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13th August,2003
11th August,2003
Detail News
India unhappy
with Nepal’s Ties with the US
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Ostensibly on official prompting, some sections of the Indian media are
obsessed by what they describe as the "growing American presence in
Nepal". Giving credence to such perceptions, Indian ambassador Shyam
Saran told a newspaper interviewer in Kathmandu recently, "The
government of India is in close touch with the US government concerning
the developments in Nepal, since both are friends of Nepal. There is no
competition or rivalry between India and the US in Nepal," he added,
leaving no doubts to readers that this indeed is the case. Nepal started
to accept US assistance shortly after the formal establishment of ties,
adding up to about US$700 million in 50 years. The size of the annual
package grew only recently - to $38 million - after the visit of US
Secretary of State Colin Powell in January 2002. The military component
in the package was allowed to be slightly increased in view of the need
to make the Royal Nepal Army capable of effectively fighting Maoist
guerrillas. Some of the grant money was spent in procuring small arms
from the US and Belgium. |
Nepal attracts
US attention, to India's dismay
By Dhruba Adhikary
KATHMANDU - Would the United States have enhanced its
concerned interest in Nepal's Maoist insurgency had the tragic events of
September 11, 2001 not occurred? It is difficult to say, but it is unusual
that the US has suddenly chosen to increase contacts with the Himalayan
kingdom that it has officially known for more than 55 years.
Washington and Kathmandu established diplomatic relations on
April 21, 1947 - shortly before independent India and Pakistan were born.
(Though small in size in comparison to her giant neighbors, Nepal was never
under British colonial rule.)
Nepal started to accept US assistance shortly after the
formal establishment of ties, adding up to about US$700 million in 50 years.
The size of the annual package grew only recently - to $38 million - after
the visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell in January 2002. The
military component in the package was allowed to be slightly increased in
view of the need to make the Royal Nepal Army capable of effectively
fighting Maoist guerrillas. Some of the grant money was spent in procuring
small arms from the US and Belgium.
More than 7,000 people have lost their lives in as many
years of armed insurgency in Nepal. The victims include Nepalis working as
guards at the US embassy in Kathmandu, as well as in a US-aided development
project in the western region. A ceasefire was agreed in January this year
between the government and the rebels, but it is far from certain whether
stuttering talks will bring peace to this largely mountainous country.
As is obvious from the figures, the US assistance is very
modest, and Nepal's present difficulties are real. But India, Nepal's
neighbor on the south, is perturbed at these developments. New Delhi's
displeasure has been made public through periodic pronouncements, and by
senior officials handling India's external affairs. Foreign Secretary Kanwal
Sibal has spoken several times in Paris, New Delhi and elsewhere that Nepal
must not take "outside assistance" to quell a domestic rebellion. "Anywhere
else in the world, this small amount of military assistance would have been
seen as trivial," wrote Indian journalist C Raja Mohan in The Hindu
newspaper on June 18. "But in the context of Nepal, this has acquired a
larger than life dimension," he added, indirectly scoffing at India's
foreign policy managers.
Ostensibly on official prompting, some sections of the
Indian media are obsessed by what they describe as the "growing American
presence in Nepal". Giving credence to such perceptions, Indian ambassador
Shyam Saran told a newspaper interviewer in Kathmandu recently, "The
government of India is in close touch with the US government concerning the
developments in Nepal, since both are friends of Nepal. There is no
competition or rivalry between India and the US in Nepal," he added, leaving
no doubts to readers that this indeed is the case.
In fact, in New Delhi's opinion, Nepal should always resolve
its problems through bilateral consultations, as suggested by a
controversial treaty concluded more than half a century ago. The Treaty of
Peace and Friendship was initialed - on July 31, 1950 - when a revolution
was going on in China. And the accord itself was signed by Nepali prime
minister Mohun Shamsher Rana, whose autocratic regime was overthrown six
months later in a popular pro-democracy movement that dismantled the
104-year-old autocracy.
Turning a blind eye to these developments, hardline
bureaucrats in India's capital still prefer to offer interpretations
requiring Nepal to understand the "spirit" of the anachronistic treaty.
Indians want Kathmandu not to buy defense supplies elsewhere, even if they
cannot always give assurances that the goods made in India would maintain
minimum quality. If they had their way, army sources said, they would like
Nepal to spend the American grants to purchase weaponry from Indian
manufacturers.
But even the discredited treaty says that Nepal can procure
its supplies from anywhere in the world. Article 5 reads as follows: "The
government of Nepal shall be free to import, from or through the territory
of India, arms, ammunitions or warlike material and equipment for the
security of Nepal. The procedure for giving effect to this arrangement shall
be worked out by the two governments acting in consultation."
There was no need for India to be alarmed when Nepal
imported some defensive weapons, such as anti-aircraft guns, from China in
1988. Since Nepal did not need to use Indian territory for those imports,
authorities in Kathmandu did not find it necessary to inform India about the
consignments coming overland via Tibet. But New Delhi considered it an
offense, and accused Nepal of breaching the "spirit" of the 1950 treaty.
Subsequently, the Indian government imposed a trade and transit blockade on
Nepal, at the start of 1989, which lasted for 15 months. Relations became
normal only after June 1990.
Will New Delhi again think of taking such punitive action
against Nepal for accepting a few air-borne military consignments from the
US and Belgium? Will India take a step "to teach a lesson" to Nepal, as its
prime minister Rajiv Gandhi did 14 years ago? Probably not this time. The
political environment has undergone a sea change over the past years: there
is no USSR to back India in a hegemonic role in the neighborhood. And the
present-day reality is that the US is omnipresent in terms of its economic
and military power. China, Nepal's neighbor on the north, has also become
too big a factor to be glossed over.
The Indian establishment, however, seems reluctant to accept
what is a stark reality. On the contrary, it is insisting on the
implementation of an accord that has been billed "unequal" since the day it
was signed. This is evident from the different status of the signatories:
from Nepal's side it was the prime minister, Mohun Shumsher Rana; from
India's side it was just an ambassador, C P N Singh. And it is believed that
Mohun Shamsher Rana accepted the treaty in the hope that his signature would
produce a quid pro quo in the form of Indian support to his falling regime.
But inconsistency in protocol matters alone did not make the
treaty unequal. Articles 6 and 7 of the document, for instance, contain
provisions for granting national treatment to each other's citizens on a
reciprocal basis. "How can a small country of 23 million people be asked to
extend 'reciprocity' to India, which has a population of over a billion?"
wonders Mohan Man Sainju , a leading expert on developmental issues.
Despite these asymmetries, Indian authorities continue to
cite the dated pact to reject Nepal's suggestions for regulating the 1,800
kilometer porous border that the two countries share. Presently, there is
unrestricted movement of people from either side. It is conspicuous that
none of India's other contiguous borders remains porous. In a write-up
published in a journal in 1994, Japanese scholar Kyoko Inoue took note of
the prevailing Nepali perception that provision for reciprocity "might
result in serious constraints on national integration and national
economy-building under its difficult geo-political condition, while no such
constraints were being felt in India." Nepal's northern border is a
regulated one, despite the fact that China's Tibet region is a very sparsely
populated area - of about only 6 million inhabitants.
That India in 1950 imposed an unequal treaty on Nepal is a
widespread perception, and popular reaction to this imposition surface
often, and particularly during parliamentary elections. Leaders of even
known pro-Indian political parties find it expedient to promise that, if
elected, they would seek the abrogation of the treaty. This trend has been
evident in all three elections since the democratic restoration of 1990. The
pact is construed as an instrument that, it is felt, undermines Nepal's
status as a sovereign and independent country.
Foreign policy analysts agree that in the camouflage of an
innocuous accord, the Indian government inserted clauses to constrict
Nepal's future policies on immigration, flood control, utilization of river
water, defense systems, trade and transit. "Operative clauses of the treaty
make it clear that it was designed to corner Nepal from every conceivable
direction," says Madhab Prasad Khanal, an analyst who once served in the
ministry of foreign affairs. "That Maoist rebels can carry on their
anti-Nepal activities from Indian soil is distinct proof of New Delhi's
desire to develop friendship with Nepal!" Khanal adds sarcastically.
The attitude in New Delhi has become something that some
Indians themselves find hard to digest. "India became free in 1947, but
could not free itself from the British mindset," concedes K V Rajan, former
Indian ambassador to Nepal, in the recently-released anthology "External
Affairs: Cross-Border Relations". Accepting that the 1950 treaty is a major
"psychological irritant" for Nepal, Rajan, whose tenure in Kathmandu was
from 1995 to 2000, urges India to come forward with positive proposals of
its own.
C Raja Mohan is another Indian author to identify
"contradictions between India's global policy and its regional approach." In
his new book Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign
Policy, Mohan makes the following observation, "At the international level,
India rejected the notions of balance of power and exclusive spheres of
influence; within the region it clung to them."
"New Delhi needs to shed its untenable expectations that the
world can be kept out of Nepal and that the problems in Kathmandu can be
resolved purely in a bilateral framework with India," Mohan, strategic
affairs editor of The Hindu newspaper, said in a separate article published
earlier this year.
Avatar Singh Bhasin, editor of books comprising documents on
Nepal-India relations, describes the treaty-bound relationship as "feudal"
and suggests that New Delhi to modernize it. "The sooner it [treaty] is
replaced, revised or abandoned the better ...", he writes.
The contentious treaty has often been compared with the
accord that the former Soviet Union imposed on neighboring Finland in 1948.
Nevertheless, the official Indian contention has been that
the treaty imposed certain security obligations on Nepal in exchange for
important economic benefits. Nepal, on the other hand, argues that it would
not be "asking for things which India does not want to provide".
Everything said and done, admit intelligentsia on both sides
of the border, the 1950 treaty has been implemented more in the breach than
in observance. For example, article 2 requires both sides to inform each
other should any friction or misunderstanding occur with any neighboring
state. India went to war with Pakistan and China, but it never officially
informed Nepal. Similarly, while Indian nationals enjoy unrestricted entry
into Nepal and movement within the kingdom, Nepali nationals visiting India
are not allowed to enter most of its northeastern states without prior
permits. Likewise, Nepal has enacted laws that prevent foreigners, including
Indian nationals, from buying landed property in this country.
What then is the use of retaining a treaty that fails to
meet the needs of the 21st century? Since the accord does not provide any
room for changes, amendments or revisions, Nepal could, though, initiate
steps for its annulment. The last article (article 10) provides a solution:
"This treaty shall remain in force until it is terminated by either party by
giving one year's notice." But is Nepal prepared to invoke this article when
it knows well that the other party is still living under an illusion that it
can retain the "unique" relationship on the strength [or weakness] of this
document? The alternative is to wait until the day that India realizes that
it is being subjected to further ridicule for not being in tune with
changing times.
But what if India quickly agreed to get rid of the treaty?
How would Nepal adjust to the new situation? While traditionalists sound
apprehensive about such a possibility, others are not worried. Keshav Raj
Jha, president of the Nepal Council of World Affairs, is one of them. "Nepal
can go for one of the two available options: sign a treaty similar to the
one it concluded with China in 1960, or begin conducting bilateral relations
without any treaty, like Bangladesh," Jha said.
Jha's reference is to the 1960 treaty with China, signed by
premiers Chou Enlai and B P Koirala in Beijing ,which was based on the
principles of equality and mutual benefit. The second allusion is to the
friendship treaty that India and Bangladesh initialed in 1972 which was
allowed to lapse after 25 years. Similarly, India's 20-year pact with the
then Soviet Union remained a one-time deal.
"No treaty, howsoever good and well-meaning it may be, can
achieve its goal if its articles are not allowed to remain relevant to the
issues at hand," comments Badri Bahadur Karki, a seasoned lawyer who once
had a stint as Nepal's attorney-general
Asia Times Online 13th August 2003
Don't expect Islamabad to
give up Sindh and Karachi, Pakistan's financial capital and the source of
most of the nation's revenues. Pakistan's eastern wing, now Bangladesh, won
its war for independence in 1971, but 3 million Bengalis died in the
process. The Punjabis have suppressed past rebellions in Balochistan and
would do so again. Pro-Taliban Islamists effectively control the provincial
legislatures of Balochistan and North-West Frontier Province. Is the world
prepared for two new independent al-Qaeda havens? Autonomy could also break
the Gordian Knot of Kashmir.
Lose the "K" in Pakistan to India and
Pakistan loses its raison d'etre as a homeland for Muslims on the
sub-continent. Similarly, if India gives up its only Muslim-majority state,
it risks losing its national identity as a secular state in a predominantly
Hindu country. Ceding Kashmir's 4
million Muslims to Pakistan would prompt Hindu extremists to unleash a
wholesale ethnic cleansing of India's 150 million Muslims and a flood of
refugees that would destroy Pakistan.
When
self-determination equals self-destruction
By Stanley A Weiss
LONDON - India's Deputy
Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani told me the story this way. Pakistan's
President General Pervez Musharraf looked at his Indian guests and said, "I
was born in India and, after partition, my family settled in Karachi, the
capital of Pakistan's Sindh province. Why not let the people of Kashmir
decide whether they want to continue to be a part of India?"
To which Advani replied, "I
was born in Karachi and, after partition, moved to India. Why not let the
people of Sindh decide whether they want to continue to be a part of
Pakistan?" At which point Musharraf changed the subject, knowing full well
that the Sindhis would vote for independence.
The terse encounter
highlights the central tension underlying much of today's instability from
the Indian sub-continent to Afghanistan to Iraq and in many other countries
- self-determination vs national preservation. Frustrated by centuries-old
conflicts, some Western observers have advocated redrawing the regional maps
and carving up "artificial countries" created by former colonial powers.
At first glance, certain
states seem ripe for the picking.
Pakistan is an invention -
literally an acronym denoting the provinces of the new Muslim state after
its 1947 partition with India: "P" for Punjab, "A" for the Afghan-border
region of the northwest frontier, "K" for Kashmir, "S" for Sindh, and "TAN"
for Balochistan.
The dominant Punjabis have
never succeeded in forging a Pakistani national identity. Balochistan,
Pakistan's largest province, has chaffed under the iron fist of Islamabad.
(When I asked my cab driver here in London if he was Pakistani, he replied
indignantly, "I am not Pakistani! I am from Balochistan!") Pashtuns in the
North-West Frontier Province have long dreamed of an independent
Pashtunistan with their ethnic cousins across the Afghan border.
Likewise, the dominant
Pashtuns of southern Afghanistan have never forged a unifying national
psyche. Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens in the north have more in common with
their brethren in neighboring Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In
the west, Herat province is reverting to its historical role as a virtual
extension of Iran.
Finally, whether Iraq
survives as a multi-ethnic nation may hinge on the Kurds, the world's
largest ethnic group without its own state. Today, 30 million Kurds are
spread across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, and repeated Kurdish rebellions
have been brutally crushed.
So why not think the
unthinkable and simply dispense with the irrational borders of the past?
After all, isn't the birth of new states from the wreckage of Yugoslavia the
latest tribute to self-determination?
On the contrary. The orgy of
violence that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia would be a picnic
compared to the carnage if dysfunctional states like Pakistan, Afghanistan
and Iraq fell - or are pushed - apart. Ethnic minorities should be careful
what they wish for: reckless quests for self-determination may only sow the
seeds of their self-destruction.
Don't expect Islamabad to
give up Sindh and Karachi, Pakistan's financial capital and the source of
most of the nation's revenues. Pakistan's eastern wing, now Bangladesh, won
its war for independence in 1971, but 3 million Bengalis died in the
process. The Punjabis have suppressed past rebellions in Balochistan and
would do so again. Pro-Taliban Islamists effectively control the provincial
legislatures of Balochistan and North-West Frontier Province. Is the world
prepared for two new independent al-Qaeda havens?
In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns
may long for unity with their Pakistani cousins, but not at the expense of
losing influence over the more fertile and prosperous regions of the north.
The Kurds may have found an
answer. The continued presence of Turkish troops in northern Iraq is a blunt
reminder that Ankara will forcibly oppose an independent Kurdistan, which
could incite Turkey's own restive Kurds. Bowing to reality, Kurdish leaders
in Iraq appear to have abandoned their quest for statehood, casting their
lot with a federal Iraq that preserves Kurdish autonomy.
Autonomy could also break
the Gordian Knot of Kashmir. Lose the "K" in Pakistan to India and Pakistan
loses its raison d'etre as a homeland for Muslims on the sub-continent.
Similarly, if India gives up its only Muslim-majority state, it risks losing
its national identity as a secular state in a predominantly Hindu country.
Ceding Kashmir's 4 million Muslims to Pakistan would prompt Hindu extremists
to unleash a wholesale ethnic cleansing of India's 150 million Muslims and a
flood of refugees that would destroy Pakistan.
So why not compromise?
Pakistan controls 35 percent of Kashmir and could accept the present Line of
Control, agreed to in 1972, as the permanent border. In return, India could
restore to Kashmir the autonomy that it enjoyed for several years after
partition.
In an ideal world, each of
these distinct ethnic groups could have their own independent homelands. And
some day, they just might. But in today's real world, their security and
survival lies not with independence, but with a high degree of autonomy. And
there is nothing artificial about that.
Stanley A Weiss is founder
and chairman of Business Executives for National Security, a national,
nonpartisan organization of business leaders based in Washington. This is a
personal comment.
Asia Times Online 11th August 2003
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