"? Would it not have been fair for the Government to indicate the impendency of an arrangement that could rework the country's security philosophy? 

Before setting out for the United States, Mr. Mukherjee did not want much significance to be read into the visit. Emerging from the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security that discussed his brief for talks with his American counterpart, Donald Rumsfeld, and other senior State Department and Pentagon officials, he said the trip was "exploratory" in nature. "I am not going with a shopping list. This is a visit by an Indian Defence Minister to the U.S. after a long time." 

If it was only an exploratory visit, how did the two countries end up signing a document obligating India to a defence relationship some of whose provisions go against the tenets of its foreign policy? These clauses include the intention to "collaborate in multinational operations," "expand collaboration relating to missile defence" and "assist in building worldwide capacity to conduct successful peacekeeping operations." 

Besides the fact that there were no discussions with the supporting parties on the defence framework, which transcends the term of the present Government, Mr. Mukherjee's briefing to the media after the CCS meeting lost credibility when he concealed the main purpose of his tour. 

To be fair to Mr. Mukherjee, most of the questions at the post-CCS meeting explored the prospects of a mega arms purchase agreement. But at another briefing by senior Defence Ministry officials hours before they boarded the aircraft as part of Mr. Mukherjee's entourage, an official said: "We are not going to open something that is closed but to build on the existing relationship." "The invitation for the visit had come from the previous Bush regime but the Defence Minister could not go as he had Parliamentary commitments. So it was decided to utilise the gap between two Parliament Sessions to make an exploratory visit," he added. 

So, was the agreement suddenly sprung on Mr. Mukherjee when he arrived at the Pentagon? This is a question that needs to be answered. 

Those in the know say that an agreement was in the pipeline for "quite sometime." It was initiated when the previous government was in office and some senior Cabinet Ministers from the Congress party had their way by deciding to continue with its formulation. They did not want the work on the defence framework to be made public for "obvious reasons," meaning the fear of opposition from within the ruling establishment and its supporting parties to continuing with the previous government's urge to build a more abiding defence relationship with the U.S. 

In the pipeline for long? 

"It was in the works and is well prepared. Such a thing cannot be conjured out of nothing. It seems to have been processed carefully," says the former Foreign Secretary, Shankar Bajpai. He believes the reason for the secrecy was the need to fine-tune the clauses and points out that no Government will reveal such an agreement in advance. As for discussing the broad contours with the allies and supporting parties, he points out there is no past precedence of negotiating an element of broader strategic partnership with another government through the public. 

The supporting parties and a large section of the strategic community feel otherwise. They had banked on the United Progressive Alliance Government adopting an operating style different from that of the previous government, of encouraging debate and discussions on broad aspects of the country's approach to regional security. Instead of opening to the public the hitherto closed process of evolving a new defence paradigm, the new Government has sustained the old approach.

 Indo-US Defence Agreement: Impact on India's Neighbourhood 

Article no. 1782  Date 7 July 2005 ,IPCS* Mathew Joseph C 
Fellow, Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies, University of Jammu

The Defense Agreement signed by India and the US on 28 June 2005 is of historic significance. Known as the New Framework for US-India Defense Relationship (NFDR), it extends the Agreed Minute on Defense Relations signed between the two countries in 1995. The NFDR will continue for the next ten years; it envisages that both countries will cooperate in fighting terrorism, curbing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, strengthening their respective militaries, enhancing defense related research and development, and collaboration in multinational operations.

The NFDR is a forward step in the strategic partnership between the two countries, and is a great recognition accorded to India by the sole superpower in the world. According to them, this has occurred because of the tectonic shifts that have taken place on the strategic horizon. In line with this thinking, the US will support India's aspirations to become a member of the UN Security Council. We can easily conclude that it is out of political compulsions that the US has entered into this agreement with India. 

The present agreement conforms to the long-term strategic calculations of the US. The end of Cold War suddenly removed its 'other' from the scene. However, the American strategic planners needed the presence of an 'Other' to maintain its pre-eminent position in the world. This led to the invention of new enemies like 'Islamic fundamentalism' and China. In the US strategic framework, India is ideally placed to be an ally in its conflict with these new enemies. 

There is considerable ideological convergence between the current neo-conservative strategic thinking in the US and the ultra-nationalist strategic discourse in India. Both are virulently anti-Muslim, and share the view that an emerging China would be a threat to their respective national interests. It is interesting that, despite a change in government, the mainstream Indian strategic thinking continues to follow the ultra-nationalist worldview.

India may not gain much from this agreement in the longer run. There is a stark contradiction between the unilateral approach of the US and India's multilateralism. It will be difficult to reconcile these two diametrically opposite principles in international politics. Pragmatism cannot obliterate such fundamental contradictions.

The impact of NFDR on India's neighbourhood will be negative. Both China and Pakistan have already expressed their concern and anxieties about this new development. The smaller countries in South Asia will also not feel comfortable with the new Indo-US camaraderie. The fragile peace in South Asia will certainly become a casualty. The current normalisation process between India and China will also be adversely affected by the new agreement. China will be suspicious of a major power like India drifting towards its strategic adversary. This could hamper the progress in the ongoing negotiations on the border dispute between India and China. 

Unlike China, Pakistan will be greatly worried about the developing friendship between India and the US. Pakistan's position as the 'major non-NATO ally' of the US will not be of much solace. The insecurity complex that Pakistan suffers vis-a-vis India will automatically increase due to the NFDR. Pakistan's strategic experts have already pointed out that the NFDR will result in the undoing of the delicate strategic balance in South Asia. Hence, Pakistan will also be compelled to acquire more sophisticated state-of- the-art weapons to counter the strategic imbalance caused by the signing of the NFDR by India and the US. This could lead to a renewed arms race between India and Pakistan.

The NFDR has the potential to derail the present peace process between India and Pakistan. The major strides taken by both countries in their bilateral relations during the last two years might evaporate as a result of the Indo-US agreement. In other words, enlarging American intervention in South Asia is not good for the stability of the region.

As a regional power, India needs to understand its geo-strategic limitations. It is important that it reassures its nervous neighbours. This does not mean that India must sacrifice its national interests for peace and tranquility in its neighbourhood. However, India must not forget its potential and limitations in becoming a 'great power'. In this context, the NFDR will not be beneficial to India. It will make India a pawn in larger US strategic designs despite the rhetoric of common interests and values being shared by both countries. Furthermore, it will create suspicions and misunderstandings about India in South Asia.
(*IPCS: Institute of peace and conflict studies)

India Seeks New Relationship With U.S. 
- After Coming Out of the Nuclear Closet 

"When India came out of the closet as a nuclear power, the Indian government made a huge and important shift in its politics, from ambiguity to clarity," Dr. Raja Mohan, a nuclear physicist, told JINSA leaders in a November 16 meeting. Mohan and Mr. S. K. Singh, former Indian foreign secretary and long-time Indian representative to the United Nations, held an informal presentation on the Indian view on the nuclear tests, the sanctions and the future. Both stressed that because of the shift in politics, India is now seeking a new relationship with the United States. 
Mohan, strategic affairs editor for The Hindu(one of India's largest newspapers), said the five Indian underground nuclear tests in May 1998 made an important change in both the global and the regional nuclear question. 

Singh emphasized too that the Indian attitude towards the global nuclear export-control mechanisms has changed. Historically, India opposed arms limitations such as export-controlling mechanisms, because India would have profited from such exports, he said. "Today, however, we are willing to cooperate with these institutions." India is beginning to emerge as a major exporter of nuclear technology. For instance, they have exported one hundred tons heavy water to South Korea, and have the potential to export small reactors to various states, Singh maintained. 

The contradiction, however, is that India still is subject to trade restrictions, Singh continued. "The United States is saying 'fine, don't export, but we're not going to make you a member of the nuclear regime.'" 

Mohan said that the differential treatment India is receiving from the world community is unfair. "India will abide the rules of the nuclear regime if the U.S. just will let us in," he said. He also pointed out the different American approach to China. India, unlike China, which violates MTCR, scrupulously abides by the nonproliferation regime and is not rewarded. "The United States deals very differently with China and India when it comes to export issues, which is a sore spot in New Delhi," Mohan said. He related that because of the severe bans on trade with the Indian nuclear programs; the sale of all American goods, including items as innocuous as toilet paper, are prohibited. "There seems to be an overriding philosophy that giving a pin to the Indian Atomic Agency is threatening to the balance of power," he said. 

Mohan also raised the concern that the nuclear regime character is not evaluated in the U.S. "The non-proliferation regime is flawed. India is democratic and China is not; China is a proliferator and India is not; China escapes sanctions and India does not." 

At the end of the Cold War, the world faced new realities, Singh continued. "Today, the non-proliferation world is deteriorating fast, with new powers and new technologies emerging. In this environment, the U.S., the only remaining superpower, is insinuating that India should [live in the past] and ignore the real world," Singh said. 

The economic sanctions imposed on India after the May tests are believed by India to be manifestly unfair, Singh said. "The U.S. has lifted the sanctions on Pakistan. But they can't do the same for us, because our economy is doing well at the moment," he said. Mohan and Singh agreed that New Delhi has been penalized because the Indian economy is doing much better than the Pakistani economy. "Must the Indian economy decline and reach Pakistan's level before we will get help from the U.S.?" the two asked. 

The effects of the sanctions on India will not have a deep impact in the long run, because of the country's former emphasis on independence in economic politics, Mohan said. "In the short term the sanctions will have an impact due to the general decline in world economies," he said. "India has now a five to six per cent GDP growth rate, but we really need a seven or eight percent growth per year, so we are definitely facing some uncertainty in the short term." 

Singh said the technology sanctions have forced India to do all research and development on her own. "Remember, India has the largest number of civilian remote-controlled satellites in space." Although the United States over the years has imported Indian technology, it has not been exporting technology to India. And now, Singh and Mohan claimed, the United States is starting to pressure Israel, with whom India has had good technical trade relations, to buy their products elsewhere. 

Over the past ten years India has undergone changes in its outlook on the world, Singh and Mohan contended. "Prior to 1989, the India that pursued non-alignment and the G-77 globally," Singh said, "was also an India that followed socialism and self-reliance. In 1989, we came to the realization that socialism was not effective anymore, and we appraised globalization after that." Today, India is not wedded to socialism or multilateralism, but prepared to embark on more bilateral oriented policies, Singh said. 

Back in 1947 when India won her independence, it was important for the nation to consider the balance of power game in the region, Mohan said. "As a newly independent country India was not ready to jump straight into a new relationship, where India would be the junior partner. So that is a way to look at the non-alignment strategy we pursued," he said. "It was a way for India to maximize its own room between the two power blocks. After 1991, however, things have changed, and on a basis of common interests India will negotiate with anyone." He continued: "India is becoming a 'normal' power; it has matured as a modern state, and is past the phase of rigid 'independence'." 

Regarding India's relations with Pakistan, Singh and Mohan said that India is not worried about Pakistan alone, but is concerned by the Pakistan-China relationship. They also pointed out that the U.S. and India have a common interest in the future of Pakistan. "Where Pakistan is going in the next ten years is a concern for both us and you," Mohan said. "The 'Talebanization' of Pakistan, the decline in the elite classes, and the concern that people will turn to the extreme side of Islam, is a problem for all parts concerned in the region," he said. 

U.S. Ends Sanctions 

The Clinton Administration announced on Dec. 2, 1998 that it waives the economic sanctions against India and Pakistan, the Washington Times reported. The lift in sanctions came about only six months after the nuclear tests that set off the punishment on the two countries. The announcement followed after a meeting between President Clinton and the Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, during which Clinton urged the Pakistanis to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 

Indian left out of step over US exercises 
By Siddharth Srivastava  Asia Times: South Asia  Nov 11, 2005 

NEW DELHI - India's left parties' antipathy toward the United States has reached new heights. 

The Indian military, known to stay neutral vis-a-vis the politics of the country, is facing the ire of pickets organized by left parties angry over mock exercises between the Indian Air Force and its US counterparts. 

Protest leaders say the plan is to assemble 500,000 pickets across the country. The exercises are ongoing this week in the state of West Bengal, a left bastion. 

Initial reports suggested protestors were distracted by the amazing array of aircraft on display, instead of going about their job. But the mood changed as more than 150,000 slogan-shouting communist activists assembled and thousands more began pouring in to demonstrate against the "American military presence". Huge contingents of police have been deployed, but so far the protest has been peaceful - though the left is known to orchestrate rallies that turn violent. 

In a conciliatory statement, the US Air Force has said the left protest against the Indo-US military exercise is an example of freedom of speech and expression in a democracy. "One of the reasons we serve in the military is to preserve freedom of speech in a democracy," said Colonel David Cannon, Pacific Air Force's public affairs director. Pacific Air Force is the sponsor of the joint exercise, codenamed "Cope 05". 

The left is a crucial coalition partner to the Congress Party-led government in New Delhi, without whose support it cannot survive. It is the first time Indian pilots have encountered the vaunted F-16 fighter planes in India, and also the first time in decades that a military airbase is facing the brunt of a political protest. Observers say that a rally of this scale only occurred prior to India's independence in 1947. 

The exercises were conceived almost two years ago as part of thawing relations between New Delhi and Washington, which previously had held back sending F-16s to India out of fear of a reaction from Pakistan. This is the third such exercise, though Indian and American forces have been engaged in mock exercises for more than a decade. More than 250 US air force personnel along with equipment, including a dozen F-16s, have arrived at the Kalaikunda airbase in West Bengal. 

Though Indian pilots are facing American F-16s from the Misawa base in Japan, the Indian Air Force had held an exercise with Singapore's F-16s earlier this year. Established in the 1940s, the Misawa base is Washington's main military buffer against Beijing in the sensitive Pacific arena to defend Japan. 

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh last week sought personal assurance from the chief minister of West Bengal, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee (who belongs to the left), that state law-enforcement agencies would ensure that protests did not get out of hand. According to reports, the federal government threatened to invoke the National Security Act that allows unlimited powers to maintain internal security. However, the state government promised that the protest will be "peaceful". 

Still, this has not prevented the high-decibel, anti-US rhetoric the left parties are known for. At the protest site, a stone's throw from the barbed enclosure of the air force base, a left party leader said: "The days are not far when we will have red [US] flags flying over this airbase and at other airports in the country. Who can tell for sure that the US forces will not take over this air force base should they find it to their liking? As many as 130 countries in the world have American military bases." 

Veteran left leader and former chief minister of West Bengal, Jyoti Basu, has been quoted as saying: "We are totally against such joint military operations. It is unfortunate that the government seems to be getting into the clutches of the Americans." 

In a statement from New Delhi, the left parties supported the call to hold demonstrations at the Kalaikunda airbase, emphasizing that they were not happy with ongoing talks between New Delhi and Washington for a "big arms purchase" from the US, which could include F-16 fighter aircraft. "The missile defense cooperation negotiations are also being held. The deepening military collaboration does not augur well for India's strategic interests and independent foreign policy." 

Fearing mass protests against the military exercises, a US Embassy statement in Kolkata clarified: "These developments do not compromise India's sovereignty or independence. These are arrangements between two equal, important partners who look to the future and understand what some of their shared values and objectives must be." 

The left has been critical of the growing military ties between India and US, including the defense pact signed between the two countries in July. 

India and US inked a 10-year defense agreement, titled the "New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship", which was signed by Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his US counterpart, Donald Rumsfeld. The agreement is vast in scope and envisages a broad range of joint activities, including multinational operations, strengthening the two militaries to promote security and defeat terrorism, and deepening capacity to take on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

A prominent left party said in a statement the pact would only help serve US strategic goals in Asia and "was fraught with serious consequences" for the country's strategic and security interests. "If this agreement is carried forward, India will be placing itself in the same category as Japan, South Korea and Philippines, all traditional military allies of the United States." 

The protests against military ties are an extension of the overall antipathy of the left parties to the US. It may be recalled that they have been protesting against steps by the Manmohan Singh government to unshackle the economy (which they refer as capitulating to "consumerism" and "imperialism" of the US) as well the "agenda" to take Indo-US relations to new heights. Examples include deals relating to nuclear energy and military cooperation. 

Of note, no protests occurred during military exercises with Russia, and the left has always supported New Delhi's moves to build relations with Beijing. 

But while some analysts say the left parties operate in a time warp, the fact is the Manmohan Singh government cannot survive without their support. And, they have managed to slow down or force the government to renege on many decisions. And they pressure the government on numerous fronts. 

There has been virulent criticism of the Indian government's support of the US and European Union at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for their stance against Iran due to its insistence on pursuing an independent nuclear program. 

In another attempt to pressure New Delhi on Iran, the left parties extended support to Natwar Singh, who was forced out this week as foreign minister after being accused by a UN report of taking bribes in the oil-for-food program from the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. According to reports, the deal was that the left would back Natwar in exchange for his support of Tehran. Noting the importance of the left, senior Iranian diplomats in India have also been seeking out left leaders to press Tehran's point of view. 

Also, the left parties have stalled attempts to remove foreign investment restrictions in retail that are being actively lobbied for in New Delhi by US giant Wal-Mart. The left has also protested against moves at privatization of public sector companies. Recently, a countrywide protest was organized against the private sector taking over management of the country's airports. Government employees and the section of unionized labor form a considerable support base and are capable of holding the nation to ransom if they wish. 

Meanwhile, direct action by taking to the streets against the growing military ties with the US will come as another shocker for a government that is feeling increasingly suffocated by the demands of the left parties. 

There have been significant steps toward military cooperation between India and the US, with Washington also eyeing India's huge arms purchases scheduled over the next few years, in a bid to modernize the forces. New Delhi has been actively courted by the US in the recent past, with the country for the first time offering its complete range of weapon systems and platforms last year. 

Indian and US forces joined in the northwest Arabian Sea for India's largest-ever naval exercise. The 10-day "Malabar-05", which concluded last month, involved more than 10,000 officers and sailors from the two nations. It was the first time that aircraft carriers and fighters from the two navies exercised together. 

The Pentagon is extending an invitation to New Delhi to witness the first flight next year of one of Washington's most ambitious and classified fighter aircraft, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. This is an important gesture as India is not a partner country in the multi-billion dollar project. US Army personnel are also learning from the Indian Army's experience of combating insurgencies over the past 50 years, including recent operations at Kargil and Kashmir, to combat the situation in Iraq. 

Indeed, the US wants to engage India independently and move beyond the traditional hyphenation of US-India-Pakistan relations toward being a strategic partner to fend off China. This is the first time in the history of India-US relations that the US is looking toward India beyond the axis of Cold War nations, when India was seen to be allied closely with the former Soviet Union. 

Although the US has upped the supply of F-16 jets to Pakistan to 80 fighters, given Islamabad's supposed cooperation in the "war on terror", Washington has been looking to deal with India independently, as evidenced by the nuclear deal between the two, which seeks to recognize India as the sixth atomic power nation. 

However, the left parties have other ideas. By taking to the streets once again, the differences between the Congress-led government and its main coalition partner has only become shriller. 

Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. 

Sri Lanka Military Commitment Not in India's Interests
Analysis - by Ranjit Devraj 

NEW DELHI, Nov 11 (IPS) - While India is ready to enter into a 'defence cooperation agreement' with Sri Lanka, it is wary of being drawn into any military involvement in the island nation's two decades-old civil war that has seen violent strife between ethnic Tamils and the Sinhalese majority - leaving over 60,000 dead on both sides. 

And that explains the delay in the signing of a formal defence agreement that was at the heart of Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga's four-day visit to India last week. 

According to Prof. S. D. Muni, South Asia expert at the Jawaharal Nehru University (JNU), the two-year peace talks between Colombo and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are stalemated. For that reason, he said, Kumaratunga's government was keen to beef up military preparedness with Indian support. 

''The Sri Lankan government does not want to initiate a conflict but would be interested in deterring the LTTE from starting one. And the Tigers look as if they are on the brink of launching another offensive,'' Muni told IPS. 

Colombo held six rounds of talks with the Tigers between September 2002 and March 2003. But in last April, the rebels abruptly pulled out of negotiations demanding recognition, first, for the right to self-rule before proceeding any further. 

Kumaratunga's India tour preceded a three-day visit to Sri Lanka, that started Wednesday, by Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen in a new bid to revive the peace talks that were supposed to follow a ceasefire that Oslo successfully brokered in February 2002. 

Petersen who was scheduled to hold discussions with both Kumaratunga and the reclusive LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in the rebel stronghold of Kilinochchi has already made it known he did not have high expectations over the outcome. The envoy said he merely wanted to ascertain whether the two sides ''wished to move towards resuming negotiations.'' 

Colombo, too, seems to be in an intractable position. 

According to former Indian army general A.S. Kalkat, the difficulty for Kumaratunga's government lay in the fact that the LTTE had become a 'de jure' power in the north and east of the island and was running every aspect of civil administration in the areas within its control. 

A veteran of India's military intervention in the Jaffna peninsula to help implement the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord -- which ambitiously provided for the disarming of the formidable LTTE -- Kalkat said the new defence deal would essentially be a reiteration of the older one minus its military commitment. 

Kalkat, who currently chairs the independent U.S.-based International Council on Conflict Resolution, said despite the failure of the Indian army to disarm or even subdue the Tigers, India remained the only power capable of influencing the course of the current peace talks. 

''The Norwegians mean well but their role is limited to that of honest broker and the LTTE is keenly aware that they do not have the power (unlike India) to underwrite any arrangement,'' Kalkat told IPS in an interview. 

In 1987, the Tamil Tigers reluctantly accepted the peace accord under Indian pressure. Under the accord, a new north-eastern provincial council was formed and the Indian army was deployed as peace keepers in the north and east. 

However, differences between India and LTTE soon surfaced and led to clashes between Tiger guerrillas and the Indian peace keeping force (IPKF). About 1,200 Indian soldiers were killed during this phase of the conflict. 

India had to pull back its forces from Sri Lanka in 1989 following the election of Ranasinghe Premadasa, a strong critic of Indian mediation. 

Last June, an international initiative led by Japan to persuade the LTTE to come back to the negotiating table failed despite an aid package offer of 4.5 billion U.S. dollars. 

Japan's special envoy, Yasushi Akashi, who called for tangible progress in the peace process before the money would be released, came back from visits to Colombo and Kilinochchi in early last November a frustrated man. He complained about the ''visible lack of progress'' and reaching an impasse in talks with both sides. 

The Tigers' chief ideologue Anton Balasingham sniffed at the proposal saying that ''a solution to the ethnic conflict cannot be pre-determined by the resolutions or declarations of donor conferences, but has to be negotiated by the parties in conflict without the constraints of external forces.'' 

But there are strong hints in the country that a new Indo-Sri Lanka defence deal could be in the making. And this has already drawn protests from the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which was backed by the LTTE in the April general elections held in Sri Lanka. 

''Tamils feel that the proposed defence agreement between India and Sri Lanka would encourage Sinhala rulers to prepare for another war abandoning the current peace process,'' TNA member of parliament P. Sithamparanathan was quoted as saying in a statement. 

She added that recent visits to the island by India's top military brass including Army Chief Gen. Nirmal Chander Vij have ''caused apprehension among Tamils that preparations are underway for another war in the island.'' 

But Kalkat pointed out that India would be ill-advised to be involved again, militarily, with Sri Lanka if only because it still had to consider the sentiments of 45 million ethnic Tamils in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu - separated from Sri Lanka's Jaffna peninsula by the narrow Palk Straits. 

Apart from the 1,200 Indian lives lost in 1987, the IPKF was immensely unpopular not only in Tamil Nadu and the Jaffna peninsula but also among the Sinhalese majority who considered it a violation of their country's sovereignty. 

The best option, now, under the present difficult circumstances is for Colombo to do its own dirty work although New Delhi can always be counted on to render good neighbourly help because of the shared belief that religion, ethnicity and language cannot be the basis for secession. 

In any case, Kalkat puts it succinctly: ''There cannot be a military option to what is a political situation.'' (END/2004) 

India pulls Sri Lankan strings 
By Ramtanu Maitra  Asia Times

A two-pronged intervention by India and the United States over the past several days has helped avert a full-blown crisis in Sri Lanka, following President Chandrika Kumaratunga's peremptory sacking of three cabinet ministers - including the powerful Defense Minister Tilak Marapana - as well as the dismissal of parliament and a day later the imposition of a nationwide emergency. 

Kumaratunga's actions, which have all the earmarks of a coup attempt, coincided with Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's meeting with US President George W Bush in Washington. The crucial White House meeting was to secure formal US support for the peace-process to end the two-decade-old ethnic war between the Tamils and Sinhalas of Sri Lanka, and to enhance trade and economic ties with the US. The meeting took on added significance as it followed similar meetings Wickremesinghe has recently held with the heads of state of Japan, India and the European Union. 

By November 5, in response to growing international concern over the future of the peace process, Kumaratunga pledged her commitment to the ceasefire between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and declared that she had no intention of "resuming or provoking" hostilities with the rebels. But it is no secret that her actions are a deliberate strike at the Norwegian-brokered peace efforts and the ceasefire that has been in force for some time. 

Two days later, on November 7, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee told Kumaratunga that India was "anxious" about the recent political developments on the island, and that a constitutional crisis must be avoided. The peace process needs to continue, he told her, and a solution to current problems found through "internal political dialogue". That same day, Kumaratunga called for a "grand alliance" of all "national and patriotic forces", and backed down on the declaration of a state of emergency. 

India's advice had also been delivered by the US, which in addition withheld the signing of the free trade agreement that had been slated for the Washington visit. Later, to underscore that instability would not be tolerated, the US announced that joint US-Sri Lankan military exercises were to continue as scheduled. 

The upheaval in Colombo may eventually lead to an attempt to form a new government under the People's Alliance, backed by Kumaratunga. In the meantime, however, the danger is that with the prime minister ostensibly weakened and Kumaratunga's credibility already low, the most aggressive factions within both the Tamil and the Sinhala communities will find in the president's moves an open invitation to provoke a violent showdown. India's ability to weigh in critically and constructively in the current turmoil is testimony to the progress New Delhi has made in reshaping and deepening ties with Sri Lanka. 

Behind New Delhi's constructive role
Over the past few years, the relationship between New Delhi and Colombo has improved dramatically. Today, the Delhi-Colombo tie is a privileged one, based on total trust and willingness to cooperate on each side. Moreover, India's present-day policies toward Sri Lanka have Washington's open endorsement. 

Speaking to rediff.com on November 3, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said it is up to India whether to play a "catalytic role" in the Sri Lankan peace process. Expressing concern over the on-going violence in Sri Lanka, Armitage said: "The overwhelming interest we have is one of humanity. And that is the development of Sri Lanka. We want this island - this nation of over 20 million - to be a full, complete partner in the economic life not only of South Asia, but of the globe. We see no reason why Sri Lanka can't be an engine of growth in South Asia and I look forward to the day when it will be." 

US support to bringing Sri Lankan security under the Indian umbrella was evident when the USS Sides (FFG 14) completed port visits to Cochin, India and Colombo in May. At the time, USS Sides commander Octavio Manduley issued a statement saying, "The United States shares many common interests with India and Sri Lanka as well as the other countries of the Indian Ocean region, including mutual security and the prosperity of our people. Port visits like these two help contribute to those goals." 

Along with security concerns that India and Sri Lanka share, Armitage was referring to the recent strengthening of the Indo-Sri Lanka relationship with a qualitative boost in economic ties - a development identified with Wickremesinghe. 

In 1998, India and Sri Lanka signed a free trade agreement (FTA). Despite India's reluctance to sign it at the time, the accord was inked because of the Sri Lankan initiative. Under the agreement, India vowed to eliminate tariffs on 1,000 Sri Lankan products over a period of three years, and Sri Lanka promised to do away with tariffs on 900 Indian products within eight years. The development was hailed by a section within Sri Lanka as a "landmark agreement" because it provided Sri Lankan manufacturers with access to the vast Indian market. 

But others in Sri Lanka criticized it, fearing a danger of downsizing and closures with resultant mass unemployment and a setback to indigenous technologies. However, the success of the FTA became visible within a short period of time. According to recent statements by Central Bank of Sri Lanka Governor A S Jayawardena, there has been a huge improvement in two-way trade between India and Sri Lanka since the FTA was signed. He views it as a prospective model for similar agreements, not only with countries in the South Asia region, but elsewhere. For instance, Sri Lanka has signed a preliminary agreement with the US, and a final agreement is expected in the near future. 

"Even a small country can have an advantage over a large country because of specialization," Jayawardena points out, discussing the accomplishments of the FTA. Likewise, Indian industry was worried about products from Sri Lanka flooding the market. That also did not happen. The genius of Wickremesinghe was in realizing the essence that economic relations could be increased multifold, and made a precursor to the much broader regional economic cooperation which has so far eluded the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in its two decades of existence. The Sri Lankan prime minister's vision is for regional economic integration through free trade, shared infrastructure and expanded physical connectivity across borders. On paper, all seven of SAARC's member nations - Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka - are committed to such an agenda. 

Economic partnership
The fast growing economic and trade ties between Sri Lanka and India were given a boost when the prime ministers of the two countries formally received the first two copies of the reports of the Indo-Lanka Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in New Delhi last month. A decision had been taken in June 2002 to expand economic ties from the current trade in goods to cover new areas of economic cooperation. The two prime ministers appointed an India-Sri Lanka joint study group in April to make recommendations for the establishment of a partnership. Its report subsequently pointed out that entering into a comprehensive partnership agreement would take the two countries to a qualitatively new level of engagement. 

The CEPA replaces the existing trade agreement, which was restricted to a list of goods for trade between the two countries and covers a very wide spectrum of trade and economic areas such as service, aviation, transport, tourism and investment. In fact, the agreement in general allows the two countries to enter into broad negotiations covering all service sectors and modes of supply within the GATT framework. Besides, it facilitates greater investment flows by addressing identified regulatory and operational constraints, helps implement measures to enhance economic cooperation, and paves the way for trade and investment liberalization. 

In addition to the economic ties now enhanced, Sri Lanka has indicated that it is most likely to award oil and gas exploration rights off the island's northwest coast to India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp. 

"We feel that Indian companies will be at an advantage, especially in the Cauvery Basin, because they are familiar with the region," Daham Wimalasena, chairman of Ceylon Petroleum Corp, said recently. Records indicate that Sri Lanka had carried out a drilling exploration program more than 20 years ago, but did not find any oil. Now, Wimalasena concludes, the government cannot afford further drilling. 

The peace process
The moves to enhance bilateral economic relations between India and Sri Lanka were not being carried out in a vacuum. They were triggered at a time when international efforts were afoot to bring about a political solution to the two-decade-old ethnic hostilities in Sri Lanka. They took place also at a time when New Delhi was pushing hard to develop concrete economic and investment ties with Southeast Asia, East Asia, China and the SAARC nations. In addition, India, too, has endorsed the peace moves. 

It is no secret that Wickremesinghe's three official working visits to India since his government came to power in December, 2001 have brought about a sea of change in Indo-Sri Lankan relations. It is widely acknowledged both in Colombo and in New Delhi that the Sri Lankan prime minister considers relations with India one of the cornerstones of his foreign, economic and national security policies. In fact, whether it is publicly admitted by Colombo or not, the Sri Lankan government has long realized that the peace process between the Tigers and Colombo is a non-starter without acknowledging the fact that India is a vital component of the process. In recent months, the Europeans and Americans have also made clear India's importance in working out a solution of the Sri Lankan imbroglio. 

It is widely known by now that in the 1980s, particularly during Indira Gandhi's regime, India harbored and trained Tamil Tigers, and provided operational intelligence to the LTTE. There was a time when the Tigers used Tamil Nadu, the southernmost Indian state of some 55 million Indian Tamils, as a sanctuary for Tamil opposition groups, including the LTTE. It was pointed out by Sri Lankan analyst Gaston de Rosayro that as late as 1996, New Delhi had warned Colombo that a former south Indian-based militant group had been attempting to mobilize political support among radical groups for the Tigers. But it became evident later that the overtures by the Tamil Nadu-based Eelam National Democratic Left Front to garner support for the Sri Lankan guerillas had had little impact on the Indian Tamils. The goodwill that the Sri Lankan Tamil extremists once enjoyed among Indian Tamils had evaporated like a bottle of camphor during the 1990s. This development provided New Delhi with a mandate to act tough against the Tigers, but without taking recourse to vengeance. 

Sri Lanka recognizes that India has been circumspect throughout the last 20 months of peace talks between Colombo and the Tigers. By not demanding extradition of Tiger supreme Velupillai Prabhakaran, who has been tried in absentia in India and found guilty of the murder of former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, at an early stage of talks, New Delhi paid heed to Colombo's concerns on the sensitive extradition issue. Colombo feared that a demand for extradition of Prabhakaran by New Delhi would preemptively collapse the peace talks. 

Security concerns
New Delhi appears to be aware at this point that it cannot afford to perpetuate yet another serious security problem in the neighborhood. According to analysts in Colombo, Wickremesinghe's official visit to Delhi last month was not only to strengthen economic ties, but also to establish formal military ties constituting a defense pact. 

As the joint statement issued subsequently said: "The two prime ministers discussed the ongoing cooperation in training and supply of equipment to the Sri Lankan defense forces, and agreed that the two sides will commence discussions with a view to conclude a defense cooperation agreement at the earliest." 

Wickremesinghe reportedly pressed for the signing of a Defense Cooperation Agreement. India is understood to have kept the door open for discussions on the matter at an appropriate time, as reported by the Delhi-based news daily, The Hindustan Times. It is a moot question whether Kumaratunga's sudden act was to bring about an end to that process. 

On the other hand, it should be noted that although there had been no formal agreement between New Delhi and Colombo on joint naval surveillance, the two countries joined hands during these 20 months to put up a joint naval blockade across the Palk Strait, which separates Sri Lanka's northernmost tip from the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. This blockade was aimed at preventing the Tiger cadres from running guns and drugs, ferrying the Tiger cadres and smuggling in fuel from the Indian coastal areas. 

It is evident that no matter what New Delhi and Colombo work out as a security arrangement, the vital Tamil issue will be subsumed within it. Those in Colombo who find it difficult to accept the growing power of India in the region will eventually come to recognize that the huge Indian republic cannot allow the festering of an on-going security problem on its threshold. 

India's priority on resolving the Tamil-Sinhala conflict reflects the international convergence on security issues. Recent reports from the US embassy in Colombo indicate that about 30 US Air Force experts have begun a joint survey of Sri Lanka's airfields to assist their local counterparts with their security, medical and engineering needs. For the past eight years or so, the Tigers have claimed that Sri Lankan troops were being afforded extensive combat-training in the southern Wirawila district, where US Special Forces have set up a sophisticated military training camp. The Colombo government, while maintaining a diplomatic silence on the issue of foreign intervention, had not denied any of the rebel allegations. 

In reality, the US is not only involved in training the Sri Lankan military, but is also selling military hardware to Colombo. Despite the measures undertaken by Colombo, India is aware that the Tamil Tigers remain a potent force. In mid-October, Defense Minister Tilak Marapana admitted that the Tigers "have gradually crept in and established a stronger foothold". As a result of this aggressive posture by the Tigers during the period of ceasefire, Colombo has increased defense outlays in its budget and made some procurements from Russia, China and Israel to update equipment for the military. 

The threat posed by the LTTE was also addressed recently in the United Kingdom, which had long been the international headquarters of the Tamil Tigers. Recent reports indicate that the Tigers are in the process of winding down operations in London in the wake of tough UK anti-terrorism laws. Sri Lanka has conveyed its "serious concerns" to South Africa that the violent separatist group may shift its headquarters there. "The South African government has been forewarned about this possibility and they have taken this question on board," said foreign ministry spokesman Ravinatha Aryasinha. 

Tamil Nadu bans CPI (Maoist)
Press Trust of India
Posted online: Wednesday, July 13, 2005 at 1237 hours IST

Chennai, July 13: The Tamil Nadu government today banned Communist Party of India (Maoist) for indulging in unlawful activities, an official release said here. 

The party, formed in September 2004 with the merger of two banned Naxalites parties -- Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist), popularly known as People's War and Maoist Communist Centre of India - both of which were proscribed by the Centre and Tamil Nadu government. 

"The party was banned as it was indulging in 'unlawful activities, maintaining links with other banned extremist groups, circulating handbills, pasting handwritten posters containing seditious slogans, calling upon the people to pursue the path of violence and had involved itself in violence and in criminal cases and causing terror among the people," the release said. 

The party, through seditious literature, wall writing, posters and pamphlets had been inciting and encouraging its members to use criminal force and violence against government machinery, it said. 

Speech of Prakash Karat  At The Public Meeting Held By the Left Parties 

“New Framework For The India-US Defence Relationship” 
On July 8, 2005 

The framework agreement on India-US Defence Relations signed in Washington recently is a major step to harness India to serve the US strategic goals in Asia.

The Indo-US military collaboration began in January 1992 during the Narasimha Rao government. An India-US Army Executive Steering Committee was set up. This was followed by the setting up of the Joint Steering Committee of the two navies. Joint naval exercises were conducted in 1992. In 1994, the Joint Steering Committee of the two air forces was set up.

The Indo-US Military Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1995. This agreement, the first of its kind, provided for officers of the Indian Armed forces being sent to the United States for training programmes, staff exchanges and joint exercises.

The BJP-led government took forward the military collaboration to the level of a strategic alliance. This was in keeping with the Vajpayee government’s declaration that India was a natural ally of the United States.

After the interruption caused by the sanctions imposed by the United States after the Pokhran explosion in 1998, the BJP-led government proceeded rapidly to cement a strategic alliance with the United States. This involved regular joint exercises between the defence wings of the two armed forces and resumption of the International Military Exchange and Training (IMET) Programme for the Indian armed forces.

The BJP-led government offered port and airport facilities for the US armed forces when they began their military operations in Afghanistan after the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Vajpayee government was disappointed when the United States decided to make Pakistan the frontline state and ally. The BJP-led government redoubled its efforts to make India act as a junior partner for the US strategic interests in the region.

It is in this period that the Indian government allowed the FBI to set up its office in Delhi. It was the first country to welcome the National Missile Defence programme announced by President Bush. The BJP-led government agreed to use Indian naval ships to escort US ships through the straits of Malacca.

The current agreement takes this strategic and military cooperation further. There are four major features which stand out and which are not in India’s security and strategic interests.

Firstly, the agreement says the two defence establishments will “collaborate” in multinational operations when it is in their common interests. There is no mention of the United Nations auspices for such operations. By this clause, India has accepted the US concept of multinational operations in third countries without UN mandate. It is well known that such operations such as the multinational force in Iraq are commanded solely by the United States military. The UPA government should explain what are the multinational operations outside the purview of the United Nations in which India can participate with the United States.

Second – the agreement states that both countries will expand collaboration relating to missile defence. It is well known that the United States is actively trying to build a missile defence shield by drawing in Asian countries as part of its National Missile Defence system. Japan has already agreed to be part of the system.

The United States cannot be offering the Patriot missile system without expecting India to be part of this overall missile defence system.

One should remember that in the 1990s the United States sought to prevent India developing its missile defence system. Two instances can be cited. In 1992 the US pressurized Russia to cancel the sale of the cryogenic rocket engines to India by threat of sanctions against the Russian space agency, Glavkasmos. In August 1993, the USA alongwith G7 countries issues a diplomatic note to India not to deploy the Prithvi missiles and to stop the Agni programme.

If the United States is today offering the Patriot missile system to India, it is only with the motive of interlocking India in its missile defence system.

India and the United States have gone beyond just talking about ballistic missile defence. In a report in The Hindu dated 9th October 2004 by Amit Baruah, an interview to the October issue of Force magazine by David Mulferd, the US Ambassador to India has been cited. “Asked if he saw the possibility of the two countries going beyond merely talking about such defences, the Ambassador was quoted as saying, `Yes, I think that is what is under discussion now. There has already been a discussion about technology and systems.’ Do you think that ballistic missile defences would destabilize the entire region? No, the Ambassador responded, stressing that these were defensive systems. `The only problem that I see is that it is a technically complicated subject and there are different generations of systems available. So the issue is to figure out which system is needed where. This is a complicated process.’ Mr. Mulford said.”

Third, the agreement talks about shared security interests in protecting free flow of commerce via land, air and sea lanes alongwith preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, data and technology. It is unfortunate that the UPA government does not view security issues in Asia as those which can be discussed and resolved among the Asian countries but seeks to advance US interests in the region. For instance, the security of the sea lands is an issue in which the US has already involved the US Navy in the Malacca straits.

It is significant that Malaysia and Indonesia took the stand that they can cooperate with Singapore to ensure the security of the sea-lanes in their region when the later proposed to involve the United States. The formulations in this section seek to involve India in the proliferation security initiative sponsored by the US. The US has set up a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) in which Australia and Singapore are participants.

The littoral states of the straits of Malacca are Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Both Malaysia and Indonesia are opposed to the introduction of external armed forces in guarding the Malacca straits. Unlike Singapore, which wants the involvement of the US, the two countries have been advocating a joint regional initiative in the ASEAN.

The Chief of the Indonesian navy stated in January 2004 that “Indonesia deems it not necessary to include troops from outside countries including the United States – to be involved in safeguarding the strategic waterway” (Jakarta Post, June 17, 2004)

Fourth – the prospects for co-production of defence equipment is mentioned. This is clearly meant to llure India to buy F16 fighter planes and open the market for US weaponary. But we find no specific commitment on lifting the curbs on supply of high technology which has been raised by India continuously.

The UPA government should know the track record of the United States in using weapons supply as a political tool. Time and again the US has cut off supplies or imposed sanctions through decisions of the US Congress or the administration whenever it perceives a country as not willing to accept its policies and strategic goals.

The United States wishes to see India as its reliable ally like Japan, South Korea and Philippines. That is why it offered to station an Indian officer in the Pacific Command and the Central Command. The demand that India should have a position in the Central Command was being made by the BJP-led government and the pro-American strategic experts. Further, the agreement displays USA’s interests to make the two armed forces compatible for joint operations through “inter-operatability”

The UPA government in its Common Minimum Programme has committed to pursue an independent foreign policy and promoting multi-polarity in international relations. Regarding the United States, the CMP states, “Even as it pursues closer engagement and relations with the USA, the UPA government will maintain the independence of India’s foreign policy positions on all regional and global issues.”

Can the Defence Minister and the UPA government explain whether this agreement is in consonance with this approach in the CMP?

Indo-US defence agreement comes at a time when the US is actively working to contain China. It is pressurizing the European Union not to lift its embargo on supply of arms to China. Donald Rumsfield the US Secretary of State has recently in Singapore voiced concern about China’s defence expenditure and acquisition of arms. The United States does not see China has a strategic partner but as a strategic rival. In contrast, the US approach manifested in this agreement is to prop up India as a counterweight.

It is clear that India will be given concessions only if it plays the role the US has designated for it in its global and Asian strategy.

The Union Defence Minister Shri Pranab Mukherjee before leaving for the United States told the media that he is going on an “exploratory” visit. If such an “exploration” has resulted in this agreement, one shudders to think of what will be the outcome of a substantive visit.

This agreement has come just before the first official visit of our Prime Minister to Washington this month. There are apprehensions. The government is anxious to get US support for the permanent membership of the Security Council. The Government should be warned not to give further concessions to the United States.

The stand of the Left parties on defence, security and foreign policy issues is resented by the BJP. L.K. Advani had warned the UPA government not to allow the communists to meddle in security matters. This was stated when we protested against the Chief Minister of Assam saying that the FBI is welcome to investigate the bomb blasts in the state last year. Advani had justified the FBI being involved in such enquiries. After all, this is the gentleman who in 1999 welcomed the first India-US joint naval exercises. And this is the gentleman who was the first home minister to pay a visit to the CIA headquarters at Langley. It is not surprising, therefore that the BJP has welcomed this agreement wholeheartedly.

We are rejecting the contention that the Left cannot have any say in security, defence and foreign policy issues. It is our intervention that rallied the opposition against sending troops to Iraq at a time when the Vajpayee government was on the verge of deciding to do so. We shall not hesitate to express our opinion. Matters of security, defence and foreign affairs cannot be treated as a holy cow and kept away from public debate and scrutiny.

The framework of the Indo-US defence relations should be rejected. Let it remain just a framework skeleton. It should not be fleshed out.

Gunning for peace in South Asia
By Siddharth Srivastava  Asia Times South Asia  Aug 13, 2005 

NEW DELHI - Two recent defense-related happenings in India and Pakistan are of note. Pakistan has test-fired its first cruise missile, which India believes cannot happen without the help of the Chinese. Second, there are revelations of a quiet but steep climb in India-Israel defense relations, despite stiff competition from Russia, France and United Kingdom, the traditional big suppliers to India. The US, which has opened its arms arsenal to India, is expected to give Israel stiff competition. 

The two developments in Pakistan and India are inter-linked. They show that despite confidence-building measures, peace talks, synergies in the Iran-Pakistan-India oil pipeline and the recent breakthroughs in trade-related matters, India and Pakistan continue to stockpile arms, and suspicions refuse to subside. 

While some of the sources of defense inputs and material to Pakistan may be unknown (with indicators pointing towards China and North Korea), India is not averse to finding new partners and upgrading its weapons systems. The Israelis are known for cutting-edge equipment and fit the bill to modernize the Indian armed forces. 

Many experts believe that Pakistan wants to quickly upgrade its weapons systems in response to India's burgeoning defense relations with Israel and the US, with their state-of-the art weapon system. The Chinese are more than willing to oblige as they are never comfortable with India rising militarily without an effective check by Pakistan. China's fears have been compounded by the new-found bonhomie between India and US. 

The share of India-US arms relations is expected to pick up in the future as discussions have only begun. In June, a 10-year defense agreement titled the "New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship", was signed between Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart Donald Rumsfeld. The US has offered joint production of weapons, apart from sales, that sets the tone of a long-term relationship. 

India miffed
India is predictably miffed with Pakistan successfully test-firing its first cruise missile this week, joining a select band of nations that have developed the ground-hugging projectiles. President General Pervez Musharraf hailed the launch of the Hatf VII Babur, which is capable of carrying nuclear warheads, as a "major milestone" in the country's defense program. 

Experts in India insist that Pakistan does not have the know-how to build cruise missiles which, unlike ballistic missiles, do not leave the atmosphere and are powered and guided throughout their flight path. In an interview, former chief adviser (technology) of the Defense Research and Development Organization, K Santhanam, said: "China is peddling at least two types of cruise missiles in the international market ... My assessment is that this Pakistani missile is of Chinese origin, with a label change." 

The US-backed Missile Technology Control Regime prevents the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload over distances of 300 kilometers and more. Although Musharraf hailed his scientists and engineers who "have once again done the nation proud by mastering a rare technology", experts in India believe that Pakistan's missile program has the secret backing of China and North Korea. The 750-kilometer range Shaheen-I and 1,500-kilometer Ghauri-I ballistic missiles are believed to be derivatives of the Chinese M-9 and North Korean Nodong missiles 

But it is clear that Pakistan's bid to induct cruise missiles as well as pile up ballistic missiles is an attempt to balance India's declared intentions to incorporate a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system either from Israel or the US. India is already examining offers for the American Patriot-3 and Israeli Arrow-2 anti-ballistic missile systems. The BMD system can be effectively checked by cruise missiles. 

Apart from inducting the Agni-I (700-800-kilometer range) and Agni-II (2,000-kilometer-plus range) ballistic missiles, India has its own cruise missile BrahMos, with a 300-kilometer strike range. The Indian navy is already inducting the BrahMos, which is believed to be similar to the American Tomahawk cruise missiles widely used in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Curiously, Pakistan did not give any prior warning to India of the cruise test, despite a recent agreement between the two to notify each other before missile tests and to set up a hotline to prevent an accidental atomic exchange. The deal only referred to ballistic missiles and not to cruise missiles, for which there was no agreement, Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Muhammad Naeem Khan said. 

The India-Israel nexus 
There is reason for Pakistan to modernize its weapons systems, by any means. It is estimated that India will purchase arms to the tune of $15 billion over the next few years. This will include fighter jets, submarines, tanks and technological advancements. 

This week, Mukherjee put a figure to the rising defense ties between India and Israel. The fillip to India-Israel defense relations happened under the previous Bharatiya Janata Party administration of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, but the current dispensation under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has kept up the tempo. Israel has now overtaken France, the UK and other countries to become the second-largest defense supplier to India. The value of military arsenal works out close to $1 billion each year for the past three years. 

Russia remains India's biggest defense partner, notching over $1.5 billion every year due to the deeply entrenched relations between the two countries that hark back to the Cold War era. Three-quarters of the equipment in use by the armed forces is of Russian origin, requiring spares and maintenance. However, it is increasingly becoming apparent that the breakup of the Soviet Union has had its impact, with Russia unable to keep up with the latest upgrades in technology. 

This major chunks of the modernization efforts of the Indian armed forces are now being sourced from Israel. One of the biggest deals has been the $1.1 billion contract signed in March 2004 for three Phalcon early warning radar and communications systems to fulfill the air force's long-standing demand for AWACS (airborne warning and control systems). Israel is supplying the latest technology that ranges from Green Pine radars and Barak anti-missile systems to Searcher-11 and Heron UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and ship-borne electronic warfare systems. A major project is in place to modernize the Indian army, which includes night-vision capabilities, Tavor-21 5.56mm standard assault rifles, Galil 7.62mm sniper rifles and advanced VHF radios. 

The Mukherjee-Rumsfeld agreement in June this year is also expected to open up new vistas for India. The deal is extremely vast in scope and envisages a broad range of joint activities, including engaging in multi-national operations, strengthening the two militaries to promote security and defeat terrorism, and deepening capacity to take on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A new panel called the defense procurement and production group has been established to oversee defense trade and a joint working group will carry out a mid-year review to be overseen by the US-India defense policy group. 

Peace may be the motto of the Indo-Pakistani talks, but there is no letting up on the arms race. 

Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist. 

Closer Sri Lanka-India economic and defence ties
By Wije Dias (WSWS) 3 November 2003

The recent visit by Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe to India points to the broader economic and strategic interests involved in the current attempts to restart negotiations to end the country’s longrunning civil war.

Wickremesinghe and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee issued a joint statement after meeting in New Delhi on October 21 announcing plans to expand economic cooperation and to formalise defence ties between the two countries. The plans were broadly hailed by big business and the media in Colombo, which senses an opportunity for carving out a key role for Sri Lanka in the region—in alliance with India and the United States in particular.

A Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, based on a statement already prepared by a joint committee, is scheduled to be signed in March 2004. The proposal will widen the existing free trade agreement, dealing with goods, to include services and to facilitate greater investment flows between the two countries. The initial deal, which became operational in March 2002, has already significantly lifted trade between the two countries.

The latest agreement is another boost to Wickremesinghe’s plans to transform Sri Lanka into an investment and trade hub for South Asia, in order to resuscitate the economy after two decades of devastating war. The ruling United National Party (UNF) government released its “Regaining Sri Lanka” program in May, setting out ambitious economic restructuring proposals aimed at slashing the public sector and transforming the island into a South Asian equivalent of Singapore.

Already there is a flurry of economic activity in Colombo. The major five star hotels are booked out, with business delegations from around the world engaged in trade fairs, business conventions and marketing forums. Free trade agreements are being negotiated not only with India, but with the US, Pakistan and Singapore. Investors have their eye on the potential profits to be made from rebuilding Sri Lanka’s infrastructure and exploiting the country’s supply of cheap, educated labour, as well as turning Sri Lanka into a base for regional operations.

The Wickremesinghe-Vajpayee statement also called for closer defence ties, declaring: “India will maintain an abiding interest in the security of Sri Lanka and remains committed to its sovereignty and territorial integrity”. The defence secretaries of the two countries will meet in the near future to establish the basis for a Defence Cooperation Agreement. Defence ties have already been growing—last year India trained over 2,000 Sri Lanka security personnel as compared to just 700 in the year 2000.

But these growing defence and economic ties could rapidly unravel if a peace deal is not reached between Colombo and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Wickremesinghe’s trip to India came just 10 days before the LTTE released its proposals for an interim administration in the north and east of the island, as the basis for restarting stalled negotiations.

The joint statement was aimed at maximising pressure on the LTTE prior to the announcement of its proposals. It reiterated that any interim arrangement should be within “the framework of the unity and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka”—firmly ruling out the LTTE’s previous demands for an independent statelet. The two prime ministers also called on the LTTE to ensure that its plan for an interim administration be “reasonable and comprehensive.”

In a thinly disguised warning, the statement called for “concerted opposition to terrorism,” adding that “there can be no justification for terrorism, be it political, religious or ideological.” India, along with the US and a number of other countries, has formally branded the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. Taken as a whole, the declaration indicates that India intends to play a larger role in Sri Lankan affairs, including using its considerable political and military muscle to pressure the LTTE to reach a deal with Colombo.

The LTTE reacted sharply to India’s implied threat. An editorial in the pro-LTTE Tamil Guardian warned that “Wickremesinghe’s public courting of Delhi has struck a raw nerve and revived unpleasant memories.” It accused the Sri Lankan prime minister of attempting to “coerce the LTTE into a political solution as opposed to co-operatively negotiating one.” The paper also accused Wickremasinghe of “turning what ought to be a process of conflict resolution into one of military blackmail.”

Indo-Lanka Accord

The reference to “unpleasant memories” is a reminder of the last time that India intervened directly into Sri Lanka, after the signing of the Indo-Lankan Accord in 1987. Under the deal, New Delhi dispatched 150,000 troops to northern Sri Lanka, ostensibly as a peace-keeping force. But the intervention rapidly became a debacle.

The real aim of the Indian “peacekeepers” was to disarm the LTTE and stabilise the shaky Colombo government. Fighting broke out in the north between Indian troops and LTTE fighters, while in the south the government came under intense pressure from a Sinhala chauvinist campaign against the Indian presence. In 1990, President R. Premedasa called for India to remove its military forces from the island.

For the last decade, Indian governments have been wary about any involvement in Sri Lankan affairs. New Delhi refused to come to the assistance of the Sri Lankan military in May 2000, when LTTE forces overran the strategic Elephant Pass and trapped the bulk of the army on the tip of the Jaffna peninsula.

India’s new involvement in Sri Lanka flows, in part, from its growing economic and defence ties with Washington. The Bush administration has called on the Vajpayee government to play a more active regional defence role in South Asia, which lies adjacent to three areas of US strategic interest—China, Central Asia and the Middle East. The US has been pushing for an end to the Sri Lankan conflict, which has long been a destabilising influence in the region.

In a report to a US Congressional Committee on October 29, US Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca declared: “Increasingly intensive Indo-US counterterrorism cooperation reflects the closer relations that the United States seeks across the board with India.” At the same time, Rocca kept up the pressure on the LTTE, declaring that the US would continue to designate it as a terrorist organization, even though it has kept to the 20-month ceasefire with Colombo.

For his part, Wickremesinghe has sought to ingratiate himself with the Bush administration in return for US assistance in bringing the LTTE to heel. During the recent UN General Assembly session, the Sri Lankan prime minister used his speech to openly endorse the criminal US occupation of Iraq, declaring “the US and its allies had no choice but to intervene.... the failure of the United Nations has created the need for a world policeman.”

As Wickremesinghe headed off for talks in Washington this week, the UNF government announced that Sri Lankan engineers and medical staff would join the US occupation forces in Iraq. The UNF government obviously calculates that this token force will help to further strengthen ties with the Bush administration.

Wickremesinghe’s official visit to Washington is the second in just over a year. Prior to that, no Sri Lankan prime minister had been received at the White House for more than two decades. It is a sure indication that strong US pressure is being exerted behind the scenes to ensure that a deal is eventually consummated between the LTTE and Colombo, in line with Washington’s broader economic and strategic plans for the region.

India insists on giving the people of the North and the East the choice to merge or to de-merge -TNA

Thu, 2006-09-28 12:29 

Colombo, 28, September, (Asiantribune.com):India might be forced to take appropriate action in case the Government in Colombo attempts to de-merge the North and East without consulting the people of these two regions and without holding a referendum on this issue, according to Tamil National Alliance delegates who met high official sources in New Delhi last week.

According to a newspaper reports published in Jaffna, Delhi officials have also expressed suspicions to the Tamil National Alliance delegates about behind-the-scene efforts by extremist groups in the South of the country to demerge the North and East. 

Recently a delegation of the Tamil National Alliance went to New Delhi on the invitation of the Indian External Affairs Ministry. This issue of de-merging the north from the east, after it had been merged for the last 18 years, was taken up for discussion.

According to reports the Delhi officials had said: 

"North and East of Sri Lanka are the homeland regions of the Tamils. Without the approval of the peoples’ of these two regions and without conducting a referendum, the homeland region of the Tamils should not be demerged. This is the position of India. 

"The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord resulted in the 13th amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution which made provisions for the merging of the North and East. Therefore, it cannot be arbitrarily de-merged. 

"While India maintains that Sri Lanka should never be divided it also maintains that North and East should never be demerged. In case North and East are demerged, India may be compelled to take actions that may not be in any way favorable to Lanka. All aspects remain opened to take necessary action.

"The same view of India has been very clearly indicated in diplomatic parlance in the last report to the leaders of the Sri Lanka’s donor conference held in Tokyo.

"Therefore New Delhi believes firmly that Colombo will not take any hasty or irresponsible decision on a subject that has been already been notified to the international community," according to the TNA delegation.

Source – Uthayan - Jaffna based pro-LTTE Tamil Daily- Asian Tribune -

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