IV. Decision
Below
The memorandum below is reported at
V. Statement
of Grounds For Jurisdiction
of
this Court
The memorandum below was filed by
the court of appeals on
This Court has jurisdiction to
review the memorandum decision provided by
28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
VI. Laws
Involved in this Case
Provisions
of the
Article I Section 10 clause 1
No State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin
Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender
in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
Thirteenth Article of Amendment
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude,
except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist in the
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Fourteenth
Article of Amendment
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Laws of
the
The Acts of the legislature of any
State, Territory, or Possession of the
The records and judicial proceedings
of any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or copies thereof,
shall be proved or admitted in other courts within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the
court annexed, if a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court
that the said attestation is in proper form.
Such Acts, records and judicial
proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
The
holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is
abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United
States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any
Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced,
or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish,
maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary
service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or
obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.
Revised Code of
(1) The
department may serve upon a
responsible parent a notice informing the responsible parent of the
department's intent to submit the parent's name to the
department of licensing
and any appropriate licensing entity as a licensee who is not in compliance
with a child support order. The department shall attach a copy of the
responsible parent's child support order to the notice. Service of the notice
must be by certified mail, return receipt requested. If service by certified
mail is not successful, service shall be by personal service.
(2) The notice of noncompliance must
include the address and telephone number of the
department's
division of child
support office that issues the notice and must inform the responsible parent
that:
(a) The parent may
request an adjudicative proceeding to contest the issue of compliance with the
child support order. The only issues that may be considered at the adjudicative
proceeding are whether the parent is required to pay child support under a
child support order and whether the parent is in compliance with that order;
(b) A request for an
adjudicative proceeding shall be in writing and must be received by the
department within twenty days of the date of service of the notice;
(c) If the parent
requests an adjudicative proceeding within twenty days of service, the
department will stay action to certify the parent to the
department of licensing
and any licensing entity for noncompliance with a child support order pending
entry of a written decision after the adjudicative proceeding;
(d) If the parent does
not request an adjudicative proceeding within twenty days of service and
remains in noncompliance with a child support order, the
department will
certify the parent's name to the department of licensing and any appropriate
licensing entity for noncompliance with a child support order;
(e) The
department will
stay action to certify the parent to the department of licensing and any
licensing entity for noncompliance if the parent agrees to make timely payments
of current support and agrees to a reasonable payment schedule for payment of
the arrears. It is the parent's responsibility to contact in person or by mail
the department's
division of child support office indicated on the notice
within twenty days of service of the notice to arrange for a payment schedule.
The department may stay certification for up to thirty days after contact from
a parent to arrange for a payment schedule;
(f) If the
department
certifies the responsible parent to the department of licensing and a licensing
entity for noncompliance with a child support order, the licensing entity will
suspend or not renew the parent's license and the
department of licensing will
suspend or not renew any driver's license that the parent holds until the
parent provides the department of licensing and the licensing entity with a
release from the department stating that the responsible parent is in
compliance with the child support order;
(g) If the
department
certifies the responsible parent as a person who is in noncompliance with a
child support order, the department of fish and wildlife will suspend the
fishing license, hunting license, commercial fishing license, or any other
license issued under chapters
77.32, 77.28, [75.28], and 75.25 RCW that the
responsible parent may possess. Notice from the department of licensing that a
responsible parent's driver's license has been suspended shall serve as notice
of the suspension of a license issued under chapters
77.32 and 75.25 RCW;
(h) Suspension of a
license will affect insurability if the responsible parent's insurance policy
excludes coverage for acts occurring after the suspension of a license;
(i) If after receiving
the notice of noncompliance with a child support order, the responsible parent
files a motion to modify support with the court or requests the
department to
amend a support obligation established by an administrative decision, or if a
motion for modification of a court or administrative order for child support is
pending, the department or the court may stay action to certify the parent to
the department of licensing and any licensing entity for noncompliance with a
child support order. A stay shall not exceed six months unless the
department
finds good cause. The responsible parent has the obligation to notify the
department that a modification proceeding is pending and provide a copy of the
motion or request for modification; and
(j) If the responsible
parent subsequently becomes in compliance with the child support order, the
department will promptly provide the parent with a release stating that the
parent is in compliance with the order, and the parent may request that the
licensing entity or the department of licensing reinstate the suspended
license.
(3) A responsible parent may request
an adjudicative proceeding upon service of the notice described in subsection
(1) of this section. The request for an adjudicative proceeding must be
received by the department within twenty days of service. The request must be
in writing and indicate the current mailing address and daytime phone number,
if available, of the responsible parent. The proceedings under this subsection
shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements of
chapter 34.05 RCW.
The issues that may be considered at the adjudicative proceeding are limited to
whether:
(a) The person named as
the responsible parent is the responsible parent;
(b)
The responsible parent is required to pay child support under a child support
order; and
(c) The responsible
parent is in compliance with the order.
(4) The decision resulting from the
adjudicative proceeding must be in writing and inform the responsible parent of
his or her rights to review. The parent's copy of the decision may be sent by
regular mail to the parent's most recent address of record.
(5) If a responsible parent contacts
the department's
division of child support office indicated on the notice of
noncompliance within twenty days of service of the notice and requests
arrangement of a payment schedule, the department shall stay the certification
of noncompliance during negotiation of the schedule for payment of arrears. In
no event shall the stay continue for more than thirty days from the date of
contact by the parent. The department shall establish a schedule for payment of
arrears that is fair and reasonable, and that considers the financial situation
of the responsible parent and the needs of all children who rely on the
responsible parent for support. At the end of the thirty days, if no payment
schedule has been agreed to in writing and the department has acted in good
faith, the department shall proceed with certification of noncompliance.
(6) If a responsible parent timely
requests an adjudicative proceeding pursuant to subsection (4) of this section,
the department may not certify the name of the parent to the
department of
licensing or a licensing entity for noncompliance with a child support order
unless the adjudicative proceeding results in a finding that the responsible
parent is not in compliance with the order.
(7) The
department may certify to
the department of licensing and any appropriate licensing entity the name of a
responsible parent who is not in compliance with a child support order or a
residential or visitation order if:
(a) The responsible
parent does not timely request an adjudicative proceeding upon service of a
notice issued under subsection (1) of this section and is not in compliance
with a child support order twenty-one days after service of the notice;
(b) An adjudicative
proceeding results in a decision that the responsible parent is not in
compliance with a child support order;
(c) The court enters a
judgment on a petition for judicial review that finds the responsible parent is
not in compliance with a child support order;
(d) The
department and
the responsible parent have been unable to agree on a fair and reasonable
schedule of payment of the arrears;
(e) The responsible
parent fails to comply with a payment schedule established pursuant to
subsection (5) of this section; or
The department shall send by regular
mail a copy of any certification of noncompliance filed with the
department of
licensing or a licensing entity to the responsible parent at the responsible
parent's most recent address of record.
(8) The
department of licensing and
a licensing entity shall, without undue delay, notify a responsible parent
certified by the department under subsection (7) of this section that the
parent's driver's license or other license has been suspended because the
parent's name has been certified by the department as a responsible parent who
is not in compliance with a child support order or a residential or visitation
order.
(9) When a responsible parent who is
served notice under subsection (1) of this section subsequently complies with
the child support order, or when the department receives a court order under section
886 of this act stating that the parent is in compliance with a residential or
visitation order, the department shall promptly provide the parent with a
release stating that the responsible parent is in compliance with the order. A
copy of the release shall be transmitted by the
department to the appropriate
licensing entities.
(10) The
department may adopt rules
to implement and enforce the requirements of this section. The
department shall
deliver a copy of rules adopted to implement and enforce this section to the legislature
by
(11) Nothing in this section
prohibits a responsible parent from filing a motion to modify support with the
court or from requesting the department to amend a support obligation
established by an administrative decision. If there is a reasonable likelihood
that a pending motion or request will significantly change the amount of the
child support obligation, the department or the court may stay action to
certify the responsible parent to the department of licensing and any licensing
entity for noncompliance with a child support order. A stay shall not exceed
six months unless the department finds good cause to extend the stay. The
responsible parent has the obligation to notify the
department that a
modification proceeding is pending and provide a copy of the motion or request
for modification.
(12) The
department of licensing and
a licensing entity may renew, reinstate, or otherwise extend a license in
accordance with the licensing entity's or the department of licensing's rules
after the licensing entity or the department of licensing receives a copy of
the release specified in subsection (9) of this section. The
department of
licensing and a licensing entity may waive any applicable requirement for reissuance, renewal, or other extension if it determines that the imposition of
that requirement places an undue burden on the person and that waiver of the
requirement is consistent with the public interest.
(13) The procedures in chapter 58,
Laws of 1997, constitute the exclusive administrative remedy for contesting the
establishment of noncompliance with a child support order and suspension of a
license under this section, and satisfy the requirements of
RCW 34.05.422.
VII. Statement of the Case
First week of May 2004, this
Petition is submitted with Mr. Knight’s Motion to Direct the Clerk to File
Petition Out of Time.
VIII. Argument for Allowance of the Writ
A. Introduction
This
case arises from a defense to a criminal prosecution for driving while license
suspended (DWLS),
City of Mercer Island
v. Knight, King County District Court, Bellevue Division Nos. MIC 84199 and
MIC 84268. Mr. Knight presented a motion
to dismiss the charges on two primary grounds: 1) he was not adequately served
as required by
RCW 74.20A.320(1) which would have afforded him the opportunity
to request an administrative proceeding from which an appeal can be had to a
state superior court where he could challenge the validity of the statutory
scheme that provided for license suspension for child support; and 2) that the
statutory scheme is invalid.
During
the hearing on motions on
After
the decision in the district court on summary judgment but before its denial of
reconsideration, the King County Superior Court of Washington, in City of Mercer Island v. Knight, No.
02-1-01137-0 SEA,
reversed the convictions for DWLS on the grounds that the
trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether service as required by
RCW
74.20A.320(1) was accomplished and that this had to be proven or the charges
dismissed. However, the
superior court found
that the trial court still lacked jurisdiction to consider the validity of the
statutory scheme, and could not order restoration of the license, even upon a
finding that service was not accomplished.
On remand, in January 2003, the
City
of
Therefore, except as to the question
of service as required by
RCW 74.20A.320(1), (barred by collateral estoppel
under 28 U.S.C. §1738 in favor of Mr. Knight), standing and all other claims
are preserved from both
Younger
abstention and
Rooker-Feldman
doctrines.
B. Collateral
Estoppel
The
court of appeals, at App. p. 3, cites only one previous case in the
28
U.S.C. §1738 reads in significant part:
Such Acts, records and judicial
proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the
It
is abundantly clear from the language of this statute that collateral estoppel
analysis of a previous state court decision shall be by the collateral estoppel
practice of that state. Therefore,
Shuman v. Dept. of Licensing, (2001) 108
A party
seeking to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel must prove: '(1) the
issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in
the second action; (2) the prior adjudication must have ended in a final
judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a
party or in privity with the party to the prior adjudication; and (4)
application of the doctrine does not work an injustice.'
Thompson v. Dep't of Licensing, 138 Wn.2d 783, 790, 982 P.2d 601
(1999).
The focus of the dispute in
Shuman is the fourth element, whether the application of the doctrine
works an injustice.
Shuman went on to find, at 108
As Professor
Trautman has noted, the requirement that an issue must have been “actually
litigated” in the prior case is not as clear as it may appear. Philip A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in
whether the issue was actually recognized by the parties as
important and by the judge as necessary to the first judgment. If so, the determination should be
conclusive, with an important qualification being whether the significance of
the issue for purposes of the subsequent action was sufficiently foreseeable at
the time of the first action.
As to res judicata,
Hisle
v. Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp., (2002) 113
In
considering whether causes of action are the same for purposes of res judicata,
courts consider (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior
judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action;
(2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions;
(3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether
the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.
Hayes
v. City of
Hisle at 113
There
are two primary federal law claims that Mr. Knight elects to present to
this
Court that he presented to the district court and to the
court of appeals: 1)
that attempt to coerce employment through license suspension and other threats
of legal process to liquidate a substantial child support arrearage, over
$60,000 as found by the district court at the time of its
decision, App. p. 7,
is declared null and void by
42 U.S.C. §1994, the Antipeonage Act, and 2) as
RCW 74.20A.320(3) (p. 6 herein above) prohibits consideration of ability to comply
with the support order, the statute is a bill of attainder, particularly as
applied to pre-existing child support orders where the obligor parent is unable
to comply with such order. That
inability to comply continues subsequent to enactment of statute is irrelevant
to such statute’s status as a bill of attainder. The merits of these claims are discussed
herein below.
The analysis of whether these claims
are barred by the previous litigation in state court of the claim that the
WorkFirst Act is a multi-subject bill under
Shuman
and
Hisle invariably finds that they
are not. Just as the statutory right to
overtime pay exists independent of any collective bargaining agreement, the
constitutional right to not be targeted by a bill of attainder and the
statutory right to not be held in a condition of peonage each exists
independent of the state constitutional right to not be governed by a
multi-subject bill.
They are simply different rights.
Under
Shuman analysis, there was simply no
recognition by either the parties or by the courts in Knight v. DSHS of the necessity of determination of whether any
part of the WorkFirst Act is a bill of attainder or whether it had the
potential to be used to coerce labor in liquidation of a debt or obligation to
the determination of whether the WorkFirst Act is void as a multi-subject bill. Nor could there be any such recognition. If a bill embraces more than one subject, in
both its title and content, it is void,
Amalgamated
Transit Union Local 587 v. State of Washington, (2000) 142 Wash. 2d.
183, 216, 11 P. 3d. 762, regardless of whether it also contains a bill of
attainder or could be used to coerce employment in liquidation of a debt or
obligation.
A
bill of attainder is void regardless of whether it is a single subject bill or
part of a multi-subject bill.
42 U.S.C.
§1994 declares all attempts by virtue of the acts, laws, resolutions,
orders, regulations, or usages of a state to establish, maintain or enforce any person’s
service or labor in liquidation of any debt or obligation; regardless of
whether any such is enacted as a single subject bill or as part of a
multi-subject bill.
Therefore,
the federal courts below erred in finding these claims barred by collateral
estoppel by virtue of Knight v.
DSHS.
C. Antipeonage Act Jurisdiction
Neither 42 U.S.C. §§1981 nor
1982 have specific
language providing jurisdiction to the federal courts. Yet these statutes were found enforceable in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., (1968)
392
The federal courts thus have jurisdiction granted
independently by the Antipeonage Act.
One construction of the phrase: “debt or obligation, or otherwise” in
42 U.S.C. §1994 includes child support, which grants a parent ordered to pay child
support an enforceable right. Another
construction, that it does not include child support, would deny such a parent
an enforceable right.
Negonsott v. Samuels, (1993) 507
“Our
task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been
expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive.”
quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
(1982) 458
The Antipeonage Act targets state court orders with the
language “acts, laws, resolutions, ORDERS,
regulations, or usages”. State court
orders are declared null and void, if such orders establish, maintain, or
enforce the service or labor of any person as a peon in liquidation of a debt
or obligation. “To suggest otherwise . .
. ‘is to reject the plain meaning of language’”,
Jones at 392 U.S. 419 quoting
Hurd
v. Hodge, (1948) 334
Therefore,
the Antipeonage Act creates a statutory exception to the doctrine set forth in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., (1923) 263 U.S. 413,
68 L. Ed. 362, 44 S. Ct. 149 and
District
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, (1983) 460 U.S. 462, 75 L. Ed. 2d.
206, 103
Any
contrary construction of the language of
42 U.S.C. §1994 is contrary to its
legislative history, its plain language, renders it an unenforceable nullity, and
is thus an absurd result.
D. Attempt to Coerce Employment
to Pay Child Support With Threat of License Suspension is Declared Null and
Void by the Antipeonage Act.
RCW 74.20A.320(5), p. 7 herein
above, clearly states that the DSHS will stay suspension of the licenses only
upon the parent entering into a “repayment” agreement. Mr. Knight owes more than $60,000,
App. p.
7. If he does not have that amount in
his possession as he set forth in a
declaration in the
district court, such
fact not refuted by any other evidence submitted therein, he would have to
obtain employment or agree to obtain employment in order to enter into such an
agreement without committing the crime of fraud,
RCW 9.45.100 and
18 U.S.C.
§1001.
If
Mr. Knight is unable to obtain employment with a salary or hourly wage rate
sufficient to allow him to comply with such a repayment agreement,
42 U.S.C.
§1994 still applies because it is the “attempt” that is declared null and void,
whether successful or not.
The
district court made an interesting finding:
In addition, plaintiff’s allegations do not support a cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1994. Neither the child support orders nor the more
recent suspension of his license holds plaintiff to service, labor, or
involuntary servitude in liquidation of a debt.
His services have not been purchased by a master, nor is he compelled to
work off his debt in any specific labor or servitude. He may undertake any
profession or job of his choosing and he may work or not work as his
obligations, responsibilities, and wealth allow. The statute under which
plaintiffs debt has been determined specifically allows for adjustments based on
plaintiff’s ability to pay.
App. p. 12. The last sentence flat ignores
RCW
26.09.170(1). But that he may undertake
any profession or job of his choosing defeats his claim of peonage is contrary
to the findings of this court in
United States v.
Reynolds,
(1914) 235 U.S. 133, 146, 59 L. Ed. 162, 35 S. Ct. 86:
The surety has paid the
state and the service is rendered to reimburse him. That is the real substance of the
transaction. The terms of that contract
are agreed upon by the contracting parties, as the result of their own
negotiations. The statute of the state
does not prescribe them. It leaves the
making of the contract to the parties concerned, and this fact is not changed
because of the requirement that the judge shall approve the contract.
It is not fatal to a claim of
peonage that a party under threat of legal process to pay amounts greater than
he possesses, particularly in the case of a monthly obligation imposed based
upon his income or imputed income, that he may undertake any profession or job
of his choosing.
The
problem here is one of paradigm. If a
playing card is flashed very quickly, and it is an 8 of clubs, the observer
will remember seeing an 8 of clubs and that the clubs are black. When given a longer look, the observer will
be surprised to find that the clubs on this particular card are red. A paradigm can prevent a person from seeing
the obvious, simply because it is not what he is used to. Most people can understand the statement: “A
mile is eight furlongs.” But unless they
know Spanish, they might not understand “Un milla es ocho estadios”, even
though it is the same simple concept.
When
considering debts and obligations in general, most people can understand the
difference between lawful and unlawful means of collecting debts. Were this not so, it would be impossible for
any prosecutor to obtain a conviction from a jury for peonage or its closely
related crime, extortion. Most people
would readily understand that armed robbery, an acute form of extortion, is a
crime even if the victim legitimately owed the perpetrator the money. Should a landlord point a gun at his tenant
and demand payment of rent, he is committing a crime even though the rent is
duly owed. In
State v. Pauling, (2003) 149
Yet
the district court found:
Under plaintiff’s
theory, any order compelling payment of a debt would constitute peonage unless
the debtor were wealthy enough to pay the debt out of his savings without the
need to find gainful employment.
App. p. 13. Most court judgments for money in civil cases
are not enforceable by contempt proceedings, arrest, imprisonment, or permanent
suspension of licenses. The theory is
that they are not ORDERS to pay the
money, rather, they are merely FINDINGS
that the money is owed. It is not just
Mr. Knight’s theory, it is exactly what the Antipeonage Act commands. ORDERS
compelling the payment of money are declared null and void if the party cannot
comply without employment. Outside of
the field of family law, we have been able to live with this since 1867.
The
facts proven to a jury in
Pauling is
that he obtained a default judgment against a former girlfriend for
$5,000. He had some photographs of her
engaged in certain activities and he threatened to post these images on the
Internet if she did not satisfy the judgment. This would embarrass her. This was found to be sufficiently coercive to
sustain a conviction of extortion.
If
Mr. Pauling told his girlfriend that she could get a job, any job, it mattered
not what she did or who she worked for, and paid him half of her take-home pay
until the judgment was paid in full, not only would he be committing extortion,
he would be committing the crime of peonage,
18 U.S.C. §1581.
That,
most people can understand.
But
if it turned out that the judgment obtained against the girlfriend was for
child support, people would suddenly act like all of this is being explained in
Spanish, and they don’t know Spanish.
Might as well say “Un milla es ocho estadios”. Many noncustodial parents say “Adios” because
to remain is to be harassed and repeatedly imprisoned.
Some
even commit suicide.
Which
certainly does not help the children.
By
the rules of statutory construction set forth herein above, at pp. 16-17, the
phrase “debt or obligation, or otherwise” clearly includes child support, the
obligation was understood to exist prior to and during the winter of 1866-67,
Congress made a deliberate decision to not exclude it from the Peonage Bill it
passed.
Such
deliberate decision should be respected.
E. Bill of Attainder
RCW
74.20A.320(3) prohibits consideration of ability to comply with a support order. If the parent is unable to comply with the
support order, the suspension is automatic and the parent has no defense. It is therefore a punishment by legislative
fiat, without requirement or availability of any MEANINGFUL administrative or judicial process, of all those unable
to comply with their support orders.
That
is a bill of attainder.
Particularly
where directed against those unable to comply with support orders pre-existing
1997, as in the case of Mr. Knight, when Laws of Washington 1997 chapter 58 was
passed, it is a bill of attainder. Prior
to this Act, there was no provision or practice in
To
say otherwise would be like saying the Nuremburg Law passed by Germany in 1935
punished only those who continued to be Jews or persons with two or more Jewish
grandparents after 1935, and therefore, not a bill of attainder. One of the consequences of this law, is that
without German citizenship, and being German they were not citizens of other
nations, those affected were often not allowed to renew their licenses.
Mass
murder was not the first thing the Nazis did to those they deemed
unworthy. One purpose of the
constitutional prohibition of bills of attainder is to prohibit a government
sponsored hate campaign directed against any group of persons.
RCW 74.20A.320(9) provides that
license may restored only upon compliance with the support order. Therefore, until Mr. Knight comes up with the
$60,000, he is PERMANENTLY barred
from operating a motor vehicle or engaging in any other activity that requires
a license issued by the State of
RCW
26.09.170(1) prohibits any court order forgiving or otherwise reducing
pre-existing child support debt, regardless of any reason or circumstance that
a court may find warrants such forgiveness or reduction.
While
Zablocki v. Redhail, (1978) 434
Under the challenged statute, no
Emphasis
added. A noncustodial parent whose
license is suspended and is unable to comply with the support order, is
absolutely prevented from acquiring restoration of the license. The license suspension is therefore PERMANENT.
This Court found that once obtained, a license is more
than a mere privilege to be taken back at the whim of government, it becomes a
property and liberty interest subject to the protection of due process,
Bell v. Burson, (1971) 402 U.S. 535,
539, 29 L. Ed. 2d. 90, 91
Operating
a motor vehicle is completely unrelated to payment or nonpayment of child
support. So is hunting
Zablocki, at 434
First, with respect to individuals
who are unable to meet the statutory requirements, the statute merely
prevents the applicant from getting married, without delivering any money at all into the hands of the
applicant’s prior children.
Therefore serving no legitimate
interest of government. A bare desire to
harm a politically unpopular group is not a legitimate interest of government. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Lawrence v. Texas, (2003) 156 L. Ed. 2d. 508, 123 S.
F. Litigation Bar
The
terms of the litigation bar prohibit Mr. Knight from bringing a
Zablocki claim identical to the claim
this Court found meritorious. It is
dependent upon all claims brought by Mr. Knight being frivolous. However, in addition to
Zablocki, a
The
standard for frivolousness of claim is set forth in
Neitzke v.
Williams,
(1989) 490
The
findings by the court of appeals and the
district court imposing the litigation
bar, App. pp. 4,
5-6,
16-20 are as irrational as a finding that the ocean is
not salty.
G. Enough is Enough
A phenomenon that can be called the
“Child Support Crusade” has grown over the past 40 years to the point where
noncustodial parents, most of whom do not make decisions as to lay-offs, plant
closings, outsourcing, off-shoring, and the planetary free trade system without
a corresponding planetary minimum wage and labor standard system, are
nevertheless brutally punished for the sad fact that, first, their spouses
filed for divorce, and second, they lost their employment or had support orders
imposed that are simply unreasonable.
Child support paid is not deductible
from taxable income.
26 U.S.C.
§152(e). This is irrational. Sufficient proof by itself that the
motivation and purpose behind the Child Support Crusade is not to serve the
needs of our children. Therefore, the
"best interests of the children" is nothing more than a pre-text.
Noncustodial parents are being
driven to suicide in every State in the
Howard University Professor Stephen
Baskerville describes what has been happening in
Why is Daddy in Jail?;[1]
Absurdistan in America,[2] Is There Really a Fatherhood Crisis?[3],
and many other essays.[4] The reason these things happen is because, in
part, the courts have refused to enforce the rights set forth in the
Constitution and the appropriate legislation passed to enforce its guarantees
of rights.
What are the motivations behind
those who assault our troops in
But whatever their motivation, all
they have to do is point out how we treat our divorced fathers and every Arab
father who does not wish to be treated the same may consider joining their
cause.
We need to deal with the issues
raised herein.
IX. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein,
this Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Roger W. Knight,
pro se
rogerwknight@hotmail.com
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[4] www.stephenbaskerville.net is a website where many of these essays may be found.
