Turkey
began taking serious steps to liberalize and strengthen its economy a
full 20 years ago. Before this reform program was instituted, tariff
barriers were high, state ownership prevailed in key sectors, and
competition was strangled by regulation. Today Turkey has plenty of
modern, high-performing companies that hold their own against
international competition. Many foreign companies, attracted by a
relatively cheap but well-educated and skilled workforce, proximity to
important markets, and the absence of major regulatory barriers, have
also performed well there. So great has the country’s economic
progress been that it now has its sights set on becoming a member of the
European Union. If Turkey succeeds in its ambition—and the EU is set
to decide at the end of next year whether to begin entry negotiations—it
is, based on current demographic projections, destined to be the
bloc’s largest member1
and the only one with a predominantly Muslim population.
One barrier to EU accession may be Turkey’s failure
to achieve stable economic growth. During the 1980s, GDP grew strongly,
at an average rate of 5.2 percent a year, thanks principally to the new
wave of liberalization and increased competition. However, in the
following decade growth fell to an average of 3.4 percent a year—lower
than it was before liberalization began.
Turkey’s economy was battered repeatedly during the
1990s, by the Persian Gulf War of 1991, currency crises in 1994 and
1997, a devastating earthquake in 1999, and a near economic meltdown in
2001 (when GDP contracted by almost 10 percent). Some of these
developments were clearly beyond the control of any government. Yet a
study by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI)2
suggests that the state can do a good deal to build the
foundation of strong, sustainable economic expansion. In Turkey, as
elsewhere, GDP growth depends heavily on the rate of productivity
increase, and our study of 11 sectors of the economy shows that it is
performing at only a little more than half of its potential productivity
level.3 To put the facts
another way, Turkish productivity currently stands at just 40 percent of
the US level, but we believe that it could reach 70 percent (Exhibit 1).4
If Turkey took measures to realize its full
productivity potential, it could create six million additional jobs by
2015 and achieve annual GDP growth as high as 8.5 percent. This would
greatly improve the living standards of Turkey’s 67 million people,
with GDP per capita rising from around 30 percent of today’s average
EU per capita income (adjusted by purchasing power parity) to around 55
percent. Such convergence would substantially improve Turkey’s chances
for EU membership.
Compared with many other developing countries, which
face dozens of barriers to productivity, Turkey is in a promising
position. Thanks to economic reforms set in motion in the 1980s and to a
customs union agreement with the EU in the mid-1990s,5
many barriers to productivity evident in other countries we have studied
don’t exist in Turkey. It has relatively few specific product market
regulations, such as pricing or product content laws, that stifle
competition. We found little evidence that Turkey’s labor market is
handicapped by regulations, infrastructure, corporate-governance
provisions, or the education of the labor force. Turkey’s level of
foreign direct investment is lower than that in many other developing
markets but not, we believe, because of regulatory barriers (see
sidebar, "Foreign investment:
A poor record").
Turkey’s productivity suffers from three specific
problems: a large informal economy, macroeconomic and political
instability, and government ownership. Together, we estimate, the three
problems account for 93 percent of the gap between Turkey’s current
and potential productivity (Exhibit 2). These are major issues, and
tackling them will take sustained resolve, but at least Turkey has the
comparative luxury of being able to focus on a limited number of areas
for reform, and the fruits of doing so are potentially substantial.
A two-track economy
Before analyzing the root causes of Turkey’s low
average productivity levels and what should be done to tackle them,
it’s important to recognize that this is a sharply divided economy.
In every sector, modern companies have adopted
cutting-edge technologies, developed many best-practice operations, and
managed to attain real economies of scale. Overall, the average
productivity of such modern companies is 62 percent of the US level.
However, alongside these effective performers, Turkey has many
traditional entities that drag down its overall productivity.6
They employ half of the labor force in the sectors we studied, and their
average productivity is less than a quarter that of the average US
enterprise. Traditional companies are typically small or midsize and
tend to make relatively poor use of available technologies. Their
products and services tend to be of low quality, they have few
standardized production processes, and most are hampered by a lack of
economies of scale.
The traditional operators’ importance to the economy
varies. In automotive parts, for example, they represent only 31 percent
of all employment, so their drag on the productivity of the sector
isn’t massive; indeed, the sector’s preponderance of efficient
companies demonstrates how competitive intensity drives productivity (see
"Auto
parts: Miles to go"). But in the retailing of fast-moving
consumer goods, traditional firms account for 88 percent of all labor.
Although this sector’s modern players achieve 75 percent of the US
productivity level, the average of the sector as a whole is therefore
only 29 percent. In telecommunications, electricity generation, and
retail banking—all with high capital requirements—traditional
operators aren’t present at all. Exhibit 3 shows the extent to which
traditional companies drag down productivity in sectors they dominate.
Clearly, the traditional companies have ample room to
improve. We estimate that their doing so would close half of the gap
between the country’s current and potential productivity.7
But the problems are hardly confined to traditional operators. Modern
companies also underperform, for three main reasons.
First, weak organization of business processes is
common. Tackling this problem offers the biggest opportunity to improve
productivity. Many retailers of fast-moving consumer goods, for example,
don’t have sophisticated logistics-management systems, so sales losses
are high. In banking, lengthy credit checks are the norm even when they
are clearly unnecessary. And government-owned monopolies—particularly
the electricity and wireline telephone businesses—are overstaffed.
Almost half of the employees in the electricity industry aren’t needed.
Second, low capacity utilization, due to overestimates of demand and to
a lack of competition, leads to high prices and dampened demand. The
third reason for the underperformance is a lack of investment in
technology. The state-owned wireline company Türk Telecom, for example,
has failed to invest sufficiently in high-speed value-added services and
hasn’t automated its management of faults.
If the modern companies tackled these problems and
raised their productivity to 95 percent of the levels of their US
counterparts, the other half of the gap between Turkey’s current and
potential productivity levels could be closed.
Root causes
We have identified several causes of low productivity
in both the traditional and the modern sectors, but companies aren’t
taking the necessary steps to correct the problem. Why don’t modern
companies invest more in technology, and why don’t traditional ones
upgrade their operations? The answer lies in the three underlying causes
of Turkey’s low productivity.
1. The informal economy
In Turkey as in other emerging economies, traditional
companies that have failed to take measures to improve their performance
are going out of business in the face of increased competition from more
efficient players. Yet the scale of corporate failure is much more
limited than would be expected given the extent of the operational
inefficiency in sectors such as confectionery (see "Confectionery:
Too many cooks"). The reason is that a lot of traditional
companies derive a cost advantage by flouting tax, labor, and product
market regulations. Many, for example, fail to remit value-added-tax
(VAT) or social-security payments, to adhere to hygiene or product
quality standards, or to pay minimum wages.
The size and impact of this cost advantage vary among
industries. In the retailing of fast-moving consumer goods, not paying
tax remittances could more than double a retailer’s monthly income.
That isn’t enough in the long run to outweigh the overall cost
advantage modern retailers enjoy thanks to their superior productivity.
However, it is sufficient to enable some companies to survive a few more
years even as turnover erodes. The low productivity of traditional
retailers ought to imply a 10 or 20 percent annual decline in their
numbers; the actual rate is 5 or 6 percent. In the dairy business, the
bankruptcy rate is even lower, with some informal operators enjoying a
cost advantage of as much as 20 percent, helping even the most
inefficient to stay afloat.
Furthermore, the substantial cost advantages of the
informal economy not only protect traditional firms from going out of
business but also act as a disincentive to improving their productivity.
For example, the Bakkalim project attempted by Migros Turk, the
country’s biggest grocery retailer, involved efforts to organize
smaller stores under an umbrella brand that would give them extra
purchasing, logistics, and merchandising muscle. Because membership
required participants to comply with tax and social-security regulations,
few grocers were willing to sign up.
Cracking down on informal operators does have a
short-term cost: in developing countries, they provide work for large
groups of unskilled laborers who migrate to urban centers, and many of
these jobs could be lost. But in the long term, higher productivity
would create far more jobs. We estimate that 33 percent of the gap
between Turkey’s current and potential productivity is due to the
informal economy. No doubt, there would be a time lag between job losses
and job creation, and the transition wouldn’t be easy. Much of the
pain could be ameliorated with targeted programs, however, and we
contend that tackling the problem of the informal economy will pay very
worthwhile long-term dividends.
Since we found no evidence in Turkey of regulatory
loopholes that allow companies to avoid tax and other social obligations
and to violate product market rules, the first step is to ensure
stricter enforcement of existing laws. Poor enforcement is largely the
result of weak processes and systems: tax offices are understaffed and
poorly organized, for instance, and penalties for evasion negligible.
Political decisions exacerbate the problem. Since 1963, Turkey has
issued ten tax amnesties, most of which permitted delinquent parties who
came forward to pay back taxes in installments and to use old
Turkish lira values—a fabulous offer in a country where inflation
averaged more than 60 percent a year during the 1990s. Not surprisingly,
many people prefer to bide their time until the next tax amnesty rather
than make their payments on time.
Bolstering enforcement of a range of regulations
across many industries simultaneously would be a massive undertaking. It
would be more practical to focus initially on a single area. We believe
that this area should be tax evasion, which accounts for the largest
portion of the informal operators’ cost advantage. Moreover, better
tax enforcement should enable the government to lower tax rates, thereby
encouraging more companies to join the formal economy. In the retailing
of fast-moving consumer goods, for example, the state collects only some
64 percent of the VAT revenue owed. If that could be increased to 90
percent, the VAT rate could be lowered to 13 percent, from 18 percent,
with no decrease in state revenues.
Turkey should consider following the lead of Poland,
which under strong pressure from the European Union began tackling its
informal economy in 1993 by focusing on VAT evasion in the retail
sector. A combination of comprehensive audits, substantial monetary
penalties, and, particularly, a change in cash register requirements to
keep better track of sales had a significant impact, according to Polish
experts.
If need be, Turkey could narrow its initial effort
even further, to the retailing of fast-moving consumer goods. Enforcing
VAT has the advantage that compliance by any single company makes
enforcement possible both upstream and downstream.8
The retailing of fast-moving consumer goods is an appropriate sector to
choose not only because almost all retail outlets in Turkey are
registered and thus easy to identify9
but also because the product range within this sector is quite broad. As
much as 20 percent of total Turkish economic activity is connected with
it at some level.
Tougher enforcement of tax and social obligations and
of product market regulations is the stick that will encourage
traditional companies to join the formal economy and to modernize their
operations. A carrot too is needed. Many small and midsize enterprises
lack the know-how to modernize, so government and private-enterprise
associations ought to educate them. For a start, Turkey should
aggressively exploit and even try to deepen the assistance the European
Union already offers to implement programs (styled after EU models) that
help such companies improve their technology, increase their operating
efficiency, and access export markets.
2. Macroeconomic and
political instability
The sine qua non for sustained economic progress in
Turkey is macroeconomic and political stability. Analysts have shown how
the debilitating economic contractions of the past decade—too often
caused by weak and short-lived governments—have led to high interest
rates, high inflation, and high government debt. But the effect of
economic instability on productivity has received little attention. Our
study indicates that almost half of the gap between Turkey’s current
and potential productivity is due to economic volatility, which hurts
modern companies most and largely accounts for their failure to improve
business processes, their low capacity utilization, and their
insufficient investment in technology.
Instability hampers productivity in three ways. First,
high real interest rates often mean that more money can be made, more
easily, from treasury operations than from productivity improvements,
particularly in cash-oriented businesses. In the 1990s, real interest
rates averaged around 20 percent but were frequently much higher;
immediately after the currency devaluation in early 2001, they shot up
to 90 percent.
Exhibit 4 demonstrates the importance of nonoperating
income for a single large retailer and for retail banks. In 2001, when
the Turkish economy contracted by almost 10 percent, this retailer
earned no net income from operations but had $60 million in nonoperating
income. Under these conditions, it is hard to blame a retailer’s owner
or manager for spending much more time negotiating payment terms with
manufacturers and managing cash than worrying about core operational
improvements. We believe that this behavior, rather than a lack of
management know-how, explains the limited use of advanced practices in
the retail sector. In retail banking, most operators have made so much
money from treasury operations that they haven’t felt the need to
become efficient in their core business.
The second effect of economic volatility is that high
real interest rates make borrowing expensive, so investment in
technology and automation is reduced; confectionery companies, for
example, don’t buy equipment to prepare dough or to automate packaging.
And high real interest rates are a massive disincentive to borrowing for
houses—Turkey has no mortgage market, because of prohibitively high
(and volatile) real interest rates—and this problem weakens the
construction industry.
Third, violent and sudden swings in demand make
planning a nightmare; the automobile assembly and cement industries, for
example, added substantial capacity in the late ’80s and early ’90s
in anticipation of strong growth that never materialized. It is
incredibly difficult to adjust labor and plant capacity effectively in
the face of such macroeconomic uncertainty. After the financial crisis
of 2001, loan activity was virtually nonexistent, but banks were
reluctant to lay off employees, as they had no idea how long the crisis
would last.
The MGI study doesn’t aim to prescribe specific
measures to stabilize Turkey’s macroeconomic and political
environment, though it should be noted that the financial prerequisites
of macroeconomic stability are well understood and that loans from the
International Monetary Fund are contingent upon them. However, this
study should provide an incentive for sustained macroeconomic reforms,
since it clearly demonstrates the enormous impact that a greater degree
of stability would have on productivity and thus on economic growth.
3. Government ownership
Previous MGI work shows that, with few exceptions,
state-owned enterprises are less productive than privately owned ones.
In Turkey as elsewhere, managers in the state sector lack incentives to
increase profits, while restructuring is politically difficult because
of job losses. Our study found that government ownership accounted for
one-sixth of the gap between Turkey’s current and potential
productivity.
The electricity and retail-banking sectors clearly
suffer from excess labor, and retail banking and wireline
telecommunications are held back because they don’t experience enough
pressure to offer new services that could increase output. The textbook
response is privatization and liberalization, and Turkey has plans for
both in the electricity, wireline telecom, and retail-banking sectors.
To ensure the desired benefits, it will be important to stage and manage
the transfer of assets within a carefully constructed regulatory
framework. Particularly in telecommunications and electricity, the
country’s regulatory framework falls well below the bar (see
"Electricity:
Unplugging the state").
Turkey’s telecom industry provides a cautionary tale.
The wireline sector has yet to be liberalized and suffers from a lack of
incentives. Its productivity10
stands at 66 percent of the US level. Startlingly, however, productivity
in the liberalized wireless sector is actually lower—59 percent. Part
of the reason was the bad design of liberalization: the government
insisted that the second wave of new mobile license holders build
base-station networks covering the entire country instead of ensuring
that newcomers and incumbents signed roaming agreements. The result has
been that much of the new capacity is now redundant, which has dragged
down capital productivity.
This experience shouldn’t deter Turkey from
undertaking further privatization and liberalization; it just serves to
emphasize that reform needs to be carried out carefully. If the
government hits on the right combination of privatization and
liberalization, we estimate that labor productivity could double in
telecommunications and triple in electricity generation.
It’s make-or-break time for Turkey. If it has the
resolve to undertake the reforms outlined here, it can double the living
standards of its people within a decade and move that much closer to
fulfilling its dream of joining the European Union. If it balks at the
task, its economy will continue to underperform. The country has already
come a long way, and many of its companies have become efficient
and productive. It would be a terrible waste if Turkey now failed to
grasp the opportunity to transform its entire economy.
Auto parts: Miles to go
Turkey’s productivity in this sector is high. But to
keep up with the global market, it will have to rise still higher.
Didem Dincer Baser and David E. Meen
Turkey’s
automotive parts manufacturing industry provides proof positive that
high competitive intensity leads to high levels of productivity and, in
turn, to growth. Turkey is a major player in global markets for car
parts. Since 1996, when the customs union agreement with the European
Union came into force, auto parts exports have risen by more than 12
percent a year as international manufacturers entered into joint
ventures with Turkish partners. More than 150 foreign auto parts
suppliers had partnerships in Turkey in 2000, and the sector now
accounts for more than 5 percent of Turkish exports. Upward of 60
percent of these parts exports go to European markets. The industry’s
total factor productivity stands at 91 percent of the US level,1
but it could rise still higher—to 127 percent, we estimate—and
indeed must keep rising if Turkey is to retain its position in
this market.
Many international car manufacturers use their Turkish
plants as a base for exports, particularly to European markets, and thus
demand high-quality parts from competitive suppliers. Global parts
manufacturers also use Turkey as a base for supplying both
original-equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and retailers in other markets.
This demand has helped drive the sector’s high level of productivity,
which also reflects the relative absence of productivity restraints;
Turkey, for instance, has a skilled workforce.
Yet as in other sectors of Turkey’s economy, not all
players are equal. The modern segment accounts for 69 percent of the
sector’s employment and outperforms its US counterpart, on average, by
10 percent. But this achievement is still undermined significantly by
small-scale traditional manufacturers that reach only 41 percent of the
US productivity level (Exhibit 1). These suppliers use labor to avoid
capital investment, produce mostly low-value and low-quality products,
and mainly supply the domestic retail market. Many have small operations
with fewer than 20 employees.
The existence of these traditional players hampers
further productivity gains by modern manufacturers. Evading taxes and
producing substandard parts without penalty permit traditional companies
to cut their costs by more than 30 percent, which allows them to
undercut more modern companies on price. Without such a cost advantage,
many would probably go out of business if they failed to raise their
productivity. Modern companies would then increase their market share
and, hence, the sector’s overall productivity. And make no mistake,
the sector must continue to raise its productivity; otherwise, as the
economy grows and increased wealth leads to higher wages, Turkey will
struggle to remain as competitive internationally as, say, the Eastern
European manufacturers that supply OEMs.
Modernization should entail investing in automation,
producing higher-value-added products, raising capacity utilization,
introducing better management processes, and using better, more reliable
suppliers. To force tradi- tional businesses to change, the Turkish
government should concentrate on preventing evasion of the
value-added-tax payments downstream of the suppliers—that is, the
evasion of VAT by wholesalers, retailers, and repair shops. Clamping
down in this part of the value chain should force compliance in the
majority of the sector as a whole. In addition, Turkey should take steps
to ensure the standardization of product quality and safety codes, not
least because substandard parts (such as brake components) endanger
public safety. Creating consumer protection laws, as well as agencies
and courts to enforce them, will help.
Improved performance in the sector depends as well
upon macroeconomic and political stability, without which efficient
manufacturers will find it difficult to raise their game further.
Economic volatility, for instance, distorts capacity planning and
utilization; in 2000, the capacity utilization of modern suppliers was
75 percent (as compared with the US average of 85 percent). Economic
downturns also push cost-conscious consumers toward substandard parts.
Exhibit 2 shows how market volatility has affected car sales.
Confectionarty: Too many cooks
Rationalization will be needed for a sweeter future.
Didem Dincer Baser and David E. Meen
If Turkey’s
automotive parts sector shows how competition strengthens an economy,
its confectionery sector—producing biscuits, chocolate, candies, and
chewing gum—demonstrates the opposite. One manufacturer dominates more
than half of the national market, the foreign presence is minimal, and
most of the remaining market share is fragmented among 350 companies (Exhibit
1). Some 90 percent are traditional operators. No wonder productivity
suffers.
Overall, the sector’s productivity1
stands at 35 percent of the US level. The traditional players, reaching
a mere 18 percent of it, suffer from low capacity utilization2
as well as from low economies of scale in production, a proliferation of
products relative to their scale, and low levels of automation. The
modern players index at 69 percent of the US productivity level—still
only a mediocre performance. They suffer from many of the same problems
that the traditional operators do, albeit to a lesser degree. Exhibit 2
shows both the extent to which Turkey’s manufacturers are subscale and
the way too many products eat into labor productivity, a result of
frequent production line changeovers.
In an industry such as this, with low capital
intensity and low skill requirements, the productivity of modern
processors might be expected to resemble that of their US counterparts
more closely. Consolidation would rapidly remove the smallest,
least-productive manufacturers. The reason this doesn’t happen? The
informal economy. In the confectionery sector, the majority of
traditional players evade their income taxes, value-added taxes, and
social-security obligations, thus lowering the cost of their products by
about 7 percent compared with modern operators—just enough, in many
cases, to keep them in business. There is also another
informality-related issue: retailers in Turkey tend to be very small,
with relatively little shelf space. This restricts the number of brands
they stock and serves as an entry barrier to suppliers, thereby
dampening competition. Half of all retail outlets stock the products of
only two confectionery companies, and often just one, in almost all
product categories.
The easiest way to deal with this issue is to
encourage the emergence of a modern retailing sector for fast-moving
consumer goods. Over the past decade, modern retailers have grown to
command a market share of about 30 percent, but they would grow much
faster if the problem of informality among traditional grocery retailers
were solved. Modern retailers with big stores can stock a much broader
range of products, from many different suppliers. They would entice into
the Turkish market global best-practice confectionery manufacturers,
which would then force sectorwide productivity improvements.
Foreign confectionery producers that have won
significant market share in much of the developing world play a minor
role in Turkey: two of them account for just 6 percent of the market. A
major reason for their absence is the lack of access to the small
groceries that still control most retailing volume. Forced to use a
number of third-party wholesalers that have limited penetration of the
retail market, they are at a serious cost disadvantage. In addition,
they have to bear indirect costs such as weight tariffs and other
import-related expenses. These extra costs result in much higher prices.
If Turkey can remove the impediments to competition in
the sector, we estimate that its productivity could reach 87 percent of
the US level by 2015. Confectionery, however, is one of the few sectors
of the Turkish economy in which output growth would not be sufficient to
outstrip the impact of productivity gains on employment. While output
would grow by around 6 percent a year from 2005 to 2015 (assuming that
the economy were to grow by around 8 percent a year), total sector
employment would remain static
Electricity: Unplugging the state
Turkey should privatize and liberalize its government-held assets—but
carefully.
Mustafa Cem Acik, Onur Genc, and Yusuf Sukal
Turkey’s
electricity sector provides a stark example of how state-run monopolies
drag down productivity. While privatization and market liberalization
would ultimately increase it, the government must recognize the need for
careful management. Unless Turkey treads cautiously, it might raise
much-needed money from the sale of state assets but fail to secure
future supplies at fair prices.
Productivity in Turkey’s electricity sector,1
including generation, transmission, and distribution, is 75 percent of
the US level. That gap can’t be closed completely, as lower incomes in
Turkey mean that electricity consumption per capita is lower though
infrastructure costs are similar. The Turkish electricity sector could,
however, reach 89 percent of the US level—just by removing excess
labor, since low workforce productivity is responsible for almost all of
the gap between the sector’s current and potential productivity (Exhibit
1).
State institutions dominate the electricity sector:
EUAS controls more than 70 percent of generation capacity, TEIAS owns
the entire transmission network, and TEDAS accounts for some 90 percent
of distribution. As might be expected of state-owned monopolies, their
managers lack incentives to reduce the use of labor. Privatizing and
liberalizing the sector would improve its labor productivity, and Turkey
intends to do both rapidly.2
But the government needs to think more carefully about the process. If
its goals are to be reached, liberalization must take place gradually,
in stages, guided by a detailed regulatory framework that is not yet in
place. After all, the United Kingdom enjoys one of the world’s most
liberalized electricity markets, but to reach that position it took ten
years from the date when state assets were sold. The liberalization
process was intricately managed, steered by regulations ensuring that
competition emerged and consumer interests were met. In contrast, Brazil
found itself coping with a severe power supply crisis when it tried to
liberalize its power markets, because it didn’t have a detailed
regulatory framework that outlined how competition would develop. The
uncertainty kept private investors away.
Turkey’s government wants to achieve three things
from privatization and liberalization in electricity. First, it hopes to
maximize the sale price of its assets; proceeds from privatization are
an important element of Turkey’s macroeconomic-reform program. Second,
it wants to encourage private investment in the sector to meet growing
demand; during the next decade, more than $40 billion worth will be
needed to match it, and only $10 billion is forecast to be available
from public funds. Finally, the government wants to encourage
competition so that electricity prices fall. For industrial customers,
they are more than double those in the United States, while residential
prices are 12 percent higher (Exhibit 2). Factor in Turkey’s lower
purchasing power parity and the differences are even more significant,
arguably hampering economic development.
All three goals aren’t compatible in the short term,
and trade-offs will have to be made. The state is likely to receive the
highest bids for its assets if it chooses to sell them as a
monopoly—as Greece did recently when it sold some of its shares in the
incumbent electricity utility and as the Czech Republic did when it sold
its gas assets. This approach, however, will not in itself guarantee new
investments or promote lower prices.
To encourage new players and new investments, Turkey
may well have to offer some form of guaranteed returns (perhaps price
guarantees) for a certain period. As governments in many emerging
markets have learned, without guarantees new players may find
investments too risky, particularly given the massive cost of building
new infrastructure. This strategy may well be counter to the notion of
encouraging competition and could keep consumer prices higher, but it is
a surer path to the ultimate goal of competition. Encouraging lower
prices for consumers isn’t necessarily compatible with encouraging new
investments if, for example, they can be secured only by offering
investors guaranteed prices.
Turkey’s current high electricity charges are less a
result of low productivity than of the contracts the state provider
signed with private power generators in the 1990s, when it was desperate
to secure new supplies. At the time, the government offered independent
companies guaranteed prices that gave them returns of from 15 to 60
percent. The state supplier is now passing on the cost of those
contracts to consumers.
The experience of other countries makes it clear that
Turkey must prioritize its goals and then set about formulating a
regulatory framework to ensure that they are reached in orderly
progression. First, the country will need a consensus among the relevant
institutions: Turkey’s privatization agency, which secures
privatization revenue for the state; the Ministry of Energy and Natural
Resources, which is concerned about future supply; and the regulator,
whose objective is opening up the market to competition to reduce
end-user prices. Given the conflicting interests of these bodies, it is
difficult to see how liberalization can proceed until they agree on some
broad goals. The country will also need a way to monitor demand and
supply, so that the liberalization process can take them into
consideration and avoid being derailed by imbalances, as happened in
Brazil. Turkey can’t afford a repeat of the mid-1990s, when looming
shortages resulted in high-priced guaranteed contracts for private
suppliers.
Finally, the country will need a clear understanding
of which regulatory levers will guide the market toward the desired end
goal. Price caps or supports, efficiency-improvement targets for
incumbents, and tariffs are just three of a long list of tools available
to the regulator to ensure that Turkey achieves the desired outcomes for
consumers, incumbents, and new market entrants. Many other countries
didn’t fully understand the impact of these levers and have
consequently disrupted the liberalization process. California’s
experience is a case in point; regulators capped the price that
retailers could charge consumers but not wholesale prices—a mistake
that led to bankruptcies among suppliers and to blackouts for consumers.