Knight v. Mercer Island Complaint

1. This court has original jurisdiction to hear this complaint for recovery of liability from defendants for actions under color of state law that deprive plaintiff of federally guaranteed civil rights provided by 42 U.S.C. §1983, for the enforcement of civil rights by 28 U.S.C. §1343(a)(3) and (4), and for federal questions by 28 U.S.C. §1331.

2. Plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT is a resident of King County, Washington.

3. Defendant CITY OF MERCER ISLAND is municipality incorporated under the laws of the State of Washington. It is located in King County, Washington, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

4. Defendant ALAN MERKLE is a resident of King County, Washington, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. He is the Mayor of defendant CITY OF MERCER ISLAND.

5. Defendant RON ELSON operates in King County, Washington, within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, in his capacity as Commander of the Mercer Island Police Department.

6. Defendant LONDI K. LINDALL is a resident of King County, Washington, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. He is the Mercer Island City Attorney.

7. Defendant WAYNE STEWART operates in King County, Washington, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, in his capacity as an Assistant City Attorney for defendant CITY OF MERCER ISLAND.

8. Defendant FRED STEPHENS is the Director of the Washington State Department of Licensing (DOL).

9. Defendant DENNIS BRADDOCK is the Secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS).

10. Defendant GARY LOCKE is the Governor of Washington.

11. Defendant SUPERIOR TOWING is a corporation doing business in the State of Washington, having its local principal office and place of business located in King County, Washington, within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.

12. Actions complained of have taken place and are currently taking place in King County in the State of Washington.

CAUSE OF ACTION

13. Mr. Knight is under an order to pay child support entered in In re Marriage of Knight, King County Superior Court No. 90-3-04471-1. The decree was entered on July 11, 1991, setting the payment rate at $851.76 per month. This order has not been modified since. Exhibit B to the Declaration of Roger W. Knight (Knight Declaration).

14. On May 29, 1995, Mr. Knight was laid off from his employment by The Boeing Company. After that he stopped making regular payments for child support. In spite of almost six years of paycheck garnishment for child support, for the order entered in In re Marriage of Knight, and for the administrative order which was superseded by Marriage of Knight, Mr. Knight was still several thousand dollars behind in compliance with the support order at the time of layoff. Exhibit C to the Knight Declaration.

15. During the 1997 session, the Washington Legislature passed Laws of Washington 1997 chapter 58, the WorkFirst Act, which became effective on July 1, 1997. Sections 801 et seq. of this Act created RCW 74.20A.320 et seq. and modified chapter 46.20 RCW and other chapters of the Revised Code of Washington to provide for the mandatory suspension or revocation of all licenses issued by the State of Washington to a noncustodial parent upon certification to the licensing authorities that the noncustodial parent is more than 180 days behind in compliance with a child support order. RCW 74.20A.320 provides that the noncustodial parent may request an administrative hearing but limits the jurisdiction of the administrative hearing to decide only the issues of whether the support order is valid, whether the party is the person named in the support order as the obligor, and whether the noncustodial parent is in compliance with the support order. There is no jurisdictional authority provided to the administrative proceeding to determine whether the noncustodial parent is able to comply with the support order and whether the noncustodial parent has exercised due diligence in becoming able to comply with the support order.

16. On July 1, 1997, the plaintiff was more than two years behind in compliance with the support order. Exhibit C to the Knight Declaration. He is a member of an easily ascertainable group of persons subject to automatic suspension of all licenses issued to them by the State of Washington without judicial trial, as of that date.

17. Since July 1, 1997, $13,860.01 have been taken from Mr. Knight and his friends, mostly by means of the kidnap and ransom scheme set forth by chapter 26.18 and other statutes and court rules known as civil contempt proceedings. When Mr. Knight is released from imprisonment by payment of “bail”, the money is not an appearance bond as when used to obtain pretrial release in a criminal case, it is automatically forfeited to the Division of Child Support of the DSHS for the support arrearage. These contempt proceedings took place between January 2000 and September 2001. King County Superior Court has apparently ceased trying to enforce the support order through contempt proceedings during September 2001. Knight Declaration page 4 and its Exhibit C.

18. From July 1995 through July 1, 1997 is 24 months. The support that the plaintiff was ordered to pay during that time is 24 X $851.76 = $20,442.24. Of the subsequent payments of $13,860.01, $3,060.87 was credited toward the months current when these payments were made. The remaining $10,799.14 was credited by the DSHS toward the arrears. Therefore, $20,442.24 - $10,799.14 = $9,643.10 is left unpaid from the 24 months prior to July 1, 1997. Exhibit C to the Knight Declaration. The Case Payment History indicates there is some additional arrearage from prior to the date Mr. Knight was laid off from The Boeing Company. $9,643.10 represents over 11 months worth of arrearages, which is more than 180 days. Therefore Mr. Knight is still more than 180 days out of compliance with the support order of 1991 as of July 1, 1997.

19. On September 13, 2001, defendant FRED STEPHENS, through his agency DOL, suspended the plaintiff’s Washington State Driver’s License effective September 16, 2001 based upon a certification by defendant DENNIS BRADDOCK, through his agency DSHS, that the plaintiff is not in compliance with a child support order. The notification cited RCW 46.20.291, chapter 74.20A and “Laws of 1997”. Exhibits D and F to the Knight Declaration which include the documents from the DOL and the DSHS.

20. On January 21, 2002, defendant RON ELSON (ELSOE, my error), Chief of Mercer Island Police, through Officer R. D. Delashmutt, Badge Number 118, pulled the plaintiff over and cited him for Driving While License Suspended, 3d Degree, RCW 46.20.342. This gave rise to City of Mercer Island v. Knight, King County District Court, Bellevue Division No. MIC 84199. Defendant LONDI K. LINDELL through defendant WAYNE STEWART, represented defendant CITY OF MERCER ISLAND in this case. Exhibits E and F to the Knight Declaration.

21. On February 2, 2002, defendant RON ELSON (ELSOE), Chief of Mercer Island Police, through Officer Richard (Brian, my error) Noel, Badge Number 115, pulled the plaintiff over and cited him for Driving While License Suspended, 3d Degree, RCW 46.20.342. This gave rise to City of Mercer Island v. Knight, King County District Court, Bellevue Division No. MIC 841268 (84268, my error). Defendant LONDI K. LINDELL through defendant WAYNE STEWART, represented defendant CITY OF MERCER ISLAND in this case. In addition, Officer Noel, on instructions by his sergeant, arrested the plaintiff, forced him to sit in the cramped back seat of his cruiser with steel handcuffs biting into his metacarpal bones, and held him in a holding cell for several hours before releasing him. Defendant SUPERIOR TOWING impounded the plaintiff’s 1966 Pontiac Lemans. Exhibits E and F to the Knight Declaration.

22. The next day, Super Bowl Sunday, the plaintiff contacted defendant SUPERIOR TOWING, who informed the plaintiff that the “hold” was released from his car and that he may pick it up if he pays the impound fee for $205.74. The plaintiff paid that amount to defendant SUPERIOR TOWING to recover his automobile that day, and with his permission, Roselle Williams drove it out of their yard.

23. Mr. Knight believed in good faith that he had standing to challenge the validity of the license suspension and the validity of the WorkFirst Act under which the license suspension was imposed for nonpayment of child support. He believed in good faith that King County District Court, Bellevue Division in the two criminal actions No. MIC 84199 and No. MIC 84268, had jurisdiction to decide the validity of the license suspension and of the WorkFirst Act, and therefore he brought a motion to dismiss each Complaint, wherein he raised the following issues:

Validity of Laws of Washington 1997 chapter 58, the WorkFirst Act, as applied to a child support order that predates the date of effectiveness of the WorkFirst Act, July 1, 1997, as applied to child support arrearages that exceeded 180 days prior to July 1, 1997, and to child support arrearages that accumulated since on a child support order unmodified to incorporate the WorkFirst Act, or the WorkFirst Act as unconstitutional on its face, specifically:

Whether the Legislature intended the WorkFirst Act to apply to pre-existing support orders and arrearages under the test defined by State v. Smith, (2001) 144 Wash. 2d. 665, 671-672, 30 P. 3d. 1245, 39 P. 3d. 294 and State v. Cruz, (1999) 139 Wash. 2d. 186, 191, 985 P. 2d. 384;

Whether application of the WorkFirst Act to a noncustodial parent subject to a child support order that pre-existed the passage of the Act, and to an arrearage that exceeded 180 days on July 1, 1997 and still exceeds 180 days prior to July 1, 1997, defines the Act as a bill of attainder and as an ex post facto law prohibited by Article I Section 23 of the Washington Constitution and prohibited to the states by Article I Section 10 clause 1 of the United States Constitution;

Whether the WorkFirst Act embraces more than one subject in violation of Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution;

Whether the underlying child support order and chapter 26.19 RCW upon which the support order is based is offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment as exceeding the state’s interest in the support of its children as limited by Troxel v. Granville, (2000) 530 U.S. 57, 147 L. Ed. 2d. 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060;

And whether enforcement of support order by license suspension without requiring proof that Mr. Knight possesses wealth sufficient to allow compliance with the support order without employment is declared null and void by the Antipeonage Act, 42 U.S.C. §1994, and whether such enforcement is the crime defined by 18 U.S.C. §1581.

The state court ruled on April 19, 2002 that the license was properly suspended within the requirements of RCW 46.20.205 and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the validity of the license suspension and the validity of the WorkFirst Act on the grounds listed herein above. Knight Declaration pages 1-4, specifically page 3 line 27 through page 4 line 5, and the Declaration of Judith Calhoun (Calhoun Declaration).

24. While there is an ongoing state court action, the two causes of action were consolidated on April 19, 2002, Knight Declaration page 4, Mr. Knight lacks adequate remedy at law in the state court by virtue of the April 19, 2002 decision. He presented the issues of whether the WorkFirst Act is a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law as applied to him and whether the absence of a requirement of proof of possession of wealth sufficient to allow compliance with the support order for suspension of all licenses is declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994 and the state court found it lacked jurisdiction to rule on these issues. Knight Declaration page 4 and Calhoun Declaration. Therefore, the requirements for abstention set forth in Younger v. Harris, (1971) 401 U.S. 37, 46-54, 27 L. Ed. 2d. 669, 91 S. Ct. 746 are not met. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to hear these issues of federal law. Mitchum v. Foster, (1972) 407 U.S. 225, 32 L. Ed. 2d. 705, 92 S. Ct. 2151.

25. While the state court’s finding on April 19, 2002 that it lacks jurisdiction to decide the validity of the WorkFirst Act as applied to the plaintiff may be in error, this Court is prohibited from finding the state court has such jurisdiction by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine[1]

26. As to the issues of state law that the state court declared itself to lack jurisdiction to consider, Mr. Knight has an absolute right under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to not be convicted of any crime unless a rational trier of fact can convict him of all elements of such crime as DEFINED BY VALIDLY PASSED STATE LAW. Fiore v. White, (2001) 531 U.S. 225, 148 L. Ed. 2d. 629, 121 S. Ct. 712, 713-714, (Fiore II); Jackson v. Virginia, (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 316, 61 L. Ed. 2d. 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781; and In re Winship, (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d. 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068. Furthermore, he has a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to not be convicted of any crime where the statute that defines the crime or provides for the legal disability the violation of which is defined as a crime is void as unconstitutional, Ex parte Royall, (1886) 117 U.S. 241, 248, 29 L. Ed. 868, 6 S. Ct. 734. The plaintiff intends to request that this Court certify to the Supreme Court of Washington the following questions of state law: 1) Whether the WorkFirst Act embraces more than one subject and is therefore null and void in violation of Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution, and 2) Whether the Washington Legislature intended the WorkFirst Act to apply to pre-existing support orders and arrearages under the test defined by State v. Smith, (2001) 144 Wash. 2d. 665, 671-672, 30 P. 3d. 1245, 39 P. 3d. 294 and State v. Cruz, (1999) 139 Wash. 2d. 186, 191, 985 P. 2d. 384.

27. Defendants are therefore acting under color of state law to deprive Mr. Knight of his civil right to not have a bill of attainder enforced against him as provided by Article I Section 10 clause 1 of the Constitution. They are depriving him of his right to not be subjected to an ex post facto law in violation of Article I Section 10 clause 1, to the extent that nonpayment of child support is sometimes considered a crime, such as in 18 U.S.C. §228. They are depriving him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law in that they are prosecuting him for a crime in a forum that lacks jurisdiction to determine whether the statutory provisions without which the criminal prosecution is impossible are valid or can be lawfully applied to him. By suspending his license and prosecuting him for driving while license suspended for noncompliance with a support order that can only be complied with by employment, they are depriving Mr. Knight of his right to not have established, maintained, or enforced his service or labor as a peon in liquidation of a debt or obligation or otherwise as provided by 42 U.S.C. §1994.

28. Defendant CITY OF MERCER ISLAND is liable under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 691-693, 56 L. Ed. 2d. 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018. The actions of its agents are pursuant to an official policy, the WorkFirst Act, and its own policy to enforce license suspensions pursuant to it.

29. Defendant ALAN MERKLE is liable because as Mayor of defendant CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, he can make the policy and direct the departments within his direct control to follow the official policies.

30. Defendants RON ELSON (ELSOE my error), LONDI K.LINDELL, and WAYNE STEWART are liable as the agents of the CITY enforcing its official policy, the police chief in that he directs the sworn officers in his department to enforce the policy, and both are liable under Monroe v. Pape, (1961) 365 U.S. 167, 5 L. Ed. 2d. 492, 81 S. Ct. 473, their actions are only possible because they are clothed with the authority of state law.

31. Ex parte Young, (1908) 209 U.S. 123, 157-168, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 found that state officers, including prosecutors, can be sued in their individual capacities under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §1983, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. RON ELSON (ELSOE, my error), LONDI K. LINDELL, WAYNE STEWART, FRED STEPHENS, DENNIS BRADDOCK, and GARY LOCKE can thus be sued for prospective injunctive relief.

32. Defendant SUPERIOR TOWING is liable under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., (1982) 457 U.S. 922, 73 L. Ed. 2d. 482, 102 S. Ct. 2744. It acted in concert with the other defendants acting under color of state law to deprive the plaintiff of his automobile and to force him to pay $205.74 to recover it.

REMEDY

WHEREFORE plaintiff, without making any election of remedies, prays that this Court enter judgment as follows:

A. For a judgment against defendants CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, ALAN MERKLE, RON ELSON, LONDI K. LINDELL, WAYNE STEWART, FRED STEPHENS, DENNIS BRADDOCK, GARY LOCKE, and SUPERIOR TOWING to the extent that such parties are not immune to such liability for the $205.74 plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT had to pay to recover his automobile, plus additional monetary damages due to the deprivation of the automobile for a period of one day, and for the arrest and imprisonment on February 2, 2002.

B. For declaratory relief that WorkFirst Act, either as applied to Mr. Knight, or on its face, is invalid as repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, not validly passed under the Constitution of the State of Washington and therefore inapplicable to Mr. Knight under the Fourteenth Amendment, and such application of the WorkFirst Act to Mr. Knight is declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994.

C. For injunction against the defendants CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, ALAN MERKLE, RON ELSON, LONDI K. LINDELL, WAYNE STEWART, FRED STEPHENS, DENNIS BRADDOCK, GARY LOCKE, and SUPERIOR TOWING prohibiting any further enforcement of the WorkFirst Act against Mr. Knight and other noncustodial parents.

D. For an award of costs and any attorney’s fees against the defendants as provided by 42 U.S.C. §1988.

E. For such other and further relief as to the Court seems reasonable and equitable.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, April 23, 2002.

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Roger W. Knight, plaintiff