Theological Themes and Genesis 1-2
Metaphors
Divine Self-Limitation in Creation
The first significant theological theme we shall analyze further is divine self-limitation. In his book, The Suffering of God, Fretheim details his understanding of God�s self-limitation in His relationship to the world. This limitation is seen in many ways. The first is with respect to promise. �Whenever God makes a promise, God limits the options available for action on any related matters.� God chooses to limit His own future options through promises, because God is faithful to His promises. This means a limitation on God�s freedom and God�s power, even if it is a self-limitation. A second way this self-limitation is seen is through the varying intensity of God�s presence. Fretheim asserts, �the intensity of the divine presence can be affected by human sinfulness or receptiveness.� The relationship God has chosen with the world is characterized by self-limitation in which the response of the creature matters to the divine presence and action. Creation can work against God, and can drive God away or force Him into hiding. This means �the divine power that can be brought to bear on each occasion will vary.� The third way that divine self-limitation is seen is through the undertaking of a �relationship of integrity.� The creatures to which God relates truly enter into relationship with God, and this entails God sharing power with them. As Fretheim points out, �such common images as master-slave or king-subject cannot be construed in a way to suggest that only the superior has power.� Fretheim details clearly the self-limited nature of God�s relationship with the world, which expands beyond the scope of creation, but encompasses it as well. This theme of self-limitation coincides with the understanding of kenosis which we are putting forth, and thus we shall look carefully at Fretheim�s understanding of the relation between this theme and the texts of Genesis 1-2.
We shall now narrow our focus to creation, for creation is an activity that God undertakes in a self-limiting way. God has truly entered into relationship, and has brought creation in as a partner in relationship, so that, �given the divine commitment to the creation, God will never be the same again.� Thus, we turn our attention to what this power-sharing means.
God has chosen to limit Himself and His power in relationship with creation. The first type of sharing we shall talk about is cooperation. As Fretheim asserts, �Although the emphasis throughout is on the divine initiative, the creative capacities of the created are clearly attested.� In order to more fully understand Genesis 1-2, we must look past the dominant understanding of creatures as passive and dependent, and uplift the creative roles that creatures play in these passages. Genesis 2 uplifts the human as a co-creator with God. In fact, humans are depicted as crucial to God�s creative activity. Fretheim observes that �Verse 5 startles the reader due to the parallel it draws between the rain and human labor�, both of which are considered indispensable to produce edible plants/herbs�.� The human activity of tilling is equally as important to the creation of shrubs as rain is. The humans are clearly asserted to play a decisive role in creation.
Michael Welker echoes this idea of the importance of the human role in creation, and speaks of God�s creation as �giving space for the human being�s own activity.� He notes the prominence of other actors in the creation account, and the large amount of input that creation has on its own formation. The mandate of dominion and the creation of the Sabbath are both explicit points in which God gives instruction to the humans, but he emphasizes that the role of the creature in creation can be clearly seen even outside of these complex issues. Welker asserts, �Anxiety about the creature�s own power being too great is apparently foreign to the classical creation texts of the biblical traditions.�
Another important point at which God�s self-limitation can be seen is in the decisive role of humans, which is reflected in numerous ways in the text. God gives the man the task of naming, brings before him all creatures, �and whatever the man called each living creature, that was its name� (2:19). God has delegated this role of naming to the man, and thus, man is given the decisive right to name as he chooses. We see that God has given power over to the man, and thus has chosen not to exercise his own power in this area. Fretheim also observes a second important point, which should be considered with regard to naming in the text. This is that it stands in parallel with God�s naming. Both God and the human undertake the role of naming. Thus there is strong analogy at this point between God�s creative role and the human�s role. Welker likewise uplifts the parallel roles that God and creatures play in the text, stating, �Not only God separates, but also the creature�. Not only God rules, but also the creature�. Not only God brings forth, but also the creature brings forth creature�.�
God�s use of speech is another element of the creation accounts which also contributes to the understanding of the role of the human in creation, and the nature of the relationship between God and the human. Fretheim observes that, specifically with regard the mandate of dominion, �the divine speaking is such that the receptor of the word is important in the shaping of the created order.� The divine speech also reflects God�s self-limitation in that God has chosen to create man in a dialogical rather than a monological act. The speech by which God creates man begins, �Let us make�� (1:26). This leads Fretheim to conclude, �Because God is engaged in a relationship of mutuality within the divine realm, does this not signal the nature of the relationship between God and human beings regarding the creative process?� This understanding fits with the command to �Be fruitful and multiply� (1:28). Looking at this relationship in terms of power, God has chosen to share power in the divine realm, and then God creates and interacts with creation in such a way that God chooses to share power with creation, specifically with the human.
Kenosis and God�s Self-Limitation in Creation
The acknowledgement of the decisive role that humans play in the shaping of creation points to kenosis in God�s action of creation, for God has chosen to limit Himself in such a way that power is given over to the humans to act. As Moltmann says, �Through the space conceded by God, creation is given detachment from God and freedom of movement over against him.� In creating beings �other� than Himself, God limited Himself in such a way as to give power and freedom over to those beings, allowing them to be truly other. Welker speaks of God�s love in creation as kenotic love, and asserts, "In this kenotic love, God really gives space for the individuality and depth of creatures�. A passionate interest in the otherness of the other, a passionate interest in letting the other unfold himself/herself in freedom, a passionate interest to pave ways for the unfolding of his/her life, all are characteristics of kenotic love." For Welker, God�s creation is truly a kenosis, and God�s love is a kenotic love. This does not mean that God is disinterested in creation, but that God pursues the other, seeking to �win the other for a new life in a new creation.� In creating in a kenotic manner, God expresses love through the giving of freedom to the creation, and specifically to humans, in order to truly allow them to be �other� than God, and in love God also works for the created, seeking to draw them to Himself. Thus, the freedom of the created demonstrated in the creation accounts of Genesis 1-2 in its cooperative participation in creating, and in God�s dependence upon and working with that which He has created points toward a kenotic model for God�s act of creation.
The discussion of self-limitation connects closely with other discussions of kenosis above. Fretheim emphasizes the themes of divine cooperation and power sharing, noting especially the decisive role given over to humans. Welker uplifts the ways in which the creature�s role is similar to God�s role in creation. These themes coincide closely with the kenotic understanding of God�s creative activity as the creation of the other, and the integrity of the relationship God chooses with the other, in allowing genuine participation and contribution. Thus, we note especially the large measure of consonance between Fretheim�s understanding of the self-limitation of God and the kenotic understanding of God�s relationship to the world. God�s creation can be viewed as a self-limitation, especially in the giving over of power to that which is created, and this points to a kenotic understanding of God�s activity of creation.
Divine Dependence in Genesis 1-2
Another theological theme that Fretheim develops is that of divine dependence upon the human. Drawing on material from throughout the Old Testament, he finds that humans have been brought into relationship with God, and this relationship is characterized by dependence and interdependence, even though, as he observes, there is �no specific biblical vocabulary� available to make this point. He draws on an understanding of God as �transcendent in relationship,� freely committing to relationship with the world and with humans, and specifically with Israel.
This image of God�s relationship to the world applies to and comes out of the creation narratives of Genesis 1-2. One way it is seen is in the connection between the two creation accounts, which presumably had different �authors.� Fretheim emphasizes that P, the author of the later and more developed Genesis 1 account, did not intend for it to stand alone. Instead, �the P perspective on creation is to be found only in Genesis 1-2 as a single whole.� Holding these two accounts together, Fretheim develops a picture of creation that includes God�s sovereignty in a qualified way, and emphasizes the creative role that creatures play. God is seen to take risks, in involving creatures in creation. In fact, God�s gift of power to the creatures brings with it responsibility and possibility. One possibility is that creatures will rebel, and this is precisely what happens, as humans misuse their God-given power and bring sin into the world. Yet, as Fretheim points out, even after sin, when a reclamation of creation becomes necessary, humans play an important role. Thus, in God�s kenotic relationship to the world in creation, God has chosen to cooperate with creatures, entering into a relationship with creatures (especially humans) that entails the sharing of power and thus the opening of possibilities that creatures will play a role in shaping. God has truly invited the participation of the other, and has in fact bound Himself, to some extent, in His self-limitation, taking on dependence on humans as God�s agents.
The theme of divine dependence is one that is also emphasized by Welker (who speaks of interdependence). He points to the statement in Genesis 2:5, which says, ��and no shrub of the field had yet appeared on the earth and no plant of the field had yet sprung up, for the Lord God had not sent rain on the earth and there was no man to work the ground�.� For Welker, Genesis 2 clearly uplifts the importance of the human contribution to creation: �The creation account explicitly emphasizes that cultivated vegetation, an important goal of the creation event, is made dependent upon the cooperation of rain and of human activity. The creation account thus emphasizes that divine and human initiative coincide.�
Kenosis and Divine Dependence
This theme of divine dependence points toward a kenotic understanding of God�s activity of creation. Just as Jesus, in taking on human form, truly limited Himself, and took on the limitations of humanity, so too in creating, God has chosen to limit himself, taking on Himself the limitation imposed by His decision to enter into a relationship of integrity with creation, and specifically with humanity. God has given over creative power to the creature in such a way that God has chosen to become dependent upon the role of the creature in the creative endeavor. The creature plays a decisive role in creative development, a role given to it by a self-limiting Creator.
Dual Agency in Creation in Genesis 1-2
Fretheim asserts that God demonstrates the sharing of power in Genesis 1-2 through the presence of dual agency within the text. This acknowledgement of dual agency means that God is truly an actor in creation, but that God has also chosen to act with others, including that which he has already made. We see this dual agency in the sharing of the power and process of creation with that which has been created, and specifically with humans, as we have discussed above. Yet, in coming to a complete understanding it is important that we maintain that power is shared: �there is neither a �letting go� of the creation on God�s part, nor a retention of all such powers unto God.� We have developed a picture of creation in which God acts through cooperation. This has led us to an acknowledgement of dual agency within creation, but we must also acknowledge God�s role and the human role, though both genuine, are not the same. Fretheim makes this point by referring to the presence of law in the Garden, in the command to not eat of the forbidden fruit. He asserts, �To obey the command is to recognize that human creativity is derivative, that human beings are not freed from all limitations in its exercise or from the good divine intention for creaturely life.� God does truly limit Himself in creating, but at the same time, God maintains a fundamentally different role from the human that is created, even in the sharing of power.
In discussing the presence of dual agency in creation, it is important to discuss the indeterminate nature of our knowledge. God has chosen to act in creation, and has chosen to limit Himself, allowing others, particularly humans, to act as well. For Fretheim, this means that God is always active, to varying degrees. Yet, at the same time, it is important to note, �in no historical event is God�s influence completely determinative.� God�s actions will not be easily separable from the actions of created beings. This is borne out in the creation accounts, especially in relation to God�s speaking and acting. In Genesis 1:24, God says, �Let the earth bring forth living creatures of every kind�.� The verse ends, �And it was so.� Then verse 25 begins, �God made the wild animals of the earth of every kind�.� God spoke with the earth, instructing it to bring forth, and the text says that this is what happens. Then, immediately after, the text ascribes the action to God. This reflects an element of dual agency in creation, where God has brought that which has been created into the activity of creation, and yet remains active Himself in creation. The text holds together the assertions that the earth brought forth and that God made. The two actions appear to be indistinguishable. As Fretheim concludes, �While v. 25 states that God made the beasts, the nondivine involvement cannot be explained away.� God is active in the created realm, and has at the same time given power over to that which has been created. No neat separation between God�s action and the actions of the created is possible, but instead the point must be made that both are actors in the ongoing creation of the world.
Kenosis and Dual Agency
The indeterminacy of agency in the creation accounts of Genesis 1-2 points toward a kenotic understanding of creation, for God is not the only actor, instead inviting others to participate with Him in creating. God has limited Himself in such a way that others have power to create as well. The indeterminacy also points to the fact that God�s action is kenotic, in that God has chosen to act in a way that is not always readily discernible or distinguishable from the activity of creation. God has limited Himself through veiling His activity within the activity of the creation. This does not necessarily mean that God is merely a cause among causes, but that God�s activity is not always readily discernable.
In understanding God�s creative activity as kenotic, it is important to remember that God does not cease being God. In creating humanity, God has done something new, and undertaken a new relationship to the world, in which God enters into a relationship of integrity. This means that God has chosen to limit Himself, giving power over to humans, but as Fretheim points out, this power is derivative, demonstrating that God and the humans do not play the same role. Acknowledging that humans genuinely play a role demonstrates clearly that God is not the only actor, and thus has chosen to limit Himself, allowing others decisive input, but at the same time, God�s activity should not be too severely diminished. In short, we don�t always understand the relationship between divine action and human action. As the dual agency discussion points out, there is a level of indeterminacy in the text as to who is doing what. It is acknowledged that creation clearly plays a formative role in the development of creation, and it is equally clear that God is creator, initiating and acting in and with creation in its development. Thus, in asserting kenosis in creation, there is a fundamental tension between God�s self-limitation and God�s exercise of power.
Welker, in Creation and Reality, notes the presence of tension in the diverse traditions of biblical literature, and asserts these should not be smoothed over in the formulation of theological understandings. Kenosis is an understanding of God�s creative activity that seeks to uphold both the assertion that God chooses to limit Himself in His relationship to creation, truly entering into a relationship of integrity with the created other, and at the same time it recognizes that God is God, qualitatively different than the world and active in the world. This fundamental tension mirrors our understanding of the divinity and humanity in Christ, the paradigmatic example of kenosis.
Through the formula developed in Chalcedonian Christology, Jesus is understood to be one person having two natures, divine and human. Philippians 2 affirms this, while at the same time asserting that in taking on the nature of humanity, God in Christ emptied Himself. The relationship between these two natures is not easily understood. There exists a tension between so limiting the divinity that it ceases to be divinity, and so undertaking the human that it isn�t truly human. Neither of these options will work, but the middle road doesn�t seem entirely clear either, other than to affirm that Jesus was truly divine and human. Along with Kierkegaard, we seek the paradox of this assertion, yet we seek to hold it together in tension. This is the same type of tension we see in God�s relationship with the world in creation, for at one and the same time, God�s divinity is clearly upheld, as is the genuine contribution of humanity. This tension can be seen in the text of Genesis 1-2, especially in the discussion of dual agency above. In asserting God�s activity in creation to be one of kenosis, we are acknowledging this tension, and seeking to integrate it in some fundamental way into our theological understandings.
At this point, our understanding of kenosis departs some from Fretheim�s understanding of God�s action in the world. In his discussion of divine dependence, he asserts that no event is wholly determined by God�s action. This statement must be dealt with carefully, for if this means that God always acts in a mediated way in creation, this preserves God�s sovereignty, whereas if this is understood to mean that God acts in a way that is only persuasive, it would assert God�s sovereignty to be totally given over to creatures. In kenosis, God has truly chosen to limit himself, and this means that God is bound to what God promises and chooses to do, but at the same time, God is also willing and able to act in the world. There is a fundamental tension, just as in the incarnation, that is preserved in this understanding of God, and we do not seek to eliminate or resolve it, but to acknowledge it. Clearly kenosis is an idea which requires further development, but it is one which shows much promise, in its ability to understand God�s mode of action in creation, and in the way God has chosen to relate to that creation.
Conclusion
Through the thought of Michael Welker and Terence Fretheim, we have returned to the text of Genesis 1-2, and carefully developed their understandings of what the text says about God�s activity of creation, and God�s relationship to that which has been created. In analyzing the metaphors and language of creation, and analyzing God�s activity in creation, we have sought a complex understanding of the text, and attempted to avoid false abstraction. In so doing, we have seen that in creating, God undertook a relationship with creation in which God chose to limit Himself, allowing that which has been created to play a formative role in the ongoing development of creation. We have also proposed kenosis as a model for God�s creative activity that may integrate these various elements and understandings of God�s activity of creation, and God�s relationship to that creation. In creating an other to which God can be related, in entering into relationship with that other, in limiting Himself and giving power over to the other, and in becoming dependent on the other, God has created in manner that is consistent with kenosis. This means that God has chosen to limit Himself in creating in a similar manner to which God chose to limit Himself in relating to the world in Jesus Christ. This move is not inconsistent with the work of either Fretheim or Welker, for Fretheim discusses self-limitation, and Welker makes the move to discussing creation as kenosis. Thus, even as we have proposed our own definition and application of kenosis, and applied it to Genesis 1-2, we have sought to maintain the integrity of their work. The assertion that God creates in a kenotic manner made in this paper may not be identical with the thought of either Fretheim or Welker, but we have sought to show consonance between their thought and the assertion of kenosis made here. We shall now turn to a broader understanding of kenosis, building on the understanding we have sought to develop with regard to creation, and placing our work in a larger context.
Themes
Assessment
