Judge Robert S. Lasnik

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

 

ROGER W. KNIGHT,                                    )

                                                                        )

                                    plaintiff,                        )           No.  C02-879L

            v.                                                         )

                                                                        )           PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, ALAN            )           PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MERKLE, Mayor of Mercer Island, RON       )

ELSON, Chief of Mercer Island Police,            )           Noted for June 28, 2002

LONDI K. LINDELL, Mercer Island City       )

Attorney, WAYNE STEWART, Assistant        )

Mercer Island City Attorney, FRED                  )

STEPHENS, Director of Department of            )

Licensing, DENNIS BRADDOCK, Secretary  )

of Department of Social and Health Services,    )

GARY LOCKE, Governor of Washington,       )

and SUPERIOR TOWING, a corporation        )

doing business in the State of Washington,         )

                                                                        )

                                    defendants.                   )

____________________________________)

 

MOTION

            Comes now the plaintiff, ROGER W. KNIGHT, and moves for a partial summary judgment:

            1)  Declaring that the impound of Mr. Knight’s automobile on February 2, 2002 by defendants CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, RON ELSOE, and SUPERIOR TOWING was an unreasonable seizure offensive to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Pursuant to this declaration, award for damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against defendants CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, RON ELSOE, and SUPERIOR TOWING in the amount of $205.74 payable to the plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT, in the amount of $50.00 for the unreasonable seizure of his automobile for one day without due process, Declaration of Roger W. Knight in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Knight Declaration III).  Allowing plaintiff his costs against the defendants, including $150.00 for his filing fee and $65.00 for the service of process.

            2)  Declaring that the Antipeonage Act, 42 U.S.C. §1994 provides jurisdiction to this Court independent of any other federal statute to the extent necessary to give force and effect to the will of Congress that no person within the United States shall be required by legal process to perform labor in liquidation of a debt or obligation.  It is state court orders that the Antipeonage Act declares null and void and it is the imposition and enforcement of such orders that 18 U.S.C. §1581 defines as a crime.  It therefore creates a statutory exception to the Rooker-Feldman[1] doctrine because any interpretation that it does not defeats the will of Congress as expressed in a statute authorized by Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.

            Regardless of whether a state court ruled on whether the Antipeonage Act applies to any effort to enforce any debt or obligation, be it child support or otherwise, if the effect of such an order is to enforce or to allow the enforcement of the service or labor of any person as a peon in liquidation of any debt or obligation, then it is declared null and void and does not have any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect, it grants no right, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection, it creates no office, it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been entered.

            Because the Antipeonage Act is directed specifically at state court orders, mere fact that Mr. Knight challenged the WorkFirst Act in a Washington court as a multi-subject bill prohibited by Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution, and that in such a civil lawsuit he could have raised the issue of whether the application of its provisions to establish, maintain, or enforce his service or labor as a peon in liquidation of a debt or obligation or otherwise is void bears no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on this Court’s consideration of this issue arising from the subsequent application of this state statute upon Mr. Knight.

            And that the present use of the WorkFirst Act, RCW 74.20A.320, by the defendants GARY LOCKE, DENNIS BRADDOCK, and FRED STEPHENS, aided and abetted by defendants CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, ALAN MERKLE, RON ELSOE, LONDI K. LINDELL, WAYNE STEWART, and SUPERIOR TOWING, to provide Mr. Knight a choice between being allowed to use his automobile or signing a repayment agreement with which he can comply only by being employed is declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994.  Pursuant to this declaration, injunction against defendants requiring that the plaintiff’s driver’s license be restored without requiring a reissue fee and prohibiting any further use of the WorkFirst Act against him.

            Damages for violating the Antipeonage Act and the other claims raised by the plaintiff shall be decided in subsequent proceedings.

            This motion is based on the pleadings herein and the following Memorandum of Law.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

            The standards for summary judgment and other dispositive motions are set forth in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., (2000) 503 U.S. 133, 150-151, 147 L. Ed. 2d. 105, 120 S. Ct. 2097; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., (1986) 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d. 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, (1985) 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 91 L. Ed. 2d. 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548; and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., (1970) 398 U.S. 144, 158-159, 26 L. Ed. 2d. 142, 90 S. Ct. 1598.  Reeves at 120 S. Ct. 2110 found that the standards apply to motions for judgment as a matter of law as well as for summary judgment.

            The existence of a genuine issue as to material fact is the first issue that must be decided by the court in any summary judgment motion.  In making this determination, the facts must be seen in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, citing Adickes at 398 U.S. 144, 158-159, but the non-moving party may not rest on his allegations, but must “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.

            In consideration of a motion for summary judgment, or other motion for dismissal, however it is characterized, it is not for the trial court to weigh the evidence.  In Reeves, at 503 U. S. 150-151, Justice O’Conner wrote:

In the analogous context of summary judgment under Rule 56, we have stated that the court must review the record “taken as a whole.” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). And the standard for granting summary judgment “mirrors” the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that “the inquiry under each is the same.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-251 (1986); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It therefore follows that, in entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court should review all of the evidence in the record.

            In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-555 (1990); Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 254; Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696, n. 6 (1962). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Liberty Lobby, supra, at 255. Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. See Wright & Miller 299. That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that “evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.” Id., at 300.

 

And furthermore, the evidence of the nonmovant is believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.  Anderson, supra at 477 U.S. 255.

            Absent a genuine issue of material fact, the matter is whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.  Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc., (9th Cir. 2001) 266 F. 3d. 1104, 1111.

NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT

            Pages 2 and 3 of the Order Denying Motion for a Preliminary Injunction have a section titled: “BACKGROUND”.  It finds that the material facts are undisputed and lists the material facts relevant to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.  These facts are incorporated by reference.  In addition to these facts, to facilitate this Court’s decision on this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the reasonableness of the seizure of Mr. Knight’s automobile on February 2, 2002 under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the plaintiff presents his Declaration by Roger W. Knight in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Knight Declaration III).  These additional facts are as follows:

            Officer Delashmutt did not order the impound of Mr. Knight’s automobile on January 21, 2002 and he did not search it.  He informed Mr. Knight that the brake lights were not working, and he allowed him to park the vehicle in a safe and legal parking spot.  Mr. Knight subsequently fixed the brake lights by replacing a part.

            Officer Noel arrested Mr. Knight on February 2, 2002 and imprisoned him for several hours.  When pulled over, the automobile was functional, the brake lights working, and it was parked in a safe and legal place along 76th Avenue South.  Because it was the second time Mr. Knight was pulled over for Driving While License Suspended (DWLS), Officer Noel ordered the impoundment of Mr. Knight’s car and Superior Towing impounded it.  Prior to the impoundment, while Mr. Knight was present to observe, Officer Noel and another officer searched the vehicle and found two sacks of food. They found no items that would be evidence of a crime.  When Mr. Knight was released later that evening, the police restored to him the two sacks of food.  Mr. Knight recovered his automobile from Superior Towing by paying Superior Towing $205.74.  Mr. Knight considers that the damages for the loss of his automobile for one day without due process to about $50.00.

YOUNGER ABSTENTION AND ROOKER-FELDMAN DO NOT PRECLUDE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MR. KNIGHT.

             The reasonableness of the impound on February 2, 2002 was never an issue in the criminal Driving While License Suspended (DWLS) case.  No evidence obtained in the search was admitted or necessary for a DWLS charge.  No other criminal charges were brought as a result of the search.  Therefore neither the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, (1971) 401 U.S. 37, 46-54, 27 L. Ed. 2d. 669, 91 S. Ct. 746 nor Rooker-Feldman precludes this Court from entering a partial summary judgment in favor of Mr. Knight for and unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

            This Court need not rule on the existence or validity of the child support order, the existence or validity of the license suspension, or validity of the WorkFirst Act, Laws of Washington 1997 chapter 58, and its §§ 801 et seq., or RCW 74.20A.320 et seq., to rule on the reasonableness of the impound.  Therefore, any opportunity that Mr. Knight may have or had to challenge the validity of the child support order, the license suspension or the WorkFirst Act in the state courts is irrelevant to his present challenge to the impound.

THE IMPOUND WAS AN UNREASONABLE SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

            The Fourth Amendment protection against unwarranted and unreasonable seizures of a person’s property is incorporated upon the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Wolf v. Colorado, (1949) 338 U.S. 25, 27-28, 93 L. Ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359 and Mapp v. Ohio, (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d. 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684 overruling Wolf in finding that alternative remedies to exclusionary rule were ineffective, therefore exclusionary rule is incorporated upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Paragraph 32 of the Complaint pleads the issue of the impound of the automobile.  Therefore, no amendment to the Complaint is necessary to claim relief for an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

            Some guidelines for determining whether the impoundment of an automobile is a reasonable seizure are set forth in Carroll v. United States, (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. Ed. 543, 45 S. Ct. 280; Cooper v. California, (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 17 L. Ed. 2d. 730, 87 S. Ct. 788; Harris v. United States, (1968) 390 U.S. 234, 19 L. Ed. 2d. 1067, 88 S. Ct. 992; Chambers v. Maroney, (1970) 399 U.S. 42, 26 L. Ed. 2d. 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975; Cardwell v. Lewis, (1974) 417 U.S. 583, 41 L. Ed. 2d. 325, 94 S. Ct. 2464; South Dakota v. Opperman, (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092; Cady v. Dombrowski, (1973) 413 U.S. 433, 37 L. Ed. 2d. 706, 93 S. Ct. 2523, Arkansas v. Sanders, (1974) 442 U.S. 753, 61 L. Ed. 2d. 235, 99 S. Ct. 2586; United States v. Chadwick, (1977) 433 U.S. 1, 53 L. Ed. 2d. 538, 97 S. Ct. 2476; and United States v. Mitchell, (9th Cir. 1972) 458 F. 2d. 960.  These cases considered the admissibility of evidence obtained in the search of automobiles, including automobiles impounded pending search warrant to prevent removal of evidence.  In none of these cases was the impoundment performed for the purpose to punish without due process.  A search of an impounded automobile does not always yield evidence linked to a crime.  Therefore the purpose of the search is neutral, not punitive.

            While there has been a distinction drawn between the expectation of privacy in the home and in a vessel or wagon in Fourth Amendment search and seizure analysis since its ratification as part of the Bill of Rights, it has also been required that all searches and seizures of transportation devices and their contents be reasonable.  Carroll v. United States at 267 U.S. 153-154 found:

It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.

 

            This is no small consideration.  There are many complaints that police routinely stop people for “Driving While Black”.  White males with long hair also notice seemingly greater attention from the police.  Mandatory seat belt laws are opposed because the loss of freedom from police stopping motorists to enforce is not justified by whatever lives are saved by requiring automobile drivers and passengers to buckle up.  Prohibitions of alcohol, marijuana, and other such substances are based upon the government’s claimed interest in protecting people from behaviors that place themselves at risk, yet we enforce Fourth Amendment restrictions against unreasonable searches and seizures in the enforcement of such laws.[2]

            Likewise, one grievance stated by the Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is the inconvenience and indignity of searches and seizures by the Israeli Defense Forces and police.  The vicious circle is completed by the constant attacks, hatred, and extremism against the Israelis by the Arabs since 1948, forcing the Israelis to believe they must impose the tight restrictions, searches and seizures upon the Palestinians.  One advantage of having Fourth Amendment restrictions against unreasonable searches and seizures is that we avoid the development of a similarly intractable situation here in the United States.

            Carroll at 267 U.S. 158-159 goes on to find:

The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest.  They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile offend against the law.

 

            A DWLS charge does not require any search of the automobile if the driver supplied the police his license card, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance, or admitted that he cannot find these documents.  Officer Noel did not have probable cause to believe Mr. Knight committed any other crime for which evidence might exist within the car and his search did not yield any such evidence.  Because of these reasons, the seizure of the automobile was not reasonable under Carroll.

            The requirement that the search of an automobile must be reasonable, though by a lower standard than a search of a fixed structure that may serve as a home or an office, was reaffirmed in Brinegar v. United States, (1949) 338 U.S. 160, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 69 S. Ct. 1302 and Preston v. United States, (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 11 L. Ed. 2d. 777, 84 S. Ct. 881.  In Preston, three persons in the vehicle were arrested for vagrancy.  The crime of vagrancy no more requires a search of the automobile for evidence than a DWLS.  Preston at 376 U.S. 368 found:

The search of the car was not undertaken until petitioner and his companions had been arrested and taken in custody to the police station and the car had been towed to the garage. At this point there was no danger that any of the men arrested could have used any weapons in the car or could have destroyed any evidence of a crime -- assuming that there are articles which can be the "fruits" or "implements" of the crime of vagrancy.

 

and therefore reversed the convictions of planning a robbery based upon the search.

            In the present case, Mr. Knight was present to authorize leaving the automobile parked in a safe and legal place.  The search was conducted while the car was parked, and impound was not necessary to conduct a search.  The only item seized was the automobile itself, the food within the automobile was returned to the plaintiff.  Any interest that the defendants would have in preventing Mr. Knight from returning to his automobile where legally parked and driving it while any license is still suspended, was defeated by the defendants allowing Superior Towing to restore the vehicle to Mr. Knight the next day.

            If an automobile is nonfunctioning or parked where it blocks traffic or otherwise parked illegally, Opperman, 428 U.S. 368-369, that is one valid reason.  It is part of the “community caretaking functions” for impounding illegally parked or nonfunctioning automobiles, Cady at 413 U.S. 441.  If the driver is incapable of safely operating the motor vehicle by reason of impairment, a physical disability or the influence of drugs or alcohol, and it is not legally parked when pulled over, that is another reason within Opperman and Cady. In Cady, the Ford Thunderbird rented by Mr. Dombrowski was damaged in an accident and presented a nuisance on the roadway.  Mr. Dombrowski was impaired by excessive alcohol consumption.  The towing of the Thunderbird to a private garage was thus reasonable.  Cady at 413 U.S. 443.  Mr. Knight was not impaired when operating the motor vehicle on February 2, 2002, and the vehicle was operating properly.  Where the officer was informed that the license was suspended for child support, and not for convictions for Driving while Under the Influence (DUI) or for Reckless Driving, for refusing a Breathalyzer test, or for being a habitual traffic offender, Mr. Knight presented no greater danger to the public safety operating the motor vehicle than any other person.  The same would be true if the license was suspended for nonpayment of debts other than traffic fines, or on the basis of race, color, religion,[3] national origin, gender,[4] blood type, sexual orientation, political beliefs and opinions, status as a cloned human,[5] or which astrological sign the person was born under.

            By the standards set forth in the Supreme Court decisions cited herein above, the seizure of the automobile was unreasonable and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.

            Officer Noel told Mr. Knight that he was impounding the automobile because it was the second time he was stopped for DWLS.  This is a specific declaration by an agent for defendants CITY OF MERCER ISLAND and RON ELSOE that the impoundment was intended to be a punishment without affording Mr. Knight any opportunity to contest the validity of the charge of DWLS, to contest the validity of the license suspension, or to contest the validity of any statute pursuant to which the license was suspended, or even to contest the fact of license suspension.  A deprivation without due process of law that is intended to be a punishment is the exact and precise thing that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits.

            It is also clearly an unreasonable seizure that violates the Fourth Amendment.

DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF $50.00 IS REASONABLE IN THIS CASE

            Mr. Knight sets forth $50.00 as his estimate of the inconvenience of the loss of his vehicle for one day, it is not out of line with the daily rental rates charged by companies such as Hertz or Avis for the contractual use of their automobiles.  Knight Declaration III.

            It is also reasonable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 to award a nominal amount in damages for intrinsic value of a deprivation of any liberty or property interest without any meaningful hearing required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Carey v. Piphus, (1977) 435 U.S. 247, 264-267, 52 L. Ed. 2d. 355, 97 S. Ct. 1642 and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, (1986) 477 U.S. 299, 91 L. Ed. 2d. 249, 106 S. Ct. 2537.

ANTIPEONAGE ACT

            42 U.S.C. §1994 reads:

            The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.

 

            The Supreme Court has repeatedly found:

            “Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”

 

            Negonsott v. Samuels, (1993) 507 U.S. 99, 104, 122 L. Ed. 2d. 457, 113 S. Ct. 1119, (internal quotation marks omitted) quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., (1982) 458 U.S. 564, 570, 73 L. Ed. 2d. 973, 102 S. Ct. 3245.  The Antipeonage Act has never been found to be contrary to any provision of the Constitution and it has always been found to be authorized by Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3, 20-23, 27 L. Ed. 835, 3 S. Ct. 18.

            Given that this statute is Constitutionally authorized, and given the rules of statutory construction stated herein above and further summarized in United States v. Romo-Romo, (9th Cir. 2001) 246 F. 3d. 1272, 1274-1275, the obvious targets of the Antipeonage Act include court orders and judgments of the States and Territories.  It is state court orders and judgments that are declared null and void, if the effect of such orders is to establish, maintain, or enforce, or to allow to be established, maintained, or enforced, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any person as a peon in liquidation of a debt or obligation, or otherwise. Any statutory provision or common law usage upon which such a state court order or judgment is based is also null and void, but it is the court order that imposes the condition of peonage.

            It has to be this way because this is exactly how the system known as peonage in New Mexico Territory worked.  While an unemployed New Mexican can, under this system, voluntarily contract with an employer to become his peon, he can also be ordered into such bondage by the courts.  That is exactly what the Antipeonage Act refers to with the language “involuntary service of labor as a peon”.  The 1867 Congress referred to peonage by contract with the word “voluntary”.  Peonage contracts were enforceable in the territorial courts as were other contracts under the usual common law rules of contract construction and breach enforcement.  Arrest and return to the condition of peonage was an available remedy to enforce peonage by contract.

            New Mexico’s system was regulated by its Master and Servant Acts which set forth the rules by which the peonage was regulated and the contracts were enforced.  There was an Imprisonment for Debt statute for enforcing contractual peonage and for other civil lawsuits.  Peonage can be imposed by court order upon judgment for debt, tort damages, breach of contract, unpaid taxes or fines, awards for attorney’s fees, and awards for alimony and child support.  A description of how New Mexican peonage worked is found in Jaremillo v. Romero, (1857) 1 N.M. (Gildersleeve) 190 and Peonage Cases, (M.D. Ala. 1903) 123 F. 671.

            Criminal statutes were enforced with peonage.  New Mexico’s peonage era Vagrancy Act is similar to most traditional vagrancy laws, it included the two traditional definitions of vagrancy: unemployed with no wealth, and abandoning family without leaving them with the means of support.  Earning of living by gambling, prostitution, or by alms were also defined as vagrancy.  These statutes specifically provided that upon conviction, the party shall be imprisoned until “sold”.  This means that an employer in need of additional peons can go to the courthouse and pay the fines of the convicted vagrants.  Such payment created the debt upon which the convict is remanded to peonage.

            This is the nutshell description of the statutory scheme to which Congress reacted when it passed the original Antipeonage Act, signed into law by President Andrew Johnson on March 2, 1867, 14 Stat 546.

            The question that Mr. Knight brings to this Court in this motion, a question that given this Court’s broad application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to a state court civil suit in which Mr. Knight raised only the state law issue of whether the WorkFirst Act was a multi-subject bill in violation of the Washington Constitution, to bar hearing Mr. Knight’s federal law claims that the WorkFirst Act as applied to him is a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law, and is declared null and void by the Antipeonage Act, is what, if any, jurisdiction is available to this Court to enforce the Act’s declaration that state court orders that enforce peonage or allow the enforcement of peonage are null and void.  This is the question this Court must answer before it can consider whether child support is a “debt or obligation, or otherwise” within the meaning of this statute.  If the answer is in the negative, then it matters not what the debt or obligation is, this Court lacks jurisdiction if the matter involves a state court order or ruling, or is “inextricably intertwined” with the state court order.  If the answer is in the positive, then this Court can rule on whether child support is covered by the statute, which it most certainly is.

            This question was not brought before this Court in Knight v. Maleng, W.D. Wash. No. C00-151Z, because Rooker-Feldman was not pled, and could not have been pled, it was a challenge to a then on going state court proceeding for contempt for noncompliance with a child support order.[6]  Having declined to rule on whether the contempt proceeding was declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994 on the basis of Younger abstention, finding that Mr. Knight could raise the issue of the Antipeonage Act before a state court family court commissioner in spite of Mr. Knight’s contention that she would expose herself to considerable criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §1581 to find in his favor, this previous federal court proceeding does not bar this Court from ruling on this issue of jurisdiction to enforce the Antipeonage Act in the face of a state court judgment that imposes or allows peonage.

            How is the Antipeonage Act to be enforced?  There is no question that it can be enforced upon indictment for the crime defined by 18 U.S.C. §1581, Peonage Cases, supra, at 123 F. 684.  An indictment of a state court judge for peonage was upheld and the judge could be tried for the crime, doctrine of judicial immunity does not apply to criminal liability.  More recently in United States v. Alzanki, (1st Cir. 1995) 54 F. 3d. 994, a conviction was upheld where jury instructions were found to be consistent with United States v. Kozminsky, (1988) 487 U.S. 931, 101 L. Ed. 2d. 788, 108 S. Ct. 2751

            42 U.S.C. §1994 can be enforced within the subject matter jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. §1983 and within the original jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343, as it defines a civil right and presents a federal question.  But Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1343 to challenge state court orders as peonage, because these statutes do not provide appellate jurisdiction to review a state court decision.  In the case of a violation of such state court decision which is prosecuted as a crime, a federal court can find such state court decision imposing peonage to be null and void under habeas corpus jurisdiction granted by 28 U.S.C. §2254 upon exhaustion of remedies in the state courts.

            But absent these circumstances, and where the peonage is imposed or allowed by state court order, and where the Supreme Court denies certiorari or Supreme Court certiorari is unavailable under 28 U.S.C. §1257 because only state law issues were raised, how then can a federal court give force and effect to the will of Congress as defined by 42 U.S.C. §1994?

            The Answer:  Neither 42 U.S.C. §§1981 nor 1982, originally passed as the Civil Rights Act of 1866, have specific language providing jurisdiction to the federal courts.  Yet these statutes were found enforceable by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, Co., (1968) 392 U.S. 409, 20 L. Ed. 2d. 1189, 88 S. Ct. 2186 without any reliance upon any other statute for jurisdiction.

            Thus, if a civil rights statute independently provides the federal courts with jurisdiction to enforce the rights it declares, as found by Jones, then the Antipeonage Act provides this Court with jurisdiction to declare state court orders and judgments null and void to the extent that such orders and judgments establish, maintain, or enforce, or allow the establishment, maintenance, or enforcement of a person’s service or labor as a peon in liquidation of a debt or obligation.  This is so because unlike the other civil rights laws, that is the precise right declared by the Antipeonage Act.  “To suggest otherwise . . . ‘is to reject the plain meaning of language’”, Jones at 392 U.S. 419 quoting Hurd v. Hodge, (1948) 334 U.S. 24, 34, 92 L. Ed. 1187, 68 S. Ct. 847.  The Antipeonage Act therefore grants a statutory exception by its independent grant of jurisdiction to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which itself is based upon the jurisdictional statutes.  Rooker-Feldman has never been found to restrict the independent jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.  It does not because 42 U.S.C. §1981 reads:

          (a) Statement of equal rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

       (b) ''Make and enforce contracts'' defined

For purposes of this section, the term ''make and enforce contracts'' includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.

     (c) Protection against impairment

The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.

 

            Like the Antipeonage Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is directed specifically at the actions of courts.  It specifically prohibits racial discrimination in the operation of the courts.  42 U.S.C. §1983 is simply a statute intended to provide for tort liability and equitable relief for violations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and is limited in scope to an extent that the previously passed Civil Rights of 1866 and Antipeonage Act of 1867 are not.

            Pursuant to this doctrine, no Washington court proceeding as previously or currently involving Mr. Knight could work as a bar to this Court’s consideration of whether the current application of the WorkFirst Act, RCW 74.20A.320 et seq., to coerce Mr. Knight into signing a repayment agreement as a condition of restoring his license, is an attempt by virtue of state law to establish, maintain, and enforce his service or labor as a peon in liquidation of the debt or obligation defined by the child support order.  Mr. Knight currently lacks wealth sufficient to allow compliance with the support order without employment.  Knight Declaration III page 4.

            The defendants are therefore engaging in an attempt by virtue of state law to establish, maintain, or enforce Mr. Knight’s service or labor as a peon in liquidation of a debt or obligation.  This is declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994 and an injunction should thus issue requiring the defendants STATE OFFICERS to restore Mr. Knight’s driver’s license without requiring a reissue fee.  The defendants MERCER ISLAND should be enjoined from further trying to enforce the existing conviction of two counts for DWLS, currently on appeal in King County Superior Court, for a child support license suspension as that state court judgment is declared null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994.  Defendant SUPERIOR TOWING is fully liable for its participation in this attempt to establish, maintain, or enforce Mr. Knight’s service or labor as a peon in liquidation of the debt and obligation under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., (1982) 457 U.S. 922, 73 L. Ed. 2d. 482, 102 S. Ct. 2744.

CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated herein, this Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be granted.

            RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, June 5, 2002.

 

                                                            ____________________________________

                                                            Roger W. Knight, plaintiff