Judge Robert S. Lasnik

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

 

ROGER W. KNIGHT,                                    )

                                                                        )

                                    plaintiff,                        )           No.  C02-879L

            v.                                                         )

                                                                        )           REPLY TO DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE

CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, ALAN            )           TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

MERKLE, Mayor of Mercer Island, RON       )           AMEND JUDGMENT

ELSOE, Chief of Mercer Island Police,             )

LONDI K. LINDELL, Mercer Island City       )

Attorney, WAYNE STEWART, Assistant        )

Mercer Island City Attorney, FRED                  )           Noted for October 25, 2002

STEPHENS, Director of Department of            )

Licensing, DENNIS BRADDOCK, Secretary  )

of Department of Social and Health Services,    )

GARY LOCKE, Governor of Washington,       )

and SUPERIOR TOWING, a corporation        )

doing business in the State of Washington,         )

                                                                        )

                                    defendants.                   )

____________________________________)

 

REPLY

            Comes now the plaintiff, ROGER W. KNIGHT, and replies to the Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment

CITY OF MERCER ISLAND DID NOT RESPOND

            To the best of the plaintiff’s knowledge, defendant CITY OF MERCER ISLAND and its officers named as defendants have not filed any response to the Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment, FRCP 59, nor have they joined the defendants STATE OFFICERS in their Response.  Local Civil Rule 7(b)(4) provides that if a party file a response to a motion, this Court may deem such to be an admission that opposition to the motion is without merit.

STATE OFFICERS DO NOT OPPOSE AMENDMENT TO THE COMPLAINT TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF LIABILITY FOR UNREASONABLE SEIZURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE

            Perhaps because they lack standing.  It was agents of defendant CITY OF MERCER ISLAND and defendant SUPERIOR TOWING who made the decision to impound a legally parked vehicle the search of which yielded no evidence of any crime, and who would thus be liable for violating the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983.  Defendants STATE OFFICERS are not responsible for that decision.  Defendants MERCER ISLAND did not respond either, Local Civil Rule 7(b)(4), this Court may deem it an admission that opposition to such an amendment is without merit.  Defendant SUPERIOR TOWING has not responded to this lawsuit, though an attorney claiming to represent them contacted Mr. Knight.  This attorney did not file a notice of appearance with this Court.

STATE OFFICERS CITE NO LEGAL AUTHORITIES TO OPPOSE THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT

            Mr. Knight presented this Court with an argument citing legal authorities that because the California Court of Appeals found an argument identical to the one presented by Mr. Knight with respect to the Antipeonage Act to be meritorious, Brent Moss v. Superior Court, (1996) 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 864, 868-870.  Therefore, under the standards established by the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court in published opinions, Mr. Knight’s claim is not frivolous and therefore a litigation bar is not appropriate.  The STATE OFFICERS do not cite any legal authority to support their opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment on the grounds that the litigation bar is appropriate.  Their citation of Judge Coughenour’s order in Knight v. Serpas, W.D. No. C02-1641C is inapplicable because, one, Mr. Knight filed a response to the order, two, Judge Coughenour has yet to make any ruling on the merits or the jurisdiction of that Complaint, and three, as Mr. Knight argued in his Response therein that No. C02-1641C is not barred by Younger abstention, this Court has made no finding in this case that Mr. Knight’s Complaint is barred by Younger abstention.  Whether or not a federal court must abstain under Younger is irrelevant to whether the complaint is frivolous as argued in the Plaintiff’s Motion.

            Therefore, defendants STATE OFFICERS present no legal authority that the Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Judgment should not be granted.

CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated herein, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Revise Judgment, FRCP 59, should be granted.

            RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, October 24, 2002.

 

                                                            ____________________________________

                                                            Roger W. Knight, plaintiff

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