BOOK II
That which the Roman people did pertinent to the aggrandizement of their
Empire
I
Whether Virtu or Fortune was the greater cause for the Empire which the
Romans acquired
II
With what People the Romans had to combat, and how obstinately they defended
their liberty
III
Rome became a great City by ruining the surrounding Cities and admitting
foreigners easily to her honors
IV
Republics have had three ways of expanding
V
That the changes of sects and languages, together with the accident of
deluges and pestilence, extinguished the memory of things
VI
How the Romans proceeded in making war
VII
How much land the Romans gave each colonist
VIII
The reason why People depart from their national places and inundate the
country of others
IX
What causes commonly make wars arise between the powerful
X
Money is not the sinew of war although this is common opinion
XI
It is not a prudent proceeding to make an alliance with a Prince who has
more reputation than power
XII
Is it better, fearing to be assaulted, to carry out or await war
XIII
That one comes from the bottom to a great fortune more by fraud than by
force
XIV
Men often deceive themselves believing that by humility they overcome
haughtiness
XV
Weak States are always ambiguous in their resolutions, and weak decisions
are always harmful
XVI
How much the soldiers in our times are different from the ancient organization
XVII
How much the army ought to esteem the artillery in the present times,
and if that opinion that is generally had of it is true
XVIII
That because of the authority of the Romans and by the example of ancient
armies, the infantry ought to be more esteemed than cavalry
XIX
That acquisitions in Republics not well organized and that do not proceed
according to Roman virtu, are the ruin and not the exaltation of them
XX
What perils are brought to that Prince or that Republic which avails itself
of auxiliary and mercenary troops
XXI
The first Praetor which the Romans sent any place was the Capua, four
hundred years after they had begun to make war (against that City)
XXII
How often the opinions of men in judging things (to be) great are false
XXIII
How much the Romans, in judging the matters for any incident that should
necessitate such judgment, avoided half-way measures
XXIV
Fortresses are generally more harmful than useful
XXV
That the assaulting of a disunited City in order to occupy it by means
of its disunion is an error
XXVI
Contempt and insult generate hatred against those who employ them, without
any usefulness to them
XXVII
To prudent Princes and Republics, it ought to be enough to win, for often
it is not enough if they lose
XXVIII
How dangerous it is for a Prince or a Republic, not to avenge an injury
made against the public or a private (citizen)
XXIX
Fortune blinds the minds of men when she does not want them to oppose
her designs
XXX
Truly powerful Republics and Princes do not purchase friendship with money,
but with virtu and reputation of strength
XXXI
How dangerous it is to believe exiles
XXXII
In how many ways the Romans occupied Towns
XXXIII
How the Romans gave their Captains of armies uncontrolled commissions
Men always praise ((but not always reasonably)) the ancient times and
find fault with the present; and they are such partisans of things past,
that they celebrate not only that age which has been recalled to their
memory by known writers, but those also ((being now old)) which they
remember having seen in their youth. And when this opinion of theirs
is false ((as it is most of the times)) I am persuaded the reasons by
which they are led to such deception are various. And the first I believe
is that the whole truth which would bring out the infamy of those times,
and they amplify and magnify those others that could bring forth their
glory. Moreover, the greater number of writers so obey the fortune of
the winners that, in order to make their victories glorious, they not
only exaggerate that which is gotten by their own virtu, but they also
exaggerate the actions of the enemies; so that whoever afterwards is
born in either of the two provinces, both the victorious and the defeated
ones, has cause to marvel at those men and times, and is forced summarily
to praise and love them. In addition to this, men hating things either
from fear or envy, these two reasons for hating past events come to
be extinguished, as they are not able to offend or give cause for envy
of them. But the contrary happens with those things that are (presently)
in operation and are seen, which because you have a complete knowledge
of them as they are not in any way hidden from you; and knowing the
good together with the many other things which are displeasing to you,
you are constrained to judge the present more inferior than the past,
although in truth the present might merit much more of that glory and
fame; I do not discuss matters pertaining to the arts, which shine so
much by themselves, which time cannot take away or add a little more
glory which they merit by themselves; but I speak of those matters pertinent
to the lives and customs of men, of which such clear evidences are not
seen.
I repeat, therefore, that the custom of praising and blaming
as mentioned above is true, but it is not true that you err in doing it.
For sometimes of necessity our judgment is the truth, as human affairs
are always in motion, either ascending or descending. And we see a City
or a Province well-organized in its government by some excellent man,
and for a time always progressing toward the better through the virtu
of that organizer. He who is born in that state, and praises the past
more than the present, deceives himself; and his deception is caused by
those things mentioned above. But if they are born in that City or province
after the time when it has begun to descend to its bad times, then he
does not deceive himself. And in thinking of how these things go on, I
judge that the world has always been in the same condition, and that there
is as much good as there is bad in it; but this bad and good vary from
province to province, as is seen by the historian of those ancient Kingdoms
which varied from one another because of the variations in customs, while
the world remained the same: the only difference was, that where virtu
first found a place in Assyria, it then (moved) to Media, afterwards to
Persia, and from there came to Italy and Rome: and if after the Roman
Empire no other Empire followed which endured, and where the world kept
together all its virtu, none the less it is seen to be scattered in many
nations where people lived with virtu, as it was in the Kingdom of the
Franks, the Kingdom of the Turks, that of the Soldan (of Egypt), and today
the people of Germany, and before then that Saracen Sect which accomplished
such great things and occupied so much of the world after having destroyed
the Eastern Roman Empire. In all these provinces, therefore, after the
Romans fell, the Sects possessed, and yet possess in part, that virtu
which is desired and lauded with true praise. And whoever is born in them
and praises the times past more than the present, may deceive himself:
but whoever is born in Italy and Greece, and has not become either an
Ultramontane in Italy or a Turk in Greece, has reason to find fault with
his times and to praise the others, for in the past there are many things
that make him marvel, but now there is not anything that will compensate
for the extreme misery, infamy, and disgrace in these times where there
is no observance of religion, of laws, or of military discipline, but
are stained by every brutish reasoning. And these vices are even more
detestable as they exist more in those who sit in the tribunals, commanding
everyone, and desiring to be adored.
But returning to our argument, I say that, if the judgment
of men is corrupt in deciding whether the present or the ancient age is
better, in those things where because of their antiquity they cannot have
a perfect knowledge as they have of their own times, the old men ought
not to corrupt themselves in judging the times of their youth and their
old age, they having known and seen the latter and the former equally.
Which thing would be true if men throughout all the periods of their lives
had the same judgment and the same appetites. But as these vary ((although
the times do not vary)), things cannot appear the same to those men who
have other appetites, other delights, and other considerations in their
old age than in their youth. For as men wane ((when they age)) in strength
but grow in judgment and prudence, so it is that those things which in
their youth appeared supportable and good, will turn out ((as they grow
old)) unsupportable and bad, and where they ought to blame their judgment,
they blame the times. In addition to this, human appetites being insatiable
((because by nature they have to be able to and want to desire everything,
and to be able to effect little for themselves because of fortune)), there
arises a continuous discontent in the human mind, and a weariness of the
things they possess; which makes them find fault with the present times,
praise the past, and desire the future, although in doing this they are
not moved by any reasonable cause. I do not know, therefore, whether I
merit to be numbered among those who deceive themselves, if in these Discourses
of mine I shall laud too much the times of the ancient Romans and censure
ours. And truly, if the virtu that then reigned and the vice that now
reigns should not be as clear as the Sun, I would be more restrained in
talking, being apprehensive of falling into that deception of which I
accuse others. But the matter being so manifest that everyone sees it,
I shall be bold in saying openly that which I learned of those times and
these, so that the minds of the young men who may read my writings can
avoid the latter (evils) and imitate the (virtu) of the former, whenever
fortune should give them the opportunity. For it is the office of a good
man to show others that good which because of the malignity of the times
and of fortune, he has not been able to accomplish, so that ((many being
capable)) some of those more loved by Heaven can accomplish them.
And having in the discourses of the preceding book talked
of the decisions made by the Romans pertinent to the internal affairs
of the City, in this (book) we shall talk of that which the Roman people
did pertinent to the aggrandizement of their Empire.
WHETHER VIRTU OR FORTUNE WAS THE GREATER CAUSE FOR THE
EMPIRE WHICH THE ROMANS ACQUIRED
Many (authors), among whom is that most serious writer Plutarch,
have had the opinion that the Roman people in acquiring the Empire were
favored more by Fortune than by Virtu. And among other reasons which he
cities, he says that, by the admission of that people, it can be shown
that they ascribed all their victories to Fortune, as they had built more
temples to Fortune than to any other God. And it seems that Livius joined
in this opinion, for he rarely makes any Roman speak where he recounts
(of) Virtu, without adding Fortune. Which thing I do not in any way agree
with, nor do I believe also that it can be sustained. For if no other
Republic will ever be found which has made the progress that Rome had,
then I note that no Republic will ever be found which has been organized
to be able to make such conquests as Rome. For it was the virtu of the
armies that enabled her to acquire that Empire; and the order of proceeding
and her own institutions founded by her first Legislator that enabled
her to maintain the acquisitions, as will be narrated below in further
discussion.
These (authors) also say that the fact of not ever engaging
in two most important wars at the same time was due to the fortune and
not the virtu of the Roman people; for they did riot engage in war with
the Latins until they had so beaten the Samnites that the Romans had to
engage in a war in defense of them: They did not combat with the Tuscans
until they first subjugated the Latins, and had by frequent defeats almost
completely enervated the Samnites: So that if these two powers had joined
together ((while they were fresh)), without doubt it can easily be conjectured
that the ruin of the Roman Republic would have ensued.
But however this thing may have been, it never did happen
that they engaged in two most powerful wars at the same time; rather it
appeared always that at the beginning of one the other would be extinguished,
or in extinguishing one another would arise. Which is easily seen from
the succession of wars engaged in by them; for, leaving aside the one
they were engaged in before Rome was taken by the French (Gauls), it is
seen that while they fought against the Equii and the Volscians, no other
people ((while these people were powerful)) rose up against them. When
these were subdued there arose the war against the Samnites, and although
before that war was ended the Latin people rebelled against the Romans
with their armies in subduing the insolence of the Latins. When these
were subdued, the war against the Samnites sprung up again. When the Samnites
were beaten through the many defeats inflicted on their forces, there
arose the war against the Tuscans; which being composed, the Samnites
again rose up when Pyrrhus crossed over into Italy, and as soon as he
was beaten and driven back to Greece, the first war with the Carthaginians
was kindled: and that war was hardly finished when all the Gauls from
all sides of the Alps conspired against the Romans, but they were defeated
with the greatest massacre between Popolonia and Pisa where the tower
of San Vincenti stands today. After this war was finished, they did not
have any war of much importance for a space of twenty years, for they
did not fight with any others except the Ligurians and the remnants of
the Gauls who were in Lombardy. And thus they remained until there arose
the second Carthaginian war, which kept Italy occupied for sixteen years.
When this war ended with the greatest glory, there arose the Macedonian
war; (and) after this was finished there came that of Antiochus and Asia.
After this victory, there did not remain in all the world either a Prince
or a Republic that could, by itself or all together, oppose the Roman
forces.
But whoever examines the succession of these wars, prior
to that last victory, and the manner in which they were conducted, will
see mixed with Fortune a very great Virtu and Prudence. So that if one
should examine the cause of that (good) fortune, he will easily find it,
for it is a most certain thing that as a Prince or a People arrives at
so great a reputation, that any neighboring Princes or Peoples by themselves
are afraid to assault him, and he has no fear of them, it will always
happen that none of them will ever assault him except from necessity;
so that it will almost be at the election of that powerful one to make
war upon any of those neighbors as appears (advantageous) to him, and
to quiet the others by his industry. These are quieted easily in part
because they have respect for his power, and in part because they are
deceived by those means which he used to put them to sleep: and other
powerful ones who are distant and have no commerce with him, will look
upon this as a remote thing which does not pertain to them. In which error
they remain until the conflagration arrives next to them, for which, when
it comes, they have no remedy to extinguish it except with their own forces,
which then will not be enough as he has become most powerful.
I will leave to one side how the Samnites remained to see
the Volscians and the Equii conquered by the Romans, and so as not to
be too prolix I will make use of the Carthaginians who were of great power
and of great reputation when the Romans were fighting with the Samnites
and Tuscans; for they already held all Africa, Sardinia and Sicily, and
had dominion in part of Spain. Which power of theirs, together with their
being distant from the confines of the Roman people, caused them never
to think of assaulting them, nor of succoring the Samnites and Tuscans;
rather it made them do as is done in any power that grows, allying themselves
with them (the Romans) in their favor and seeking their friendship. Nor
did they see before this error was made, that the Romans having subdued
all the peoples (placed) between them and the Carthaginians, begun to
combat them for the Empire of Sicily and Spain. The same thing happened
to the Gauls as to the Carthaginians, and also to Philip King of Macedonia
and to Antiochus; and everyone of them believed ((while the Roman people
were occupied with others)) that the others would overcome them, and then
it would be time either by peace or war to defend themselves from (the
Romans). So that I believe that the (good) Fortune which the Romans had
in these parts would be had by all those Princes who would proceed as
the Romans and who would have that same Virtu as they had.
It would be well here in connection with this subject to
show the course held by Roman people in entering the Provinces of others,
of which we have talked about at length in our treatment of Principalities
(Treatise on the Prince), for there we have debated this matter widely.
I will only say this briefly, that they have always endeavored to have
some friend in these new provinces who should be as a ladder or door to
let them climb in, both to let them enter and as a means of keeping it;
as was seen, that by means of the Capuans they entered Samnium, by means
of the Camertines into Tuscany, by the Mamertines into Sicily, by the
Saguntines into Spain, by Massinissa into Africa, by the Aetolians into
Greece, by Eumences and other Princes into Asia, and by the Massilians
and the Aeduans into Gaul. And thus they never lacked similar supports,
both in order to be able to facilitate their enterprises of their acquiring
provinces and in holding them. Which those people who observed them saw
that they had less need of Fortune, than those people who do not make
good observers. And so as to enable everyone to know better how much more
Virtu enabled them to acquire that Empire than did Fortune, in the following
chapter we will discuss the kind of people they had to combat and how
obstinate they were in defending their liberty.
WITH WHAT PEOPLE THE ROMANS HAD TO COMBAT, AND HOW OBSTINATELY
THEY DEFENDED THEIR LIBERTY
Nothing caused so much hard work for the Romans as the overcoming
of the surrounding people and part of the distant Provinces, as the love
many people in those times had for liberty; which they so obstinately
defended but they would never have been subjugated except for the excessive
virtu (of the Romans). For, from many examples, it is known into what
dangers they placed themselves in order to maintain or recover (their
liberty), and what vengeance they practiced against those who had deprived
them of it. It is also to be learned from the lessons of history what
injury the people and the City received from such servitude. And, while
in these times there is only one Province of which it can be said has
in it free Cities, in ancient times in all the Provinces there existed
many free people. It will be seen that in those times of which we speak
at present, there were in Italy, from the Alps ((which now divide Tuscany
from Lombardy)) up to the furthest (part) in Italy, many free peoples,
such as were the Tuscans, the Romans, the Samnites, and many other people,
who inhabited the remaining part of Italy. Nor is there ever any discussion
whether there was any King outside those who reigned in Rome, and Porsenna,
King of Tuscany, whose line was extinguished in a manner of which history
does not speak. But it is indeed seen that in those times when the Romans
went to besiege Veii, Tuscany was free, and so much did it enjoy its liberty
and so hated the title of Prince, that when the Veientians created a King
for the defense of Veii, and requested aid of the Tuscans against the
Romans, they decided, after much consultation, not to give aid to the
Veientians as long as they lived under the King, judging it not to be
good to defend the country of those who already had subjected themselves
to others. And it is easy to understand whence this affection arises in
a people to live free, for it is seen from experience that Cities never
increased either in dominion or wealth except while they had been free.
And truly it is a marvelous thing to consider to what greatness Athens
had arrived in the space of a hundred years after she had freed herself
from the tyranny of Pisistratus. But above all, it is a more marvelous
thing to consider to what greatness Rome arrived after it liberated itself
from its Kings. The cause is easy to understand, for not the individual
good, but the common good is what makes Cities great. And, without doubt,
this common good is not observed except in Republics, because everything
is done which makes for their benefit, and if it should turn to harm this
or that individual, those for whom the said good is done are so many,
that they can carry on against the interests of those few who should be
harmed. The contrary happens when there is a Prince, where much of the
time what he does for himself harms the City, and what is done for the
City harms him. So that soon there arises a Tyranny over a free society,
the least evil which results to that City is for it not to progress further,
nor to grow further in power or wealth, but most of the times it rather
happens that it turns backward. And if chance should cause that a Tyrant
of virtu should spring up, who by his courage and virtu at arms expands
his dominion, no usefulness would result to the Republic but only to be
himself; for he cannot honor any of those citizens who are valiant and
good over whom he tyrannizes, as he does not want to have to suspect them.
Nor also can he subject those Cities which he acquires or make them tributary
to the City of which he is the Tyrant, because he does not help himself
in making them powerful, but it will help him greatly in keeping the State
disunited, so that each town and each province should recognize him. So
that he alone, and not his country, profits from his acquisitions. And
whoever should want to confirm this opinion with infinite other arguments,
let him read Xenophon's treatise which he wrote on Tyranny.
It is no wonder, therefore, that the ancient people should
have persecuted the Tyrants with so much hatred and should have loved
living in freedom, and the name of Liberty so much esteemed by them; as
happened when Hieronymus, nephew of Hiero the Syracusan, was killed in
Syracuse; that when the news of his death came to his army, which was
not very far from Syracuse, they at first begun to raise a tumult and
take up arms against his killers; but when they heard that there was shouting
of liberty in Syracuse, attracted by the name everyone became quiet, their
ire against the Tyrannicides was quelled, and they thought of how a free
government could be established in that City. It is also no wonder that
the people took extraordinary vengeance against those who deprived them
of liberty. Of which there have been many examples, but I intend to refer
only to one which happened in Corcyra, a City of Greece, in the times
of the Peloponnesian war, where, the Province being divided into two factions,
of which the Athenians followed one, the Spartans the other, there arose
then among the many other Cities a division among themselves, some following
(the friendship of) Sparta, the the others (of) Athens: and it happened
in the said City (Corcyra) that the nobles had prevailed and had taken
away the liberty from the people; the populari (popular party) with the
aid of the Athenians recovered its power, and, having laid hands on the
nobility, put them into a prison capable of holding all of them; from
which they took out eight or ten at one time under a pretext of sending
them into exile in different places, but put them to death with (examples
of) extreme cruelties. When the remainder became aware of this, they resolved
if possible to escape that ignominious death, and arming themselves as
(best) as they could, they fought with those who attempted to enter and
defended the entrance to the prison; but when the people came together
at this noise, they pulled down the upper part of that place, and suffocated
them in the ruins. Many other similar notable and horrible cases occurred
in the said Province, so that it is seen to be true that liberty is avenged
with great energy when it is taken away than when it is only threatened
(to be taken).
In thinking, therefore, of whence it should happen that
in those ancient times the people were greater lovers of Liberty than
in these times, I believe it results from the same reason which makes
men presently less strong, which I believe is the difference between our
education and that of the ancients, founded on the difference between
our Religion and the ancients. For, as our Religion shows the truth and
the true way (of life), it causes us to esteem less the honors of the
world: while the Gentiles (Pagans) esteeming them greatly, and having
placed the highest good in them, were more ferocious in their actions.
Which can be observed from many of their institutions, beginning with
the magnificence of their sacrifices (as compared) to the humility of
ours, in which there is some pomp more delicate than magnificent, but
no ferocious or energetic actions. Theirs did not lack pomp and magnificence
of ceremony, but there was added the action of sacrifice full of blood
and ferocity, the killing of many animals, which sight being terrible
it rendered the men like unto it. In addition to this, the ancient Religion
did not beatify men except those full of worldly glory, such as were the
Captains of armies and Princes of Republics. Our Religion has glorified
more humble and contemplative men rather than men of action. It also places
the highest good in humility, lowliness, and contempt of human things:
the other places it in the greatness of soul, the strength of body, and
all the other things which make men very brave. And, if our Religion requires
that there be strength (of soul) in you, it desires that you be more adept
at suffering than in achieving great deeds.
This mode of living appears to me, therefore, to have rendered
the world weak and a prey to wicked men, who can manage it securely, seeing
that the great body of men, in order to go to Paradise, think more of
enduring their beatings than in avenging them. And although it appears
that the World has become effeminate and Heaven disarmed, yet this arises
without doubt more from the baseness of men who have interpreted our Religion
in accordance with Indolence and not in accordance with Virtu. For if
they were to consider that it (our Religion) permits the exaltation and
defense of the country, they would see that it desires that we love and
honor her (our country), and that we prepare ourselves so that we can
be able to defend her. This education and false interpretations, therefore,
are the cause that in the world as many Republics are not seen in them
that the people have as much love for liberty now as at that time. I believe,
however, the reason for this rather to be, that the Roman Empire with
its arms and greatness destroyed all the Republics and all civil institutions.
And although that Empire was later dissolved, yet these Cities could not
reunite themselves, nor reorganize their civil institutions, except in
a very few places in that Empire.
But however it was, the Romans found a conspiracy in every
smallest part of the world of Republics very well armed and most obstinate
in the defense of their liberty. Which shows that the Roman people could
never have overcome them without that rare and extreme virtu. And to give
an example of one instance, the example of the Samnites suffices for me,
which seems to be a marvelous one. And T. Livius admits that these (people)
were so powerful and their arms so valiant, that, up to the time of the
Consul Papirus Cursor, son of the first Papirus, for a period of forty
six years, they were able to resist the Romans, despite the many defeats,
destruction of Towns, and massacres suffered by their country. Especially
as it is now seen that that country where there were so many Cities and
so many men, is now almost uninhabited: and yet it was so well established
and so powerful, that it was unconquerable except by Roman virtu. And
it is an easy thing whence that order and disorder proceeded, for it all
comes from their then living in freedom and now living in servitude. For
all the towns and provinces which are free in every way ((as was said
above)) make the greatest advances. For here greater populations are seen
because marriages are more free and more desired by men, because everyone
willingly procreates those children that he believes he is able to raise
without being apprehensive that their patrimony will be taken away, and
to know that they are not only born free and not slaves, but are also
able through their own virtu to become Princes. They will see wealth multiplied
more rapidly, both that which comes from the culture (of the soil) and
that which comes from the arts, for everyone willingly multiplies those
things and seek to acquire those goods whose acquisition he believes he
can enjoy. Whence it results that men competing for both private and public
betterment, both come to increase in a wondrous manner. The contrary of
all these things happens in those countries which live in servitude, and
the more the good customs are lacking, the more rigorous is the servitude.
And the hardest of all servitudes is that of being subject to a Republic:
the one, because it is more enduring and the possibility of escaping from
it is missing: the other, because the final aim of a Republic is to enervate
and weaken ((in order to increase its own power)) all the other states.
Which a Prince who subjugates you does not do unless that Prince is some
barbarous Prince, a destroyer of countries and dissipater of all human
civilization, such as are oriental Princes: But if he has ordinary human
feelings in him, most of the times he will love equally the Cities subject
to him, and will leave them (enjoy) all their arts, and almost all their
ancient institutions. So that if they cannot grow as if they were free,
they will not be ruined even in servitude; servitude being understood
as that in which Cities serve a foreigner, for of that to one of their
own Citizens, we have spoken above.
Whoever considers, therefore, all that which has been said,
will not marvel at the power which the Samnites had while they were free,
and at the weakness to which they came afterwards under servitude: and
T. Livius gives testimony of this in many places, and mainly in the war
with Hannibal, where he shows that when the Samnites were pressed by a
legion of (Romans) who were at Nola, they sent Orators (Ambassadors) to
Hannibal to beg him to succor them. Who in their speech said to him. that
for a hundred years they had combatted the Romans with their own soldiers
and their own Captains, and many times had sustained (battle against)
two consular armies and two Consuls; but now they had arrived at such
baseness that they were hardly able to defend themselves against the small
Roman legion which was at Nola.
ROME BECAME A GREAT CITY BY RUINING THE SURROUNDING CITIES
AND ADMITTING FOREIGNERS EASILY TO HER HONORS
Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis. (Rome grew on
the ruins of Alba) Those who plan for a City to achieve great Empire ought
with all industry to endeavor to make it full of inhabitants, for without
this abundance of men, one can never succeed in making a City great. This
is done in two ways, by love and by force. Through love, by keeping the
ways open and secure for foreigners who should plan to come to live there.
Through force, by destroying the neighboring Cities and sending their
inhabitants to live in your City. Which was so greatly observed by Rome,
that in the time of the sixth King of Rome, that there lived there eighty
thousand men capable of bearing arms. For the Romans wanted to act according
to the custom of the good cultivator, who, in order to make a plant grow
and able to produce and mature its fruits, cuts off the first branches
that it puts out, so that by retaining that virtu in the roots of that
plant, they can in time grow more green and more fruitful. And that this
method of aggrandizing and creating an Empire was necessary and good,
is shown by the example of Sparta and Athens; which two Republics although
well armed and regulated by excellent laws, none the less did not attain
to the greatness of the Roman Empire, and Rome appeared more tumultuous
and not as well regulated as those others. No other reason can be adduced
for this than that mentioned above; for Rome, from having enlarged the
population of the City in both those two ways, was enabled to put two
hundred thousand men under arms, while Sparta and Athens were never able
(to raise) twenty thousand each. Which resulted not from the site of Rome
being more favorable than those of the other, but solely from the different
mode of procedure. For Lycurgus, founder of the Spartan Republic, thinking
that nothing could more easily dissolve its laws than the admixture of
new inhabitants, did everything (he could) so that foreigners would not
come to them; and in addition to not receiving them into their citizenship
by marriage, and other commerce that makes men come together, ordered
that in that Republic of his only leather money should be spent, in order
to take away from everyone the desire to come there in order to bring
in merchandise or some arts: of a kind so that the City could never increase
its inhabitants. And because all our actions imitate nature, it is neither
possible nor natural that a slender trunk should sustain a big branch.
A small Republic, therefore, cannot conquer Cities or Republics which
are larger and more valiant than it; and if it does conquer them, it happens
then to them as to that tree that has its branches bigger than its trunk,
which sustains it only with great effort with every little breeze that
blows; such as is seen happened in Sparta, which had conquered all the
Cities of Greece, but as soon as Thebes rebelled, all the others rebelled,
and the trunk remained alone without branches. Which could not have happened
to Rome, as it had its trunk so big that it could sustain any branch.
This mode of proceeding therefore, together with others which will be
mentioned below, made Rome great and most powerful. Which T. Livius points
out in two (few) words, when he said: Rome grew while Alba was ruined.
REPUBLICS HAVE HAD THREE WAYS OF EXPANDING
Whoever has studied the ancient histories finds that Republics
had three ways of expanding. One has been that which the ancient Tuscans
observed, of being one league of many united Republics, where there is
not any one before the other either in authority or in rank. And in acquiring
other Cities they made them associates of themselves, as in a similar
way the Swiss do in these times, and as the Achaens and Aetolians did
in ancient times in Greece. And as the Romans had many wars with the Tuscans
((in order to illustrate better the first method)) I will extend myself
in giving a particular account of them. Before the Roman Empire, the Tuscans
were the most powerful people in Italy, both on land and on the sea, and
although there is no particular history of their affairs, yet there is
some small record and some signs of their greatness; and it is known that
they sent a colony to the sea, above (north of) them, which they called
Adria, which was so noble that it gave a name to that sea which the Latins
also called the Adriatic. It is also known that their arms (authority)
was obeyed from the Tiber up to the foot of the Alps which now encircle
the greater part of Italy; notwithstanding that two hundred years before
the Romans became so powerful that the said Tuscans lost the Dominion
of that country which today is called Lombardy: which province had been
seized by the Gauls, who, moved either by necessity or the sweetness of
the fruits, and especially of the wine, came into Italy under their leader
Bellovesus, and having defeated and driven out the inhabitants of the
province, they settled there where they built many Cities, and they called
that Province Gallia from the name they themselves had, which they kept
until they were subjugated by the Romans. The Tuscans, then, lived in
that equality and proceeded in their expansion through the first method
which was mentioned above: and there were twelve Cities, among which were
Clusium, Veii, Fiesole, Arezzo, Volterra, and others like them, which
through a league governed their Empire; nor could they go outside of Italy
with their acquisitions, a great part of which still remained intact (independent),
for the reasons which will be mentioned below.
The other method is to make them associates; not so closely,
however, that the position of commanding the seat of the Empire and the
right of sovereignty should not remain with you; which method was observed
by the Romans. The third method is to make subjects of them immediately
and not associates, as did the Spartans and Athenians. Of which three
methods this last is entirely useless as is seen was the case in the above
mentioned two Republics, which were ruined for no other reason than from
having acquired that dominion which they were unable to maintain. For
to undertake the governing of Cities by violence, especially those which
were accustomed to living in freedom, is a difficult and wearisome thing.
And unless you are armed, and powerfully armed, you cannot either command
or rule them. And to want to be thus established, it is necessary to make
associates of them who would help in increasing the population of your
City. And as these two Cities (Sparta and Athens) did not do either the
one or the other, their method of procedure was useless. And because Rome,
which is an example of the second method, did both things, she therefore
rose to such exceeding power. And as she had been the only one to act
thusly, so too she had been the only one to become so powerful; for she
had created many associates throughout all Italy, who lived with them
in many respects equally under the law, but on the other hand ((as I said
above)) she always reserved for herself the seat of Empire and the right
of command, so that these associates of hers came ((without their being
aware of it)) through their own efforts and blood to subjugate themselves.
For as soon as they begun to go beyond Italy with their armies to reduce
other Kingdoms to Provinces, and to make for themselves subjects of those
who, having been accustomed to live under Kings, did not care to be subjects,
and from having Roman governors, and having been conquered by armies under
Roman command, they recognized no one to be superior other than the Romans.
So that those associates of Rome (who were) in Italy found themselves
suddenly surrounded by Roman subjects and pressed by a very large City
like Rome: and when they understood the deceit under which they had lived
they were not in time to remedy it, for Rome had achieved so much authority
with the (acquisition) of the external provinces, and so much power was
to be found within themselves, the City having become greatly populated
and well armed. And although these associates of hers conspired against
her in order to avenge the injuries inflicted on them, they were defeated
(in war) in a short time, worsening their condition; for from being associates
they too became their subjects. This method of proceeding ((as has been
said)) had been observed only by the Romans; and a Republic which wants
to aggrandize itself cannot have any other method, for experience has
not shown anything else more certain and more true.
The fore-mentioned method of creating Leagues, such as were
the Tuscans, Achaians, and the Aetolians, and as are the Swiss today,
is, after that of the Romans, the better method; for with it, it is not
possible to expand greatly, but two benefits ensue: the one, that they
are not easily drawn into war: the other, that that which you take you
can easily hold. The reason they are not able to expand is that Republics
are not united and have their seats in several places, which makes it
difficult for them to consult and decide. It also makes them undesirous
of dominating, for, as many Communities participating in that dominion,
they do not value much such acquisitions as does a single Republic which
hopes to enjoy it entirely by itself. In addition to this they are governed
by a council, and it follows that they are tardier in every decision than
those which come from those who live in the same circle. It is also seen
from experience that such methods of procedure have a fixed limit, of
which there is no example which indicates it has ever been transgressed;
and this (limit) is the addition of twelve or fourteen communities, beyond
which they cannot go, and as their defending themselves appears to them
to be difficult they do not seek greater dominion, as much because necessity
does not constrain them to have more power, as well as for not recognizing
any usefulness in further acquisitions for the reason mentioned above:
for they have to do one of two things: either to continue making additional
associates for themselves, as this multitude would cause confusion, or
they would have to make them subjects to themselves. And as they see the
difficulty of this, and little usefulness in maintaining it, they see
no value in it. When, therefore, they are come to such a great number
that it appears to them they can live securely, they turn to two things:
the one, to take up the protection of others who seek it, and by this
means obtain money from each one, and which they can readily distribute
among themselves: the other, is to become soldiers for others and accept
a stipend from this Prince or that, who hires them for undertaking his
enterprises, as is seen the Swiss do these days, and as one reads was
done by the above mentioned ones. Of which Titus Livius gives testimony,
where he tells of Philip, King of Macedon, coming to negotiate with Titus
Quintus Flaminius, and discussing the accord in the presence of a Praetor
of the Aetolians, the said Praetor in coming to talk with him, was by
him reprimanded for avarice and infidelity, saying that the Aetolians
were not ashamed to enlist in the military service for one, and then also
send their men into the service of the enemy, so that many times the Aetolian
ensigns were seen among the two opposing armies. We see, therefore, that
this method of proceeding through leagues has always been the same, and
has had the same results. It is also seen that the method of making (them)
subjects has always been ineffective and to have produced little profit:
and when they had carried this method too far, they were soon ruined.
And if this method of making subjects is useless in armed Republics, it
is even more useless in those which are unarmed, as the Republics of Italy
have been in our times.
It is to be recognized, therefore, that the Romans had the
certain method, which is so much more admirable as there was no example
before Rome, and there has been no one who has imitated them since Rome.
And as to leagues, only the Swiss and the league of Swabia are found to
be the only ones which imitated them. And finally of this matter it will
be said, so many institutions observed by Rome, pertinent to the events
both internal as well as external, have not only not been imitated in
our times, but have not been taken into account, being judged by some
not to be true, by some impossible, by some not applicable and useless.
So that by remaining in this ignorance we (Italy) are prey to anyone who
has wanted to rule this province. But if the imitation of the Romans appeared
difficult, that the ancient Tuscans ought not to appear so, especially
by the present Tuscans. For if they could not acquire that power in Italy,
which that method of procedure would have given them, they lived in security
for a long time, with very much glory of Dominion and arms, and especially
praise for their customs and Religion. Which power and glory was first
diminished by the Gauls, and afterwards extinguished by the Romans: and
was so completely extinguished, that, although two thousand years ago
the power of the Tuscans was great, at present there is almost no memory.
Which thing has made me think whence this oblivion of things arises, as
will be discussed in the following chapter.
THAT THE CHANGES OF SECTS AND LANGUAGES, TOGETHER WITH
THE ACCIDENT OF DELUGES AND PESTILENCE, EXTINGUISHED THE MEMORY OF THINGS
To those Philosophers who hold that the World has existed
from eternity, I believe it is possible to reply, that, if such great
antiquity was true, it would be reasonable that there should be some record
of more than five thousand years, except it is seen that the records of
those times have been destroyed from diverse causes: of which some were
acts of men, some of Heaven. Those that are acts of men are the changes
of the sects (religion) and of languages. Because, when a new sect springs
up, that is, a new Religion, the first effort is ((in order to give itself
reputation)) to extinguish the old; and if it happens that the establishers
of the new sect are of different languages, they extinguish it (the old)
easily. Which thing is known by observing the method which the Christian
Religion employed against the Gentile (heathen) sect, which has cancelled
all its institutions, all of its ceremonies, and extinguished every record
of that ancient Theology. It is true that they did not succeed in entirely
extinguishing the records of the things done by their excellent men, which
has resulted from their having maintained the Latin language, which was
done by force, having to write this new law in it. For if they could have
written it in a new language, considering the other persecutions they
suffered, none of the past events would have been recorded. And whoever
reads the methods used by Saint Gregory and the other Heads of the Christian
Religion, will see with what obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient
memorials, burning the works of the Poets and Historians, ruining statues,
and despoiling every thing else that gave any sign of antiquity. So that,
if to this persecution they had added a new language, it would have been
seen that in a very brief time everything (previous) would have been forgotten.
It is to be believed, therefore, that that which the Christian
Religion wanted to do against the Gentile sect, the Gentiles did against
that which preceded them. And as these sects changed two or three times
in five or six thousand years, all memory of things done before that time
are lost. And if, however, some signs of it were left, it would be considered
a fabulous thing, and not to be given credence: as happened with the history
of Diodorus Siculus, who although he gives account of forty or fifty thousand
years, none the less it is reputed ((as I believe it is )) a mendacious
thing.
As to the causes that come from Heaven, they are those that
extinguish the human race and reduce the inhabitants of parts of the world
to a very few. And this results either from pestilence, or famine, or
from an inundation of water; and the last is the most important, as much
because it is the most universal, as because those who are saved are men
of the mountains and rugged, who, not having any knowledge of antiquity,
cannot leave it to posterity. And if among them there should be saved
one who should have this knowledge, he would hide it or pervert it in
his own way in order to create a reputation and name for himself; so that
there remains to his successors only what he wanted to write, and nothing
else. And that these inundations, pestilences, and famines, occur, I do
not believe there is any doubt, not only because all histories are full
of them, but also because the effects of these oblivious things are seen,
and because it appears reasonable they should be; For in nature as in
simple bodies, when there is an accumulation of much superfluous matter,
it very often moves by itself and makes a purgation which is healthy to
that body; and so it happens in this compound body of the human race,
that when all the provinces are full of inhabitants so that they cannot
live or go elsewhere in order to occupy and fill up all places, and when
human astuteness and malignity has gone as far as they can go, it happens
of necessity that the world purges itself in one of the three ways, so
that men having been chastised and reduced in number, live more commodiously
and become better. Tuscany, then, was once powerful, as was said above,
full of Religion and Virtu had its own customs and its own national language;
all of which was extinguished by the Roman power. So that ((as was said))
nothing remained of it but the memory of its name.
HOW THE ROMANS PROCEEDED IN MAKING WAR
Having discussed how the Romans proceeded in their expansion,
we will now discuss how they proceeded in making war, and it will be seen
with how much prudence they deviated in all the actions from the universal
methods of others, in order to make their road to supreme greatness easy.
The intention of whoever makes war, whether by election or from ambition,
is to acquire and maintain the acquisition, and to proceed in such a way
so as to enrich themselves and not to impoverish the (conquered) country
and his own country. It is necessary, therefore, both in the acquisition
and in the maintenance, to take care not to spend (too much), rather to
do every thing for the usefulness of his people. Whoever wants to do all
these things must hold to the Roman conduct and method, which was first
to make the war short and sharp, as the French say, for corning into the
field with large armies, they dispatched all the wars they had with the
Latins, Samnites, and Tuscans, in the briefest time. And if all those
things they did from the beginning of Rome up to the siege of the Veienti
were to be noted, it will be seen that they were all dispatched some in
six, some in ten, some in twenty days; for this was their usage. As soon
as war broke out, they went out with the armies to meet the enemy and
quickly came to the engagement. Which, when they won it, the enemy ((so
that their countryside should not be completely laid waste)) came to terms,
and the Romans condemned them (to turn over) lands, which lands they converted
into private possessions or consigned them to a colony, which, placed
on the confines of those people, served as a guard to the Roman frontiers,
with usefulness as well to those colonists who received those fields as
to the people of Rome, who, without expense, maintained that guard. Nor
could this method be more secure, more effectual, or more useful. For,
as long as the enemy were not in the fields, that guard was enough; but
as soon as they went out in force to oppress that Colony, the Romans also
came out in force and came to an engagement with them, and having waged
and won the battle, (and), having imposed heavier conditions on them,
they returned home. Thus, little by little, they came to acquire reputation
over them and strength within themselves (their state). And they kept
to this method up to the time of war when they changed the method of proceeding;
which was after the siege of the Veienti, where, in order to be able to
wage a long war, they ordered them to pay their soldiers, (and) which
at first ((since it was not necessary as the wars were short)) they did
not pay. And although the Romans gave them the money, and by virtue of
which they were able to wage longer wars, and to keep them at a greater
distance if necessity should keep them in the field longer, none the less
they never varied from the original system of finishing them quickly,
according to the place and time: nor did they ever vary from sending out
of colonies. For, in the first system, the ambition of the Consuls contributed
in making the wars short ((in addition to the natural custom)), who, being
elected for one year, and six months of that year in quarters, wanted
to finish the war in order to (have a) triumph. In the sending of colonies
there was usefulness to them and resultant great convenience. They (the
Romans) made a good distribution of booty, with which they were not as
liberal as they were at first, as much because it did not appear to them
to be so necessary ((the soldiers receiving a stipend)), as also because
the booty being larger, they planned to enrich themselves of it so that
the public should not be constrained to undertake the enterprises with
the tributes from the City. Which system in a short time made their Treasury
very rich. These two methods, therefore, of distributing the booty and
of sending of colonies, caused Rome to be enriched by the wars while other
unwise Princes and Republics were impoverished (by theirs). And these
were brought to such limits that a Consul did not think he could obtain
a triumph unless, with his triumph, he could bring much gold and silver,
and every other kind of booty into the Treasury.
Thus the Romans with the above described conditions and
by finishing wars quickly, being satisfied by the length (of the wars)
to massacre the enemy, and by defeating (their armies) and overrunning
(their lands), and (making) accords to their advantage, always became
richer and more powerful.
HOW MUCH LAND THE ROMANS GAVE EACH COLONIST
I believe it is very difficult to find out the truth as
to how much land the Romans distributed per colonist. I believe they gave
them more or less, according to the places where they sent the colonies.
And I would judge that in any instance and in all places the distribution
was small. First, in order to send a greater number of men assigned to
guard that country: then, as they lived poorly at home it would not have
been reasonable that they should desire that their men should live too
abundantly outside.
And T. Livius says that, after taking Veii, they sent a
colony there and distributed to each three and seven-twelfths (3 7/12)
Jugeri of land, which in our measures are ... (2 2/3 acres). For, in addition
to the above written things, they judged it was not the amount of land,
but its good cultivation, that should suffice. It is necessary also that
all the colonies have public fields where everyone could pasture their
beasts, and forests where they could get wood to burn, without which things
a colony cannot organize itself.
THE REASON WHY PEOPLE DEPART FROM THEIR NATIONAL PLACES
AND INUNDATE THE COUNTRY OF OTHERS
Since there has been discussed above the method of proceeding
in war observed by the Romans and how the Tuscans were assaulted by the
Gauls, it does not appear to me alien to the subject to discuss how two
kinds of war are made. One is waged because of the ambitions of Princes
or of a Republic that seek to extend their Empire, such as were the wars
that Alexander the Great waged, and those that the Romans waged, and those
which one power wages against another. While these wars are dangerous,
they never drive all the inhabitants out of a province, but the obedience
of the people is enough for the conqueror, and most of the times he leaves
them to live with their laws, and always with their homes and possessions:
The other kind of war is when an entire people with all their families
are taken away from a place, necessitated either by famine or by war,
and goes to seek a new seat in a new province, not in order to seek dominion
over them as those others above, but to possess it absolutely; and to
drive out or kill its old inhabitants. This kind of war is most cruel
and most frightful. And of these wars Sallust discusses at the end of
(the history) of Jugurtha, when he says that, after Jugurtha was defeated,
movements of the Gauls coming into Italy were heard: where he (also) says
that the Roman People had combatted with all the other peoples only as
to who should dominate, but that with the Gauls they combatted for the
(very) existence of each. For to a Prince or a Republic that assaults
a province, it is enough to extinguish only those who command, but to
these entire populations, it behooves them to extinguish everyone because
they want to live on that which the others lived.
The Romans had three of these most perilous wars. The first
was when Rome was taken, which was occupied by those Gauls who had detached
Lombardy ((as was mentioned above)) from the Tuscans and made it their
seat: for which Titus Livius assigns two causes: The first, as was said
above, that they were attracted by the sweetness of the fruits and wines
of Italy, which were lacking in France: The second, that in that Kingdom
of Gaul, men multiplied so fast that they were no longer able to feed
them, (and) the Princes decided it should be necessary that a part of
them should go some place to seek a new country. And having made such
a decision, they elected as captains over those who should depart Bellovesus
and Sicovesus, two Kings of the Gauls, of whom Bellovesus went into Italy
and Sicovesus passed into Spain. From the passage of this Bellovesus there
resulted the occupation of Lombardy, and hence the first war that the
Gauls made against Rome. After this came that which they made after the
first Carthaginian war, where they (the Romans) killed over two hundred
thousand Gauls between Piombino and Pisa. The third was when the Teutons
and Cimbrians came into Italy, who having overcome several Roman armies,
were defeated by Marius. The Romans, therefore, won these three most perilous
wars. And no little virtu was necessary to win them; for it is seen that
when that Roman virtu was lost (and), those arms lost their ancient valor,
that Empire was destroyed by similar people, such as were the Goths, Vandals,
and the like, who occupied all the western Empire.
These people go out from their countries ((as was said above))
driven by necessity; and the necessity arises from famine, or war, and
oppression, which in their own country is experienced by them, so that
they are constrained to seek new land. And these such are sometimes of
a great number, and then enter into the countries of others with violence,
killing the inhabitants, taking possession of their goods, create a new
Kingdom, and change the name of the province, as Moses did, and those
people who occupied the Roman Empire. For these new names that exist in
Italy and in the provinces, do not come from anything else than of having
been thus named by the new occupiers, such as is Lombardy which was called
Cisalpine Gaul, France which was called Transalpine Gaul, and now is called
after the Franks, as those people were called who had occupied it; Slavonia
was called Illyria, Hungary Pannonia, England Brittania, and many other
provinces which have changed names, to recount which would be tedious.
Moses also called that part of Syria occupied by him Judea. And as I have
said above that sometimes such people are driven from their own seats
because of war, whence they are constrained to seek new lands, I want
to cite the example of the Maurusians, a most ancient people of Syria,
who, hearing of the coming of the Hebrew people and judging not to be
able to resist them, thought it better to save themselves and leave their
own country, than to attempt to save it and lose themselves; and taking
up their families, they went to Africa where they established themselves
after driving out those inhabitants whom they found in that place. And
thus those who were unable to defend their own country, were able to occupy
that of others. And Procopius, who wrote of the war that Belisarius made
against the Vandals, occupiers of Africa, refers to having read letters
written on certain columns in the places that were inhabited by these
Maurusians, which said: We Maurusians here fled from before Jesus the
robber, son of Narva. Whence appeared the reason of their departure
from Syria. These people, therefore, who have been driven out by an extreme
necessity are most formidable, and if they are not confronted by good
arms, will never be checked. But when those who are constrained to abandon
their own country are not many, they are not as dangerous as those people
who were discussed, for they are unable to use as much violence but must
employ cunning in occupying some place, and having occupied it, to maintain
themselves by way of friends and confederates: as is seen was done by
Aeneas, and Dido, and the Massalians, and the like, all of whom were able
to maintain themselves, with the consent of their neighbors.
The great numbers of people that went out, and are going
out, are almost all from the country of Scythia, a cold and poor place,
where, because there were a great number of men and the country of a kind
which was unable to feed them, they are forced to go out, having many
things which drive them out and none to retain them. And if in the past
five hundred years it has not occurred that some of these people have
not inundated any country, it arises from several reasons. The first,
the great evacuation which that country made during the decline of the
Empire, when more than thirty tribes left (Scythia). The second is, that
Germany and Hungary, whence also such people went out, have now improved
their country so that they are able to live comfortably, that they are
not necessitated to change places. On the other hand, their men being
very warlike are a bastion in holding back the Scythians, who have the
same boundary with them, from presuming to overcome or pass through them.
And often times there occurred very great movements of Tartars, who were
later checked by the Hungarians and the Poles, and they often boast that
if it had not been for their arms, Italy and the Church would have many
times felt the weight of the Tartar armies. And this I want to be enough
concerning the people mentioned.
WHAT CAUSES COMMONLY MAKE WARS ARISE BETWEEN THE POWERFUL
The cause which made war arise between the Romans and the
Samnites who were in league for a long time, is a common cause which arises
among all powerful Principalities. Which cause either arises by chance
or is made to arise by those who desire to set a war in motion. That which
arose between the Romans and the Samnites was by chance, for it was not
the intention of the Samnites, in setting the war in motion against the
Sidicians, and afterwards against the Campanians, to set it in motion
against the Romans. But the Campanians being hard pressed and having recourse
to Rome, beyond the thoughts of the Romans and the Samnites, the Campanians
forced the Romans to take them to themselves as subjects of theirs, so
that it appeared to them (the Romans) they could not honorably evade (the
obligation) of defending them, and (hence) take up that war. For it indeed
appeared reasonable to the Romans not to defend the Campanians as friends
against the Samnites, who were their friends, but it seemed to them disgraceful
not to defend them as subjects, even though voluntary ones, judging that
if they did not undertake such defense, it would alienate all those who
should plan to come under their dominion. And as the aim of Rome was Empire
and Glory, and not Quiet, she could not refuse this enterprise.
This same cause gave beginning to the first war against
the Carthaginians because of the defense of the Messenians in Sicily which
the Romans undertook, which was also by chance. But the second war which
afterwards arose between them was not by chance, for Hannibal the Carthaginian
Captain assaulted the Saguntines friends of the Romans in Spain, not to
injure them, but to move the Romans to arms, and to have occasion to combat
them and pass into Italy. This method of kindling new wars has always
been customary among Powers, and who have some respect for the faith (treaties)
with others. For if I want to make war against a Prince, and have between
us a signed treaty observed for a long time, I would assault a friend
of his very own with some other pretext and justification, especially
knowing that in assaulting his friend either he would resent it and I
would obtain my intention of making war against him, or if he did not
resent it, his weakness and unfaithfulness in not defending his ally will
take away reputation from him, and to execute my designs more easily.
It ought to be noted, therefore, because of the dedication
of the Campanians in setting the war in motion in the way mentioned above,
that the best remedy which a City has, that is unable to defend itself,
but wants to defend itself in whatever manner against anyone who should
assault them: which is to give itself freely to whomever they design to
defend them, as the Campanians did to the Romans, and the Florentines
to King Robert of Naples, who, unwilling to defend them as friends, defended
them afterwards as subjects against the forces of Castruccio of Lucca
who was pressing them hard.
MONEY IS NOT THE SINEW OF WAR ALTHOUGH THIS IS COMMON OPINION
Because anyone can commence a war at his pleasure, but cannot
so finish it, a Prince ought before he undertakes an enterprise to measure
his forces, and govern himself in accordance with them. But he ought to
have so much prudence as not to deceive himself of the two forces: and
he will deceive himself every time when he measures it either by his money,
or by the location (of his country), or by good will of his people, while
on the other hand he lacks his own arms. For although the above things
will increase his strength, (but) they will not give it to him, and of
themselves are nothing, and will not be of benefit without trustworthy
arms. For without them, great amounts of money will not suffice you, the
strength of the country will not benefit you, and the faith and good will
of men will not endure, as these cannot remain faithful to you if you
are not able to defend them. Every mountain, every lake, every inaccessible
place becomes a plain where strong defenders are lacking. Money alone,
also, will not defend you, but causes you to be plundered more readily.
Nor can that common opinion be more false which says that money is the
sinew of war. Which sentence was said by Quintus Curtius in the war which
existed between Antipater the Macedonian and the King of Sparta, where
he narrates that because of a want of money the King of Sparta was obliged
to come to battle and was routed, that if he had deferred the fight a
few days the news of the death of Alexander in Greece would have arrived,
whence he would have remained victor without fighting. But lacking money,
and being apprehensive that, for the want of which, his army would abandon
him, was constrained to try the fortune of battle. So that for this reason
Quintus Curtius affirms money to be the sinew of war. Which opinion is
alleged every day, and acted on by not so prudent Princes to whom it is
enough to follow it: For relying on it, they believe it is enough to have
much treasure to defend themselves, and do not think that if treasure
should be enough to win, that Darius would have vanquished Alexander,
the Greeks would have vanquished the Romans, and in our times Duke Charles
would have vanquished the Swiss, and a few days ago the Pope and the Florentine
together would not have had difficulty in defeating Francesco Maria, nephew
of Julius II, in the war at Urbino. But all the above named were vanquished
by those who esteemed not money, but good soldiers, as the sinew of war.
Among other things that Croesus, King of Lydia, showed to
Solon the Athenian was a countless treasure: and asking what he thought
his power to be, Solon answered that he did not judge him more powerful
because of that, because war was made with iron and not gold, and that
someone might come who had more iron than he and would take it away from
him. In addition to this, when, after the death of Alexander the Great,
a great multitude of Gauls passed into Greece and then into Asia, and
the Gauls sent Ambassadors to the King of Macedonia to treat of certain
accords, that King to show his power and to dismay them showed them much
gold and silver: whence those Gauls who had already as good as signed
the peace broke it, so much did the desire grow in them to take away that
gold. And thus was that King despoiled by the very thing that he had accumulated
for defense. The Venetians a few years ago also, having their Treasury
full of treasure, lost the State without being able to be defended by
it.
I say, therefore, that gold ((as common opinion shouts))
is not the sinew of war, but good soldiers; because gold is not sufficient
to find good soldiers, but good soldiers are indeed sufficient to find
gold. To the Romans ((if they had wanted to make war more with money instead
of with iron)) it would not have been enough to have all the treasure
of the world, considering the great enterprises that they made and the
difficulties that they had to encounter. But making their wars with iron,
they never suffered from want of gold, because it was brought, even up
to their camps, by those who feared them. And if that King of Sparta,
because of a dearth of money, had to try the fortune of battle, that which
happened to him on account of money many times would have happened for
other causes; for it has been seen that any army lacking provisions, and
being obliged either to die of hunger or to engage in battle, will always
take the side of fighting as being more honorable, and where fortune can
in some way favor you. It has also happened many times that a Captain,
seeing succor come to the army of his enemy, has preferred to come to
an engagement with him at once and try the fortune of battle, rather than
wait until he is reinforced and then have to fight him in any case under
a thousand disadvantages. It has also been seen, how it happened to Hasdrubal
when he was assaulted in the Marca (Metaurus River) by Claudius Nero,
together with the other Roman Consul, that a Captain obliged either to
fight or flee, always elects to fight, it seeming to him in this way,
even if most doubtful, to be able to win, but in the other to lose in
any case.
There are many necessities, therefore, which make a Captain
choose the side of coming to battle against his will, among which sometimes
it can be the dearth of money, but not for this ought money to be judged
the sinew of war more than other things which induce men to a similar
necessity. Repeating again, therefore, the sinew of war is not gold, but
good soldiers. Money is indeed necessary in a secondary place, but it
is a necessity that good soldiers by themselves will overcome; for it
is impossible that good soldiers will lack money, as it is for money by
itself to find good soldiers. Every history in a thousand places shows
that which we say to be true, notwithstanding that Pericles had counselled
the Athenians to make war with all the Peloponnesus, showing that they
could win that war with perseverance and by the power of money. And although
in that war the Athenians at times had prospered, in the end they lost,
and the good counsels and good soldiers of Sparta were of more value than
the perseverance and the money of Athens. But the testimony of Titus Livius
is more direct than any other, where, discussing if Alexander the Great
should have come into Italy, if he would have vanquished the Romans, he
showed three things to be necessary for war, many and good soldiers, prudent
Captains, and good fortune: where examining whether the Romans or Alexander
should have prevailed in these things, afterwards makes his conclusion
without ever mentioning money. The Campanians had, when they were requested
by the Sidicians to take up arms of them against the Samnites, to measure
their power by money and not by soldiers; for having undertaken the proceeding
to aid them, after two defeats were constrained to make themselves tributaries
of the Romans if they wanted to save themselves.
IT IS NOT A PRUDENT PROCEEDING TO MAKE AN ALLIANCE WITH
A PRINCE WHO HAS MORE REPUTATION THAN POWER
Titus Livius, wanting to show the error of the Sidicians
in trusting to the aid of the Campanians, and the error of the Campanians
in believing themselves able to defend them, could not say it with more
forceful words, saying, The Campanians brought a greater name in aid
of the Sidicians, than they did men for protecting them. Where it
ought to be noted that leagues made with Princes who have neither the
convenience of aiding you because of the remoteness of their location
nor the strength to do so because of disorganization or other reasons
of theirs, bring more notoriety than aid to those who trust in them: as
happened in our times to the Florentines, when in one thousand four hundred
seventy nine (1479) the Pope and the King of Naples assaulted them, that
being friends of the King of France derived from that friendship more
notoriety than protection; as also would happen to that Prince who
should undertake some enterprise trusting himself to the Emperor Maximilian,
because this is one of those friendships that would bring to whoever made
it more notoriety than protection, as is said in this treatise
of what that of the Campanians brought to the Sidicians.
¶ The Campanians, therefore, erred in this part by
imagining themselves to have more strength than they had. And thus little
prudence sometimes does to men, who not knowing how nor being able to
defend themselves, want to undertake enterprises to defend others; as
also the Tarentines did, who, when the Roman armies encountered the Samnites,
sent ambassadors to the Roman Consul to make him understand that they
wanted peace between those two people, and that they were ready to make
war against the one that should refuse peace. So that the Consul, laughing
at this proposition, in the presence of the ambassadors, had the (bugle)
sound for battle and commanded his army to go and meet the enemy, showing
the Tarentines by acts and not words of what a reply they were worthy.
¶ And having in the present chapter discussed the wrong
proceedings which Princes undertake for the defense of others, in the
following one I want to talk of those means they should undertake for
their own defense.
IS IT BETTER, FEARING TO BE ASSAULTED, TO CARRY OUT OR
AWAIT WAR
I have heard from men much practiced in the things of war
some time discuss whether, if there are two Princes of almost equal strength,
if one more stalwart has declared war against the other, what would be
the better proceeding for the other, either to await the enemy within
his own boundaries, or to go out to meet him in his house and assault
him. And I have heard reasons cited on every side. And those who defend
the going out to assault the other, cite the counsel that Croesus gave
to Cyrus when, having arrived at the confines of the Messagates to make
war against them, their Queen Tamiri sent to say that they should select
which of the two proceedings they wanted, either to enter her Kingdom
where she would await him, or that he want her to come out to meet him:
And the matter coming under discussion, Croesus, against the opinion of
the others, said that he would go to meet her, saying that if he should
vanquish her at a distance from her kingdom, he would not be able to take
away her kingdom because she would have time to recover; but if he should
vanquish her within her confines he could follow her in flight and, by
not giving her time to recover, could take away her State from her. He
also cites the counsel that Hannibal gave Antiochus when that king planned
to make war against the Romans, where he showed that the Romans could
not be beaten except in Italy, for there the others could avail themselves
of the arms and the wealth of their friends; but whoever would combat
them outside Italy and would leave Italy free to them, he would leave
them that font which would never lack life in supplying strength where
it was needed: and he concluded that Rome could be taken from the Romans
easier than the Empire, and Italy before the other provinces. He also
cites Agatocles, who, not being able to sustain the war at home, assaulted
the Carthaginians who were waging it against him, and reduced them to
ask for peace. He cites Scipio, who, to lift the war from Italy, assaulted
Africa.
Those who speak to the contrary say that he who wants to
inflict an evil on the enemy will draw him away from home. They cite the
Athenians, who, as long as they made war convenient to their home, remained
superior, but that when they went a distance with their armies into Sicily,
lost their liberty. They cite the poetic fables where it is shown that
Anteus, King of Libya, being assaulted by Hercules the Egyptian, was insuperable
as long as he awaited him within the confines of his own kingdom, but
as soon as he went off a distance, through the astuteness of Hercules,
lost the State and his life. Whence a place is given to the fable of Anteus
who, when (thrown) on the ground, recovered his strength from his mother
which was the earth, and that Hercules, becoming aware of this, lifted
him high (and) off the ground. They also cite modern judges. Everyone
knows that Ferrando, King of Naples, was held to be a most wise Prince
in his time, and when two years before his death, news came that the King
of France, Charles VIII, wanted to come to assault him, after he had made
preparations, but fell sick, and as he was approaching death, among other
advices he left to his son Alfonso, was that he should await the enemy
inside the Kingdom, and for nothing in thy world to withdraw his forces
outside of his State, but should await him entirely within all his borders.
Which (advice) was not observed by him, but sending an army into the Romagna,
without a fight, lost it and the State. In addition to the instances described,
the reasons that are cited in favor of every (both) side are: That he
who assaults comes with more spirit than he who awaits, which makes the
army more confident. In addition to this, many advantages are taken away
from the enemy to be able to avail himself of his resources, (and) he
will not be able to avail himself of those from his subjects who have
been plundered; and as the enemy is in his house, the Lord is constrained
to have more regard in extracting money from them and in overworking them,
so that that font comes to dry up, as Hannibal says, which makes him able
to sustain the war. In addition to this, his solders, because they find
themselves in the countries of others, are more necessitated to fight,
and that necessity makes virtu, as we have several times said.
On the other hand, it is said that in awaiting the enemy
one waits with many advantages, for without any inconvenience you can
cause great inconveniences of provisions and of every other thing which
an army needs: You can better impede his designs because of the greater
knowledge of the country you have than he: You can meet him with more
strength because of being able to unite (concentrate) (your forces) easily,
while he cannot take his all away from home: You can ((if defeated)) recover
easily, as much because much can be saved of your army having places of
refuge near, as well as reinforcements do not have to come from a distance,
so that you come to risk all your forces but not all your fortune; but
taking yourself to a distance you risk all your fortune but not all your
strength. And there have been some who, in order better to weaken their
enemy, have allowed him to enter several days (march) into their country
and to take many Towns, so that by leaving garrisons everywhere his army
is weakened, and then they are able to combat him the more easily.
But to say now what I think, I believe that this distinction
ought to be made: either I have my country armed like the Romans and as
the Swiss have, or I have it disarmed like the Carthaginians, and as have
the Kings of France and the Italians. In this (latter) case the enemy
ought to be kept distant from home, for your virtu being in money and
not in men, whenever that (money) may be impeded to you, you are lost,
and nothing will impede it to you as war at home. As an example, there
are the Carthaginians, who, as long as they were undisturbed at home with
their revenues, could make war against the Romans, but when they were
assaulted (in their own country) they were unable to resist (even) Agathocles.
The Florentines did not have any remedy against Castruccio, Lord of Lucca,
because he waged war against them at home, so that they were obliged to
give themselves ((in order to be defended)) to King Robert of Naples.
But after the death of Castruccio, those same Florentines had the courage
to assault the Duke of Milan in his home (territory) and work to take
away his Kingdom. As much virtu as they showed in distant wars, just so
much baseness (did they show) in nearby ones. But when Kingdoms are armed
as Rome was armed and as the Swiss are, the more difficult are they to
overcome the nearer you are to them. For these bodies (states) can unite
more forces to resist an attack (impetus) than they are able to assault
others. Nor am I moved in this case by the authority of Hannibal, because
his passion and his interests make him say thusly to Antiochus. For if
the Romans had experienced in Gaul three such defeats in so great a space
of time as they had in Italy from Hannibal, without doubt they would have
been beaten; for they would not have availed themselves of the remnants
of the armies as they did in Italy, (and) could not have reorganized them
with the same ease, nor could they have resisted the enemy with that same
strength as they were able to. It has never been found that they ever
sent outside armies of more than fifty thousand men in order to assault
a province: but to defend themselves at home against the Gauls after the
first Punic war, they put eighteen hundred thousand men under arms. Nor
could they have put to rout those (Gauls) in Lombardy as they routed them
in Tuscany, for they could not have led so great a force against so great
a number of enemies at so great a distance, nor fight them with such advantage.
The Cimbrians routed a Roman army in Germany; nor did the Romans have
a remedy. But when they (Cimbrians) came into Italy and they (Romans)
were able to put all their forces together, they destroyed them (Cimbrians).
The Swiss are. easily beaten when away from home where they cannot send
more than thirty or forty thousand men, but it is very difficult to beat
them at home where they are able to gather together a hundred thousand.
I conclude again, therefore, that that Prince who has his
people armed and organized for war should always await a powerful and
dangerous war (enemy) at home and not go out to meet it. But that (Prince)
who has his subjects unarmed and the country unaccustomed to war, should
always keep it as distant as he can. And thus one and the other ((each
in his own manner)) will defend himself better.
THAT ONE COMES FROM THE BOTTOM TO A GREAT FORTUNE MORE
BY FRAUD THAN BY FORCE
I believe it to be a most true thing that it rarely or never
happens that men of little fortune come to high rank without force and
without fraud, unless that rank to which others have come is not obtained
either by gift or by heredity. Nor do I believe that force alone will
ever be found to be enough; but it will be indeed found that fraud alone
will be enough; as those will clearly see who read the life of Philip
of Macedonia, that of Agathocles the Sicilian, and many such others, who
from the lowest, or rather low, fortune have arrived either to a Kingdom
or to very great Empires. Xenophon shows in his life of Cyrus this necessity
to deceive, considering that the first expedition that he has Cyrus make
against the King of Armenia is full of fraud, and that he makes him occupy
his Kingdom by deceit and not by force. And he does not conclude anything
else from such action except that to a Prince who wants to do great things,
it is necessary to learn to deceive. In addition to this, he made Cyraxes,
King of the Medes, his maternal uncle, to be deceived in so many ways,
without which fraud he shows that Cyrus could not have achieved that greatness
he attained. Nor do I believe anyone will ever be found of such fortune
to have arrived at great Empire only by force and ingenuity, but indeed
only by fraud, as did Giovanni Galeazzo in order to take away the State
and Dominion of Lombardy from his uncle Messer Bernabo. And that which
Princes are obliged to do at the beginning of their expansions, Republics
are also obliged to do until they have become powerful so that force alone
will be enough. And as Rome used every means, either by chance or by election,
necessary to achieve greatness, she did not also hesitate to use this
one (fraud). Nor could she, in the beginning, use greater deceit than
to take up the method discussed above by us to make associates for herself,
because under this name she made them her slaves, as were the Latins,
and other surrounding people. For first she availed herself of their arms
to subdue the neighboring peoples and to take up the reputation of the
State: after subduing them, she achieved such great expansion that she
could beat everyone. And the Latins never became aware that they were
wholly slaves until they saw two routs of the Samnites and (saw them)
constrained to come to an accord. As this victory greatly increased the
reputation of the Romans with the distant Princes, who heard the Roman
name and not their arms, generating envy and suspicion in those who saw
and felt those arms, among whom were the Latins. And so much was this
envy and so powerful this fear, that not only the Latins, but the colonies
they had in Latium, together with the Associates who had been defended
a short time before, conspired against the Roman name. And the Latins
began this war in the way mentioned above that the greater part of wars
are begun, not by assaulting the Romans, but by defending the Sidicians
against the Samnites, against whom the Samnites were making war with the
permission of the Romans. And that it is true that the Latins began the
war because they had recognized this deceit, is shown by T. Livius through
the mouth of Annius Setinus, a Latin Praetor, who in their council said
these words: If even now under the pretext of equal confederates, we
can suffer servitude, etcetera.
It will be seen, therefore, that the Romans in their first
expansions did not also lack using fraud; which has always been necessary
for those to use who, from small beginnings, want to rise to sublime heights,
which is less shameful when it is more concealed, as was this of the Romans.
MEN OFTEN DECEIVE THEMSELVES BELIEVING THAT BY HUMILITY
THEY OVERCOME HAUGHTINESS
Many times it is seen that humility not only does not benefit,
but harms, especially when it is used by insolent men who, either from
envy or for other reasons, have conceived a hatred against you. Of this
our Historian gives proof on the occasion of the war between the Romans
and the Latins. For when the Samnites complained to the Romans that the
Latins had assaulted them, the Romans did not want to prohibit such a
war to the Latins, desired not to irritate them; which not only did not
irritate them, but made them become more spirited against them (Romans),
and they discovered themselves as enemies more quickly. Of which, the
words of the aforementioned Annius, the Latin Praetor, in that same council,
attest, where he says: You have tried their patience in denying them
military aid: why do you doubt this should excite them? Yet they have
borne this pain. They have heard we are preparing an army against their
confederates, the Samnites, yet have not moved from their City. Whence
is there such modesty, except from their recognition of both our virility
and theirs? It is very clearly recognized, therefore, by this text
how much the patience of the Romans increased the arrogance of the Latins.
And therefore a Prince ought never to forego his own rank, and ought never
to forego anything by accord, wanting to forego it honorably, unless he
is able or believes that he is able to hold it; for it is almost always
better ((matters having been brought to the point where you cannot forego
it in the manner mentioned)) to allow it to be taken away by force, rather
than by fear of force; for if you permit it from fear, you do so in order
to avoid war, but most of the times you do not avoid it, for he to whom
you have from baseness conceded this, will not be satisfied, but will
want to take other things away from you, and he will excite himself more
against you esteeming you less: and on the other hand, in your favor you
will find the defenders more cold, it appearing to them that you are either
weak or a coward: but as soon as you discover the intention of the adversary,
if you prepare your forces, even though they may be inferior to his, he
will begin to respect you, (and) the other neighboring Princes will respect
you more, and the desire to aid you will come to those ((being armed by
you)) who, even if you gave yourself up, would never aid you.
This is what is learned when you have an enemy: but when
you have several, to render to some of them some of your possessions,
either to gain him over to yourself even though war should already have
broken out, or to detach your enemies from the other confederates, is
always a prudent proceeding.
WEAK STATES ARE ALWAYS AMBIGUOUS IN THEIR RESOLUTIONS,
AND WEAK DECISIONS ARE ALWAYS HARMFUL
In connection with this same matter and with the origin
of the war between the Latins and the Romans it can be noted, that in
all deliberations it is well to come to the point of what it is to be
decided and not to be always ambiguous, nor to remain uncertain of the
matter. Which is manifestly seen in the deliberation that the Latins held
when they thought of alienating themselves from the Romans. For having
foreseen this bad mood that had come upon the Latin people, the Romans
in order to assure themselves of the matter and to see if they could regain
those people to themselves without resorting to arms, made them understand
that they should send eight Citizens to Rome, because they wanted to consult
with them. The Latins, learning of this, and being conscious of many things
done against the wishes of the Romans, called a council to arrange who
should go to Rome and to give them the commission of what they should
say: And while this was deliberated in the councils, their Praetor Annius
said these words: I judge it to be most important for our interest,
that we should think of what we shall do that what we shall say: when
we have decided that, it will be easy to accommodate our words (the details
of our counsels) to our acts. These words without doubt are very true,
and ought to be of benefit to every Prince and every Republic; for words
are not made to explain the ambiguity and incertitude of that which is
to be done, but once the mind is fixed, and that which is to be done decided,
it is an easy thing to find the words. I have the more willingly noted
this part, as I have known many such indecisions to interfere with public
actions, with damage and shame to our Republic: And this will always happen
that in doubtful proceedings and where spirit is needed in making decisions,
this ambiguity (indecision) will exist when these deliberations and decisions
have to be made by weak men. Slow and late decisions are also not less
harmful than ambiguous ones, especially when they have to decide in favor
of some friend, for no person is helped by their lateness, and it injures
oneself. Such decisions so made proceed from feebleness of spirit and
strength or from the malignity of those who have to decide, who, moved
by their own passion to want to ruin the State or to fulfill some desire
of theirs, do not allow the deliberations to proceed, but impede and thwart
them. For good citizens ((even though they see a popular fad turning itself
into a perilous course)) never impede deliberations, especially when those
matters cannot be delayed.
After the death of Hieronymus, Tyrant of Syracuse, while
the war between the Carthaginians and the Romans was at its height, a
dispute arose among the Syracusans whether they ought to follow the Roman
friendship (alliance) or the Carthaginian. And so great was the ardor
of the parties that they remained undecided, nor was any action taken,
until at last Appolonides, one of the first men of Syracuse, with a speech
(of his) full of prudence, showed that those who held the opinion to adhere
to the Romans were not to be blamed, nor those who wanted to follow the
Carthaginian side; but that it was right to detest that indecision and
tardiness in taking up the proceeding, because he saw surely the proceeding
had been undertaken (the decision made), whatever it might be, some good
could be hoped for. Nor could T. Livius show better than in this case
the damage done by remaining undecided. He shows it also in the case of
the Latins, for the Lavinians seeking their aid against the Romans, they
delayed so long in determining upon it that, when they had just gone out
of the gate with forces to give them succor, the news arrived that the
Latins were routed. Whence Milonius, their Praetor, said: This short march
would cost us much with the Roman people: For if they had decided at once
either to help or not to help the Latins, they would by not aiding them
not have irritated the Romans; and by helping them, the aid being in time,
they could by joining forces enable them to win; but by delaying, they
would come to lose in any case, as happened to them.
And if the Florentines had noted this text, they would not
have received so much injury or so much trouble from the French as they
had in the passage of King Louis XII of France to make war against Lodovico,
Duke of Milan, in Italy. For the King when he was considering such a passage
sought to make an accord with the Florentines, and the ambassadors to
the King made an accord with him that they would remain neutral, and that
the King after coming into Italy should take their State under his protection,
and gave the City one month to ratify it. This ratification was delayed
by those who, because of little prudence, favored the affairs of Lodovico,
so that the King having already achieved his victory, and the Florentines
then wanting to ratify it, the ratification was not accepted, as he recognized
that the friendship of the Florentines came by force and not voluntarily.
Which cost the City of Florence much money, and was to lose them the State,
as happened to them another time from similar causes. And that proceeding
was so much more damnable because it did not even serve the Duke Lodovico,
who, if he had won, would have shown more signs of enmity against the
Florentines than did the King.
And although above in another chapter I have discussed the
evil that results to a Republic from this weakness, none the less having
a new opportunity for a new incident, I wanted to repeat it, especially
as it seems to me a matter that ought to be noted by Republics similar
to ours.
HOW MUCH THE SOLDIERS IN OUR TIMES ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE
ANCIENT ORGANIZATION
The most important engagement ever fought in any war with
any nation by the Roman People, was that which they had with the Latin
people during the Consulate of Torquatus and of Decius. As every reason
would have it, just as by the loss of the battle the Latins became slaves,
so too the Romans would have been slaves if they had not won. And Titus
Livius is of this opinion, because on both sides he makes the armies equal
in organization, in virtu, in obstinacy, and in numbers: the only difference
he makes is that the Heads of the Roman army were of more virtu than those
of the Latin army. It will also be seen that in the managing of this engagement,
two incidents arose which had not arisen before, and that afterwards were
rare examples; that of the two Consuls, in order to uphold the courage
of the soldiers and keep them obedient to their command and more deliberate
in action, one killed himself and the other his son. The equality which
Titus Livius says existed in these armies resulted from their having fought
together a long time, having the same language, the same discipline, and
the same arms: For they held to the same manner in the order of battle,
and the organizations and Heads of the organization had the same names:
Being of equal strength and of equal virtu, it was therefore necessary
that something extraordinary should arise which would make one more firm
and obstinate than the other; in which obstinacy victory ((as was said
at another time)) was contained; for so long as that endured in the breasts
of those who combatted, no army will ever turn its back. And as it endured
more in the breasts of the Romans than in the Latins, partly chance and
partly the virtu of the Consuls gave rise that Torquatus had to kill his
son and Decius himself.
In demonstrating this equality of strength, T. Livius shows
the whole organization that the Romans had in the armies and in battles.
As he has explained this at length, I will not otherwise repeat it; but
I will discuss only that which I judge to be notable, and that which,
because it is neglected by all Captains of these times, has caused many
disorders in armies and battles. I say, then, that from the text of Livius
it is gathered that the Roman armies were composed of three principal
divisions, which in Tuscan can be called Ranks, and they named the first
Astati, the second Principi, the third Triari, and each of these had its
cavalry. In organizing a battle they put the Astati in front, directly
behind in the second line they placed the Principi, and in the same manner
in the third line they placed the Triari. The cavalry of all of these
orders were placed to the right and the left of these three battalions,
the ranks of which cavalry, from their shape and place, they called Alae
(Wings), because they seemed like two wings of that body. They arranged
the first ranks of the Astati, which were in the front and serried in
a way that it could strike or sustain (the attack of) the enemy. The second
line of the Principi ((as it was not the first in combat, but was bound
to support the first line when it was struck or hurled back)), they did
not make straight, but maintained its order open (thin) and of a kind
so that it could receive within itself the first line, without disordering
itself, whenever, pushed by the enemy, it should be necessary for them
to retreat. The third line of the Triari was arranged even more open than
the second, in order to receive within itself, if need be, the first two
lines of Principi, and Astati. These three ranks thus deployed kindled
the battle, and if the Astati were forced or overcome, they retreated
into the open ranks of the Principi, and the two ranks being united together
into one body rekindled the battle: if these were also forced or rebuffed,
they both retired into the open ranks of the Triari, and all these ranks
becoming one body, renewed the fight; where, if they were overcome ((for
not having further reinforcements)) they lost the engagement. And as every
time that this last rank of Triari became engaged, the army was in danger,
and gave rise to that proverb, The matter has come to the Triari,
which in Tuscan usage means to say, we have put up the last resource.
The captains of our times, having abandoned entirely the
organization and no longer observing the ancient discipline, have thus
abandoned this part which is not of little importance: for whoever arranges
(his army) so as to be able to reorganize three times in an engagement,
must have fortune inimical to him three times in order to lose, and must
have (pitted) against him a virtu three times as adept to overcome him.
But whoever cannot maintain himself against the first onrush ((as the
Christian armies are today)) can lose easily, for every disorder, every
half-way virtu, can take away the victory. And that which prevents our
armies from being able to reorganize three times is to have lost the manner
of receiving one rank into the other. Which arises because at present
engagements are arranged with two defects: either their ranks are formed
shoulder to shoulder, and make their battle line wide in front and thin
in depth, which makes it very weak from having too few men in the depth
of the ranks: or, in order to make it stronger, they reduce the ranks
(in width of the front), in accordance as the Romans did; if the first
rank is broken, there not being an arrangement to be received by the second,
they will be entangled all together, and rout themselves; for if that
front rank is pushed back, it will be hurled on the second; if the second
rank wants to go forward, it is impeded by the first: Whence that the
first being hurled upon the second, and the second on the third, there
ensues so much confusion that the slightest accident often ruins an army.
In the battle at Ravenna, which was ((according to our times))
a very well-fought engagement, in which the Captain of the French forces,
Monsignor De Foix, was killed, the Spanish and French armies were organized
in one of the above mentioned methods, that is, that the one and the other
army came with all its forces arranged shoulder to shoulder so as to have
a wide front and little depth. And thus they always did when they had
a large field as they had at Ravenna: for recognizing the disorder that
is caused in retiring, when they put themselves all into one rank, they
avoid it when they can by making the front wide, as has been said; but
when the country is restricted, they remain in the disorder described
above without thinking of a remedy. In similar disorder the cavalry rides
through the enemy's country, either for plunder or for some other purpose
of war. And at Santo Regolo and elsewhere in the war against Pisa, where
the Florentines were routed by the Pisans in the (time of the) war which
existed between the Florentines and that City because of her rebellion,
after the passage of Charles, King of France, into Italy; that ruin did
not result from anything else than the friendly cavalry, which being in
front and repulsed by the enemy, was thrown back into the Florentine infantry
and broke it, whence all the remaining forces turned back: and Messer
Criaco Del Borgo, Head of the Florentine infantry, has affirmed in my
presence many times that he would never have been routed except for the
cavalry of his friends. The Swiss who are masters of modern war, when
they fought for the French, above all things they take care to put themselves
on the side where the friendly cavalry, if it should be repulsed, will
not be hurled back on them.
And although this thing would appear easy to understand
and not easy to do, none the less there has not yet been found any of
our contemporary Captains who have imitated the ancient order and corrected
the modem one. And although they also divide their army into three parts,
calling one part the Vanguard, the next the Battle Corps, and the last
the Rearguard, they do not serve themselves of it other than to command
them in their quarters; but in using it, it is a rare thing ((as was said
above)) that they do to unite them all in one body, so that they all share
the same fortune: And as many, to excuse their ignorance, allege that
the violence of the artillery will not allow the same arrangements that
the ancients had to be used in these times, I want to discuss this matter
in the following chapter, and to examine whether the artillery impedes
them so that it is not possible to use the ancient virtu.
HOW MUCH THE ARMY OUGHT TO ESTEEM THE ARTILLERY IN THE
PRESENT TIMES, AND IF THAT OPINION THAT IS GENERALLY HAD OF IT IS TRUE
In addition to the things written above, in considering
how the many field fights, called in our times by the French word Engagements
(Giornate), and by the Italians Deeds of arms, were fought by the Romans
at diverse times, I have thought upon the general opinions of many, which
hold that if artillery had existed in those days the Romans would not
have been permitted to conquer provinces and make other people tributary
to themselves as they did, nor would they in any way have been able to
make such large acquisitions: They say also that because of these instrument
of fire men are not able to use or show their virtu as they were able
to anciently. And a third thing should be added that one now comes to
the joining of battle with more difficulty than formerly, nor is it possible
to maintain the same discipline as in those times, so that in time wars
will be reduced to artillery (exchanges). And as I judge it not to be
outside this subject to discuss whether such opinions are true, and whether
artillery has increased or diminished the strength of armies, and whether
it gives or takes away opportunity to good Captains of acting with virtu.
I shall begin by speaking concerning the first opinion that
the ancient Roman armies would not have made the conquests that they did
if artillery had existed: Upon which in replying, I say that war is made
either to defend oneself or to take the offensive: whence it must first
be examined as to which of these two kinds of war make it (artillery)
more useful or more damaging. And although there is something to say on
both sides, none the less I believe that beyond comparison it does more
damage to whoever defends himself than to whoever attacks. The reason
I say this is that he who defends himself is either inside some fortified
place or in a camp within a stockade: and if he is inside a town, either
this town is small as are the greater part of the fortresses, or it is
large: in the first case whoever defends himself is entirely lost, for
the impetus of the artillery is such that a wall has not yet been found
which is so strong that in a few days it will be battered down by it;
and if whoever is inside does not have considerable space for retreat,
and (cannot protect himself) with ditches and earthworks, he is lost,
nor can he sustain the attack of the enemy who would then enter through
the breach in the wall: nor will the artillery he has be of any benefit
to him in this, for there is a maxim that where men attack in mass, the
artillery will not stop them; and thus the fury of the Ultramontanes in
the defense of their lands has never been resisted: the assaults of the
Italians are easily resisted, as they go in battle, not in mass, but in
small detachments, which by their own name are called Scaramouches (skirmishes):
and when they deliberately go in this disordered manner into a breach
in a wall where there is artillery, they go to a certain death, for against
them the artillery is of value: but when they go in a dense mass, and
one pushes the other as they come to a break, if they are not impeded
by ditches or earthworks, they enter in every place and artillery will
not hold them: and if some are killed, they cannot be so many that they
would impede the victory. That this is true has been recognized by the
many conquests made by the Ultramontanes in Italy, and especially that
of Brescia; for when that land rebelled against the French, and the fortress
being still held by the King of France, the Venetians, in order to resist
the attacks which could come from the town, had fortified all the road
that descends from the fortress to the City with artillery, placing it
in front and on the flanks and in every convenient place: of which Monsignor
De Foix took no account, rather, with his squadron, he descended on foot,
and passing through the midst of it (the artillery) occupied the City,
nor from what was heard had he received any recordable damage. So that
whoever defends himself in a small area ((as was said)) and finding the
walls of his town breached, and does not have space to retreat with earthworks
and ditches, and have to rely on artillery, will quickly be lost.
If you defend a large town and have the convenience of retreating,
I none the less maintain beyond comparison that artillery is more useful
to whoever is outside than to whoever is inside. First, because if you
want artillery to harm those outside, you are necessitated to raise yourself
with it above the level of the surrounding land, for being on the plain,
every little embankment and earthwork that the enemy raises remains secure,
and you cannot harm him, so that by having to raise it and draw it along
the aisle between the walls, or in some other way raise it above the ground,
you have two drawbacks: the first, that you cannot place artillery of
the same size and power as those outside can bring to bear, as you are
not able in a small place to handle large things: the other, no matter
how well you can place it, you cannot make those earthworks trustworthy
and secure in order to save the said artillery as those outside can do
being on higher ground, and having that convenience and space which they
themselves lacked: So that it is impossible to whoever defends a town
to keep his artillery in elevated positions when those who are on the
outside have plenty and powerful artillery: and if they have to place
it in lower places, it becomes in large part useless, as has been said.
So that the defense of a City is reduced to defending it with the same
(manual) arms as was done anciently, and with small size artillery: from
which little usefulness is derived ((because of the small size artillery))
unless there is a mine of disadvantages that counterweighs the advantage
(of the artillery): for in respect to that, the walls of the town are
kept low and almost buried in the ditches, so that when the battle comes
to hand to hand fighting, either because the walls are breached or the
ditches filled up, those inside have many more disadvantages than they
had before. And therefore ((as was said above)) these instruments benefit
much more whoever besieges the towns that whoever is besieged.
As to the third case when you are in a camp within a stockade
and you do not want to come to an engagement unless it is at your convenience
or advantage, I say that in this case you do not ordinarily have a better
remedy to defend yourself without fighting than what the ancients had,
and some times you may have greater disadvantage on account of your artillery:
For if the enemy turns on you and has even a small advantage of ground,
as can easily happen, and finds himself higher than you, or that at his
arrival you have not yet finished your earthworks and covered yourself
well with them, he quickly dislodges you before you have any remedy and
you are forced to go out of your fortress and come to battle. This happened
to the Spaniards in the engagement at Ravenna, who, being entrenched between
the river Ronco and an earthwork which was built insufficiently high,
and the French having a slight advantage of terrain, were constrained
by the artillery to leave their fortified place and come to battle. But
suppose ((as must often happen)) that the location you have chosen for
your camp is higher than the other side at the (time of) encounter, and
that your earthworks are good and secure, so that owing to the site and
your other preparations, the enemy does not dare to assault you, in this
case he will resort to those means that the ancients resorted to when
one, with his army, was in a position where he could not be attacked,
that is, he will overrun the country, take or besiege lands friendly to
you and impede your provisions; so that you will be forced by some necessity
to dislodge him, and come to battle, where artillery ((as will be mentioned
below)) will not be of much use. Considering, therefore, in what manner
the Romans made war, and observing that almost all their wars were to
attack others and not to defend themselves, it will be seen ((if all the
things said above were true)) that they would have had even greater advantage,
and would have made their conquests more easily, if they should have lived
in those times (of the advent of artillery).
As to the second proposition, that men are not able to show
their virtu as they could anciently because of the use of artillery, I
say that it is true that where men have to expose themselves in small
groups, that they are exposed to greater danger than when they had to
scale (the walls of) a town or make similar assaults, where men did not
have to act bunched together, but by themselves one after the other. It
is also true that the Captains and Heads of the army are now subjected
to the danger of death than at that time, as they can be reached by artillery
in every place, and it is of no benefit to them to be in the rear ranks,
and protected by their strongest men: None the less it is seen that the
one and the other of these dangers rarely caused extraordinary damages,
for well fortified towns are not scaled, nor do you go to assault them
with feeble attacks, but in wanting to conquer them, the matter is reduced
to a siege, as was done anciently. And even in those places that can be
conquered by assault, the dangers are not much greater now then they were
then, for even in that time there did not lack to the defenders of towns
means for throwing (missiles), which ((if they were not as furious (as
cannon) is)) had a similar effect in killing men. As to the death of Captains
and Candottieri, in the twenty four years in which there have been wars
in Italy in recent times, there have been fewer examples then there were
in any ten years time (of war) of the ancients. For, outside of Count
Lodovico Della Mirandola ((who was killed at Ferrara when the Venetians
assaulted that State a few years ago)) and the Duke of Nemours ((who was
killed at Cirignuola)), it never happened that any were killed by artillery,
since Monsignor De Foix was killed at Ravenna by steel (sword) and not
by fire. So that if men do not show their virtu individually, it is not
the result of the artillery, but from poor discipline and weakness of
the armies, which, lacking virtu collectively, are not able to show it
in the (individual) parts.
As to the third proposition mentioned by some, that it is
no longer possible to come to hand-to-hand fighting, and that wars will
be entirely conducted through artillery, I say this opinion is entirely
false, and will always be so held by those who would want to manage their
armies according to the ancient virtu: For whoever wants to create a good
army must, by real or feigned exercises, accustom his men to meet the
enemy, and to come against him with sword in hand and to seize him bodily,
and he must rely more upon the infantry than on cavalry, for the reasons
which will be mentioned below. And when they rely on infantry and on the
aforementioned means (of training), the artillery will become entirely
useless; for the infantry in meeting the enemy can escape the blows of
the artillery with greater ease than anciently they were able to escape
from the attacks of elephants, from scythed chariots, and other obsolete
means of attack which the Roman infantry had to encounter, (and) against
which they always found a remedy: and they would have found it so much
more readily against this (artillery), as the time in which artillery
can harm you is much shorter than that in which the elephants and chariots
could do harm. For these disorganized you in the midst of battle, while
that (the artillery) only impedes you before the battle; which impediment
is easily avoided by the infantry either the nature of the site covering
them or by lying down on the ground during the firing. Even experience
has shown this not to be necessary, especially when defending themselves
from large artillery, which cannot be so (accurately) aimed, (and) either
((if they are aimed high)) they pass over you, or ((if they are aimed
low)) they do not reach you. Then when you have come with the army to
hand to hand (fighting), this becomes clearer than light that neither
the large nor the small artillery can then harm you. For if he has the
artillery in front, you capture it, and if he has it in the rear, he first
harms his friend rather than you: even on the flank he cannot harm you
so, that you cannot go up to capture them, and the result mentioned above
(first) will happen.
Nor is this disputed very much, because the example of the
Swiss has been seen, who in MDXIII (1513) at Novara, without artillery
or cavalry, went to encounter the French army armed with artillery within
their fortresses, and routed them without having any impediment from that
artillery. And the reason is ((in addition to the things mentioned above))
that the artillery, to be well served, has need to be guarded either by
walls, ditches, or earthworks: and that if it lacks one of these guards,
it is captured or becomes useless, as happens in open field engagements
and battles when it is defended only by men. On the flank it cannot be
employed except in that manner that the ancients used their catapults,
which they placed outside of the squadrons, so that they should fight
outside of the ranks, and every time they were pressed by cavalry or others,
they took refuge within the legions. Who employs it otherwise does not
understand it well, and relies on something which can easily deceive him.
And if the Turk by means of artillery gained the victory over the Sofi
(Persians) and the Soldan (Egyptians), it resulted from no other virtu
than from the unaccustomed noise which frightened their cavalry. I conclude,
therefore, coming to the end of this discussion, that artillery is useful
in an army when it is mixed with the ancient virtu, but, without that,
it is most useless against a valorous army.
THAT BECAUSE OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE ROMANS AND BY THE
EXAMPLE OF ANCIENT ARMIES, THE INFANTRY OUGHT TO BE MORE ESTEEMED THAN
CAVALRY
And it can be clearly demonstrated by many arguments and
by many examples how much the Romans in all their military actions esteemed
the foot soldier more than the cavalry, and based all the plans of their
forces on them: as is seen by many examples, and among others that which
occurred when they came to battle with the Latins next to Lake Regillo,
where the Roman army already having given way, made their cavalry descend
from their horses in order to succor their foot soldiers, and by that
means renewed the battle and obtained the victory. Where it is manifestly
seen that the Romans had more confidence in their men, when on foot, than
maintaining them on horseback. They used this same means in many other
battles, and they always found it an optimum remedy in their dangers.
Nor is the opinion of Hannibal opposed to this who, when he saw in the
engagement at Cannae that the Consuls made their horsemen descend on foot,
making a mock of a like proceeding, said: Quam malem vinctos mini traderent
equites, that is, I would have more concern if they would give them
to me bound. Which opinion, although coming from the mouth of a most excellent
man, none the less if we have to go back to authority, we ought to believe
more if it came from a Roman Republic and from so many excellent Captains
which she produced, than to one single Hannibal; although even without
authorities, there are manifest reasons, for a man can go into many places
on foot where he cannot go on horseback: you can teach him to preserve
the ranks, and should they be broken, how to reform them, but it is difficult
to make horses preserve the ranks, and when they are disturbed impossible
to reform them: in addition to this, it will be found ((as in men)) that
some horses have little spirit and some have much, and many times it happens
that a spirited horse is ridden by a base man, and a timid horse by a
spirited man, and however this disparity arises, uselessness and disorder
result. Well disciplined infantry can easily break the cavalry but only
with difficulty can they be routed by them. Which opinion is corroborated
((in addition to many ancient and modern examples)) by the authority of
those who make regulations for civil affairs, where they show that at
first wars were begun to be fought by cavalry, because (good) infantry
was not yet been organized: but as soon as this was done, it was quickly
recognized how much more useful these were then cavalry: However, the
cavalry is necessary in armies for reconnaissance, to overrun and plunder
the country, and to pursue the enemy when in flight, and to be a part
of the opposition to the cavalry of the adversaries: but the foundation
and the sinew of the army, and that which should be more esteemed, ought
to be the infantry.
And among the faults of the Italian Princes who have made
Italy slave to foreigners, there is none greater than to have taken into
little account this organization (infantry), and to have turned all their
attention to mounted troops. Which error arose from the malignity of the
Heads, and from the ignorance of those who ruled the State: For during
the past twenty five years the Italian military have been brought under
men who did not have a State, but were as Captains (Soldiers) of fortune,
whose main thought was how they should be able to maintain their reputation
by their being armed, and the Princes disarmed. And as a large number
of infantry could not continuously be paid by them, and not having subjects
of whom they could avail themselves, and as a small number would not give
them reputation, they turned to keeping cavalry; for two hundred or three
hundred cavalry paid by a Condottiere maintained his reputation, and the
payment was not such that it could not be met by men who had a State:
and so that this should be facilitated and to maintain themselves in even
greater reputation, they took away all the affection for and the reputation
of the infantry, and transferred those to their cavalry; and so greatly
increased this disorder, that the infantry was a minimum part of any of
the largest armies. Which usage ((together with many other disorders that
accompanied it)) made the Italian military so weak, that their province
has been easily trampled on by all the Ultramontanes. This error of esteeming
cavalry more than infantry is shown more openly by another Roman example.
The Romans were besieging Sora, and a squadron of cavalry having gone
out from the town to assault the camp, the Master of the Roman cavalry
went to meet it with his cavalry, and coming breast to breast, chance
would have it that in the first shock the Heads of both armies were killed;
and the fight continued none the less, while (both sides) remained without
direction, when the Romans in order to overcome the enemy more easily,
dismounted and forced the cavalry ((if they wanted to defend themselves))
to do similarly, and with all this the Romans carried the victory.
This example could not be better in demonstrating how much
greater virtu there is in the infantry than in the cavalry; for if in
the other cases the Consuls made the Roman cavalry dismount, it was to
succor the infantry which was suffering and in need of aid; but in this
case they dismounted, not to succor the infantry, nor to fight with enemy
infantry, but a combat of cavalry against cavalry, (and) not being able
to overcome them on horseback, they judged that by dismounting they would
be able more easily to overcome them. I want to conclude, therefore, that
a well organized infantry cannot be overcome without the greatest difficulty,
except by another infantry. Crassus and Marc Anthony overran the dominion
of Parthia for many days with very few cavalry and many infantry, and
encountered innumerable cavalry of the Parthians. Crassus with part of
the army was killed, Marc Anthony saved himself with virtu. None the less,
in this Roman affliction is seen how much the infantry prevailed against
the cavalry; for being in a large country where mountains are rare, rivers
rarer, distant from the sea, and far from all conveniences, none the less,
in the judgment of the Parthians themselves, he saved himself skillfully;
nor did the Parthian cavalry ever dare to try the discipline of his army.
If Crassus were returned to you, whoever examines his actions carefully
will see that he was rather deceived than overpowered, and never in his
greatest straits did the Parthians dare to hurl themselves against him,
rather they always went on flanking him and impeding his provisions, (and)
by promising them to him and then not observing it, they reduced him to
the last extremity.
I believe I should have to endure more hard work in persuading
(the reader) how much more superior is the virtu of the infantry than
that of the cavalry, except that there are many modern examples which
render the fullest testimony. And it has been seen how nine thousand Swiss
at Novara, mentioned above by us, went out and attacked ten thousand cavalry
and as many infantry, and defeated them, for the cavalry could not attack
them, and the infantry being forces composed for the most part of Gascons
and ill-disciplined, they (the Swiss) esteemed them little. It has subsequently
been seen how twenty six thousand Swiss went to encounter north of Milan
the King of the French, Francis, who had with him twenty thousand cavalry,
forty thousand infantry, and a hundred pieces of artillery; and if they
did not win the engagement, as at Novara, they fought valiantly for two
days, and though they were later routed, half of them were saved. Marcus
Attilius Regulus attempted to resist with his infantry not only (the attack
of) the cavalry, but the elephants: and if his design did not succeed,
yet it not that the virtu of his infantry was not such that he did not
have faith in them believing them capable of overcoming those difficulties.
I repeat, therefore, that to want to overcome a disciplined infantry it
is necessary to oppose them with a better disciplined infantry, otherwise
one goes to a manifest defeat.
In the time of Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan, about sixteen
thousand Swiss descended into Lombardy, whence the Duke having at that
time Carmignuola as his Captain, sent him with about a thousand cavalry
and a few infantry to meet them. This man, not knowing their method of
fighting, went to meet them with his cavalry presuming to be able to rout
them quickly. But finding them immovable, having lost many of his men,
he retired: and being a most valiant man, and knowing he had to take new
proceeding in new events, reorganized his forces and went to meet them;
and on coming to the engagement made all his men at arms dismount and
go on foot, and placing them at the head of the infantry, went to attack
the Swiss, who had no remedy (against them). For the forces of Carmignuola
being on foot and well armored, could easily enter between the ranks of
the Swiss without suffering any injury, and having entered therein could
easily attack them: So that of all that number, there remained only the
part which was saved through the humanity of Carmignuola.
I believe that many recognize this difference in virtu that
exists between the one and the other of these systems, but so great is
the infelicity of these times, that neither the examples of the ancients
or the moderns, nor the confession of error, is enough to cause the modern
Princes to re-see things, and to make them think that to give reputation
to the military of a Province or a State it is necessary to revive these
insinuations (of the ancients), to keep them close to one, to give them
reputation, to give them life, so that in return it may give him life
and reputation: And as they deviate from these methods, so they deviate
from the other methods mentioned above: whence there results that the
acquisitions become harmful, not an aggrandizement, to a State, as will
be told below.
THAT ACQUISITIONS IN REPUBLICS NOT WELL ORGANIZED AND THAT
DO NOT PROCEED ACCORDING TO ROMAN VIRTU, ARE THE RUIN AND NOT THE EXALTATION
OF THEM
This opinion contrary to the truth, founded upon those bad
examples that have been introduced by these corrupt centuries of ours,
causes men not to think of deviating from their accustomed habits. Would
it have been possible to persuade an Italian of thirty years ago that
ten thousand infantry could have attacked, in an open plain, ten thousand
cavalry and as many more infantry, and with these not only to fight them,
but to defeat them, as is seen in the example at Novara given by us many
times? And although histories are full (of such examples), yet they would
not have believed it; and if they had believed it, they would have said
that in these times one is better armed, and that a squadron of men at
arms would be more adept at charging a rock than a body of infantry: and
thus with these erroneous arguments their judgment was corrupted, nor
have they considered that Lucullus with few infantry routed one hundred
and fifty thousand cavalry of (King) Tigranes, and that among those horsemen
was a kind of cavalry entirely similar to our men at arms. And thus that
fallacy was uncovered by the example of the Ultramontane forces: And as
that which is narrated in histories is seen to be true in regard to infantry,
so also ought all the other ancient institutions to be believed to be
true and useful. And if this were believed, the Republics and Princes
would have erred less, would have been stronger in opposing the attack
that might come upon them, they would not have put their hope in flight,
and those who had the government in their hands would have known better
how to direct the manner of aggrandizement or the manner of preservation;
and they would have believed that for the city to increase its inhabitants,
to make associations for themselves and not subjects, to send colonies
to guard the acquired countries, to make capital of the plunder, to subdue
the enemy by incursions and engagements, and by sieges, to keep the public
rich, the private citizen poor, to maintain military exercises with the
greatest zeal, these are the ways to make a Republic great and to acquire
Empire. And if these means of expanding did not please them, they would
consider that acquisitions by any other means are the ruin of a Republic;
and they would place a restraint to all ambition, regulating the internal
affairs of the City well with laws and other customs, prohibiting conquests,
and thinking only of defending themselves, and to keep the defenses well
organized; as do the Republics of Germany, who, in this manner, live and
have lived for a long time.
None the less ((as I have said another time when discussing
the difference that existed between being organized for conquest and being
organized for preservation)) it is impossible that a Republic succeeds
in remaining quiet and enjoy its liberty and her limited confines; for
even if she does not molest others, she will be molested: and from being
molested there will arise the will and desire for conquest: and even if
she should not have any outside enemies, she would find some at home,
as it appears necessary to occur to all great Cities. And if the Republics
of Germany could live in this fashion, and have been able to endure a
long time, it arises from certain conditions that exist in that country
which are not found elsewhere, without which they could not have maintained
such a manner of living. That part of Germany of which I speak was subject
to the Roman Empire, as was France and Spain: but when the decline of
the Empire came afterwards, and the rule of that Empire reduced in that
Province, the more powerful Cities begun ((according to the weakness or
necessity of the Emperors)) to make themselves free, ransoming themselves
from the Empire by reserving a small annual rent to it: so that little
by little all those Cities which were held directly by the Emperor, and
were not subject to any Prince, ransomed themselves in similar fashion.
There occurred in these same times when these Cities were ransoming themselves,
that certain Communities subject to the Duke of Austria rebelled against
him, among which were Fribourg, the Swiss, and other like, which prospering
from the beginning, gradually expanded little by little, that they did
not return under the yoke of Austria, and became feared by their neighbors;
and these are those whom we call Swiss. And therefore this Province is
divided between the Swiss, Republics which they call Free Towns, Princes,
and the Emperor. And the reason that among such a diversity of forms of
government wars do not arise, or if they do arise they do not last long,
is that this shadow of an Emperor, who, although he has no power, none
the less he has so much reputation among them that he is their conciliator,
and with his authority by interposing himself as a mediator, quickly extinguishes
all trouble. And the major and longer wars that have occurred have been
those that took place between the Swiss and the Duke of Austria: and although
for many years past the Emperor and the Duke of Austria have been the
same person, yet he has never been able to overcome the audacity of the
Swiss, where there has never been a means of accord except by force: Nor
has the rest of Germany given him much help, as much because the Communities
do not want to injure those who want to live free as they do, as because
those Princes (are unable to aid him) part of whom cannot because they
are poor, part do not want to because they envy his power. These Communities
therefore can live contentedly with their small dominions because they
have no reason ((in respect to the Imperial authority)) of desiring a
greater one: They can live united within their walls because they have
an enemy nearby and who would take the opportunity to occupy them whenever
they should have a discord. If this Province was constituted otherwise,
it would behoove them to seek to expand and break their quiet existence.
And because elsewhere such conditions do not exist, this
way of living cannot be adopted, and it is necessary either to expand
by means of leagues, or to expand as the Romans did: And whoever governs
otherwise seeks not his life, but his death and ruin, for in a thousand
ways and for many reasons, the acquisitions are harmful; for he may very
well extend his Empire, but not power; and whoever acquires Empire and
not power together, comes to ruin. Whoever impoverishes himself in war
cannot acquire power, even though he is victorious, for he puts in more
than he draws out of the acquisitions; as the Venetians and Florentines
have done, who have been much weaker when the one had Lombardy and the
other Tuscany, than they were when the one was content with the (dominion
of the) sea, and the other with six miles of boundaries. For all of this
resulted from their having wanted to acquire but not to have known the
means to do so: and they merit so much more blame as they had less excuse,
having seen the methods which the Romans employed, and having been able
to follow their example, while the Romans, without any example, through
their prudence, knew how to find it by themselves. In addition to this,
acquisitions sometimes do no little damage to any well ordered Republic
when they acquire a City or a Province full of luxury, where those (indolent)
habits can be picked up through intercourse they have with them, as happened
to Rome first in the acquisition of Capua, and afterwards also to Hannibal.
And if Capua had been further distant from the City (of Rome), and if
the errors of the soldiers had not have prompt remedy, or if Rome had
been in any part corrupted, that acquisition without doubt would have
been the ruin of the Roman Republic: And Titus Livius bears witness of
this with these words; Capua the instrument of all pleasures, the least
conducive to military discipline, turned the spirit of the military away
from the memory of their country. And truly similar Cities or Provinces
avenge themselves against their conquerors without a fight and without
bloodshed; for by transferring to them their own bad habits they expose
them to being conquered by whoever assaults them. And Juvenal in his Satires
could not have better understood this part, when he says that, because
of the acquisitions of foreign lands, foreign customs had entered the
breasts of the Romans, and in exchange for parsimony and other very excellent
virtus, gluttony and luxury dwell there, and will avenge the conquered
world. If, therefore, the conquest was to be pernicious to the Romans
in the times when they proceeded with so much prudence and so much virtu,
what then would it be to those who deviate from their methods? And what
would it be, if in addition to the other errors they make ((which have
been discussed at length above)), they avail themselves of mercenary or
auxiliary soldiers? Whence often those injuries result which will be mentioned
in the following chapter.
WHAT PERILS ARE BROUGHT TO THAT PRINCE OR THAT REPUBLIC
WHICH AVAILS ITSELF OF AUXILIARY AND MERCENARY TROOPS
If I had not in another work of mine treated a length of
how useless mercenary and auxiliary troops are, and how useful their own
(national troops) are, I should extend myself in this discourse much more
than I will: but having talked of it at length elsewhere, I shall be brief
in this part. Nor did it seem to me I ought to pass it over entirely,
having found in Titus Livius ((as to auxiliary soldiers)) so striking
an example, for auxiliary soldiers are those which a Prince or a Republic
send to your aid, captained and paid: and referring to the text of Titus
Livius, I say, that the Romans at different places had routed two armies
of the Samnites with their army which had been sent to the succor of the
Capuans, and by this liberated the Capuans from that war which the Samnites
made against them, (and) as they wanted to return to Rome, in order that
the Capuans, who had been deprived of their garrisons should not become
a prey again to the Samnites, left two legions in the country of Capua
for their defense: Which legions, plunged into idleness, begun to delight
themselves there, so that forgetting their country and the reverence due
to Senate, decided to take up arms and make themselves lords of that country
which they had defended with their virtu, it appearing to them that the
inhabitants were not worthy to possess those things which they did not
know how to defend. Which matter becoming known, it was suppressed and
corrected by the Romans, as will be shown more fully where we will speak
of conspiracies.
I say again, therefore, that of all the other kinds of soldiers
the auxiliaries are the most harmful, because that Prince or that Republic
which calls them to their aid have no authority over them, but only he
who sends them has authority. For auxiliary soldiers are those who are
sent you by a Prince, as I have said, under their captains, under their
ensigns, and paid by them, as was this army that the Romans sent to Capua.
Such soldiers as these, when they had won, most of the time plunder as
well him who leads them as him against whom they are led; and they do
so either from the malignity of the Prince who sends them or from their
own ambition. And although the intention of the Romans was not to break
the accord and convention which they had made with the Capuans, none the
less the ease of attacking them appeared to those soldiers to be such,
that it was able to persuade them to think of taking the town and the
State from the Capuans. We could give many examples of this, but I deem
it sufficient to cite that of the Rhegians, whose lives and city were
taken away by a legion which the Romans had placed there as a guard. A
Prince or a Republic ought, therefore, first to take up any other proceeding
than to have recourse to bringing auxiliary forces into their State relying
on them for its defense, for every pact, every convention ((however hard))
that they have with the enemy, will be much lighter than such a proceeding.
And if past events are well read, and present ones discussed, it will
be found that for one who has had a good ending, infinite others have
been deceived. And an ambitious Prince or Republic cannot have a greater
opportunity to occupy a City or a Province, than to be requested by it
to send their armies to its defense. Therefore, he who is so ambitious
that he calls for such aid not only to defend himself but to attack others
as well, seeks to acquire that which he will not be able to hold, and
which can easily be taken away from him by him from whom he acquired it.
But the ambition of men is so great, that to gratify a present desire,
do not think of the evil which, in a short time, will result from it.
Nor do the ancient examples move him, as well in this as in the other
matters discussed; for if they were moved by them, they would see how
much more the liberality they show their neighbors, and the less desirous
they are of occupying them, so much the more they throw themselves into
your arms, as will be told below through the example of the Capuans.
THE FIRST PRAETOR WHICH THE ROMANS SENT ANY PLACE WAS THE
CAPUA, FOUR HUNDRED YEARS AFTER THEY HAD BEGUN TO MAKE WAR (AGAINST THAT
CITY)
It has been discussed at length above, how the Romans differed
in their manner of proceeding in their acquisitions from those who in
the present time expand their jurisdiction; and how they left (the people
of) those lands which they did not destroy living with their laws, including
even those who had surrendered to them, not as associates, but as subjects,
and how they did not leave in them any sign of the authority (Empire)
of the Roman people, but obligated them to some conditions, which so long
as they were observed by them, they would maintain them in their state
and dignity. And it is known that these methods were observed until they
went outside of Italy and commenced to reduce Kingdoms and States into
Provinces. There is no clearer example of this than that of the Praetors
sent by them to any place was to Capua; whom they sent, not because of
their ambition, but because they had been requested by the Capuans, who
((there being discord among them)) judged it necessary to have a Roman
Citizen within that City who would restore order and re-unify them. From
this example, (and) moved and constrained by a similar necessity, the
people of Antium also requested a Praetor from them. And T. Livius says
of this incident and (commenting) on this new method of ruling, That
they promised not only arms, but Roman justice. It is seen, therefore,
how much this facilitated Roman expansion; for those Cities mainly that
are accustomed to living free or to govern themselves by their own citizens,
remain more quiet and content under a government they do not see ((even
though it may have some inconvenience in itself)) than under one which
they see every day, as it would appear to them they would be reproached
by their servitude every day. Another advantage also results to the Prince
who, not having at hand his ministers, judges and magistrates to render
both civil and criminal decisions in that City, (and) no sentence being
able ever to be pronounced which will bring censure or infamy upon the
Prince, in this manner, comes to escape many causes of calumny and hatred.
¶ And that this is the truth, in addition to the ancient
examples which could be cited, there is one recent example in Italy. For
((everyone knows)) Genoa having been occupied by the French many times,
the King always ((except at the present time)) has sent a French Governor
who governs in his name. Only at present has he allowed that City to be
governed by itself and by a Genoese governor, not by election of the King,
but because necessity so ordained. And without doubt, if it were to be
examined as to which of these two methods gives more security to the King
from the Rule (Empire) over it, and more contentedness to that people,
without doubt this latter method would be approved. In addition to this,
men will so much more readily throw themselves into your arms the less
you appear disposed to subjugate them, and so much less will they fear
you in connection with their liberty as you are more humane and affable
with them. This affability and liberality made the Capuans have recourse
to request the Praetor from the Romans: that if the Romans had shown the
slightest desire to send one, they would quickly have become jealous and
would have kept their distance from them (Romans).
¶ But what need is there to go to Capua and Rome for
examples, when we have them in Florence and Tuscany? Everyone knows how
the City of Pistoia a long time ago came voluntarily under the Florentine
Empire (Dominion). Everyone also knows how much enmity there has existed
between the Florentines, the Pisans, the Lucchese, and the Sienese; and
this difference in spirit has not arisen because the Pistoians do not
value their liberty as the others or do not esteem themselves as much
as the others, but because the Florentines have always borne themselves
toward them (the Pistoians) as brothers, and like enemies towards the
others. It was this that caused the Pistoians to have run voluntarily
under their Dominion, and the others to have used, and still use, every
force not to come under them. And doubtless, if the Florentines either
by means of leagues or by rendering them aid, had cultivated instead of
frightening their neighbors, at this hour they would have been Lords of
Tuscany. I do not judge by this that arms and force are not to be employed,
but that they ought to be reserved as the last resort where and when other
means are not enough.
HOW OFTEN THE OPINIONS OF MEN IN JUDGING THINGS (TO BE)
GREAT ARE FALSE
Those who have found themselves witnesses of the deliberations
of men have observed, and still observe, how often the opinions of men
are erroneous; which many times, if they are not decided by very excellent
men, are contrary to all truth. And because excellent men in corrupt Republics
((especially in quiet times)) are frowned upon both from envy and from
other reasons of ambition, it follows that a common deception (error)
is judged good, or it is put forward by men who want favors more readily
for themselves than for the general good. When this error, in times of
adversity, is discovered, then from necessity refuge is sought among those
who in times of quiet were almost forgotten, as will be discussed in full
in its proper place. Certain events also arise where men who do not have
a great amount of experience of things are easily deceived, for they have
in them that incident which resembles so many similar actions which are
true as to make that one believed, (and) upon cases such as this men are
persuaded. These things have been said of that (error) which the Praetor
Numicus ((when the Latins were routed by the Romans)) persuaded them,
and of that (error) which a few years ago was believed by many, when Francis
I, King of France, attempted the conquest of Milan, which was defended
by the Swiss.
¶ I say, therefore, that after the death of Louis XII,
and Francis of Angouleme succeeded to the kingdom of France, and when
he desired to restore to the kingdom the Duchy of Milan, which a few years
before was occupied by the Swiss, through the help of Pope Julius II,
desired to obtain aid in Italy which should facilitate the enterprise
for him; and, in addition to the Venetians whom King Louis and gained
over to himself, attempted to regain the Florentines and Pope Leo X, deeming
his enterprise would be easier any time he should have regained those
people to himself, inasmuch as the forces of the King of Spain were in
Lombardy, and the other forces of the Emperor were in Verona. Pope Leo
did not yield to the desires of the king, but was persuaded by those who
counselled him ((according as it was said)) to remain neutral, showing
him that certain victory consisted in this proceeding, for the Church
not to have either the King (of France) or the Swiss too powerful in Italy;
but if he wanted to bring it (the Church) to its ancient liberty, it was
necessary to liberate her from the servitude of the one and the other.
And because it was not possible to overcome one and the other, or each
one separately, or both together, it would be best that one should overcome
the other, and that the Church with her friends should attack the one
that remained victor. And it was impossible to find a better opportunity
than the present, as the one and the other were in the field, and the
Pope had his forces organized so as to be able to show himself on the
borders of Lombardy and near to both armies, under pretext of wanting
to guard his possessions; and where he could remain until an engagement
should take place, which reasonably ((both armies being of equal virtu))
ought to be bloody for both parties, and leave the victor so debilitated
that it would be easy for the Pope to assail him and rout him, and thus
he would, with great glory to himself, to remain Lord of Lombardy and
arbiter of all Italy. And how much this opinion was wrong is to be seen
from the result, for the Swiss were defeated after a long fight, and the
forces of the Pope and of Spain did not presume to assault the victors,
but prepared for flight: which also would not have done them good if it
had not been for the humanity or indifference of the (French) King, who
did not seek a second victory, but it sufficed him to make an accord with
the Church.
This advice was based on certain reasons which at a distance
appear true, but are entirely alien to the truth. For it rarely happens
that the victor loses many of his soldiers, because the victor loses only
those who die in battle, none by flight; and in the ardor of the combat,
when men have turned to face one another, only a few fall, especially
because very often it only lasts a short time: and even if it did last
a long time and many of the victors should die, the reputation which follows
the victory and the terror which it brings with it, are such that it greatly
outweighs the injury which the death of his soldiers causes the victor
to endure. So that an army, which in the belief that he has been weakened,
should go and meet him, will find itself deceived, unless the army should
be such as to be able to have combatted with him at any time, even before
the victory. In this case it is possible to win or lose according to its
fortune and virtu; but that one which should have first fought, and won,
will have rather the advantage over the other. This was recognized for
certain by the experience of the Latins and by the error that the Praetor
Numicus committed, and by the injuries which those people suffered who
believed him, when ((after the Romans had defeated the Latins)) he shouted
throughout all the country of Latium now was the time to assault the Romans
weakened by the fight they had had with them, and that only the name of
victory remained to the Romans, inasmuch as all the other injuries they
had suffered were as though they had been defeated, and that any little
force that should assault them anew would destroy them. Whence those people
who believed him raised a new army, but were quickly routed, and suffered
those injuries which those people always suffer who hold similar opinions.
HOW MUCH THE ROMANS, IN JUDGING THE MATTERS FOR ANY INCIDENT
THAT SHOULD NECESSITATE SUCH JUDGMENT, AVOIDED HALF-WAY MEASURES
Such was the state of things in Latium, that they could
endure neither peace nor war. Of all the happy and unhappy states
to which a Prince or a Republic can be reduced is to come to such terms
that they cannot accept peace or sustain war; to which those are reduced
who are oppressed too much by the conditions of the peace, and who, on
the other hand, ((wanting to make war)) would have to throw themselves
as prey to those who aid them, or to remain prey to the enemy. And all
this comes from evil counsels and from the bad procedure of not having
well measured their strength, as was said above. For that Republic or
that Prince which should measure them well, will only with difficulty
be brought to that condition which the Latins were brought, who made an
accord with the Romans when they ought not to have, and declared war when
they ought not to have, and thus they knew how to manage so that the enmity
and friendship of the Romans were equally damaging to them. The Latins
were therefore overcome and afflicted in the extreme, first by Manlius
Torquatus, and afterwards by Camillus, who having constrained them to
give themselves up and put themselves into the arms of the Romans, and
having placed guards throughout the towns of Latium, and having taken
hostages from all, returned to Rome and reported to the Senate that all
Latium was in the hands of the Roman people. And as this judgment was
notable and merits being observed so as to be able to be imitated when
similar opportunities are given to Princes, I want to cite the words which
Livius placed in the mouth of Camillus, which give witness both of the
manner which the Romans held in expanding and how in the judgments of
the State they always avoided half-way measures and turned to extremes.
For a government consists only in so holding the subjects that they cannot
or ought not want to injure you. This is done either by assuring yourself
entirely by taking away from them all means of harming you, or by benefiting
them so that it would not be reasonable that they would have a desire
for any change of fortune. Which is entirely understood, first from the
proposition of Camillus, and then by the judgment given by the Senate
upon it. His words were these: The immortal Gods caused you to go where
you were able to by these counsels, placing in your hands whether Latium
should exist. Therefore, you can prepare a peace in perpetuity in relation
to the Latins, either by violence or forgiveness. Will you proceed cruelly
against those whom you conquered and who gave themselves up to you? If
so, you are at liberty to destroy all Latium. Will you rather by example
desire to increase the power of the Roman Republic by accepting those
whom you have overcome into your citizenship? If so, you have the opportunity
for a most glorious increase. Certainly that Empire is more firm which
enjoys obedience. While, therefore, their minds are in a stupor and in
suspense, it behooves you to assure yourselves either through punishment
or benefits. This proposition was followed by the decision of the
Senate which was in accordance with the words of the Consul, so that going
from town to town which were of importance, they either bestowed benefits
on them or destroyed them, granting to the beneficiaries exemptions and
privileges, giving them Citizenship, and assuring them in every way: the
others they destroyed their towns, colonies were sent there, (the inhabitants)
transferred to Rome, and so dispersing them that they could never by arms
or by counsel injure Rome.
Nor did they (the Romans) ever employ neutral means in these
matters of moment ((as I have said)). Princes ought to imitate this judgment,
and the Florentines ought to have adopted this course when, in MDII (1502)
Arezzo and all the Val Di Chiana rebelled: which if they had done so,
they would have secured their Empire and greatly increased the City of
Florence, and given her those fields which she lacked in order to live.
But they employed that middle way, which is most pernicious in the judging
of men, so that they exiled part of the Aretini, and a part they condemned
to death, and they deprived all of them of their honors and their ancient
ranks in the City, but left the City entire. And when any Citizen in their
deliberations advised that Arezzo should be destroyed, those who were
deemed more wise said that it would be of little honor to the Republic
to destroy her, as it would appear that Florence lacked the strength to
hold her: which reasons are of those which appear to be, but are not,
true; for by this same reason a parricide, a criminal, or an infamous
person would not be put to death, as it would be a shame for that Prince
to show that he did not have the power to be able to restrain a solitary
man, And those who have similar opinions do not see, that individual men,
and a whole City, will some times so sin against a State, that as an example
to others, and for his own security, a Prince has no other remedy but
to destroy them. And honor consists in being able and knowing when and
how to castigate them, not in being able with a thousand dangers to hold
them, for the Prince who does not castigate evil-doers in a way that he
can no longer do evil, is held to be either ignorant or cowardly. This
judgment which the Romans gave when it was necessary, is also confirmed
by the sentence given against the Privernati. Where from the text of Livius,
two things ought to be noted: the one, that which is mentioned above that
subjects ought to given benefits or destroyed: the other, how much the
generosity of spirit and speaking the truth helps, especially when it
is spoken in the presence of prudent men. The Roman Senate had assembled
to judge the Privernati, who had rebelled, but were later by force returned
to the Roman obedience. Many Citizens had been sent by the people of Privernatum
to beg pardon from the Senate, and when they had come into their presence,
one of them was asked by a Senator, what punishment do you think the
Privernati merit? To which the Privernate replied, That which those
who feel themselves worthy of liberty merit. To which the Consul replied,
If we remit your punishment, what peace can we hope to have with you?
To which that man responded, A faithful and perpetual one, if you give
us a good one; if a bad one, only a day-by-day one. Whence, although
many were displeased, the wiser part of the Senate said, This was the
voice of free and virile people, and they could not believe that it is
possible for that people, or an individual, would otherwise remain in
a condition that was punishment to them, except if it resulted from necessity.
Peace would be trustful where it was made voluntarily, and not from a
position where servitude is prevalent where it is hopeless to look for
good faith. And after these words they decided that the Privernati
should be Roman Citizens, and they honored them with the privileges of
their society, saying: Those who think of nothing except liberty are
here worthy of being Romans. So much did this true and generous response
(of the Privernati) please those generous spirits (Romans); for any other
response would have been false and cowardly. And those who believe men
to be otherwise ((especially if these are accustomed to be, or appeared
to be, free)) deceive themselves, and under this deception take up proceedings
that are neither good in themselves nor satisfactory to them (who are
affected by it). From which there often results rebellions and the ruin
of States.
But to return to our discussion, I conclude, both from this
and from the judgment given to the Latins, when a City, powerful and accustomed
to living free, is to be judged, it must be either destroyed or caressed,
otherwise every judgment is vain; and above all the middle-way course
ought to be avoided, which is pernicious, as it was to the Samnites when
they had enveloped the Romans at the Caudine forks, and when they did
not want to follow the advice of that old man who counselled them that
they should allow the Romans to go honorably, or to kill them all; but
by taking a middle way, disarming them and putting them under the yoke,
they allowed them to go full of ignominy and anger. So that a little afterwards,
to their harm, they realized how useful the sentence of that old man had
been and how harmful was their decision, as will be discussed more fully
in its place.
FORTRESSES ARE GENERALLY MORE HARMFUL THAN USEFUL
It may perhaps appear to these sages of our times as something
not well considered, that the Romans in wanting to assure themselves of
the people of Latium and of the City of Privernum, did not think of building
some fortresses there, which would be a restraint to hold them faithful;
especially as there was a saying in Florence alleged by our wise men,
that Pisa and other similar Cities ought to be held by fortresses. And
truly, if the Romans had been like them, they would have thought to build
them: but as they were of another virtu, of another judgment, of another
power, they did not build them. And so long as Rome lived free and followed
her institutions and virtuous constitutions, they never built one to hold
either a City or a province, but they did save some that had already been
built. Whence seeing the mode of proceeding of the Romans in this regard,
and that of the Princes in our times, it appears to me proper to put into
consideration whether it is good to build fortresses, or whether they
are harmful Or useful to him who builds them. It ought to be considered,
therefore, whether fortresses are built for defending oneself from the
enemy or to defend oneself form one's subjects.
In the first case they are not necessary, in the second
harmful. And I will begin by giving the reason why in the second case
they are harmful, I say that that Prince or that Republic which is afraid
of its subjects and of their rebelling, it results first from the fact
that that fear arises from the hate which the subjects have for them,
and the hate they have of the treatment given them. The ill treatment
results either from the belief of being able to hold them by force, or
from the little prudence of those who govern them; and one of the things
that makes them believe they are able to force them, is to have their
fortresses near them: for the ill treatment that is the cause of hatred,
arises in good part because of that Prince or that Republic have the fortresses,
which ((if this is true)) are much more harmful by far than useful: For
firstly ((as has been said)) they cause you to be more audacious and more
violent toward your subjects: afterwards there is not that internal security
of which you persuade yourself, as all the strength and violence that
is employed in holding a people are nothing, except these two: either
you have always to place a good army in the field, as the Romans had,
or you must disperse them, extinguish them, disorganize them, and so destroy
them that they are not able to come together to attack you; for if you
impoverish them, the despoiled ones will win their arms: if you
disarm them, fury will serve as arms: if you kill the Captains
and continue to injure the others, the Heads will spring up as those of
the Hydra: if you build fortresses, they are useful in times of peace
because they give you more courage to do evil to them, but in times of
war most useless because they will be assaulted by the enemy and by your
subjects, nor is it possible that they can resist the one and the other.
And if ever they were useless, they are now in our times on account of
artillery, because of which the small places, where moreover you cannot
retire behind earthworks, are impossible to defend, as we discussed above.
I want to discuss this manner more tritely. Either you,
a Prince, want to keep the people of the City in restraint with these
fortresses, or you, a Prince or a Republic, want to keep a City in restraint
that has been occupied in war. I want to turn to the Prince, and I say
to him that such fortresses cannot be more useless to him in holding his
Citizens in restraint for the reasons given above, for it makes you more
prompt and less regardful in oppressing them, and that oppression will
expose you to your ruin and will excite them so, that that fortress which
is the reason for it cannot afterwards defend you; so that a wise and
good Prince, in order to keep himself good and not give cause to his sons
to dare to become bad, will never build fortresses, so that they will
rely, not upon the fortresses, but on the good will of men. And if Count
Francesco Sforza who had become Duke of Milan was reputed wise and none
the less built fortresses in Milan, I say that in this case he was not
wise, and the result has shown that that fortress was harmful and not
a security to his heirs: for judging that through the medium of it to
live securely, and to be able to oppress their Citizens and subjects,
they indulged in all kinds of violence, so that they became so hated as
described above, that they lost the State as soon as the enemy assaulted
them: nor did that fortress defend them, nor did they have any usefulness
for them in war, and in peace had done them much harm: for if they had
not had them, and if because of little prudence they had not treated their
Citizens harshly, they would have discovered the peril more quickly, and
would have retreated, and would then have been able to resist the impetus
of the French more courageously with friendly subjects and without a fortress,
than with hostile subjects, and with the fortress, which do you no good
in any way, for either they (fortresses) are lost through the treachery
of those who guard them, or because of the violence of those who assault
it, or by famine.
And if you want them to do you any good and to help you
in recovering a lost State, where only the fortress remains to you, it
behooves you to have an army with which you can assault those who have
driven you out; and if you have the army you would recover the State in
any case, (and) even more (easily) if the fortress did not exist, and
so much more easily as men would be more friendly than they were to you,
for you had maltreated them because of the pride of having the fortress.
And from experience it has been seen that this fortress of Milan was of
no usefulness either to the Sforza or to the French in times of adversity
for the one or the other; rather it brought much harm and ruin to both,
not having given thought because of it to more honest means of holding
that State. Guidobaldo Duke of Urbino, son of Frederick, who is his time
was an esteemed Captain, was driven out of his State by Cesare Borgia,
son of Pope Alexander VI; when afterwards because of an incident that
had arisen he returned there, he caused all the fortresses that existed
in that province to be destroyed, judging them to be injurious. For he
being beloved by men, did not need them on their account, and with regard
to his enemies, he had seen that he could not defend them; as they needed
an army in the field to defend them, he resolved to destroy them. Pope
Julius, after having driven out the Bentivogli from Bologna, built a fortress
in that City, and afterwards had those people assassinated by one his
Governors: so that that people rebelled, and the Pope quickly lost the
fortress; and thus the fortress did him no good, but injury, and the more
so, that by conducting himself otherwise it could have done him good.
Niccolo Da Costello, father of the Vitelli, returning to his country when
he had been exiled, quickly razed two fortresses that Pope Sixtus IV had
built, judging that the good will people, not the fortresses, would keep
him in that State. But of all the other examples, the most recent and
the most notable in every way, and apt to show the uselessness of building
them and the usefulness of destroying them, is that of Genoa which ensued
in the most recent time. Everyone knows that in MDVII (1507) Genoa rebelled
against Louis XII, King of France, who had come in person with all his
forces to recover it, and having recovered it, he had a fortress built
stronger than all others known up to the present time; it was impregnable
because of its location and other circumstances, being placed on the apex
of a hill that extended into the sea, called Codefa by the Genoese, and
by means of this he commanded all the port and great part of the town
of Genoa. Afterwards in the year MDVII (1512) it happened that the French
forces were driven out of Italy, Genoa rebelled notwithstanding the fortress,
and Ottaviano Fregoso seized the State, who, after sixteen months and
with every industry, captured it by starvation. And everyone believed,
and many counselled him, that he should preserve it as a refuge in any
event: but being a most prudent man, (and) knowing that the good will
of men and not fortresses maintained Princes in their States, destroyed
it. And thus without founding his State on the fortress, but on his virtu
and prudence, he has held it and still holds it. And where before only
a thousand infantry usually were enough to overturn the State of Genoa,
his adversaries have assaulted him with ten thousand and have not been
able to harm him. It will be seen from this, therefore, that the destruction
of the fortress did no more harm Ottaviano, than the building of it protected
the King of France. For when he was able to come into Italy with his army,
he was able to recover Genoa without the fortress being there; but without
the army he could not come into Genoa even though he had a fortress there.
For him, therefore, it was an expense to do (build) it and a disgrace
to lose it: To Ottaviano the recovery of it was glorious and the destruction
of it useful.
But let us come to the Republics which build fortresses,
not within their own country, but inside the towns they acquire. And if
the example given of France and Genoa are not enough to demonstrate the
fallacy of this, those of Florence and Pisa will be enough for me; for
the Florentines build fortresses in order to hold that City, and did not
understand that to hold a City which was always hostile to Florentine
rule, had lived in freedom, and had resorted to rebellion as a refuge
for liberty, it was necessary in wanting to observe the old Roman method,
either to make her an associate or to destroy her: for the virtu of fortresses
is seen in the coming of King Charles, to whom they all surrendered, either
through the treachery of those who guarded it, or from fear of a greater
evil: for if there had not been one, the Florentines never would have
based their holding Pisa on it, and the King (of France) could never in
that manner have deprived the Florentines of that City: and the means
by which they had maintained it up to that time would perhaps have been
sufficient to preserve it, and without doubt would have stood the test
better than the fortress.
I conclude, therefore, that to hold one's own country a
fortress is injurious and to hold towns that are acquired fortresses are
useless: And I want the authority of the Romans to be enough (for me),
who razed the walls of those towns which they wanted to hold, having taken
them by violent means, and never rebuilt them. And if anyone should cite
in opposition to this opinion that (example) of Tarantum in ancient times
and of Brescia in modern times, both of which places were recovered from
their rebellious subjects by means of fortresses, I reply, that for the
recovery of Tarantum Fabius Maximus was sent at the beginning of the year
with the entire army, who would have been more apt to have recovered it
if there had not been a fortress: for although Fabius had used that means,
if there had not been this means (fortress), he would have used other
means which would have had the same result. And I do not know of what
usefulness a fortress may be, if in the recovery of a town, a consular
army with Fabius Maximus for its Captain is needed to recover it: And
that the Romans would have recovered it in any event, is seen by the example
of Capua where there was no fortress, and which they reacquired through
the virtu of the army. But let us come to Brescia. I say that there rarely
occurs that which occurred in that rebellion, that while the fortress
remains in your power ((the town having revolted)) you should have a large
army (and) nearby as was that of the French: for Monsignor De Foix, Captain
of the King, being with his army at Bologna and learning of the loss of
Brescia recovered the town by means of the fortress. The fortress of Brescia,
therefore, ((in order to be of benefit)) also needed a Monsignor De Foix,
and a French army which had to succor it in three days: Hence this example
in contrast to opposite examples is not enough, for many fortresses have
been taken and retaken in wars of our times, by the same fortune as field
campaigns (have taken and retaken), not only in Lombardy, but also in
the Romagna, in the Kingdom of Naples, and throughout all parts of Italy.
But as to building fortresses in order to defend oneself
from external enemies, I say that they are not necessary to those people,
or to those Kingdoms that have good armies, and are useless to those who
do not have good armies: for good armies without fortresses are sufficient
to defend themselves, and fortresses without good armies cannot defend
you. And this is seen from the experience of those who are held to be
excellent as governors and in other things, as was the case with the Romans
and the Spartans; for if the Romans did not build fortresses, the Spartans
not only abstained from building them, but even did not permit the City
to have walls, because they wanted (to rely on) the personal virtu of
their men to defend them, (and) not some other means of defense. When,
therefore, a Spartan was asked by an Athenian whether the walls of Athens
appeared beautiful to him, he replied "yes, if the (City) was inhabited
by women".
The Prince, therefore, who has good armies, may have on
the frontiers of his State, or on the sea, some fortresses that could
resist the enemy for some days until he could be checked; this may sometimes
be a useful thing, but is not a necessary one. But when the Prince does
not have a good army, then having fortresses throughout his State or at
the frontiers, are either injurious or useless to him: injurious, because
he loses them easily, and when they have been lost they are turned (make
war) against him; or even if they should be so strong that that enemy
cannot occupy them, they are left behind by the enemy army, and are of
no benefit; for good armies, unless they are confronted by equally brave
ones, enter into enemy country regardless of the City or fortress which
they leave behind, as is seen in ancient histories; and as Francesco Maria
did, who in recent times, in order to assault Urbino, left ten enemy Cities
behind him, without taking any account of them. That Prince, therefore,
who can raise a good army, can do without building fortresses: He who
does not have a good army, ought not to build. He ought indeed to fortify
the City where he lives, and keep it fortified, and keep the Citizens
of that City well disposed, in order to be able to sustain an enemy attack
so that he can (keep it) free by an accord or by external aid. All other
plans are an expense in times of peace, and useless in times of war. And
thus whoever considers all that I have said, will recognize the Romans
as wise in all their other institutions, as they were prudent in their
judgments concerning the Latins and the Privernati, where, not thinking
of fortresses, they assured themselves of these people by wiser and more
virtuous means.
THAT THE ASSAULTING OF A DISUNITED CITY IN ORDER TO OCCUPY
IT BY MEANS OF ITS DISUNION IS AN ERROR
There was so much disunity within the Roman Republic between
the Plebs and the Nobility that the Veienti together with the Etruscans
((through the medium of such disunion)) thought they could extinguish
the name of Rome. And having raised an army and made incursions upon the
fields of Rome, the Senate sent Gnaius Manilus and M. Fabius against them,
(and) when they had led their army near the army of the Veienti, the Veienti
did not cease both with assaults and insults to attack and abuse the Roman
name; and so great was their temerity and insolence that, from being disunited
the Romans became united, and coming to battle they defeated and routed
them. It will be seen, therefore, how much men deceive themselves ((as
we discussed above)) in adopting some course, and how many times they
believe they can gain a thing and lose it. The Veienti believed that by
assaulting the Romans when they were disunited, they could defeat them,
but that assault was the cause of the unification of them (the Romans)
and of their (the Veienti) ruin. For the cause of disunity in Republics
most of the times is due to idleness and peace; the cause of unity is
fear and war. And, therefore, if the Veienti had been wise, the more disunited
they saw the Romans, the more they would have kept war away from them,
and sought to oppress them by the arts of peace. The way to do this is
to gain the confidence of the people of that City which is disunited,
and to manage to become arbiters between the parties, as long as they
did not come to arms. But if they come to arms, to give light aid to the
weaker party, as much to keep up the war longer and make them consume
themselves, as well not to make them wholly apprehensive because of your
large forces that you should want to oppress them and become their Prince.
And if this part is well carried out it will always almost happen that
you will obtain the object which you had presupposed. The City of Pistoia
((as I have said in other discussions and on other matters)) did not come
to the Republic of Florence with other arts than this; for she being divided,
and the Florentines favoring first the one party, and then the other,
without caring for either, brought her to such terms that, weary of her
tumultuous existence, she came to throw herself spontaneously into the
arms of Florence. The City of Siena has never changed her State with the
help of the Florentines unless that help has been weak and small. For
when it has been strong and large, they caused that City to become united
in defense of the existing government. I want to add another example to
those written above. Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan, often made war against
the Florentines, relying on their disunity, and always was the loser.
So that he had to say, lamenting his enterprise, that the follies of the
Florentines had made him spend two millions in gold uselessly.
The Veienti and the Tuscans, therefore, ((as was said above))
were deceived by this opinion, and were in the end defeated by the Romans
in one engagement. And thus in the future anyone who believes he can subjugate
a people in a similar manner and for similar reasons will be deceived.
CONTEMPT AND INSULT GENERATE HATRED AGAINST THOSE WHO EMPLOY
THEM, WITHOUT ANY USEFULNESS TO THEM
I believe that it is one of the great signs of prudence
which men exhibit in abstaining from threatening and injuring anyone with
words, for neither the one and the other takes away strength from the
enemy; but the one makes him more cautious, and the other causes him to
have greater hatred against you, and with more industry to think of injuring
you. This is seen from the example of the Veienti of whom discussion was
had in the above chapter, who added the opprobrium of words to the injury
of war against the Romans, from which every prudent Captain ought to make
his soldiers abstain, as they are things which inflame and excite the
enemy to revenge, and in no way impede him ((as has been said)) in attacking
you, so that they are all as arms turned against you. A notable example
of which occurred in Asia, where Gabades, Captain of the Persians, having
for a long time besieged Amida, and becoming weary of the siege, decided
to depart, and having already broken up his camp, all the inhabitants
of the town came upon the walls; and having become haughty from (the thought)
of victory, did not omit assailing them with every kind of injury, vituperating
them, accusing and reproaching them for their cowardice and poltroonery.
Irritated by this, Gabades changed his counsel and returned to the siege,
and so great was his indignation at this injury, that in a few days he
took and sacked it. And the same thing happened to the Veienti, to whom
((as has been said)) it was not enough to make war against the Romans,
but they also had to vituperate them with words, and went up to the very
stockade of their camp to speak their insults, irritating them more with
words than with arms: and those soldiers who at first fought unwillingly,
constrained the Consuls to enkindle the battle, so that the Veienti suffered
the punishment for their contumacy as was mentioned previously. Good Princes
(Leaders) of the army and good Governors of a Republic, therefore, have
to take every convenient means that these injuries and reproaches are
not used either by their Citizens or their army, either among themselves
or against the enemy, for then there arises those inconveniences mentioned
above; and among themselves, it would be even worse unless they are stopped,
as prudent men have always stopped them. The Roman legions left at Capua
having conspired against the Capuans, as will be narrated in its proper
place, and this conspiracy having given rise to sedition, which was later
quelled by Valerius Corvinus, among the other stipulations of the convention
that was made, was that they ordained the greatest penalties against those
who should ever reprove any of those soldiers with that sedition. Tiberius
Gracchus, who in the war against Hannibal, was made Captain over a certain
number of slaves whom the Romans had armed because of the scarcity of
men, ordered among the first things that the capital penalty (be inflicted)
on whoever should reproach any of them with their (previous) servitude.
So much did the Romans think this was a harmful thing ((as has been said
above)) to treat men with contempt and reproach them with any disgrace,
because there is nothing that so excites their spirit and generates greater
indignation, that whether true or false, it is said: For harsh statements,
even when they have the least truth in them, leave their harshness in
the memory.
TO PRUDENT PRINCES AND REPUBLICS, IT OUGHT TO BE ENOUGH
TO WIN, FOR OFTEN IT IS NOT ENOUGH IF THEY LOSE
The use of dishonorable words against an enemy arises most
of the times from the insolence that victory, or the false hope of victory,
gives you; which false hope makes men err not only in their words, but
also in their deeds. For when this (false) hope enters the hearts of men,
it makes them go beyond the mark, and often lose that opportunity of obtaining
a certain good, hoping to obtain an uncertain better. And because this
is a matter that merits consideration, this deception that exists in men
and very often causing damage to their State, it appears to me it ought
to be demonstrated in detail by ancient and modem examples, as it cannot
be so clearly demonstrated by arguments. After Hannibal and defeated the
Romans at Cannae, he sent his ambassadors to the Carthaginians to announce
the victory and request their support. This was discussed in the Senate
as to what should be done. Hanno, an old and prudent Carthaginian Citizen
advised that they should use this victory wisely in making peace with
the Romans, for, having won, they were able to do so with more favorable
conditions than they would expect (to make them) after a defeat; for the
intentions of the Carthaginians ought to be to show the Romans that it
was enough for them in combatting them, to have obtained a victory for
themselves and not to seek to lose it in the hope of a greater one. This
proceeding was not taken, but later when the opportunity was lost, it
was well recognized by the Carthaginian Senate to have been a wise one.
After Alexander the Great had already conquered all the Orient, the Republic
of Tyre ((noble and powerful in those times for having their City situated
on water like the Venetians)), seeing the greatness of Alexander, sent
ambassadors to tell him they wanted to be his good servants and to render
him that obedience he wanted, but that they were not ready to accept him
or his forces in their land. Whereupon Alexander, indignant that a City
should close those doors that all the world had opened to him, rebuffed
them, and, not accepting their conditions, went to besiege them. The town
was situated in water and very well supplied with provisions and the other
munitions necessary for defense, so that Alexander saw after four months
(of siege) that taking the City would take away more time and glory from
him that many other acquisitions had not taken away, decided to try for
an accord and concede to them that which they themselves had asked. But
those people of Tyre having become haughty, not only did not want to accept
the accord, but killed whoever came to present it. At which Alexander
being indignant, he exerted himself with so much strength to its extinction
that he took and destroyed it, and killed or made slave its people. In
the year 1502 a Spanish army came into the Florentine dominion to reinstate
the Medici in Florence and to tax the City, they being called there by
its Citizens who had given them hope that, as soon as they had entered
the Florentine dominion, they would take up arms in their favor; and having
entered the plain and not discovering anyone, and having a scarcity of
provisions, they attempted an accord: which the people of Florence, having
become haughty, did not accept; when there resulted the loss of Prato
and the ruin of that State (Florence). Princes who are attacked cannot
make a greater error, therefore, especially when the assault is made by
men who are far more powerful than they, than to refuse any accord, and
especially when it is offered; for it would never be offered so harshly
that it will not be in some way good for those who accept it, and they
will in a way have obtained a part of the victory. For it should have
been enough for the people of Tyre that Alexander had accepted those conditions
which he at first refused, and it should have been a great enough victory
for them that they had with arms in hand made so great a man condescend
to their will. It should also have been enough for the Florentine people,
and it would have been a great victory for them, if the Spanish army had
yielded in something to their will, and not fulfill all things of theirs,
for the intention of that army was to change the State in Florence, to
take it away from its attachment to, France, and extract money from it.
If of the three things, they (Spaniards) should have obtained the last
two, and there should have remained to the (Florentine) people the first,
that of saving their State, there would have remained within each one
some honor and satisfaction and the people ought not to have cared for
the other two things, as long as they existed free; nor ought they ((even
if they should have seen a greater and almost certain victory)) to have
wanted to put any part of it (their liberty) to the discretion of fortune,
as this was their last resource, which no prudent man would ever risk
except from necessity.
Hannibal departed from Italy where he had been for sixteen
glorious years, recalled by the Carthaginians to succor his own country;
he found Hasdrubal and Syphax broken, the Kingdom of Numida lost, Carthage
restricted between the confines of its walls, and no other refuge remaining
but he and his army: and knowing that this was the last resource of his
country, he did not want to place it in jeopardy without first having
tried every other remedy, and was not ashamed to ask for peace, judging
that if his country had any remedy, it was in it (peace) and not in war;
which afterwards having been refused, he did not hesitate to combat ((and
to be defeated)), judging he might have (a chance to) win, or if he lost,
to lose gloriously. And if Hannibal who had so much virtu and had his
army intact, sought peace first rather than a battle, when he saw that
losing it his country would be enslaved, what ought someone else with
less virtu and less experience than he do? But men make this error of
not knowing where to place the limits to their hopes, and by relying on
these without otherwise measuring their resources, they are ruined.
HOW DANGEROUS IT IS FOR A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC, NOT TO
AVENGE AN INJURY MADE AGAINST THE PUBLIC OR A PRIVATE (CITIZEN)
That which indignation makes men do, is easily recognized
as that which happened to the Romans when they sent the three Fabii as
ambassadors to the Gauls who had come to assault Tuscany, and Clusium
in particular. For the people of Clusium having sent to Rome for aid,
the Romans sent Ambassadors to the Gauls that in the name of the Roman
people they should signify to them to abstain from making war against
the Tuscans: These ambassadors, being more accustomed to act than to speak,
having arrived there as the Gauls and Tuscans were engaged in battle,
put themselves among the first in combatting against them: Whence there
arose that, being recognized by them (the Gauls), all the indignation
that they had against the Tuscans turned against the Romans. This indignation
became greater, because the Gauls having complained to the Roman Senate
through their Ambassadors of this injury, and asked that in satisfaction
for the harm done that the three above-mentioned Fabii should be turned
over to them; not only were they not delivered to them or in any way castigated,
but when the Comitii assembled, they were made Tribunes with consular
powers. So that the Gauls seeing those men honored who ought to have been
punished, took it all to be to their disparagement and ignominy, and,
excited by anger and indignation, went to assault Rome, and captured it
all except the Campidoglio (Capitol). This ruin to the Romans resulted
only from their own non-observance of justice, for their Ambassadors having
sinned against the law of nations, instead of being castigated
were honored.
It is to be considered, therefore, how much every Republic
and every Prince ought to be careful in making a similar injury, not only
against an entire people, but even to an individual. For if a man is greatly
offended either by the public or by a private citizen, and is not avenged
according to his satisfaction, if he lives in a Republic he will seek
to avenge himself even with their ruin, if he lives under a Prince and
has any courage within himself, he will never remain quiet until in some
way he should have revenged himself against him, even though he may see
in it his own ruin. To verify this, there is no better or truer example
than that of Philip of Macedonia, father of Alexander. This man had in
his court Pausanias, a beautiful and noble youth, of whom Attalus, one
of the chief men close to Philip was enamored; and having several times
sought that he should consent (to his desires), but finding him opposed
to such things, decided to obtain by deceit and force that which he was
unable to obtain by other means. And he gave a grand banquet at which
Pausanias and many other noble Barons were gathered; after each one was
full of viands and wine, he caused Pausanias to be seized, and brought
to a retired place; and he not only gave vent to his libido by force,
but also to shame him still more, caused him to be abused in a similar
fashion by many others. Pausanias complained of this injury many times
to Philip, who for a time kept him in the hope of avenging him, but not
only did he not avenge him, but promoted Attalus to the governship of
a Province of Greece: Whence Pausanias seeing his enemy honored and not
castigated, turned all his indignation not against him who had injured
him, but against Phillip who had not avenged him; and one morning during
the solemn nuptial of the daughter of Phillip to Alexander of Epirus,
while Phillip was going to the Temple to celebrate them, between the two
Alexanders, his son and son-in-law, he (Pausanias) killed him. Which example
is very similar to that of the Romans, should be noted by anyone who governs,
that he ought never to underestimate a man so as to believe ((adding injury
on injury)) that he whom he has injured does not think of avenging himself,
even with every danger and injury to himself.
FORTUNE BLINDS THE MINDS OF MEN WHEN SHE DOES NOT WANT
THEM TO OPPOSE HER DESIGNS
If we consider well how human affairs proceed, many times
many events will be seen to arise and accidents happen against which the
Heavens have not entirely desired that they should be provided. And if
this of which I speak happened at Rome where there was so much virtu,
so much religion, and so much order, it is no wonder that it should happen
much more often in a City or a Province which lacks the above mentioned
attributes. And as this case in point is most remarkable in demonstrating
the power of Heaven over human affairs, T. Livius relates it at length
and in the most effective language, saying that Heaven, wanting some means
to have the Romans know its power, first made those Fabii err who had
gone as ambassadors to the Gauls, and through whose deeds excited them
to make war against Rome: Afterward it ordained that, to reprimand them
for that war, nothing should be done in Rome worthy of the Roman people,
having first ordained that Camillus, who alone could be the remedy for
so much evil, was sent into exile at Ardea; afterwards when the Gauls
were approaching Rome, those people who had many times before created
a Dictator in order to check the attacks of the Volscians and other neighboring
enemies, did not create one when the Gauls came. Also they were slow and
without extraordinary diligence in making their selection of soldiers,
and were so slow in taking up arms, that only with great effort were they
in time to meet the Gauls on the river Allia, ten miles distant from Rome.
Here the Tribunes established their camp without any of the customary
diligence, without first examining the place, not circumscribing it with
ditches and palisades, and not using any human or divine remedy. And in
the order of battle, they made the ranks open and weak, so that neither
the soldiers nor the Captains did anything worthy of the Roman discipline.
They fought them without any bloodshed, for they fled before they had
been assaulted; and the greater part went off to Veii, the remainder retreated
to Rome, where they entered the Capitol without entering even their own
homes; so that the Senate with no thought of defending Rome ((any more
than the others)) did not close its gates, (and) a part of them fled,
another part entered the Capitol with the others. In defending it (the
Capitol), however, they did employ some non-tumultuous methods, for they
did not burden it with useless people, they supplied it with all the grain
they could so as to be able to endure a siege, and of the useless crowd
of old men and women and children, the greater part fled to the surrounding
towns, the rest remained in Rome a prey to the Gauls. So that whoever
had read of the things done by that people so many years before, and then
should read of the events of those times, could in no way believe that
it was the same people. And T. Livius who had told us of all the above
mentioned troubles, concludes by saying: Fortune thus blinds the minds,
when she does not want them to resist her power.
Nor can this conclusion be more true. Whence men who ordinarily
live in great adversity or prosperity merit less praise or less blame,
for most of the time it will be seen that they have been brought to ruin
or to greatness by some great expedient which Heaven has caused, giving
them the opportunity or depriving them of the ability to work with virtu.
Fortune indeed does this, when she wants to bring some great things, she
selects a man of much spirit and much virtu, that he will recognize those
opportunities she offers. So too in the same way, when she wants to bring
some great ruin, she promotes men who can do such ruin. And if anyone
should be able to resist her, she either kills him or deprives him of
all the faculties of being able to do any good. From this text it is to
be clearly recognized how fortune, in order to make Rome greater and bring
her to that greatness that she arrived at, judged it was necessary to
beat her ((as will be discussed at length in the beginning of the next
book)) but did not want to ruin her entirely. And because of this, it
is seen that she caused Camillus to be exiled and not killed, caused Rome
to be taken but not the Capitol, ordained that the Romans should not think
of any good thing in preparing Rome (for the attack), but should not lack
any good preparation for the defense of the Capitol. She caused ((as Rome
was to be taken)) that the greater part of the soldiers who were defeated
at the Allia to go to Veii, and thus cut off all means for the defense
of the City of Rome. And yet in ordaining this, she prepared everything
for her recovery, having conducted an entire Roman army to Veii, and Camillus
to Ardea, in order to be able to raise a large band under a Captain unstained
by any ignominy of defeat and completely dedicated to the recovery of
his country.
We might cite some modern example in confirmation of the
things mentioned here, but as I judge it unnecessary, ((this one being
able to satisfy anyone)) I shall omit it. I indeed reaffirm this to be
most true ((according as is seen from all histories)) that men can second
fortune but not oppose her, they can develop her designs but not defeat
them. They ought never to abandon themselves; because not knowing her
aims, (and) the devious and unknown ways she takes, they always have hope;
and in hoping, not to abandon themselves no matter in what (ill) fortune
or trouble they find themselves.
TRULY POWERFUL REPUBLICS AND PRINCES DO NOT PURCHASE FRIENDSHIP
WITH MONEY, BUT WITH VIRTU AND REPUTATION OF STRENGTH
The Romans were besieged in the Capitol, and although they
awaited succor from Veii and from Camillus, being driven by hunger, they
came to terms with the Gauls to ransom themselves with a certain amount
of gold, but while making these terms ((the gold already being weighed))
Camillus arrived with his army, which fortune caused ((as the historian
says)) so that the Romans should not live under an aura of ransom.
Which occurrence not only is more noteworthy in this instance, but more
so in the course of events of this Republic, where it is seen that they
never acquired lands by means of money, but always through the virtu of
their army. Which I do not believe ever to have happened with any other
Republic.
And among the other signs by which the power of a State
is recognized, is to see how it lives with its neighbors; and if it is
governed in a way that the neighbors ((so as to have them friendly)) are
its pensioners, then it is a certain sign that that State is powerful:
But when these said neighbors ((although inferior to it)) draw money from
it, then it is a great sign of its weakness. Let anyone read all the Roman
histories and he will see that the Massalians, the Aeduans, the Rhodians,
Hiero the Syracusan, Eumene and the Kings of Massinissa, who all lived
near to the confines of the Roman Empire, in order to have its friendship,
agreed to contribute to its needs and expenses by tribute, not seeking
any other return from it than to be defended. On the other hand, it will
be seen in weak States, and beginning with our own Florence in times past
in the period of her greatest reputation, that there was not a petty Lord
in the Romagna who did not get a pension from her, and in addition she
gave one to the Perugini, the Castellani, and all her other neighbors.
But if this City had been armed and strong, everything would have proceeded
oppositely, for everyone in order to have her protection would have given
money to her, and sought, not to sell their friendship, but to purchase
hers. Nor are the Florentines to be seen alone in this baseness, but the
Venetians and the King of France, who with so great a Kingdom lives tributary
to the Swiss and the King of England. All of which resulted from having
disarmed their people, and because that King and the others mentioned
above desired rather to enjoy a present usefulness of being able to plunder
the people, and to avoid an imaginary rather than a real peril, than to
do things which would have assured them and made their States happy in
perpetuity. Such baseness, if it sometimes produces some quiet, is in
times of necessity the cause of irreparable harm and ruin.
And it would be lengthy to recount how many times the Florentines,
and the Venetians, and this Kingdom (of France) have bought themselves
off in wars, and how many times they subjected themselves to an ignominy
to which the Romans were subjected only one time. It would be lengthy
to recount how many lands the Florentines and the Venetians have purchased,
in which disorders were seen afterwards, and that the things acquired
with gold cannot be defended with iron. The Romans continued in this high-minded
existence as long as they lived free, but when they came under the Emperors,
and the Emperors commenced to be bad, and to love the shade more than
the sun, they too begun to buy off now the Parthians, now the Germans,
now other neighboring peoples, which was the beginning of the ruin of
so great an Empire. Such troubles proceeded, therefore, from having disarmed
its own people, from which an even greater evil results, that the more
the enemy comes near, so much more will he find you weak. For whoever
lives in the manner mentioned above, ill treats those subjects who are
in the interior of his Empire so as to obtain men who can hold the enemy
at the frontiers. From this there arises that to keep the enemy more distant
he has to give subsidies to these Lords and peoples who are near their
borders. Whence there arises that these States so paid make a little resistance
at their frontiers, but as soon as the enemy has passed, they do not have
any advantage. And they do not see that this mode of proceeding of theirs
is against every good institution. For the heart and the vital parts of
the body have to be kept armored, and not its extremities, for without
these it is possible to live, but when the former are injured, it is possible
to die: And these States have their hearts unarmored but their hands and
feet armored. The disorders which have been caused to Florence have been
seen, and can be seen, every day, that as soon as an army passes the frontiers
and enters near the heart, no further remedy is to be found. In the last
few years the Venetians afforded similar proof, and if their City had
not been surrounded by water, their end would have been seen. This experience
has not often been seen in France because that Kingdom is so great that
it has few enemies who are superior. None the less, when the English in
MDXIII (1513) assaulted that Kingdom, all that Province trembled, and
the King himself and everyone else believed that only one defeat would
take away the State.
The contrary happened to the Romans, for the more the enemy
approached Rome, so much more he found that City powerful to resist him.
And it is seen in the coming of Hannibal into Italy, that after three
defeats and after so many captains and soldiers were killed, they were
able not only to sustain the enemy, but to win the war. All of which resulted
from her having the heart well armored and holding little account of the
extremities. For the foundation of their State was in the people of Rome,
the Latin people, and the other lands allied in Italy, and their Colonies,
from which they drew so many soldiers sufficient for then to conquer and
hold the world. And that this is true is seen from the question that Hanno
the Carthaginian put to those Ambassadors of Hannibal after the battle
at Cannae, who having magnified the things done by Hannibal, were asked
by Hanno if anyone had come from the Roman people to ask for peace, and
if any towns of the Latins or any of the Colonies had rebelled against
the Romans: and when they replied negatively, Hanno replied; This war
is yet as full as before.
It will be seen therefore, both from this discussion and
from what we have said elsewhere several times, how much difference there
is in the proceedings of present Republics from the ancient ones. Because
of this every day are seen astonishing losses and remarkable conquest,
for where men have little virtu, fortune greatly shows her power, and
as she varies it, Republics and States change often, and they will always
change until there springs up one who is a great lover of antiquity who
is able to rule so that she has no reason at every revolution of the sun
to show how powerful she can be.
HOW DANGEROUS IT IS TO BELIEVE EXILES
And it does not appear to me to be foreign to this subject
to discuss among other matters how dangerous a thing it is to believe
those who have been driven out of their country, these being matters that
are acted upon each day by those who govern States; and I am especially
able to demonstrate this by a memorable example given by T. Livius in
his history, even though it may be outside his subject. When Alexander
the Great crossed with his army into Asia, Alexander of Epirus, his brother-in-law
and uncle, came with his forces into Italy, having been called there by
the exiled Lucanians, who had given him the hope that he could through
their means occupy all that province. Whence he, upon their faith and
hope, having come into Italy, was killed by them, because they had been
promised a return to their Country by the Citizens if they would kill
him. It ought to be considered, therefore, how vain are the faith and
promises of those who find themselves deprived of their country. For,
as to their faith, it has to be borne in mind that anytime they can return
to their country by other means than yours, they will leave you and look
to the other, notwithstanding whatever promises they had made you. As
to their vain hopes and promises, such is the extreme desire in them to
return home, that they naturally believe many things that are false and
add many others by art, so that between those they believe and those they
say they believe, they fill you with hope, so that relying on them you
will incur expenses in vain, or you undertake an enterprise in which you
ruin yourself. The previously mentioned example of Alexander is enough
for me, but in addition, that of Themistocles, the Athenian, who, having
been declared a rebel, fled to Darius in Asia, where he promised him so
much if he should want to assault Greece, that Darius turned to that enterprise.
Themistocles, not being able to observe these promises, he poisoned himself,
either from shame or from fear of punishment. And if this error was made
by Themistocles, a most excellent man, it ought to be considered how much
more those men err who, because of less virtu, allow themselves to be
drawn by their desires and passions. A Prince, therefore, ought to go
slowly in undertaking an enterprise upon the representations of an exile,
for most of the times he will be left either with shame or very grave
injury. And as the taking of towns rarely succeeds by deceit or by intelligence
others within may have, it does not appear outside the subject to discuss
it in the following chapter, adding some account of how many ways the
Romans acquired them.
IN HOW MANY WAYS THE ROMANS OCCUPIED TOWNS
The Romans being very often at war, they always did so with
every advantage, both as to expense and as to every other thing that it
required. From this arose the fact that they guarded against the taking
of towns by siege, as they judged this method to be of such an expense
and so much trouble that it surpassed by far any usefulness that they
could draw from the acquisition: and because of this they thought that
it would be better and more useful to subjugate a town by any other means
than besieging it: whence there are very few examples of sieges made by
them in so many wars and in so many years. Their mode of taking Cities,
therefore, was either by assault or by voluntary surrender. The capture
by assault was either by force or by open violence, or by force mixed
with fraud: the open violence was either by assault without piercing the
walls ((which they called attacking the city in crown fashion))
because they surrounded the City with the entire army, as when Scipio
took New Carthage in Spain; or if this assault was not enough they addressed
themselves to breeching the walls with rams or with other machines of
war of theirs; or they made a mine and by means of it entered the City,
by which method they took the City from the Veienti: or in order to be
at the same level with those who defended the walls, they made towers
of wood: or they made embankments of earth placed against the outside
of the walls in order to come to a height above them. In the first case
those who were defending the towns against these assaults were exposed
to the greatest peril quickly from being assaulted on all sides and had
the greatest doubts of being able to remedy this, because they needed
to have many defenders in every place, (and) those they had were not numerous
enough to be able to substitute for or relieve those in every place, or
if they were able to do so, they were not all of equal courage to resist;
and if the fight was lost on any one side, all the rest were lost. It
happened, therefore, ((as I have said)) that this mode (of assault) many
times was a happy success. But if it did not succeed at the first (try),
they did not repeat it much, as it was a dangerous method for the army,
for defending themselves over so much space, everything was left weak
so as to be unable to resist a sortie that those inside might make, and
also it would fatigue the soldiers and cause disorder: so that they attempted
this method only one time and by surprise. As to the breaking down of
walls, it was opposed as in the present time by repairs; and to resist
the mines they made counter mines, and through which they opposed the
enemy either with arms or other means, among which was this that they
filled barrels with feathers which they set on fire while burning they
put them into the mine, so that the smoke and the smell impeded the entrance
to the enemy: and if they assaulted them with towers, they endeavored
to ruin them by fire. And as to earth embankments, they broke the wall
down where the embankment leaned against it, drawing inside the earth
which those outside were heaping, so that placing earth outside and taking
it away from inside, the embankment did not grow. These means of attack
cannot be attempted for long, and (if not successful) the siege must be
abandoned and other means sought to win the war, as did Scipio, when he
entered Attica, having assaulted Utica and not succeeding in taking it,
he betook himself from the field and sought to break the Carthaginian
army, or rather to turn to (regular) sieges as he did at Veii, Capua,
Carthage, Jerusalem, and similar towns which they occupied by sieges.
As to the acquisition of towns by stealth and violence,
((as happened at Palepolis, where the Romans occupied it by treating secretly
with those within)) this kind of conquest was tried by the Romans and
many others, but few succeeded: the reason is, that every least impediment
disrupts the design, and impediments come easily. For the conspiracy is
discovered before the deed happens, which is done without much difficulty,
as much from the treachery of those to whom it is communicated, as from
the difficulty of carrying it out, having to come together with enemies
or under some pretext with those with whom it is not permitted to speak.
But if the conspiracy is not discovered in its progress, then thousand
difficulties spring up in putting it into execution. For if you arrive
before the designated time or if you arrive after, everything is spoiled.
If a furtive noise is raised, as the geese at the Capitol, if a customary
order is broken, every least least error and every least fault made, will
ruin the enterprise. Added to this is the darkness of the night which
puts more fear into those who are engaged in those dangerous things. And
the greater part of men who are engaged in similar enterprises being unacquainted
with the situation of the country or the places where they are sent, are
confounded, become afraid, and will turn back at every least unforeseen
accident. And every false imagining acts to make them put themselves in
flight. Nor has anyone ever been found who was more successful in these
fraudulent and nocturnal expeditions than Aratus of Sicyon, who was as
valiant in these as he was pusillanimous in expeditions carried out openly
and in daylight. Which can be attributed rather to some occult virtu which
he possessed, than to any natural faculty in achieving success. Of these
attempts, many are projected, few are put to the test, and very few succeed.
As to the acquisition of Towns through surrender, they give
up either voluntarily, or by force. The willingness arises either from
some extrinsic necessity that constrains them to find refuge under you,
as did Capua to the Romans, or from the desire to be well governed, being
attracted by the good government which that Prince bestows on those who
have voluntarily placed themselves in his arms, as were the Rhodians,
the Massileans, and other such Citizens, who gave themselves to the Roman
People. As to forced surrenders, this force results either from a long
siege ((as was said above)), or from a continuous pressure from incursions,
depredations, and other ill treatment; which in wanting to avoid, a City
surrenders. Of all the methods mentioned, the Romans employed this last
more than any others, and during more than four hundred and fifty years
of harassing their neighbors with routs and incursions, and then by means
of accords obtained reputation over them, as we have discussed at another
time. And they always relied on this method, even though they tried all
others, which they found more dangerous or useless. For in a siege it
is the length of time and expense; in open assault it is doubtful and
dangerous; in a conspiracy it is uncertitude. And they (the Romans) saw
that by one rout of an enemy army they acquired a Kingdom in a day, but
in taking an obstinate City by siege, they consumed many.
HOW THE ROMANS GAVE THEIR CAPTAINS OF ARMIES UNCONTROLLED
COMMISSIONS
I think that ((reading this history of Livius and wanting
to profit)) all the methods of procedure of the Roman People and Senate
should be considered. And among other things that merit consideration,
is to see with what authority they sent out their Consuls, Dictators,
and other Captains of armies; from which it is seen that the authority
was very great, as the Senate did not reserve to itself anything other
than the authority to declare new wars, to confirm peace (treaties), and
left everything else to the arbitration power of the Consul. For once
a war was decided on by the People and the Senate ((for instance against
the Latins)) they remitted all the rest to the discretion of the Consul,
who could either make an engagement or not make it, and lay siege to this
or that town as seemed proper to him. Which things are verified by many
examples, and especially by that which occurred in the expedition against
the Tuscans. For Fabius, the Consul, having defeated them near Sutrium,
and planning afterwards to pass with the army through the Ciminian forest
and go to Tuscany, not only did not counsel with the Senate, but did not
even give them any notice, even though war was to be waged in a new unknown,
and dangerous country. Further witness of this is given by the decisions
which were made by the Senate on learning of this, who, when they had
heard of the victory Fabius had won, and fearful that he might take up
the proceeding of passing through the said forest into Tuscany, judging
that it would not be well to attempt that (war) and run that risk, sent
Legates to Fabius to make him understand he should not cross into Tuscany;
but when they arrived he had already crossed over, and had obtained this
victory, so that in place of being impeders of the war, they returned
as messengers of the conquest and the glory that was obtained.
And whoever considers well this method will see it is most
prudently employed, for if the Senate had wanted the Consul to proceed
in the war from hand to hand according to that which they committed to
him, they would have made him (Fabius) less circumspect and more slow;
for it would not have seemed to him that the glory of the battle should
be all his, but as being shared by the Senate, by whose counsels he had
been governed. In addition to this the Senate would have obligated itself
to want to advise on a matter that they could not have understood; for
notwithstanding that there many of them who were men most expert in war,
none the less not being in that place, and not knowing the infinite particulars
that are necessary to be known to want to counsel well, infinite errors
((by counselling)) would have been made. And because of this, they wanted
the Consul to make decisions by himself and that the glory should be all
his, the love of which they judged should be a restraint as well as a
rule in making him conduct himself well.
This part is more willingly noted by me, because I see that
the Republics of present times, as the Venetian and the Florentine, have
understood it otherwise, and if their Captains, Providers, or Commissioners
have to place (a battery of) artillery, they want to know and counsel
about it. Which system merits the same praise as (their conduct) in other
things merit, which all together have brought about the conditions that
are found at present.
|