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NOTE;
The musical tapestries you hear on these pages are courtesy of IO Sound Design. Joris Wittenberg is a superior musical artist, composing not music, but mood. His work will set the backdrop for these articles and I urge you to visit his own professional site, IO Sound Design.
The Works of Joris Wittenberg
"The Mustang; Myth or Legend."
"Without his horse, a warrior is but half a man."
- an ancient Mongol saying.
Preface
Underneath the open yawn of a trembling sky, set powerfully against a quaking sunset, a figure etches itself into the dreaming mind. The broad, chiseled visage is stark, the high epitome of mobile warfare, yet pacifying to the touch and liberating in it's flight and spirit. I am nuzzled warmly by a mare of yesteryear.
And it is, as it was then, an inseparable peace and grace that she imparts. But in her fluid, gentle movement, there is an equipoise which would suggest something of her dark and war-torn history.
The warhorse.
It has a mystique befitting that of kings and high princes. It's path is inextricably bound to that of war and it's predestigator, mankind. High fantasy has no more power to bind and capture than this noble beast. It is the very measure of power we rely upon today.
Horsepower.
For thousands of years, she has born man into battle, never to flinch or fail, her breathtaking figure bridging a sea of soldiers, storming the citadel of the waking mind. A millennia of such horror involving the horse invoked a new rubric.
The nightmare.
And, as it was in our past of pasts, so would it be again in 1943, when another thorobred, a stallion of a like reckoning, powerful, fast and bearing a regal figure entered a world at war.
She was the North American P-51 Mustang.
Atop the apex of aircraft at war, the P-51 Mustang left an idolatarized legacy, unrivaled by any aircraft to take flight in wartime. Bathed in the trial of fire that is war, it's immortal appeal transcends national, ethnic and cultural boundaries, holding a gripping sensationalism denied it's wartime sisters throughout the world. It's impact in WWII is well documented, the subject of film, literature, the world wide web and museums worldwide. Never again will such an aircraft figure so prominently in the hearts and minds of aviation enthusiasts.
But, did the 51 contribute so powerfully to the European air war? Or, was it instead a simple transition, a bookmark in the turning of air supremacy from Axis to Ally?
Did the 51 simply mark the end of German supremacy in the air, numerically overwhelmed by the might of Allied industry?
It is what I contend and what we shall venture to unveil.
No different than the knight of the High Middle Ages were the aces of the Second World War. They were both a breed apart, the envy and disdain of their infantry counterparts. Yet, while the infantryman might disparage the knight, he was ever enthralled at the pounding thunder of their fearsome approaches. And while he may in private hold the knight in contempt, his spirit and heart would race at their powerful liberation.
As it was then, so it would be again as the knights of WWII took to their modern warhorses. Again, they belonged to another caste, at once together and yet separate from that of the infantryman. Again, they were regarded with a measure of derision and alternately, respect.
However, when enmired in the thick enthrall of war, when the infantryman wrested with the very real and physical form and face of privation and mortality, nothing stirred the soul so as the mythical approach of the warbirds. The beating of wings and heart.
At that moment, when from the maw of hell they were delivered.... then the modern knight and stallion found a sweaty and breathtaking respect in the grime of war.
40,000 feet
Where angels dare to tread.
Tucked into the corner of a gauge dial is a tattered picture, which contrary to modern science is what really keeps you flying. In the vast feathery heavens, you are alone.
You, unlike the thing you fly, are afraid.
The warplane knows no fear. She knows no compassion. She will never stop. Under your trained direction, she banks and slips obediently, spitting fire in a blinding furor of power. Her savagely beating heart pours out 1300 horsepower effortlessly. She drinks rapaciously, much like you. Her skin is steel and rivet, oblivious to temperature and discomfort. She feels no pain. She has no patience and will never forgive. She is the mighty Mustang.
Before beginning, let me affirm my purpose. I'm not writing this to strip her of her hard won honour. It was paid for in lead and fire. In the smouldering world of eternal war, she knew no rest. She paid the price of duty and sacrifice, shed in a war in heaven. The young she took aloft, returned to touch the soft earth grown men. She delivered them into the mouth of the enemy and then, enwrapped in her powerful rapture, returned them to the familiarity of laughter and friendship. She dwelt between heaven and earth, an orphan of society, belonging to no one. She found her companionship and synergy with the men who flew with her. A purer form of love.
The Mustang is finally at rest. She knows the world peace and security she helped secure. She weeps not, wants not. Such is her indomitable nature. She will endure in thought eternal, her beating propeller still stirring the soul, her figure in motion a powerful reminder of her terrible rage.
I simply seek to illustrate a truth. That, while the Mustang brought the war to Berlin, the road she traveled had been laid by Thunderbolts, Lightnings, Spitfires, Hurricanes and a multitude of others. I take nothing from her. But the war of 1939, '40 and '41 was a different creature from that of the 51's time, i.e., '42, '43, '44 and '45.
The early air war was witness to a more aggressive and organized Luftwaffe, and an overwhelming numerical superiority enjoyed by an air force and an industry that had been largely decimated by the time of the Mustang's arrival. She entered an air war that had been largely won, though contributing no less significantly. Her contribution struck to the very nature of the air war in Europe. Early on, it had been a struggle for air supremacy, to win control of the air. That had been achieved by early 1942 and then we see the priority begin to shift in Europe.
This is instead, an offering of the Mustang's true significance and it's history. A analysis of the Second World War... where it began and where and why it ended. And, of course, the role of the mighty Mustang in that epic.
I will not detail the 51 here. It's specifications can be found on a hundred sundry sites and in a million more books, all more potently portraying the technical half of the Mustang more ably than I. Instead, I offer who she really was, and is today. A soldier, one of many, participating in a war we started and they finished. And, to understand the Mustang, we must understand the war in which she fought and the nature behind the conflict.
World War Two-A Background Of Powers, A Path To War
By 1939, Britain was the sole possessor of a premium air force that could deliver, with admirable precision, a very heavy payload and, in significant numbers.
Churchill had stated early on that, "...if Hitler were to be repulsed here and not try invasion, he will recoil eastward... and we will have nothing to stop him. But there is one thing that will bring him back... and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country." The very notion of "bringing them back" was strikingly bold, but repulsing them was another entirely. However, this statement struck to the very nature of British air action for the remainder of the war. And, affirmed the form that action would take. An industrial war.
By the end of September 1940, that "repulsion" was resoundingly achieved by the men of the RAF in the two month long Battle of Britain. There could no longer be any doubt.
Germany had been defeated.
Wait. It's only 1940. True. However, the Battle of Britain effectively concluded the Third Reich and I will explain why.
At that moment it became a war of industry... and the British immediately realized this. The role had suddenly reversed.
Up to the opening days of September 1940, the war had hinged on the able Wehrmacht, with the Luftwaffe acting in the capacity of airborne artillery for the advancing Army. Britain, poorly equipped to fight with the deadly Luftwaffe toe to toe, could do nothing. Her fighter aircraft were obsoleted by the Germans and her tactical doctrine was lackluster. But now, the security of England secured, the Air Ministry took immediate steps to obviate, single out and exterminate the German industrial and political machine.
The shoddy RAF of a month earlier suddenly had teeth. Out of their tactical role and now into the strategic, the RAF was at home. It was a critical failing of the Luftwaffe, which had never possessed a serious strategic element.
Hitler had squandered a full two thirds of his available combat ready aircraft in the battle, a figure totaling near 3,000 aircraft. Nearly 3,500 of the Luftwaffe's most experienced aviators had perished in the ultimately futile attempt to break the young RAF.
Goering's brash arrogance had crushed the most vital and talented of Germany's venerable Luftwaffe.
As it was over London in 1940, it would be again at Stalingrad in 1942, where the Luftwaffe in the East would make their last stand.
By the end of October 1940, the Luftwaffe was outnumbered in France in the air by three to one by the RAF. But the RAF, much like Germany, had no long range fighter aircraft, and were unable to exploit their costly victory. Germany knew it.
However, the massive gap in air coverage created by the disproportionate losses over England demanded the thinly stretched resources of the Luftwaffe now cover an ever expanding empire with their existing airpower. A gap RAF Bomber Command fully meant to exploit.
Additionally, the loss of experienced aviators over England created a new demand for pilots. Sadly, this was the mortal wound. Over half of the pilots who crossed the English Channel and never returned were veterans of the Spanish Civil War and pivotal to the infrastructure of the Luftwaffe, which was now deflating.
Egregious losses, insufficient machines and sinking morale was destroying the previously unshakeable faith of Hitler's most venerable and deadly weapon. In the upper strato of command, senior officials were now openly and testily questioning the war. This was only further aggravated by Hitler's tendency to pamper the Wehrmacht, equipping and re-arming Germany's Army with the finest and newest equipment available.
As early as June, 1941, frequent requests were bombarding squadron quartermasters for equipment, spare parts and much needed fuel and ammunition.
In the East, the Battle of Britain was immediately, potently and directly felt. The immense losses over England forced the Luftwaffe to hurry fighter and bomber aircraft from the East to France. Into this vacuum entered the Soviet air force, though poorly equipped, now numerically superior to the force opposing them.
Additionally, now that France lay largely stripped of air power and vulnerable to the most dangerous British weapon, her Royal Navy, all new weaponry was shuttled West. The Luftwaffe in the East would battle the Soviets in aging Bf, Dornier and JU aircraft for the remainder of the war.
Time and again, the West would take priority over the Eastern Front, exposing the gravely injured Luftwaffe to the gearing wartime economy of the Soviet Union, an economy which would soon paralyze the entire world.
Even today, the Russian Federation is the world's leading exporter of arms and munitions and continues to stretch the envelope of technology and engineering in exploits the West has yet to duplicate.
It was only a matter of time before the Soviets gained a technological edge, coming in mid- '42 with the introduction of the LaGG-5 La5FN Lavoschka. The final sally-forth of the Luftwaffe in the East would come that very year at the battle of Stalingrad.
The strain of September 1940 and the Battle of Britain would be felt for the remainder of the war. By 1941, the Afrika Corps in North Africa had barely any air support. Carrier borne aircraft in the service of the British Royal Navy had destroyed the Italian Fleet, securing the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Suez, assuring British naval and air supremacy for the remainder of the war.
The RAF in the Middle East destroyed the remaining elements of Iraq's pro-German government, ('41) opening the colonial corridor to the East and providing critical oil and petroleum for Britains war effort.
By late '42, the Luftwaffe was outnumbered in Europe 8 to 1 and by '43, every modern element of the Luftwaffe outside of mainland Europe had been invalidated as a viable weapon.
In the East, the Luftwaffe was now forced to pick it's battles very carefully as the Wermacht reeled under the strain of the Soviet Union's latest weapon, the IL-2 Sturmovik. The most produced WWII era aircraft, over 30,000 of all types were built.
An ever increasing number of Yakolev's, Lavoschka's and Po2V aircraft were arriving as the massive industrial complex of the USSR began to finally catch up with the breath taking advance of the Wehrmacht.
More devastating than the defeat suffered over South Wales and Southern England was proof of the deliberate abandonment of Operation SeaLion by the most senior officials in Germany's wartime machine. In June '40, Hitler had ordered his Chiefs of Staff to begin the necessary operational planning for a front in the East by the spring of 1941. Under advice from Raeder and Doenitz, Hitler decided against a cross-Channel invasion of England, which in truth, he had never truly wanted. Hitler had hoped that England would join him, or, in the least, remain neutral.
However, even had air supremacy been achieved over England and the Channel, Germany would still have to affront Great Britain's most powerful weapon, the Royal Navy.
Overwhelming disparages in equipment between the two navies assured that any cross-Channel attempt would result in a total failure. The Royal Navy outnumbered the Kreigsmarine in capital ships 100 to 1 and in support craft 500 to 1. The British Navy wielded the most advanced naval tactical doctrine in the world and had the combat experience to exercise that doctrine and prosecute a total war against Germany at sea on a planetary scale. It was this absolute and resolute knowledge that led to the abandonment of SeaLion.
By July '40, Germany had transferred 30 divisions to the East in preparation for the Soviet front, further proof of her lack of interest in England. This figure represented fully half of it's ground forces in France and the Low Countries. However, it was necessary to put pressure against the home island of England if only for political leverage. Hitler had placed an incomprehensible faith in Lloyd George, a British politician whom he'd met in 1938. George was opposed to Churchill's government and to English participation in the war. Hitler hoped that through the bombardment of London, George would win the 1940 elections on an anti-war, anti-Labour platform and with the aid of popular support, end Britain's involvement in the war. He'd hoped England would break.
Never could he have been more misguided. From the green fields of England flew an air armada never before or never since equaled. In the stirring, playing motion of shadow against field, they would leave beloved England. Their target would be the heart of Germany.
The abandonment of SeaLion, the consequential defeat of the Luftwaffe and the resulting disparity in machines and men brought the Third Reich to it's end. The thinning of the Luftwaffe would be completed over Stalingrad, and the massive gaps in air coverage would now be exploited by the bombers.
As I think I've illustrated in this rather winded prelude, by '43 the air war in Europe was losing ground. And by the time of the Mustang, many of the Luftwaffe's most experienced aviators had been lost in action. Only one thing remained.
The seemingly indestructible German industrial complex. Now I offer a brief treatise on the psychology and machinery of WWII, this only to further illustrate my point.
The Machines Of The Second World War-Pandora's Box Revealed
For example, the German Air Service of WWI had suffered extremely disproportionate casualties in men and materiel while embarking upon a campaign of strategic bombing in the Verdun and Somme air campaigns of 1918. It resulted in a tendency in German air doctrine to concentrate upon using aircraft in a ground support capacity. This experiment was brought to fruition in the proving grounds of the Spanish Civil War, where the deployment of supporting aircraft in coordination with ground forces validated Hitler's Blitzkrieg. The Luftwaffe competently and effectively used this tendency in the Polish, Low Country and French campaigns. It also meant that the German Air Force asked industry to design their airframes around this supporting role.
In short, the Luftwaffe had neither the capability nor the intent to prosecute a campaign of heavy aerial bombardment.
The British on the other hand, had been badly mauled throughout the 1918 air campaign of the Somme while trying to compete for air superiority over France. This left an irrevocable and indelible impression within the Royal Flying Corps and resulted in a tendency to rely upon strategic, long range bombers, with supporting fighter aircraft. This tendency was passed onto it's younger brother, the RAF.
By 1939, advances in aircraft manufacture and technology had made both German and British machines formidable in their individual roles. It also created a paradox.
The Germans had no long range, strategic platforms with which to carry the war to the island country. The British, by comparison, lacked competent tactical fighter aircraft with which to carry their bombers to the enemy. Into this formula enter America.
Both the German and British air forces had been deployed in combat after the Great War and both European nations realized the demand for a separate service devoted to the airplane. Both nations likewise developed a cogent and strong support apparatus to achieve this objective. America however, lacked an appreciation for the value of aircraft, even after the decisive performance it rendered in WWI. The USAAF lacked any qualitative combat experience following WWI and lacked innovative, modern machines.
Among the powers was an immediate, if not awkward imbalance in aircraft. The Germans held the advantage in the tactical fighter, Britain in the strategic bomber and the U.S. lay floundering inbetween, groping for a comfortable middle ground.
The Japanese boasted the most versatile mix of the two, with both long range strategic aircraft and the tactical element in support.
Along with the German bent for the fighter, the British bent for the bomber and the American bent to find anything that worked, was the varied tendency of their design.
The Germans almost always opted for armour and firepower. It supported this "ground support" role to which the Luftwaffe was often relegated. They were complex and advanced machines, requiring extensive maintenance and upkeep. Poorly switching between roles, the German aircraft suffered from it's highly dedicated role and the technical nature of their design.
Irony concludes that the very nature of the German war effort was found culpable for it's failure, both in the air and on the ground. The incredibly technical and highly advanced German weaponry required servicing and upkeep that allied weaponry did not. It created a need for a complex and well-oiled supply line and a solid corps of mechanics and engineers. In fact, it can be said without any reservation that the German T (Tiger) tank was likely the most advanced and effective main battle tank of the Second World War. But, much like their aircraft, the Tiger saw little action because it's advanced systems were constantly subject to mechanical failure under the stress of combat.
The British by contrast, designed their aircraft simply, for the ease of servicing, repair and cost effectiveness. They had no long range fighters, much like their German counterparts. They also concentrated more upon maneuverability, diversity and simplicity. They began the war on the defensive, ultimately believing the German war machine would invade Britain. Though this would inevitably prove untrue, the design reflected the mentality. Long range wasn't necessary, firepower was secondary to the amount of ammunition carried and speed could be sacrificed in the name of maneuverability. Indeed, such was the innovative nature of the RAF's programme that the most effective weapon of the Battle of Britain, the Hurricane MKIIb, could be repaired in under 15 minutes and be operational again. Her skin was fabricated of Irish linen and invalidated the punch of the most effective Luftwaffe weaponry, her cannon.
It was the lack of appreciation for early British strategic power that sounded the final blow to the German war machine in Europe. Many highly varied "theories" circulate within the historical community pointing to an event, or series of events, that finally led to the downfall of German superiority and predominance in WWII. I contend it was their failure to break the British RAF during the Battle of Britain.
In particular, the incidental bombing of London. A flight of ten (some accounts say 12) Me-111/110 Heinkel bombers, opened a pandora's box Germany could not hope to contain. Low on fuel and under pursuit, they dropped their payload, mistaking the city for a strategic target and wanting to lighten their load. An error of dead-reckoning navigation, it led to the eventual, if not inevitable fall of Nazi Germany. Nine people died and the act incensed the British leadership.
Both the British and German air forces did not, as a part of their air doctrine, bomb civilian targets. The Luftwaffe however, frequently broke with that unwritten rule, starting in Poland during the siege of Warsaw and Cracow and culminating in the bombing of Rotterdam in the Netherlands.
The British increasingly saw the practice as proof of Germany's willingness to subjugate a population through terror. Though unwilling to openly engage in the bombing of civilian targets, the attack on London evoked an immediate response from Churchill. The following night a bomb raid led against industry near Berlin produced little actual collateral damage, however, the impact on the German people was instant and glaring.
Hermann Goering had bragged publicly that the RAF would never appear over Berlin. More than irreparable damage to Goering's reputation, the raid had accomplished another more profound objective.
Until that moment, the people of Germany had nothing with which to associate the fighting beyond the periphery of their borders.
That night, when the bombs fell, the war had finally come to Germany. The RAF had fulfilled a prophecy made by Churchill during the September battle.
Moreover, the attack brought an immediate response from Hitler, who enraged, ordered retaliatory raids against London and other English cities and towns. The priority of the Luftwaffe shifted mid-step and RAF Fighter Command received a much needed break in the middle of the Battle of Britain.
The result was predictable. Germany had no long range heavy bombers, something which the British had perfected as an air doctrine and had in excess in their inventory. On the contrary, German bombers were slow and under-gunned, carrying an insignificant payload by comparison.
The poor performance of the ME-109 as a long range escort and it's brief loiter time over England led to egregious losses for the Luftwaffe. Quite often, the RAF found no opposition when going up to intercept inbound bombers. Indeed, the RAF acclimated very well to bomber interception, a mix of competent machines, radar, excellent coordination and second to none staff work.
To put it more simply, Germany opened the door to a bombing campaign against a country which was capable of delivering ten times the tonnage, with more accuracy and more frequently than they could possibly dare. By early '42, the RAF was leading the first of hundreds of "1000 bomber" raids against German cities.
More than 500,000 German civilians would pay the price for Hitler and Goering's blind ambition.
The bombing of civilian targets became standard operating procedure for the RAF, which exacted an awful vengeance for the dead of the "London Blitz". Perhaps as a better platform for my contention, Hitler's failure in England turned him east, to the Soviet Union. This, by far and large, is the most widely accepted "theory" as the beginning of the end for Nazi Germany. Though, it would be more aptly said, that the eastward drive was deliberate and never as a result of their failure in England.
Early in the war, bombing cities took hold in the allied air forces as an acceptable and indeed, necessary means of prosecuting the war with the Axis. The objective of course, was to destroy their industry and incapacitate their armed services as a direct result.
By as early November 1940, Adolf Galland had written Goering to protest. His objection arrived with the names of over thirty Air Chiefs of Staff and Adjutants. It began a long and bitter rivalry between Goering and Hitler's favorite air commander.
Essentially, there weren't the resources for the Luftwaffe to support the ambitions of the Wehrmacht throughout Europe and North Africa.
Hitler ordered the invasion of Russia despite this early warning, bereft of the airpower he desperately needed and in fact, had enjoyed throughout 1940. This shortcoming led to an early disaster at Leningrad and culminated in the failure of the German Sixth Army Group at Stalingrad.
A military blunder of enormous proportions, Goering had informed Hitler that the Luftwaffe could resupply the Sixth Army Group, which was now encircled at Stalingrad. Acting upon Goering's recommendations, Hitler refused to allow Von Paulus to break out at Stalingrad and regroup at the Sigfried line. Consequentially, the Sixth Army was wiped out in hard fighting, taking almost 200,000 dead and 400,000 captured.
The lack of airpower in the Russian campaign was a direct result of the costly expenditure in machines and life earlier in September of 1940. The Battle of Britain revisited Hitler at every turn of the war. Spectres of Spitfires and Hurricanes surely tormented Goering's dreams, their dead pilots returning daily to once again rise against tyranny, their sacrifice forever haunting the German effort in the air. By the autumn of 1942, they would dance nightly in wildy howling fires which gutted German towns, cities, industry and population.
The Air War In Europe 1940-1942
Only slightly more successful was RAF Bomber Command, bombing at night, often during inclement weather. Somehow, some way, Germany kept sending up aircraft.
More alarmingly, German aircraft was markedly more superior to comparable Allied machines, including complex radio direction finding, bomb sights and lethal weaponry. Irregardless of the inhuman pounding, the Luftwaffe continued to introduce new and deadly machines right up to the final months of WWII. The machines were innovative, cutting edge and absolutely stunning.
The British, funding their powerful bomber programme, were falling desperately behind. They were also unwilling to consider radical advancements in aircraft design, unwilling to leave "what worked". The British had, in fact, been the first nation to test and validate a working jet engine in 1931, fully two years before the Germans. But seeing no value to such a new and experimental engine, it was never given an airframe and shelved.
However, in retrospect this had little impact on the war. The Germans never fully appreciated the value of the Me262 and never employed it in the capacity for which it had been designed.
Hitler's interference ensured that it would never be used effectively, insisting it be used as a low level bomber. The very nature of the Me262 forbade this, with a large, high profile nose which did not allow a pilot to watch the fall of the bomb.
Even the later modification of landing gear and flight surfaces did not significantly alter this. It simply allowed the Me262 a better line of sight during perhaps it's most imperceptibly dangerous approaches. Take-off and landing.
To reference the era in which the 51 entered service modestly, I offer a brief background on one of it's late war rivals.
The Me262.
Intended to enter service in the spring of '41, the continuing engineering difficulties already plaguing the Third Reich delayed it's entrance until mid-'44. Though the fighter had been operational by '41, a ongoing competition in Germany's industrial sector had several such jet fighters under development at the same time as the Me262. This invariably hurt the development of the 262 as the scarcity of rare metals and the Jumo engine placed a strain on the competitive projects.
As the war evolved, Germany lost their ability to procure rare metals such as chromium when Turkey was occupied by Great Britain. This setback meant that Messerschmiddt had to build the entire engine assembly out of steel. Because of the extreme operating temperature of the Jumo engine, it warped and cracked the delicate fan blades leading to frequent engine failure or explosion. It also warped and skewed the exhaust ventricle at the tail of the aircraft. Without chromium, this fundamental failure was never righted and the 262 had to undergo a complete engine overhaul after a mere ten hours of flight.
It's range was extremely limited as the Jumo engine consumed enormous quantities of fuel. A 262 had enough J-2 fuel for only 2-4 hours of flight.
By '43 and the entrance of the new 51, the availability of the J2 fuel required, (640gal a flight) was strained as the industrial complex of Nazi Germany fell under the ever unfolding blanket of allied bomb coverage. Additionally, allied command made the Me262 manufacturing facilities a primary target and many of these facilities had to be relocated to remote locations.
By the autumn of '43 the Luftwaffe had a total of 280 combat ready aircraft in France, by late spring of the following year, (June) a mere 120 combat ready aircraft to offer against 7,000 allied combat aircraft.
Flying over the beach head at Normandy, the famed German fighter ace, Josef "Pips" Priller sarcastically radioed his headquarters, "... this is the finest day in the history of the Luftwaffe."
As mayhaps a more potent illustration, on 6 June of '44 and the Normandy landings, a total of 5,000 allied aircraft participated in the landings.
The Luftwaffe resisted with an estimated 225 aircraft, only 125 of which were combat ready.
Regardless of this overwhelming numerical superiority and under the inhuman strain of allied bomb power, now capable of delivering in excess of 2 million tons of bombs daily, in comparison to 7,000 tons daily in '40, the Luftwaffe managed to build 1200 262's from the spring of '42 to fall of '45. They were never used in numbers, the largest recorded formation numbering 59 Me262's. They were opposed in action that day by 1200 allied bombers and 800 fighters.
Regardless of the almost superhuman odds, the 262 managed an incredible 700 kills in it's short operational lifespan. The U.S., using the same German technology, designed by many of the same WWII era German engineers, recorded an astounding 757 Mig-1 kills in Korea in '50, with a mere 79 machines lost.
Though the British had their own jet fighter aircraft deployed before war's end, it never saw battle with the venerable 262. With the acronym "Glouster" it was magnanimously less advanced than the 262, boasting only a superior engine design. Galland later remarked after flying the RAF Glouster that had the 262 had a Glouster engine, it could have been far more effective.
The campaign against the Me262 simply further illustrates this theory. Instead of engaging the 262 in the air, she was destroyed on the ground, at the factory, in a total economic war. Regardless of the Luftwaffe's incredible machinery, it was being picked apart from the sky. By late '43 they were confined to a limited offensive role and burdened under the immense weight of their new defensive role. Stop the Eighth USAAF and RAF Bomber Command.
However, though the Luftwaffe had been eliminated as a tactical threat, they laboured on in the defensive role quite admirably. By mid-summer '43 it was apparent that not only had the Luftwaffe the machines and men, but had admirably shifted from one air doctrine to another mid-stride, without a falter. The bomber losses were climbing.
So began a scramble to find an aircraft that could carry the industrial war to Germany. The bombers were there. The working doctrine was in place. But advances in German anti-aircraft batteries and the ever threatening Luftwaffe now made their safe introduction into German airspace and moreover, their return home... nearly impossible.
Bomber defenses were largely ineffective and in place for the psychological security of it's aircrews.
By '43, Germany was no longer a threat outside of Europe. But from behind the Atlantic wall, she leered. No empire or nation would dare against that wall. Not, in the least, until the mighty Luftwaffe could be brought down.
The P47 Thunderbolt, P38 Lightning and Spitfire hadn't the range to protect the bombers... something new was desperately needed.
But for the moment in time, seized in steel and fuel, a reckoning was coming over the skies of Axis Europe. A final and horrible reckoning. It would be led, in it's final lusting fury, by America's golden child.
The Mustang.
The American declaration in '41 finally opened the floodgates of the Atlantic to the wartime industry of the United States. Afar from the distant warring shore of Europe came the thunder of hooves and an epitaph that history would emblazon into the mind. In an unimportant office, three engineers and one newly nervous aviation industry president huddle over a scattered, unkempt pile of papers. There she lay.
Her conception date fell in 1938, in a hangar where thickly hung the stale reek of avgas and oil. In perhaps history's greatest exercise of irony... she was given life by a man named Willy Messerschmiddt.
The North American P-51 Mustang-The Real Deal
Hostilities erupted and Dutch eagerly sought out combat reports from both sides and began to develop several projects of his own. Although Dutch had no experience with fighter aircraft, he collaborated with a friend and colleague in J. Leland Atwood to formulate the outline for a fighter project. A project team was quickly formed at North American, composed of such people as Raymond H. Rice, Edgar Schmued, Larry Waite and E. H. Horkey. An urban legend currently circulating claims that Edgar Schmued worked for Willy Messerschmitt and that the Mustang was heavily influenced by the Bf 109.
In April '40, Kindelberger met with the British Air Purchasing Commission and was asked to manufacture the Curtiss Hawk 87 (P40D) under license for the RAF.
Kindelberger objected, offering that NAA could do better than the P40. He claimed that NAA could design a real fighter in the same time period it would take to put the P-40 into production. The British commission warmly received Kindelberger and on 10 April they accepted his proposal, providing that the first prototype be airworthy in 120 days. The design was assigned the company project name of Model NA-73 and it was designed, built, tested and flown in 117 days.
At this time, the BPC was under considerable pressure to move along the delivery of aircraft. Throughout early 1940, January through May, the BPC had prosecuted a fairly relaxed purchasing programme, but an event in June altered the pitch and tenor of that mission unimaginably. France surrendered on 22 June at Compiegne and presented Britain with the immediate spectre of invasion.
At that time, the USAAC reserved the right to block the sale of aircraft that it regarded as "outside the Army's interest". But, on May 4, 1940, the US Army reluctantly agreed not to block the British sale, under a condition. Two production models of the initial lot for Britain were to be transferred to the USAAC for testing... free of charge.
The NA-73X prototype contract was signed on 23 May, the British insisting on a heavy eight-gun armament. NAA had actually been quietly designing a fighter with those specifications since the summer of 1939, and by that date they had already completed much of the detail design. On 29 May, a provisional RAF procurement was issued for 320 aircraft, contingent on satisfactory testing of the prototype. NAA agreed to start deliveries in January 1941. The aircraft was given the name Mustang I in RAF service.
Another urban legend surrounding the Mustang is that it owed a great deal to the Curtiss P40, and, in fact, stole a number of design features from that fighter. Although NAA paid 56,000 for technical aerodynamic data on the Curtiss XP46, the NA-73X owed virtually nothing to the design and certainly owed nothing to the Curtiss P40. The two warhorses were a breed apart.
The NA-73X prototype emerged from the Inglewood plant in only 102 days, thus meeting the 120-day deadline with time to spare, although the aircraft lacked an engine, which had been inevitably delayed at the Allison factory. The engine installed was an unsupercharged Allison V-1710-F3R liquid-cooled Vee, rated at 1100 hp. Veteran test pilot Vance Breese flew it for the first time on 26 October, 1940 and it was a clear 25 mph faster than the P-40, despite being powered by an identical engine.
The NA-73X had encountered very few problems during initial testing and production for the RAF began almost immediately. The first production Mustang I for the RAF (AG345) flew for the first time on April 23, 1941, well behind the original schedule.
It was kept by NAA as a test machine. Perhaps the most noticeable change was the extension of the carburetor inlet right up to the nose in order to give good ram recovery at extended angles of attack. This machine was initially unpainted, but it later received a RAF paint job with camouflage, remaining at Inglewood where it was never armed.
Armament was fitted to the second aircraft off the production line (AG346). This aircraft was accepted by the RAF in September and started a long journey to Britain, finally arriving in Liverpool on October 24, 1941. It lacked a radio, a gunsight, and certain other equipment which was by contract to be supplied by British manufacturers. Once the British equipment was installed, the complete aircraft was evaluated at the Aeroplane & Armament Experimental Establishment at Boscome Down and by the Air Fighting Development Unit at RAF Duxford.
The newly-arrived Mustang was quickly recognized as being the best fighter aircraft yet to be delivered from the USA, though lacking in comparison to comparable British machines. It was found to be superior to the Kittyhawk, Airacobra and Spitfire in both speed and maneuverability at low altitudes. Maximum speed was 382 mph at 13,000 feet. The armament of four 0.50-inch and four 0.30-inch machine guns was heavy and effective. Handling was excellent. The range was nearly double that of any RAF single-engined fighter. It was 25 to 45 mph faster than the Spitfire V at altitudes up to 15,000 feet.
The problem was the rapid fall-off in performance at altitudes above 15,000 feet, caused by its low-altitude Allison engine. This was more than just a minor deficiency, since most aerial combat over Europe at that time was taking place at medium to high altitudes. Consequently, it was decided that the Mustang I could be best used for low-level tactical reconnaissance and ground attack, where full advantage could be taken of its exceptional low-altitude performance. At this time, the venerable P47 Thunderbolt was engaged in these activities, soldiering on against superior German aircraft. Thanklessly pulled from her duty, she was replaced by the young 51, who would learn to regret the experience. Later in the war, with 51 losses climbing on the ground, she'd be again replaced by the venerable P47, the Thunderbolt taking her place at the front lines where she belonged.
The first RAF unit to receive the Mustang was No 26 Squadron at Gatwick which began to operate the fighter in February 1942. In April, two more squadrons received Mustangs, and eight more in June. Most of the aircraft went to Army Cooperation Command, usually replacing Curtiss Tomahawks or Westland Lysanders. The first Mustang combat mission was undertaken by Flying Officer G. N. Dawson of No. 26 Squadron on May 10, 1942, strafing hangars in France and shooting up a train.
The first Mustang I operational sortie was on July 27, 1942. Mustang Is participated in the disastrous Dieppe landings by British commandos on August 19, 1942, where it saw the first air-to-air action. During this operation, pilots of No 414 Squadron of the RCAF were attacked by Fw 190s. An American RCAF volunteer, F/O H. H. Hills, shot down one of the enemy, which was first blood for the Mustang.
In October of 1942, On a mission to the Dortmund-Elms Canal and other objectives in Holland, the Mustang I became the first single- engined fighter based in the UK to penetrate the German border. By this time, the Mustang I equipped Nos 2, 4, 16, 26, 63, 169,239, 241, 268, and 613 Squadrons of the RAF, plus Nos 400, 414 and 430 Squadrons of the RCAF, and No 309 (Polish) Squadron of the RAF.
With the passage of Lend-Lease, 150 more Mustangs were ordered by the US Army, all of which were intended for delivery to Britain. These were designated Mustang Mark IA by the RAF and NA-91 by the factory. The Mustang IA differed from earlier versions in having the machine guns replaced by four 20-mm wing-mounted Hispano cannon, with most of the long barrels protruding well ahead of the wing. For contractual purposes, these aircraft were given the US designation of P-51. Throughout 1941, the Army referred to these aircraft under the name Apache, but this was changed to Mustang at about the time the deliveries began in mid-1942. The P designation stood for pursuit.
Tactical reports from RAF army cooperation units were laudatory. The Mustang I and IAs were able to take an incredible amount of battle damage. The long range of the Mustang made it an excellent tactical reconnaissance aircraft and its heavy armament made it effective against most ground targets. In 18 months of operation 200 locomotives and 200 barges were destroyed or severely damaged, and an undetermined number of enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground. This was accomplished at the expense of only one Mustang being shot down by enemy fighters, five lost to flak, and two vanishing with no record of their fate. At low altitudes, the Mustang was faster than either the Bf 109 or the Fw 190. At sea level, the Mustang could run away from any enemy aircraft.
But, this also exhibits the relaxed situation of the air war over France by late 1942. The Mustang had yet to see serious air-to-air action.
In March of 1943, a batch of 35 P-51/F-6As were assigned to the 154th Observation Squadron at Oujda in French Morocco. This was the first US Mustang unit. Its first mission was a photographic coverage of Kairouan airfield, Tunisia on April 10, 1943.
The fourth and tenth NA-73s were duly delivered to the US Army in May of 1941 for testing at Wright Field, Ohio. They bore the designation XP-51. They were initially unpainted except for national insignia and the black antiglare panel over the forward fuselage ahead of the pilot. The Army painted the serials 1038 and 1039 on the fin and on each side of the nose, together with the WRIGHT arrowhead emblem on the rear fuselage. Much later, they were both painted olive drab overall.
The testing of the two Wright Field XP-51s was rather slow at first, almost as if the Army didn't really want to bother with these airplanes and that they were some sort of nuisance that the Army wished would just go away. Some authors have suggested that there were secret motives behind the Army's reluctance to test the XP-51s. However, the slow pace of the testing of the XP-51s can probably be blamed more on bureaucratic inertia than on anything all that sinister. At that time, the Army was overloaded with other test programs, the Lockheed P-38 Lightning, Bell P-39 Airacobra, and a newer Republic P-47 Thunderbolt being thought to meet all the Army's requirements for fighter aircraft. Furthermore, the Mustang was a "foreign" type not built to any American specification, and was therefore way down on the Army's list of priorities.
Nevertheless, the testing of the XP-51s did eventually get underway at Wright Field, and the Army's test pilots reported very favorably on the performance of these planes. Inexplicably, no Army orders were forthcoming. Much later, the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (better known as the "Truman Committee", after its chairman Sen. Harry S Truman of Missouri) was given the task of investigating the system under which military production contracts were awarded during wartime conditions. They looked specifically into the reason why the Army had sat on its hands for so long before ordering any examples of the Mustang, an airplane which had such demonstrably superior performance.
Some insiders claim that NAA President "Dutch" Kindelberger had been asked to pay bribes in exchange for a production contract, but that he had refused all such demands in no uncertain terms. The primary cause of the long delay in Army acquisition of the Mustang may be somewhat less sinister. The Mustang may have been the victim of the "Not Invented Here" (NIH) syndrome, in which the Army looked askance at an upstart aircraft which had not been designed in response to any of its official requirements. The USAAF finally ordered 500 of the NA aircraft.
They saw their first action during aerial attacks on the island of Pantelleria, with the first sortie being flown on June 6, 1943. The A-36A was involved in the taking of Monte Cassino, and participated in the sinking of the Italian passenger liner Conte di Savoia.
The USAAF now finally had an aircraft which could compete on equal terms with the Fw 190 and the later models of the Bf 109. But, numbers and other considerations demanded a much later deployment date. In fact, the Mustang was not a very accomplished dogfighter. It's armament lacked the punch of comparable German aircraft and until early '44, the Mustang lacked any serious innovation beyond her initial design.
Certainly cockpit armour, self-sealing fuel tanks and bullet proof glass was considerable, however serious problems plagued the 51 well into '44.
Modifications to the rear spar for the bubble canopy induced avionics trouble and was hastily corrected. It's Merlin engine, the set-piece armament and other improvements had been instituted by the British, which the Americans quickly mimicked.
However, this once again further serves to illustrate the point. It's late deployment, inexperienced crews and radical design created problems suffered by any new venture. No time was given to shake down the aircraft for bugs. It was hastily pressed into service.
The first combat unit equipped with Merlin-powered Mustangs was the 354th Fighter Group, which reached England in October of 1943. The 354th flew their first cross-Channel sweep mission on December 1, 1943, and scored their first victory on a mission to Bremen on December 16. However, inexperienced pilots and ground crews and numerous technical problems limited operations with the P-51B/C until about eight weeks into 1944. From the early spring of 1944, the Merlin-powered Mustang became an important fighter in the ETO. By '44, the Mustang had come full circle, becoming the aircraft we know today. Almost a year later, the war would end.
The Mustang was the only Allied fighter with sufficient range to accompany bombers on their "shuttle" missions in which landings were made in Russia after deep-penetration targets had been attacked from English bases.
That simple statement outlines the true and significant contribution of the Mustang. She watched the bombers vigilantly as they carried on the exercise of a war of industry with a nation doomed to inevitable economic exhaustion. It was the lone fighter, out on long range escorts her sisters were incapable of reproducing.
If a single aircraft could be said to have "won" the war, and I do not believe for one moment that it could, it would have to be the B17 Flying Fortress.
It can be said with certainty that the reason, in the main, for the Mustangs legendary status amongst allied aircraft is the media. The air war in Europe was clean, sanitized and the losses in men and materiel, though staggering, were far, far less than those on the ground. Thus, this is the side of the war the allied military leadership most wanted to show the public. A clean war, far from baked earth and blooded countryside.
Significant materiel surplus and overwhelming numerical superiority in the air was a highly visible and positive image, easily published in the media and beneficial for the general morale of the allied nations. Moreover, it fit well with the still largely pacifist U.S. public, who saw the fighter and bomber as a more humanitarian method of bringing the war to the Axis. Reasoning fewer people died on both sides, air power became the measure of how war was prosecuted both in the military and public eye. Even when that pacifist opinion changed later in the war, air power still resulted in less allied casualties while delivering far more collateral damage to men and materiel to the enemy. Bombers were a favourite of the USAAF, the poster child of it's relationship with the U.S. media. The bomber carried seven to ten men and was capable of killing a hundred times that number. Ultimately, this sensational campaign idolatarized the air war, and managed to keep the majority of the ugly ground fighting and worse yet, the Holocaust, effectively out of the public eye.
Epilogue
Of the 18,000 plus P series Mustangs built between 1940 and 1945, only 300 now remain, few of them airworthy. Numerically speaking, that figure is four times the number of horse lost in Napoleon's drive to Moscow.
In war, it is often the case that the beast of burden brings the war to the enemy. Be it beast or machine, a human heart accompanies it into battle. It carries the burden of the army and shoulders the weight of victory or defeat. Such was true of the workhorse of the USAAF.
Remarkable aircraft indeed. Revolutionary even. However... the one that won the war? Hardly.
The 51 laboured through the Second World War as a soldier, serving a cause, alongside thousands of other aircraft who had paved the way for it's arrival. Her weaknesses shouldered by others, her strengths carrying the faults of yet more. A truly stunning aircraft, but just a soldier. One of many. Many, who never came home.
Rest well and welcome home.
FINIS.
Fair Skies
9Iron
Addendum of Interesting Facts
Mustang P-51Ds in Foreign Service
RAF Mustang IV's based in England were kept busy during the latter part of 1944 by the V-1 "buzz bomb" threat, destroying 232 of these missiles by September 5.
On April 16, 1945, Mustangs of 611 Squadron were the first RAF aircraft to greet their Russian allies over Berlin.
At the end of the war in Europe, the RAF took delivery of 600 Mustang IVs in India for use against the Japanese in Burma and beyond. However, Japan surrendered before these could be put to use, and most of these aircraft were scrapped.
After the war, a large number of the RAF's Mustangs were returned to the USA, but a few continued to serve with the RAF as late as May of 1947 when they were replaced by British-built equipment.
In late 1944, the first French unit began its transition to reconnaissance Mustangs. In January 1945, the Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 2/33 of the French Air Force took their F-6Cs and F-6Ds over Germany on photographic mapping missions.
The Italian-based Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) No 3 Squadron had operated Mustang IIIs and IVs from November 1944 until VE Day. Most of the missions flown by this unit were ground support operations over northern Italy in pursuit of reteating German forces, and fighter sweeps over Yugoslavia.
In the Pacific theatre, the RAAF had been equipped with Spitfire VIIIs, but these possessed insufficient range for the missions that would now be required in the final push against Japan. 314 US-supplied P-51Ks were allocated to the RAAF, but the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) simultaneously made arrangements to produce the P-51D under license in Australia. NAA supplied 100 kits and Packard supplied 80 V-1650-3 engines in order to get CAC started.
Designated CA-17 Mustang 20, the first Australian-assembled Mustang flew for the first time on April 29, 1945. A total of 80 CA-17s were assembled, but all were too late to take any part in the war against Japan. After the war, CAC went on to produce 120 more Mustangs, all built from Australian-manufactured components. The first 40 examples were designated CA-18 Mustang 21, and were powered by the V-1560-7 engine. These were followed by 14 Mustang 22s with the RAF installation of an F24 oblique camera behind the cockpit. The CAC manufacture was completed by the production of 66 Mustang 23s which were powered by British-built Merlin 66 or 70 engines. Fourteen Mustang 21s were later converted to Mustang 22 standards. The RAAF also received 214 P-51Ds and 84 P-51Ks directly from the USA under Lend-Lease, but no RAAF Mustangs became operational until well after the end of the Pacific War.
The Mustang-equipped RAAF Squadrons No. 76, 77, and 82 participated in the occupation of Japan starting in 1946. They remained there until 1949, when Nos 76 and 82 Squadrons were withdrawn back to Australia, leaving only No. 77 Squadron still in Japan. No. 77 Squadron was in Japan when the Korean War began, and they immediately joined with the US Fifth Air Force, using their Mustangs as fighter-bombers in a desperate attempt to stem the North Korean advance. During the first six months of the Korean conflict, they flew 2600 sorties against tremendous odds. The Australian Mustangs were finally superseded by Gloster Meteors in 1951.
Thirty P-51Ds were supplied to the Royal New Zealand Air Force in 1945, but they were not introduced into service until a couple of years later. They were replaced by de Havilland Vampires in 1950.
In 1950, the South African Air Force received a batch of ex-USAF F-51D Mustangs as a result of their contribution to the United Nations forces in Korea. Mustangs serving with No 2 Squadron SAAF entered combat against North Korea in November of 1950. They remained in service with the SAAF until 1953 when they were replaced by Sabres.
The Royal Canadian Air Force received 100 P-51Ds shortly after the war ended. These served with the RCAF for some years, the last example not going out of service until 1956.
Early in 1945, there was a distinct possibility that Sweden might get involved in the war in Europe. In an effort to bolster its air defenses, Sweden purchased 50 P-51Ds from the USA. The Swedish government had been planning to introduce the homegrown SAAB-21A as its frontline fighter, but its entry into service was slow and 90 more Mustangs were purchased from the USA as an interim stopgap measure until the SAAB fighter could be available in greater quantity. Eventually, enough Swedish-built fighters became available, and the Swedish Mustangs were phased out of service or sold off as surplus.
The Swiss Air Force flew mainly German-built equipment during and immediately after the war. With the defeat of Germany, the Swiss had to look elsewhere for arms suppliers, and they ordered a batch of jet-powered de Havilland Vampire fighters from Britain. However, deliveries of the Vampires were slow. While awaiting the Vampire deliveries, Switzerland bought 100 surplus F-51Ds as an interim type. These were finally phased out of service in 1956.
The Chinese Air Force received three squadrons of P-51Ds in 1946. When Chiang Kai-shek's government was overthrown by Mao's Communists in 1949, most of the Nationalist P-51Ds fled to Formosa. However, a few were left behind and were incorporated into the People's Liberation Army Air Force. However, it is not known if these P-51Ds were ever used against United Nations forces in Korea.
The Netherlands forces fighting against the Japanese in the Pacific late in the war were equipped with P-51Ds. When the war against Japan ended, Dutch Mustangs were used in a futile attempt to suppress the Indonesian nationalists. When the sovereignty of Indonesia was at last recognized in June of 1950, the Netherlands East Indies Air Force was officially disbanded and the surviving Mustangs were transferred to the Indonesian Air Force. Indonesian Mustangs remained in service with the IAF until replaced by Russian fighters in 1959.
After Italy quit the Axis and joined with the Allies, the Italian air force was supplied with American equipment, including P-51Ds. By late 1948, Italy had 48 Mustangs in service, and they remained front-line equipment until replaced by Vampires and Sabres in 1953.
In spite of a Western-sponsored arms embargo, the new state of Israel managed to purchase 25 surplus F-51D fighters from Sweden in 1952. These replaced the Avia S.199 (Czech-built Bf-109G) fighters previously operated by Israel. The F-51Ds served with the Israel Defense Force/Air Force for several years. They saw action against Egypt during the Suez incident of October-November 1956. They were finally replaced by jets in the late 1950s.
The Republic of Korea Air Force were supplied with F-51D Mustang fighters in 1950 for use in opposing the North Korean attack. At first, they were used for defensive purposes, but they eventually went over to the offensive ground attack role. They were finally replaced by Sabres in 1960.
Under the terms of the Rio Pact of 1947, Cuba was supplied with F-51D Mustangs. These were still in service when Fidel Castro seized control of Cuba in 1959, and they served with the Cuban air force until they were replaced with Russian-built equipment in the early 1960s.
Dominica purchased 32 surplus P-51Ds from Sweden in 1952, and these were still in service in 1962.
Guatemala purchased a small number of P-51Ds just after the war ended, but no spares were available and were allowed simply to go out of service as parts begin to wear out.
Haiti purchased six P-51Ds just after the war, and some of them remained in service well into the 1960s.
Nicaragua took delivery of a few F-51Ds in 1947, and some of them remained in service well into the 1960s.
Uruguay also got a few P-51Ds just after the war, and these remained in service until the 1960s.
The Philippine Air Force received a number of P-51Ds in 1946, and they served until 1960.
The P-51 was recalled from her forlorn hangars during the Vietnam War and... the U.S. planned contingencies for her service continuing into the 80's!
For the rest of the story, visit; Joe Baugher.
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