The creation accounts of Genesis 1-2 give us an important starting point for our discussion of dual agency, because they exhibit a classical instance of dual agency, in their depiction of the creation of the world. As is very clear from the outset, God created all things by His word. God spoke, and creation came to be. But within this truth, there is more than simply God speaking and things appearing. Genesis 1 gives a much richer account of creation. A careful reading of this text helps us develop a much richer picture of God's creative activity, for God not only creates in a unilateral fashion, but also invites and commands others to participate (see our discussion of Kenosis and Genesis 1-2 for a more complete discussion of this text).
Terence Fretheim is one of a number of Old Testament scholars who acknowledge that God demonstrates the sharing of power in Genesis 1-2 through the presence of dual agency within the text. This acknowledgement of dual agency means that God is truly an actor in creation, but that God has also chosen to act with others, including that which he has already made. We see this dual agency in the sharing of the power and process of creation with that which has been created, and specifically with humans, as we have discussed above. Yet, in coming to a complete understanding it is important that we maintain that power is shared: �there is neither a �letting go� of the creation on God�s part, nor a retention of all such powers unto God.� We have developed a picture of creation in which God acts through cooperation. This has led us to an acknowledgement of dual agency within creation, but we must also acknowledge God�s role and the human role, though both genuine, are not the same. Fretheim makes this point by referring to the presence of law in the Garden, in the command to not eat of the forbidden fruit. He asserts, �To obey the command is to recognize that human creativity is derivative, that human beings are not freed from all limitations in its exercise or from the good divine intention for creaturely life.� God does truly limit Himself in creating, but at the same time, God maintains a fundamentally different role from the human that is created, even in the sharing of power.
In discussing the presence of dual agency in creation, it is important to discuss the indeterminate nature of our knowledge. God has chosen to act in creation, and has chosen to limit Himself, allowing others, particularly humans, to act as well. For Fretheim, this means that God is always active, to varying degrees. Yet, at the same time, it is important to note, �in no historical event is God�s influence completely determinative.� God�s actions will not be easily separable from the actions of created beings. This is borne out in the creation accounts, especially in relation to God�s speaking and acting. In Genesis 1:24, God says, �Let the earth bring forth living creatures of every kind�.� The verse ends, �And it was so.� Then verse 25 begins, �God made the wild animals of the earth of every kind�.� God spoke with the earth, instructing it to bring forth, and the text says that this is what happens. Then, immediately after, the text ascribes the action to God. This reflects an element of dual agency in creation, where God has brought that which has been created into the activity of creation, and yet remains active Himself in creation. The text holds together the assertions that the earth brought forth and that God made. The two actions appear to be indistinguishable. As Fretheim concludes, �While v. 25 states that God made the beasts, the nondivine involvement cannot be explained away.� God is active in the created realm, and has at the same time given power over to that which has been created. No neat separation between God�s action and the actions of the created is possible, but instead the point must be made that both are actors in the ongoing creation of the world.
Kenosis and Dual Agency
The indeterminacy of agency in the creation accounts of Genesis 1-2 points toward a kenotic understanding of creation, for God is not the only actor, instead inviting others to participate with Him in creating. God has limited Himself in such a way that others have power to create as well. The indeterminacy also points to the fact that God�s action is kenotic, in that God has chosen to act in a way that is not always readily discernible or distinguishable from the activity of creation. God has limited Himself through veiling His activity within the activity of the creation. This does not necessarily mean that God is merely a cause among causes, but that God�s activity is not always readily discernable.
In understanding God�s creative activity as kenotic, it is important to remember that God does not cease being God. In creating humanity, God has done something new, and undertaken a new relationship to the world, in which God enters into a relationship of integrity. This means that God has chosen to limit Himself, giving power over to humans, but as Fretheim points out, this power is derivative, demonstrating that God and the humans do not play the same role. Acknowledging that humans genuinely play a role demonstrates clearly that God is not the only actor, and thus has chosen to limit Himself, allowing others decisive input, but at the same time, God�s activity should not be too severely diminished. In short, we don�t always understand the relationship between divine action and human action. As the dual agency discussion points out, there is a level of indeterminacy in the text as to who is doing what. It is acknowledged that creation clearly plays a formative role in the development of creation, and it is equally clear that God is creator, initiating and acting in and with creation in its development. Thus, in asserting kenosis in creation, there is a fundamental tension between God�s self-limitation and God�s exercise of power.
Welker, in Creation and Reality, notes the presence of tension in the diverse traditions of biblical literature, and asserts these should not be smoothed over in the formulation of theological understandings. Kenosis is an understanding of God�s creative activity that seeks to uphold both the assertion that God chooses to limit Himself in His relationship to creation, truly entering into a relationship of integrity with the created other, and at the same time it recognizes that God is God, qualitatively different than the world and active in the world. This fundamental tension mirrors our understanding of the divinity and humanity in Christ, the paradigmatic example of kenosis.
Through the formula developed in Chalcedonian Christology, Jesus is understood to be one person having two natures, divine and human. Philippians 2 affirms this, while at the same time asserting that in taking on the nature of humanity, God in Christ emptied Himself. The relationship between these two natures is not easily understood. There exists a tension between so limiting the divinity that it ceases to be divinity, and so undertaking the human that it isn�t truly human. Neither of these options will work, but the middle road doesn�t seem entirely clear either, other than to affirm that Jesus was truly divine and human. Along with Kierkegaard, we seek the paradox of this assertion, yet we seek to hold it together in tension. This is the same type of tension we see in God�s relationship with the world in creation, for at one and the same time, God�s divinity is clearly upheld, as is the genuine contribution of humanity. This tension can be seen in the text of Genesis 1-2, especially in the discussion of dual agency above. In asserting God�s activity in creation to be one of kenosis, we are acknowledging this tension, and seeking to integrate it in some fundamental way into our theological understandings.
At this point, our understanding of kenosis departs some from Fretheim�s understanding of God�s action in the world. In his discussion of divine dependence, he asserts that no event is wholly determined by God�s action. This statement must be dealt with carefully, for if this means that God always acts in a mediated way in creation, this preserves God�s sovereignty, whereas if this is understood to mean that God acts in a way that is only persuasive, it would assert God�s sovereignty to be totally given over to creatures. In kenosis, God has truly chosen to limit himself, and this means that God is bound to what God promises and chooses to do, but at the same time, God is also willing and able to act in the world. There is a fundamental tension, just as in the incarnation, that is preserved in this understanding of God, and we do not seek to eliminate or resolve it, but to acknowledge it. Clearly kenosis is an idea which requires further development, but it is one which shows much promise, in its ability to understand God�s mode of action in creation, and in the way God has chosen to relate to that creation.
