About
Ka-band Multimedia Satellites
The Ka-band
Report aims to
provide a comprehensive survey of the current environment for Ka-band satellites.
These represent the next major opportunity for the satellite communications
industry.
The term Ka-band satellite
is now generally recognised as a shorthand term for a new generation of communications
satellites that will use on-board processing and switching to provide full two
way services to and from small earth stations comparable in size to today's
satellite television dish. To do this efficiently they will use multiple pencil
like spot beams. A number of proposals also include use of inter-satellite links.
A variety of orbits are being considered. Apart from the conventional geostationary
orbit, both low earth and middle earth orbit systems have been planned.
Such Ka-band satellite systems
have also been described in other terms such as "multimedia satellites",
"ATM satellites", "broadband switched" and "broadband
interactive satellites". The first two terms are generally inaccurate in
that Ka-band satellites can be used for other applications than multimedia or
providing an ATM platform. Indeed, it remains questionable whether many of the
proposals are suitable for ATM. The Ka-band Report
uses the most commonly used shorthand, Ka-band satellites" to describe
such systems. The term "ATM Satellite" is also incorrect because on-board
switching can involve either ATM switching or circuit switching or both.
Moreover, there are in existence
a number of Ka-band satellites that do not use on-board processing or pencil
beams or inter-satellite links and whose use has either been confined to experimental
work or conventional telecommunications or broadcasting traffic. The
Ka-band Report covers these satellites only insofar as they affect
the new generation of satellites.
However, use of on-board
processing and switching are not confined to Ka-band satellites. Already the
satellite communications industry is beginning to think about using even higher
frequencies to provide services similar to or beyond those planned for the new
generation of Ka-band satellites. The Ka-band Report
draws attention to Motorola's M-Star and Celestri projects.
Indeed, on-board processing
and switching (effectively the provision of the equivalent of a sophisticated
telephone switchboard on a satellite) are already employed in satellites providing
mobile communications to hand held receivers. One of a new generation of mobile
satellite systems (Iridium) employs Ka-band communications for links between
fixed ground stations that interconnect the public switched telephone networks
to the satellites. However, the links between the satellites and the hand held
receivers are in L-band. A number of GSO MSS systems under development also
use OBP and switching.
Understanding the relationship
between inter-satellite links, pencil spot beams and on-board processing and
switching is essential in understanding the commercial role these satellites
are aiming to fulfil.
In effect, the switching
capability is capable of making them operate like a public telephone network
but with the facility to offer digital services with a wide variety of bit rates.
Users will be offered bit rate on demand and its variation, variable
bit rate on demand - that is to say they will only pay for the time that
they use a link. This contrasts with conventional satellites where users usually
have to pay for permanent leases. That only makes it economic to use satellites
where there is a massive amount of information to be moved, such as TV channels
and trunk telephony links.
In contrast, the Ka-band
concept offers the equivalent of a local drop telephone circuit where the user
pays for temporary lease of time. The Ka-band environment also allows an alternative,
charging per bit of information moved.
However,
such services require a lot of bandwidth because each link will usually be
operating on a point to
point basis. The prime method of using the available spectrum efficiently is
to use multiple "pencil" spot beams, each covering only a small
area of the earth. This allows frequency re-use in much the same way as a
cellular
phone network re-uses spectrum.
Use of multiple spot beams
in itself demands the use of on-board processing and switching to direct each
transmission path between the different spot beams used for uplinking and downlinking.
Similarly, inter-satellite links with similar Ka-band satellites will demand
switching capabilities.
In effect, the on-board
processing and switching capability is a network management facility. The Ka-band
satellite operators will each become like telephone companies but with their
telephone exchanges in the sky.
In the long term it looks
likely that there will be a "merger" of services offered by mobile
satellite systems with those offered by "mainstream" Ka-band satellites.
The sudden interest in Ka-band
satellite communications during the middle of this decade is not an accident.
It comes as a result of supply economics meeting a perceived demand for new
services.
On the supply side, nearly
two decades of R&D into using the Ka-band for satellite communications has
produced results. Hitherto, the satellite communications industry has been wary
of using Ka-band because it is subject to substantial interference from rain.
That problem has now largely been circumvented. Much more significantly, NASA
launched an advanced Ka-band satellite in 1993 that uses on-board processing
and switching, pencil spot beams and the Ka-band - the three key technologies
for the new commercial Ka-band satellites.
NASA's ACTS satellite performed
extremely well; the project was very well managed and involved testing a wide
variety of new ground stations and services (the ACTS experiments are continuing).
By the mid-1990s it was
clear that the existing frequency bands being used by satellite operators had
insufficient spectrum left to provide new bandwidth hungry two way broadband
services. The Ka-band, in contrast, was little used. The Ka-band available to
satellite operators involved a massive 2.5-3.5 GHz of spectrum - that is to
say some 4-7 times that available to some C-band satellite operators.
On the demand side, the
growth of Internet as a mass-market consumer (and business) service and perceived
likely growth in demand for multimedia (services combining two way video, voice,
data and graphics) indicated a need to provide substantive infrastructure for
two way services and associated switching technology. Ka-band satellites offered
one major solution to meeting the demand.
Indeed, there is growing
belief that the main market for Ka-band satellites will be the provision of
high speed Internet and Intranet access.
Thus by 1997 some 59 Ka-band
projects had emerged world wide alongside an intensified R&D effort to refine
Ka-band satellite and associated technologies.
The Ka-band
Report provides
coverage of both these Ka-band satellite plans and the associated R&D initiatives.
Ka-band satellites represent
a technology breakthrough. As is the case with so many such breakthroughs in
the past, this will change the way things are done and in ways that are difficult
to predict and even more difficult to forecast. In the earliest days of the
telephone it was believed that its prime use would be to provide a form of cable
TV home entertainment by allowing users to listen in to concerts.
The satellite industry is
a lot more sophisticated in researching potential markets than the early proponents
of the telephone. Nevertheless, Ka-band satellites appear to be pitched at serving
a variety of niche markets, each with uncertain demand. With the possible exception
of high speed Internet access, no "killer application" for Ka-band
infrastructure is foreseen by the industry.
Some of the major players
in the Ka-band environment are now undertaking the costly and detailed market
research on which to centre their business plans. It is not an easy exercise
to do; plans involving global satellite networks involve researching national
markets throughout the world. Ka-band offers the prospect of new services in
new markets, generally recognised as one of the highest risk market entrance
strategies.
Similarly, the entrance
of Ka-band into the communications marketplace is paralleled by the introduction
of complementary technologies for which the demand is uncertain. The most notable
of these are ATM and digital satellite television. Similarly, other new delivery
infrastructures are being developed that would compete with (and sometimes complement)
Ka-band satellite systems. There too, future market demand is difficult to forecast.
Such competing delivery infrastructure includes interactive high-speed digital
cable networks, ADSL and VDSL, LMDS and PCNs.
Moreover, it looks highly
unlikely that the first Ka-band satellites will be in operation much before
the year 2000. Any realistic forecast for the demand for Ka-band services will
necessarily be long term and therefore subject to wide margins of error.
Despite these difficulties,
The Ka-band Report has analysed each of
the major service markets that Ka-band satellites may address and come to some
robust conclusions.
One conventional piece of
wisdom is that Ka-band will be initially rolled out either to service integrated
Ku-band/Ka-band receivers to provide consumers with a combination of one-way
broadcast and two-way interactive offerings or it will be targeted at big ticket
corporate users.
In the consumer environment,
The Ka-band Report concludes that stand-alone
Ka-band terminals, without DBS TV capabilities, are much more likely to serve
a mass market. That in turn suggests that aiming at corporate users may not
be the most desirable initial market entrance strategy.
Other potential markets
that The Ka-band Report considers include
tele-medicine, tele-education, voice, local television, VSATs, "home-use
VSATs" and satellite newsgathering.
However, all of these developments
are dependent on the global marketplace for satellite communications being opened
up. The reader might assume that because satellite television is now ubiquitous
in the developed world and rapidly becoming available in the developing world
that this is already the case.
Unfortunately, this is not
the case where two-way satellite communications is involved. Any cursory knowledge
of the satellite PCS environment will indicate the difficulties of gaining even
limited market access outside of the country of origin of the satellite operator.
The PCS operators have used
a variety of levers to gain access. These include lobbying at the ITU for spectrum,
lobbying the US Government and the FCC to negotiate on their behalf in such
fora as the ITU and WTO, offering franchises to local telecoms companies to
retail their services and sub-contacts to local satellite and hand-held set
manufacturers.
Such an approach is now
being taken in the Ka-band environment. Teledesic appears to have approached
just about all the world's telephone companies and satellite manufacturing and
R&D establishments offering partnership deals. It has also lobbied national
governments and the European Commission, "hijacked" the WRC'95 Ka-band
negotiations and tied up a lot of now relatively scarce Ka-band spectrum. Teledesic
is not the only Ka-band player to have taken this route.
The Ka-band
Report details
and analyses the key developments and issues in this geopolitical environment,
including the lead role being taken by the US Federal Communications Commission,
its DISCO II arrangements and the freedom (or otherwise) of non-US Ka-band operators
to enter the lucrative US market, the concerns of the European Commission and
European industry and World Trade Organisation negotiations.
Finally, in presenting an
over-all picture of the market for Ka-band satellites,
The Ka-band Report takes a special look at one market that is significantly
different - Japan.
The research for The
Ka-band Report was undertaken between February 1996 and January 1997.
A revision, in the form of the second edition, was undertaken in June 1997.
It was clear that over this
period the number of potential players in the marketplace was relatively fluid.
Some satellite operators looked at providing Ka-band and found that it was outside
of their main core businesses; others put together ideas that remain on the
back-burner and some plans looked to have been dropped because of mergers and
acquisitions. However, in general, the identified number of players and plans
increased considerably and there was also a significant refining and development
of thinking.
Management
Summary
The next big development
in satellite communications will be broadband interactive services involving
a combination of Ka-band (or higher) spectrum, "switchboards in the sky"
and inter-satellite links. The market for services using such technological
features is unproven but currently looks to be a series of niches with no clear
killer application. In the long term there is likely to be some form of integration
of such services with narrowband satellite delivered PCS services. These are
the main conclusions of a new survey of Ka-band satellite communications called
"The Ka-band Report".
The Big
Picture Business Environment:
The development of such services is intimately bound up with the opening up
of the international marketplace for information technology and the convergence
of computing, broadcasting and telecommunications technology. The Ka-band satellite
concept offers the prospect of quick and scaleable (therefore economically realistic)
roll out of advanced infrastructure and services within this environment and
is therefore an issue now high on the political and world trade agenda.
The Ka-band environment
also involves a fundamental shift in the structure of the satellite communications
market from one dominated by a combination of governmental sponsored international
satellite organisations and regional and domestic satellite systems to global
commercial satellite operations financed through the marshalling of vast investments
from the international financial markets.
The USA
Dominates: The
current arrangements are dying because Intelsat and other ISOs are no longer
perceived in the United States as suitable vehicles for maximising US interests
in the satellite communications marketplace. Indeed, there is no doubt that
the United States has taken the lead in both Ka-band technology and the drive
to open up the international marketplace for satellite communications and therefore
the interests of its own domestic manufacturing and communications industries.
By September 1995, US business
was forced to declare its hand in planning to develop Ka-band satellite infrastructure.
The FCC has set a deadline for filing for authorisation for such systems. What
was revealed was a series of projects that involved global satellite systems
with a high degree of vertical integration between satellite manufacturers and
operators as well as a similar number of filings to protect the position of
operators or of an opportunistic nature.
Since then the rest of the
world has followed on with a series of plans for Ka-band systems, some of which
are little more than paper plans to secure potentially scarce spectrum. Nevertheless
most of the worlds satellite operators now have plans for Ka-band systems
and at least three European satellite manufacturers have plans that involve
a degree of vertical integration with satellite operating.
Nevertheless, few of the
plans originating from outside of the United States involve true global networks;
the mind-set still involves domestic or regional satellite operations. Only
two non-US plans look to be truly global in capability (those from Alcatel Espace
and SES).
This is a sign of weakness
in competing with US interests. The United States has the upper hand in other
ways. It is dominating the negotiation procedures on spectrum and opening up
markets through the carrot and stick of allowing access to US domestic communications
markets of all sorts. It is ahead of the rest of the world in developing the
key technologies that will be used in the Ka-band environment - on-board processing
and switching, inter-satellite links, phased array antennas and a vast array
of other applicable technology.
The US Government and its
industry are also twisting the arms of its potential rivals in the rest of the
world. A key approach to developing its global satellite networks has been to
"offer" partnerships to local telecommunications carriers and manufacturing
firms. This both spreads commercial risk and assures that such partners have
a vested interested in opening up the markets for the global satellite systems.
It looks possible that other tools may be used to strengthen the market position
of such global operations, such as allowing access to inter-satellite links.
Lessons
for the Satcoms World:
Clearly potential operators of Ka-band satellites are going to have to enter
into partnerships with industry and communications carriers to develop their
services and markets. Whilst it is theoretically possible that the WTO agreements
will give the operators a free hand to enter any market they want, this is a
politically and commercially naïve option.
The Ka-band technology offers
the possibility of a direct attack on the biggest communications market of all,
telecommunications (10 times the size of the broadcasting marketplace).
Satellite operators have
hitherto concentrated on marketing transponders and bandwidth (usually through
full time leases) to a limited number of broadcasting or specialised telecommunications
customers, usually in limited geographic territories. They will need to adapt
to a very different environment of selling variable bandwidth on demand and
exploiting the value added of on-board processing and switching.
Their customer base will
radically alter to a much broader base of commercial networks, intra-company
communications, consumer markets (the US DBS operators are in a strong position
here but not their equivalents elsewhere), interconnection arrangements with
PSTNs, PCS networks, MSS infrastructure, inter-satellite links with other satellite
operators and so on.
It is highly questionable
whether the typical satellite operator of today, employing perhaps around 120-300
staff, is anywhere near experienced enough to undertake this alone and in a
hostile and competitive international marketplace.
The Ka-band satellite operators
will need to address the options of whether they want to remain wholesalers
of capacity or full service providers (or a combination of both).
In either case they will
need to partner with local telecommunications firms to gain market position,
probably interconnection with PSTNs, facilitate obtaining licences and freedom
to transmit data across borders, contact mechanisms to lobby politicians and
so forth. Such local arrangements allow for mass marketing of Ka-band services
that the satellite operators are ill-equipped to deal with.
Such partnerships also "buy
out" potential competition. The concept can be extended to satellite
manufacturing in a world where such manufacturers are also integrated satellite
operators.
Who Wants
the Technology?
Serious players in the Ka-band market are now undertaking detailed market research
into the likely demand for services. However, it is clear from conversations
with industry players that there is no single killer application apart from
high speed Internet access. Instead there is likely to be a series of niche
markets ranging from ATM based multimedia for businesses and personal use, videoconferencing
and video telephony, data broadcasting, voice for remote rural areas, tele-medicine,
tele-education, SCADA, local television, a variety of applications in the mobile
environment, satellite data relay services, news on demand, inter-connection
of satellite and terrestrial PCS networks and satellite news gathering.
What this means in practice
this means is that the Ka-band environment can offer sophisticated next generation
VSAT type services including what the Japanese have called Home-use VSATs.
The one area that has been
over-hyped in the Ka-band environment is the possibility of combining service
with digital Ku-band DBS TV. In this scenario, a consumer could have a single
dish that would provide both conventional TV and a plethora of two-way services,
including, incidentally, voice based on distance insensitive tariffs.
The Ka-band
Report concludes
that this is unlikely to be a significant market because digital DBS is a niche
market that only marginally overlaps with the likely market at consumer level
for two way services. Bandwidth limitations for Ka-band preclude its use for
mass-market video on demand. Provision of local TV through Ka-band to the DBS
environment is likely to be viable only in the specific circumstances of the
US marketplace and will only be viable if the DBS operators go into head on
war with the cable operators.
Internet
Access: Current
thinking amongst many Ka-band proponents suggests that high speed Internet and
Intranet services will be the major market driver. Ka-band satellites might
be able to capture around 10-15% of the global market for these transmission
paths. Commercial and public sector R&D organisations as well as carriers
are now increasingly focusing technical and market research on this sector.
Constraints
on Ka-band: There
are some severe constraints in matching the supply side with demand.
In most cases transmission
costs via satellite are likely to be significantly higher than those available
where there is a reasonably sophisticated terrestrial infrastructure. That means
in most of the developed world, where such infrastructure is not available,
low levels of purchasing power will dampen demand. Perhaps the one clear exception
to this is in the provision of high speed Internet access where the main alternative
currently remains as ISDN and where the satellite option looks to be cheaper
than using high-speed cable modems.
The use of geostationary
satellites creates significant technical and commercial disadvantages where
voice and two-way video are involved. This may rule out delivery of some services
based on the ATM platform. However, there is now a growing interest in using
low earth orbit and middle earth orbit to overcome the latency problem.
Use of LEO and MEO satellite
configurations involve substantial initial capital investments by the satellite
operators in contrast to the GSO option. Typically LEO solutions require a near
complete global network of satellites before full commercial service can start.
GSO requires only a single Ka-band payload on a single satellite before service
can start and investment can be scaled up as and when demand increases. Typically
the GSO environment may require initial investment (and therefore market exposure)
of under $200 million whereas the LEO or MEO environment involves initial exposure
well in excess of $1 billion.
The on-board processing
and switching payloads are heavy, placing a severe constraint on what else the
satellite can carry. In the engineering trade-offs needed to accommodate the
OBP payload this may include reduction of station keeping fuel or increasing
the mass of the satellite with associated increases in platform and launch costs.
The R&D establishment continues to work on developing lower mass OBP equipment
but development times are measured in years rather than months so the benefits
from such work will stretch well into the next decade.
Costs of two way ground
stations are far from clear, Whilst Ka-band proponents have suggested unit prices
of $1,000 or less, there remains considerable scepticism whether such figures
can be reached within the next few years. One potential Ka-band operator has
suggested that the costs of ground stations will need to be subsidised. The
use of LEO and MEO satellite configurations will call for the use of phased
array antennas, which are significantly more expensive options than the conventional
parabolic dish.
There is a growing belief
that within the Ka-band there may be insufficient spectrum to meet the demand
for services. Whilst it was initially expected that some 2.5-3.5 GHz would be
available for GSO satellites, this is being whittled down by demands from spectrum
for LMDS, MSS feeder links and non-geostationary Ka-band FSS satellites. The
alternative is to go to even higher frequencies but their use in the commercial
satellite environment is unproven and considerable expenditure on R&D may
be required. This would delay start of services.
The Ka-band satellites are
complex and require large platforms. Thus construction time is significantly
higher than for conventional C-band and Ku-band satellites. It appears that
the minimum time is about three years compared to 18 months now generally on
offer by the satellite world. There is also some industry concern about the
reliability of on-board processing systems that needs to be addressed by the
satellite manufacturers.
There are no agreed standards
shared between the potential operators of Ka-band satellites. In general the
approach has been to let the market decide the de facto standards. Whilst there
are strong arguments in favour of this approach (because it allows innovation
and, potentially, a return on investment in developing equipment and intellectual
property), the potential downside is loss of economies of scale and scope in
manufacturing the ground segment.
Capacity
Constraints Rule Out VOD:
There are some significant limitations on the capabilities of Ka-band systems.
In the VOD environment using current MPEG-2 based compression techniques a typical
HS-601 satellite could provide around a maximum of 2,300 video circuits. This
might be increased by a factor of 10 through a combination of more advanced
compression techniques such as Wavelet technology and larger satellites. However,
it is not a realistic option for mass market VOD.
Likely
Rollout Timetable for Ka-band Satellites:
Initial rollout of service is likely to be in a non-switched environment, using
a limited number of transponders for bent pipe or data broadcasting type services.
SES is planning to roll out services in 1998 at a time when Eutelsat could also
offer ISIS type services using a combination of Ku-band switching and the Italsat
Ka-band platform.
Most of the potential key
players in the marketplace are secretive about their Ka-band plans but both
Asiasat and Koreasat look to be front runners, with new Ka-band capacity available
from 1999. None of the US proposals has yet involved an announcement to cut
metal but one key player has suggested that it may initially roll out service
for the Asian marketplace.
Most of the big players
are looking to find partners to invest and develop service; so far there is
little public confirmation that potential partners are committing serious investment.
The typical reaction from PTOs is "we are considering all options".
They are able to choose between partnering with the new fully private sector
ventures such as SES, Cyberstar or Galaxy (to name a few) or to operations in
which they already have an investment (domestic or regional satellite operators
or the ISOs). The outcome is likely to involve a major strategic decision both
for the PTO and the satellite operating industry.
It is therefore unrealistic
to assume that major Ka-band platforms will be in operation until well into
the year 2000.
Given the need to marshal
major investment resources and commercial partners and the current still restrictive
trade environment even this is optimistic.
Timetables have already
been slipping - at one stage it was expected that construction of the first
satellites carrying the Spaceway payload would begin in late 1995. Even though
Hughes now has an international licence from the FCC and there is hearsay evidence
to suggest it has lined up partners, there has been no announcement of go-ahead
from the company.
Development of US domestic
Ka-band satellites has also been delayed by the lack of award of licences from
the FCC - it has faced difficulties in getting together a workable framework
for the different claims on Ka-band spectrum and auctioning policies (the latter
looks to have been dropped for Ka-band satellites).
Nevertheless, potential
users of Ka-band satellites are now looking seriously at the opportunities open
to them. Some of the satellite service providers have expressed the view that
Ka-band is too far downstream for them to begin serious planning. Others, however,
are now undertaking market research. The Ka-band environment offers them (and
others) the possibility of offering value-added services over and above straight
transmission. These include complete turnkey services using leased capacity
(such as T1 circuits) to offer content to end users or complete telecommunications
networks.
Developments over the last
year in the US telecommunications marketplace also look good for Ka-band. Whilst
the received wisdom until mid-summer was that the cable companies and the telcos
were about to engage in all out warfare to enter each other's marketplace, there
is now a stand-off as they realise costs do not match potential benefits. The
consequence is that heavy investment in providing new services is not taking
place on the scale envisaged. The cable companies are no longer rushing to provide
two-way digital services and the telephone companies have cold feet about providing
broadcast overlays.
Likely
Structure of the Future Ka-band Marketplace:
Whilst there are some 59 planned Ka-band satellite systems, the vast majority
of such plans will fall by the wayside. Ka-band is one element in an overall
restructuring of the worlds satellite communications marketplace.
In the medium term (years'
2000-2010), the overall satellite communications marketplace (excluding MSS)
will consolidate around major commercial international players (perhaps three
to four systems) with a limited number of regional systems (notably in Asia).
The domestic players will, for the most part, either die or be taken over or,
where they are particularly strong, expand into regional operations.
The future of the ISOs in
this environment is uncertain as there is now considerable pressure to ensure
that their dominant economic power is curtailed.
In the long term (after
the year 2010) a feasible scenario may involve a second-generation global network
of switched satellites providing a combination of narrowband and broadband services
through both geostationary and MEO or LEO satellites. Such networks could be
meshed together with inter-satellite links.
It also looks likely that
there will be no winner in the battle between LEO/MEO systems and GSO systems.
Ka-band GSO infrastructure is already going into place, which means that a market
will be locked into using it through fixed earth stations.
Nevertheless, the technical
shortcomings of geostationary satellites leaves a major market for non-geostationary
systems that may include provision of conventional digital broadcast services.
Line of sight is an endemic and permanent problem for all forms of GSO spacecraft
(MSS, DBS and FSS). MEO and LEO configurations can address the market gap unserved
by GSO (indeed, highly inclined elliptical orbits remain a further option not
so far seriously envisaged by the commercial Ka-band fraternity).
Europe
Needs to Get its Act Together:
From the supply side, the key three markets in the world involved in Ka-band
are the USA, Europe and Japan. The European satellite communications marketplace
is over dependent on conventional DTH/DBS TV. This is now a mature marketplace
and the digital successor looks to be of very limited potential. Yet its satellite
operators are committed to rapidly expanding capacity to serve the DST marketplace.
SES has three satellites and a spare on order for this marketplace and Eutelsat
has a further three Hot Bird satellites under construction. There are also two
additional Scandinavian satellites going into orbit this year and which are
primarily dedicated to TV traffic.
The only one of the European
satellite operators that has positioned itself for the Ka-band era is SES which
has a modest commitment in the form of two transponders. Eutelsats thinking
on Ka-band is opaque to say the least and it is far from clear whether its PTO
owners would fund investment in a regional Eutelsat Ka-band infrastructure.
Moreover, Europes
plans for Ka-band satellite systems are focused on serving the low growth European
marketplace rather than the global environment. The Asian environment is largely
ignored but even the most cursory analysis shows that this offers both the largest
and fasted growing market for satellite communications. Indeed, anecdotal evidence
suggests that major US proponents of Ka-band see China as perhaps the largest
Ka-band market of them all.
Europe largely stopped R&D
on the Ka-band after the in-orbit failure of the Olympus satellite. There has
subsequently been almost an emergency response to developments in the USA through
funding of such projects as Secoms. Nevertheless, despite an active OBP programme
in ESA, there are no firm plans from the organisation to launch an OBP payload
and France has opted out from the ESA framework in favour of Stentor. At the
moment it is envisaged that this will not carry a Ka-band payload and France
is also having problems in funding the project.
Whilst Italy has considerable
experience of the Ka-band through its Italsat project, Alenia Spazio is heavily
dependent on EC funding for development of the Euroskyway project. Indeed it
is believed that Alenia Spazio has asked for much more substantial EC funding.
What is under question is
whether Europe has the technological base to compete effectively in the manufacturing
of Ka-band satellites and whether its satellite operators will, in the long
term, be key players in provision of Ka-band infrastructure.
Europe is also way behind
the USA in the development of phased array antennas.
However, the European Commissions
coordinating "Action Plan" on satellite communications may produce
some results. The European Space Agency is expected in the second half of 1997
to take further initiatives in giving European and Canadian firms contracts
to develop multimedia satellite technologies.
The Peculiar
Circumstances of the Japanese Marketplace:
The Japanese market for Ka-band communications remains different from that of
the rest of the world. It looks as if Japan is trying to jump one-step ahead
of Ka-band to provide GBit/s levels of communications as part of a broader,
and still relatively dirigist, approach to communications.
Japan has a long in place
Ka-band infrastructure used to provide trunk telecoms capacity for the PSTN.
It also has a substantial and evolving satellite R&D policy now refocusing
away from satellite platform and payload development to a dual environment including
tighter focus on provision of service.
The position of the key
Japanese satellite operators in the broadband multimedia environment is unclear.
JSC has not filed for Ka-band capacity but SCC has filed for a significant increase
in its Ka-band capacity (it already has Ka-band capacity but with onboard processing
and switching).
Is Ka-band
a Will othe Wisp?
No. The commercial risks of the Ka-band environment are probably considerably
lower than the LEO/MEO MSS environment but the latter has already seen massive
marshalling of finance and is just about to start service. The Ka-band environment
offers less risk because it addresses the needs of a wide portfolio of services
and demand. It also facilitates development of a wide variety of new services
and applications. The use of GSO satellites in the Ka-band environment also
presents the possibility of considerably lower capital investment exposure than
the MSS environment.
The current constraints
on developing Ka-band are mostly technical or lack of access to markets because
of trade constraints. Both are now being addressed.
This is not to say that
some of the thinking behind offering Ka-band services is flawed. One conclusion
of The Ka-band Report is that the Teledesic
approach is extremely high risk - it addresses a narrow niche centred on PC
to PC communications and Internet access and involves a capital exposure of
at $9 billion. Moreover, the technical aspects of the configuration are questionable.
It is highly unlikely that the satellite system can be integrated with other
services such as MSS and DBS.
One also suspects that it
is politically unrealistic given that hidden barriers to trade and protection
of markets will be endemic over the next decade despite any WTO agreements.
There is some clear indication
that Ka-band multimedia satellites offer major end user cost savings over conventional
Ku-band systems. US consulting firm TelAstra has compared the costs of offering
data communications through Ku-and DBS satellites and through Ka-band. It found
that the former would involve transmission costs eight times higher than in
Ka-band.
Risk
Analysis: Basic
analysis of the market positioning of satellite based switched services suggests
that many new services will be high risk ventures to launch. Low risk launches
usually involve existing products into existing markets; highest risk launches
involve new products in new markets. The relationship between whether the product
is new or existing and whether the market is new or existing can be plotted
on a simple 2*2 matrix, with the highest risk opportunities lying in the bottom
right hand quadrant. (Table not shown here)
The implication
of inter-satellite links:
The plans from US GSO operators aiming at the global marketplace indicate a
potential shift away from current dominant orbital slots in the international
satellite market place. Inter-satellite links obviate the need for satellites
placed over the main Ocean Regions to provide international communications.
Instead, operational satellites can (and are planned to) be centred over landmasses
where there are customers and where better line of sight can be provided.
New dominant orbital slots
will therefore emerge and content providers may be forced to use them (rather
than existing slots) to gain access to households. Moreover, the combination
of global coverage and inter-satellite links means that each content provider
may only need one uplink site to provide global distribution through a plethora
of spacecraft.
Nevertheless, it is difficult
not to conclude that inter-satellite links could be used as a tool by some operators
to leverage their market position into an anti-competitive environment. This
is particularly the case if there are no agreed technical standards for inter-satellites
and no regulation of inter-connect rates.
Key Developments
Expected in Ka-band in 1997: Whilst
the Ka-band opportunity featured highly in 1995 in the debate on the future
of satellite communications, developments in 1996 were distinctly low key, if
not inconclusive.
Nevertheless, 1997 will
see some major milestones in the progress towards operational broadband multimedia
satellites -
The WTO negotiations on
opening up the market for satellite communications were completed on 15 February
1997. These may render the FCCs DISCO II proposals on opening up the satcoms
marketplace either semi-redundant- or the basis for future bilateral negotiations.
In early May 1997 the Federal
Communications Commission finally granted licences to the geostationary orbit
applicants following a log series of negotiations with the players involved.
On 27th June
1997 the European Commissions Action Plan on satellite communications
was agreed by the Council of Ministers. Whilst the Commission has very limited
economic and legal power in the satcoms arena, the Action Plan represents its
attempt to coordinate European policy in the face of intense competition from
US interests.
Further orders for Ka-band
space segment are expected this year with Koreasat and Asiasat being front runners
in Asia and SES in Europe.
The number of serious Ka-band
plans emanating from the USA will reduce. Such consolidation is natural at this
stage in market development.
There will be growing interest
in the LEO and MEO Ka-band option and, possibly, the use of even higher frequencies.
Two-way Internet access
services using Ku-band (and, possibly, C-band) will be rolled out through 1997
as equipment manufacturers and service providers instigate new products and
services. These will be precursor services to Ka-band Internet delivery.
The ATM Forum will set standards
for ATM standards for use with satellites.
In October and November
WRC 97 will cover spectrum and Ka-band for feeder links and use of high
frequencies as an alternative to Ka-band.
The major proponents of
Ka-band will continue to seek partners amongst PTOs, other carriers and industry
to finance and market their projects.
Table
2.1: Summary of Planned Multimedia Systems Worldwide
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Satellite System
|
Country of Origin
|
Backer(s)
|
Configuration
|
Orbital Slots
requested
|
Num. of Satellites proposed
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Spaceway |
USA |
Hughes |
GSO |
15 |
15 |
|
| PanAmSat |
USA |
Hughes |
GSO |
1 |
1 |
|
| GE*Star |
USA |
GE Americom |
GSO |
5 |
9 |
|
| Astrolink |
USA |
Lockheed Martin |
GSO |
5 |
9 |
|
| Echostar |
USA |
Echostar |
GSO |
2 |
2 |
|
| Orion |
USA |
Orion |
GSO |
6 |
6 |
|
| Millenium |
USA |
Motorola |
GSO |
4 |
4 |
|
| KaStar |
USA |
Private |
GSO |
2 |
2 |
|
| Cyberstar |
USA |
Loral Space |
GSO |
4 |
4 |
|
| Morningstar |
USA |
Private |
GSO |
4 |
4 |
|
| Netsat 28 |
USA |
Private |
GSO |
1 |
1 |
|
| Voicestar |
USA |
AT&T |
GSO |
7 |
12 |
|
| Teledesic |
USA |
Gates/McCaw |
LEO |
0 |
288 |
|
| M-Star |
USA |
Motorola |
LEO |
0 |
77 |
|
| Celestri |
USA |
Motorola |
LEO |
4 |
59 |
|
| Cyberstar |
USA |
Loral Space |
MEO |
0 |
9 |
Est |
| SkyBridge |
France/USA |
Alcatel |
LEO |
0 |
64 |
|
| Cansat K |
Canada |
Telesat Canada |
GSO |
5 |
2 |
Est |
| Megasat |
Mexico |
Not Known |
GSO |
10 |
12 |
Est |
| Intelsat |
International |
PTTs |
GSO |
10 |
12 |
Est |
| Inmarsat |
International |
PTTs |
GSO |
5 |
6 |
Est |
| Astra K |
Luxembourg |
SES |
GSO |
21 |
24 |
Est |
| Eutelsat K |
Regional, Europe |
Eutelsat |
GSO |
20 |
23 |
Est |
| Euroskyway |
Italy |
Alenia Spazio |
GSO |
7 |
2 |
|
| Sarit |
Italy |
Telespazio? |
GSO |
1 |
2 |
Est |
| West, GSO |
UK/France |
Matra Marconi |
GSO |
5 |
2 |
Est |
| West, MEO |
UK/France |
Matra Marconi |
MEO |
0 |
9 |
|
| Sirius 4 |
Sweden |
NSAB |
GSO |
1 |
1 |
Est |
| Hispasat K |
Spain |
Hispasat |
GSO |
1 |
1 |
Est |
| Videosat |
France |
France Telecom |
GSO |
3 |
3 |
Est |
| Medsat |
Mediterranean |
Aerospatiale,
etc. |
GSO |
1 |
2 |
Est |
| Kyprosat K |
Cyprus |
Not Known |
GSO |
5 |
6 |
Est |
| Maltasat K |
Malta |
Not Known |
GSO |
3 |
1 |
Est |
| Euro*star K |
Germany |
Private |
GSO |
3 |
3 |
Est |
| DB-Sat |
Germany |
Not Known |
GSO |
1 |
2 |
Est |
| Bifrost |
Norway |
Telenor |
GSO |
1 |
2 |
Est |
| Turksat K |
Turkey |
Turksat |
GSO |
3 |
3 |
Est |
| Genesis |
Germany |
DT |
GSO |
6 |
7 |
Est |
| Skysat K |
UK |
Afro-Asian |
GSO |
11 |
2 |
Est |
| Yamal |
Russia |
Gazprom |
GSO |
5 |
2 |
Est |
| Afrisat |
UK |
Not Known |
GSO |
4 |
2 |
Est |
| Diamondsat |
South Africa |
Not Known |
GSO |
1 |
2 |
Est |
| South Africa-sat |
South Africa |
Not Known |
GSO |
1 |
2 |
Est |
| Arabsat |
Arab League |
Arabsat |
GSO |
3 |
4 |
Est |
| Asiasat K |
Hong Kong |
Not Known |
GSO |
5 |
6 |
Est |
| Koreasat 3 |
South Korea |
Koreasat |
GSO |
2 |
2 |
Est |
| Dacomsat-4 |
South Korea |
Dacom |
GSO |
1 |
2 |
Est |
| Superbird K |
Japan |
SCC. |
GSO |
2 |
3 |
Est |
| Samsat |
Singapore |
Pacific Century |
GSO |
3 |
4 |
Est |
| Thaicom K |
Thailand |
Binariang |
GSO |
5 |
6 |
Est |
| Measat K |
Malaysia |
Shinawatra |
GSO |
9 |
11 |
Est |
| Insat K |
India |
Insat/ISRO |
GSO |
15 |
17 |
Est |
| Paksat K/HDTV |
Pakistan |
Not Known |
GSO |
5 |
5 |
Est |
| Vinasat |
Regional |
Vietnam |
GSO |
4 |
5 |
Est |
| Seysat K |
Seychelles |
Not Known |
GSO |
3 |
4 |
Est |
| Palapa K |
Indonesia |
Palapa |
GSO |
3 |
4 |
Est |
| Chinasat 41-48 |
China |
Chinese Govt. |
GSO |
9 |
11 |
Est |
| Logohu |
Papua New Guinea |
Telikom PNG? |
GSO |
7 |
8 |
Est |
| Tongasat |
Tonga |
Tongasat |
GSO |
9 |
11 |
Est |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: DTT Consulting
Commentary
on Table 2.2:
This table is intended to summarise all the known plans for the next generation
of Ka-band satellites world-wide. However, it relies heavily on both FCC and
ITU filings; in both cases the filings are likely to involve requests for more
orbital slots and spectrum that the satellite operator envisages using. There
have also been substantial modifications to filings at the ITU, with some operators
reducing the number of slots and spectrum requested for co-ordination. Moreover,
there is no direct relationship between filings made at the FCC and corresponding
filings for them made by the USA with the ITU.
Where it is possible, DTT
Consulting has estimated the real number of satellites that are likely to be
ordered to contrast with claimed plans. This is almost impossible to do for
the USA without frequent access to print material available at the FCC.
In some cases no filings
have yet been made with the ITU or have, for reasons unknown, been completely
withdrawn (Dacomsat 4). However, in both cases we have assumed that these are
real (albeit paper) plans.
It is also suspected that
a number of other existing or proposed satellite operators are planning to make
filings at the ITU for Ka-band. However, we have made no assumption that they
will and have therefore excluded them from the table.
The list excludes R&D
and demonstration satellites and existing satellite systems using Ka-band such
as Italsat, DFS-Copernicus, NStar and Superbird. It also excludes Big LEOs using
Ka-band for feeder links and the Japanese aeronautical/GPS and date relay satellite
MTSat.
However, because the M-Star
satellite system appears to be closely associated with Motorolas Ka-band
plans, this has been included in the table. Similarly SkyBridge as been included
although it is a Ka-band project.
Table 2.1 indicates that
use of some 279 orbital slots by 307 geostationary satellites is planned in
addition to 497 spacecraft in non-geostationary orbits. In total, 804 satellites
are planned to be launched. Excluded from the latter are in-orbit spares for
non-geostationary systems. However, in-orbit spares for geostationary systems
are included as they tend to be used for non-essential traffic.
The table also indicates
that the number of networks planned is 59 and the number of existing or potential
satellite operators involved is 55.
|