Knight v. Serpas Complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

ROGER W. KNIGHT, )

)

plaintiff, ) No.

v. )

) COMPLAINT FOR

RONAL W. SERPAS, Chief of the ) ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL

Washington State Patrol, MITCHELL, ) RIGHTS, 42 U.S.C. §1983

TROOPER NO. 872, of the Washington ) AND FOR ENFORCEMENT OF

State Patrol, FRED STEPHENS, Director ) THE ANTIPEONAGE ACT,

of Department of Licensing, DENNIS ) 42 U.S.C. §1994

BRADDOCK, Secretary of Department )

of Social and Health Services, ) (DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL)

GARY LOCKE, Governor of Washington, )

and UNKNOWN CORPORATION, d.b.a. )

CLARK’S TOWING, a corporation )

doing business in the State of Washington, )

)

defendants. )

____________________________________)

Plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT, alleges as follows:

JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND PARTIES

1. This court has original jurisdiction to hear this complaint for recovery of liability from defendants for actions under color of state law that deprive plaintiff of federally guaranteed civil rights provided by 42 U.S.C. §1983, for the enforcement of civil rights by 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3) and (4), and for federal questions by 28 U.S.C. §1331. Additionally, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction provided by 42 U.S.C. §1994 independent of any other statute for recovery of liability of the defendants for their attempts by virtue of the acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of a State to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of the plaintiff as a peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, which are declared null and void.

2. Plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT is a resident of King County, Washington.

3. Defendant RONAL W. SERPAS is the Chief of the Washington State Patrol (WSP).

4. Defendant MITCHELL, TROOPER NO. 872, is a sworn officer of the WSP.

5. Defendant FRED STEPHENS is the Director of the Washington State Department of Licensing (DOL).

6. Defendant DENNIS BRADDOCK is the Secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS).

7. Defendant GARY LOCKE is the Governor of Washington.

8. Defendant UNKNOWN CORPORATION d.b.a. CLARK’S TOWING is a corporation doing business in the State of Washington, having its local principal office and place of business located in King County, Washington, within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.

9. Actions complained of have taken place and are currently taking place in King County in the State of Washington.

CAUSE OF ACTION

10. Mr. Knight is under an order to pay child support entered in In re Marriage of Knight, King County Superior Court No. 90-3-04471-1. The decree was entered on July 11, 1991, setting the payment rate at $851.76 per month. This order has not been modified since.

11. On May 29, 1995, Mr. Knight was laid off from his employment by The Boeing Company. After that he stopped making regular payments for child support. In spite of almost six years of paycheck garnishment for child support, for the order entered in In re Marriage of Knight, and for the administrative order which was superseded by Marriage of Knight, Mr. Knight was still several thousand dollars behind in compliance with the support order at the time of layoff.

12. During the 1997 session, the Washington Legislature passed Laws of Washington 1997 chapter 58, the WorkFirst Act, which became effective on July 1, 1997. Sections 801 et seq. of this Act created RCW 74.20A.320 et seq. and modified chapter 46.20 RCW and other chapters of the Revised Code of Washington to provide for the mandatory suspension or revocation of all licenses issued by the State of Washington to a noncustodial parent upon certification to the licensing authorities that the noncustodial parent is more than 180 days behind in compliance with a child support order. RCW 74.20A.320 provides that the noncustodial parent may request an administrative hearing with the DSHS but limits the jurisdiction of the administrative hearing to decide only the issues of whether the support order is valid, whether the party is the person named in the support order as the obligor, and whether the noncustodial parent is in compliance with the support order. This statute provides that this hearing is the only administrative hearing available to contest a proposed child support license suspension, the DOL has no jurisdiction to hold a hearing on a child support license suspension once the DSHS certifies to it noncompliance with a child support order. There is no jurisdictional authority provided to the administrative proceeding to determine whether the noncustodial parent is able to comply with the support order and whether the noncustodial parent has exercised due diligence in becoming able to comply with the support order. RCW 74.20A.320(1) provides that notice and opportunity to be heard be provided by one of two specific methods:

Service of the notice must be by certified mail, return receipt requested. If service by certified mail is not successful, service shall be by personal service.

RCW 4.28.080(15) defines personal service under Washington state law.

13. On July 1, 1997, the plaintiff was more than two years behind in compliance with the support order. He is a member of an easily ascertainable group of persons subject to automatic suspension of all licenses issued to them by the State of Washington without judicial trial, as of that date.

14. Since July 1, 1997, $13,860.01 have been taken from Mr. Knight and his friends, mostly by means of the kidnap and ransom scheme set forth by chapter 26.18 RCW and other statutes and court rules known as civil contempt proceedings. When Mr. Knight was released from imprisonment by payment of “bail”, the money was not an appearance bond as when used to obtain pretrial release in a criminal case, it was automatically forfeited to the Division of Child Support of the DSHS for the support arrearage. These contempt proceedings took place between January 2000 and September 2001. King County Superior Court ceased trying to enforce the support order through contempt proceedings during September 2001.

15. From July 1995 through July 1, 1997 is 24 months. The support that the plaintiff was ordered to pay during that time is 24 X $851.76 = $20,442.24. Of the subsequent payments of $13,860.01, $3,060.87 was credited toward the months current when these payments were made. The remaining $10,799.14 was credited by the DSHS toward the arrears. Therefore, $20,442.24 - $10,799.14 = $9,643.10 is left unpaid from the 24 months prior to July 1, 1997. Exhibit C to the Knight Declaration. The Case Payment History indicates there is some additional arrearage from prior to the date Mr. Knight was laid off from The Boeing Company. $9,643.10 represents over 11 months worth of arrearages, which is more than 180 days. Therefore Mr. Knight is still more than 180 days out of compliance with the support order of 1991 as of July 1, 1997.

16. On September 5, 2001, defendant DENNIS BRADDOCK, through his agency DSHS, certified to defendant FRED STEPHENS through his agency DOL that plaintiff was not in compliance with a child support order without first complying with the service requirements of RCW 74.20A.320(1).

17. On September 13, 2001, defendant FRED STEPHENS, through his agency DOL, suspended the plaintiff’s Washington State Driver’s License effective September 16, 2001 based upon a certification by defendant DENNIS BRADDOCK, through his agency DSHS, that the plaintiff is not in compliance with a child support order. The notification cited RCW 46.20.291, chapter 74.20A and “Laws of 1997”.

18. On August 4, 2002, defendant RONAL W. SERPAS, Chief of WSP, through defendant MITCHELL, TROOPER NO. 872, pulled the plaintiff over while traveling westbound on Interstate 90 near Mile Post 18, a location between Preston and Issaquah. He told the plaintiff that he saw plaintiff “weave back and forth” and wanted to make sure plaintiff was not impaired. He immediately pronounced plaintiff not impaired and refused plaintiff’s offer for a breath test on the basis of no sign of alcohol or drug impairment. After inspecting the plaintiff’s license and registration, he told plaintiff that his license was suspended for Driving While License Suspended (DWLS) 3d degree, child support. TROOPER MITCHELL did not cite the plaintiff for failure to wear a seat belt, equipment violation, driving while under the influence, speeding, or any other traffic infraction or crime. Defendant MITCHELL did not supply the plaintiff with any paperwork concerning any charge of infraction or DWLS. Defendant MITCHELL returned the driver’s license to the plaintiff with a hole punched out of it, the hole did not exist prior to the stop. Defendant MITCHELL contacted defendant UNKNOWN CORPORATION d.b.a. CLARK’S TOWING and authorized an impound. The vehicle was parked on the shoulder of the road safely out of the traveling lanes. Under defendant MITCHELL’S watchful eye, the plaintiff could have reparked the vehicle further out of harm’s way. There is no mandatory towing regulation for the shoulders at Mile Post 18 on Interstate 90. The posted speed limit at this location is 70 miles per hour, 60 miles per hour for trucks. Ordinarily, the WSP allows vehicles parked on the shoulders of limited access expressways outside of mandatory towing zones 24 hours before ordering removal. If owners are able to arrange a tow or effect repair, they are allowed this opportunity to remove the vehicle themselves. Defendant MITCHELL required the plaintiff to wait until defendant CLARK’S TOWING arrived and hooked his vehicle for impound. Defendant MITCHELL then released the plaintiff to ride off the freeway with defendant CLARK’S TOWING.

19. Defendant UNKNOWN CORPORATION d.b.a. CLARK’S TOWING provided the plaintiff a ride to a gasoline station near Exit 17 of Interstate 90. Defendant CLARK’S TOWING refused to release the vehicle to the plaintiff and told him that it can only be released to a person with a “valid license”. The automobile was staying the night. Defendant CLARK’S TOWING refused to give the plaintiff a ride anywhere else, or even to its yard at 6003 221st Place South East, Issaquah.

20. Plaintiff could not contact anyone he was willing to roust out of bed in the middle of the night after a Sunday and before a Monday. He therefore was forced to walk over 15 miles to his home in Seattle. At some locations along the route, in the dark of night, he could not locate parallel roads, bike paths, or walking trails, and therefore, had to walk on the shoulder of Interstate 90. At one location, he noticed a bike path along the freeway, but was prevented by a steel wire fence from reaching it. He sustained his energy with a few wild blackberries and a quart of Gatorade he purchased from an all night store. He reached his home at about 5:45 am August 5, 2002 in an extreme state of exhaustion and in physical pain. To the extent defendants are liable for damages, they are liable for damages due to this stranding of the plaintiff.

21. Later on August 5, 2002, the plaintiff contacted defendant UNKNOWN CORPORATION d.b.a. CLARK’S TOWING, who informed the plaintiff that he may recover his car if he pays the impound fee for $147.42 and brings a driver with a “valid license. The plaintiff paid that amount to defendant CLARK’S TOWING to recover his automobile that day, and with his permission, Judith Calhoun drove it out of their yard.

22. Laws of Washington 1997 chapter 58, the WorkFirst Act, as applied to a child support order that predates the date of effectiveness of the WorkFirst Act, July 1, 1997, as applied to child support arrearages that exceeded 180 days prior to July 1, 1997, to child support arrearages that accumulated since on a child support order unmodified to incorporate the WorkFirst Act, and on its face is unconstitutional as a bill of attainder and as an ex post facto law prohibited to the states by Article I Section 10 clause 1 of the United States Constitution. The defendants are therefore liable for violating the plaintiff’s right to not be the target of a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law.

23. The Fourteenth Amendment requires the State to afford a person whom it has licensed to operate a motor vehicle notice and opportunity to be heard before suspending or revoking any such license. The Washington Legislature specifically defined the requirement for notice for a child support license suspension in enacting RCW 74.20A.320(1) as part of the WorkFirst Act. The plaintiff had the Fourteenth Amendment right to rely upon this statutory scheme to obtain the only administrative hearing available under RCW 74.20A.320 to contest any child support based license suspension. By failing to comply with the actual notice requirement of RCW 74.20A.320(1) before certifying to defendant FRED STEPHENS noncompliance with a child support order, defendant DENNIS BRADDOCK violated the plaintiff’s rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. All efforts to enforce this license suspension by all of the defendants are thus in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

24. Attempting to coerce, by license suspension for noncompliance with a support order, the plaintiff’s consent to a “repayment agreement” without requiring proof that Mr. Knight possesses wealth sufficient to allow compliance with the support order without employment is declared null and void by the Antipeonage Act, 42 U.S.C. §1994. While both 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 1994 each create a statutory exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. §2283, by including the word “orders” 42 U.S.C. §1994 creates a statutory exception to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. §1738 and to the preclusion doctrine based upon 28 U.S.C. §1738 as determined by Allen v. McCurry, (1980) 449 U.S. 90, 66 L. Ed. 2d. 308, 101 S. Ct. 411 and by Migra v. Warren City School Board of Education, (1984) 465 U.S. 75, 79 L. Ed. 2d. 56, 104 S. Ct. 892. 42 U.S.C. §1994 creates, by including the word “orders” a statutory exception to the the Rooker-Feldman doctrine[1]

25. At the time this Complaint is filed, August 6, 2002, the plaintiff has not been made aware of any ongoing state court action as arising from the stop by defendant RONAL W. SERPAS through defendant MITCHELL, TROOPER NO. 872. Defendant MITCHELL did not provide to the plaintiff any citation form that would commence such an action.

26. The impoundment of the automobile is an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

27. Ex parte Young, (1908) 209 U.S. 123, 157-168, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 found that state officers can be sued in their individual capacities under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §1983, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants RONAL W. SERPAS, MITCHELL, TROOPER NO. 872, FRED STEPHENS, DENNIS BRADDOCK, and GARY LOCKE can thus be sued for prospective injunctive relief.

28. Defendants RONAL W. SERPAS and MITCHELL, TROOPER NO. 872 are liable under Monroe v. Pape, (1961) 365 U.S. 167, 5 L. Ed. 2d. 492, 81 S. Ct. 473, their actions are only possible because they are literally clothed with the authority of state law as police officers.

29. Defendant UNKNOWN CORPORATION d.b.a. CLARK’S TOWING, is liable under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., (1982) 457 U.S. 922, 73 L. Ed. 2d. 482, 102 S. Ct. 2744. It acted in concert with the other defendants acting under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of his automobile and to force him to pay $147.42 to recover it, and to strand the plaintiff 15 miles from his home after midnight between a Sunday and a Monday.

REMEDY

WHEREFORE plaintiff, without making any election of remedies, prays that this Court enter judgment as follows:

A. For a judgment against defendants RONAL W. SERPAS, MITCHELL, TROOPER NO. 872, FRED STEPHENS, DENNIS BRADDOCK, GARY LOCKE, and UNKNOWN CORPORATION d.b.a. CLARK’S TOWING to the extent that such parties are not immune to such liability for the $147.42 plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT had to pay to recover his automobile, plus additional monetary damages due to the deprivation of the automobile for a period of one day, and for the stranding 15 miles from his home after midnight between Sunday, August 4, 2002 and Monday, August 5, 2002.

B. For declaratory relief that WorkFirst Act, either as applied to plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT, or on its face, is invalid as repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and such application of the WorkFirst Act to plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT is declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994.

C. For injunction against the defendants RONAL W. SERPAS, MITCHELL, TROOPER NO. 872, FRED STEPHENS, DENNIS BRADDOCK, GARY LOCKE, and UNKNOWN CORPORATION d.b.a. CLARK’S TOWING prohibiting any further enforcement of the WorkFirst Act against Mr. Knight and other noncustodial parents.

D. For an award of costs and any attorney’s fees against the defendants as provided by 42 U.S.C. §1988.

E. For such other and further relief as to the Court seems reasonable and equitable.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, August 6, 2002.

____________________________________

Roger W. Knight, plaintiff