BOOK I
Decisions made by the Romans pertinent to the internal affairs of the
City
I
What have generally been the beginnings of some Cities, and what was that
of Rome
II
Of the kinds of Republics there are, and of which was the Roman Republic
III
What events caused the creation of the Tribunes of the Plebs in Rome,
which made the Republic more perfect
IV
That disunion of the Plebs and the Roman Senate made that Republic free
and powerful
V
Where the guarding of liberty is more securely placed, either in the People
or in the Nobles; and which have the greater reason to become tumultuous
either he who wants to acquire or he who wants to maintain
VI
Whether it was possible to establish a government in Rome which could
eliminate the enmity between the Populace and the Senate
VII
How much the faculty of accusing (Judiciary) is necessary for a Republic
for the maintenance of liberty
VIII
As much as accusations are useful to a Republic, so much so are calumnies
pernicious
IX
How it is necessary for one man alone in desiring to organize a new Republic
to reform its institutions entirely outside the ancient ones
X
As much as the founders of Republics and Kingdoms are laudable, so much
are those of a Tyranny shameful
XI
Of the religions of the Romans
XII
Of how much importance should be given Religion; and how Italy, because
the medium of the Roman Church was lacking, was ruined
XIII
How the Romans served themselves of Religion to establish the City and
to carry out their enterprises and stop tumults
XIV
The Romans interpreted the auspices according to necessity, and with their
prudence made a show of observing Religion, even when they were forced
not to observe it, and if anyone recklessly disparaged it they punished
him
XV
How the Samnites had recourse to Religion as an extreme remedy for the
things afflicting them
XVI
A People accustomed to living under a Prince, if by some accident becomes
free, maintains its liberty with difficulty
XVII
A corrupt People coming into their liberty can maintain itself free only
with the greatest difficulty
XVIII
In what way in a corrupt City a free State can be maintained, if there
is one there, or if not, how to establish it
XIX
A weak Prince who succeeds an excellent Prince can be maintained, but
any Kingdom cannot be maintained if a weak one is succeeded by another
weak one
XX
Two continuous successions of Princes of virtu achieve great results;
and that well organized Republics of necessity have successions of virtu;
therefore their acquisitions and expansions are great
XXI
How much blame that Prince and Republic merit who lack their own arms
XXII
What is to be noted in the case of the three Roman Horatii and of the
three Alban Curatii
XXIII
That one ought not to put in peril all his fortune and all his forces;
and because of this the guarding of passes is often harmful
XXIV
Well organized Republics establish rewards and penalties for their Citizens,
but never compensate one (at the expense) of the other
XXV
Whoever wants to reform an ancient State into a free City, should retain
at least a shadow of the ancient forms
XXVI
A new Prince in a City or Province taken by him ought to organize everything
anew
XXVII
Very rarely do men know how to be entirely good or entirely bad
XXVIII
For what reasons the Romans were less ungrateful to their Citizens than
the Athenians
XXIX
Which is more ungrateful, a People or a Prince
XXX
What means a Prince or a Republic ought to use to avoid this vice of ingratitude,
and what that Captain or that Citizen ought to do so as not to be touched
by it
XXXI
That Roman Captains were never extraordinarily punished for errors committed;
nor were they yet punished when, by their ignorance or bad proceedings
undertaken by them, harm ensued to the Republic
XXXII
A Republic or a Prince ought not to defer benefiting men in their necessity
XXXIII
When an evil has sprung up either within a State or against a State, it
is a more salutary proceeding to temporize with it than to attack it rashly
XXXIV
The dictatorial authority did good and not harm to the Roman Republic;
and that the authority which Citizens take away, not those are given them
by free suffrage, are pernicious to Civil Society
XXXV
The reason why the creation of the Decemvirs in Rome was harmful to the
liberty of that Republic, notwithstanding that it was created by public
and free suffrage
XXXVI
Citizens who have been given the higher honors ought not to disdain the
lesser
XXXVII
What troubles the Agrarian law brought forth in Rome; and how troublesome
it is to make a law in a Republic which greatly regards the past but contrary
to the ancient customs of the City
XXXVIII
Weak Republics are irresolute and do not know how to decide; and if they
take up any proceeding, it results more from necessity than from election
XXXIX
The same incidents often happen to different People
XL
The creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what is to be noted in it;
and where it will be considered among many other things how a Republic
can be saved or ruined because of similar accidents
XLI
To jump from humility to pride and from mercy to cruelty without profitable
means, is an imprudent and useless thing
XLII
How easily man may be corrupted
XLIII
Those who combat for their own glory are good and faithful Soldiers
XLIV
A multitude without a head is useless, and one ought not to threaten first,
and then seek authority
XLV
It is a bad example not to observe a Law that has been made, and especially
by the author of it; and it is most harmful to renew every day new injuries
in a City and to the one who governs it
XLVI
Men jump from one ambition to another, and first they seek not to be offended,
then to offend others
XLVII
Men, although they deceive themselves in general matters do not deceive
themselves in the particulars
XLVIII
Whoever wants a Magistracy not to be given to a vile or wicked one, will
have it asked by a man more vile and more wicked, or by one more noble
and more good
XLIX
If those Cities which had their beginning free as Rome, have had difficulty
in finding laws that would maintain them, those that had their beginning
in servitude have almost an impossibility
L
A Council or Magistrate ought not to be able to stop the activities of
a City
LI
A Republic or a Prince ought to feign to do through liberality, that which
necessity constrains them
LII
To reprimand the insolence of a powerful one who springs up in a Republic,
there is no more secure and less troublesome way than to forestall
him those ways by which he comes to power
LIII
The People many times desire their ruin, deceived by a false species of
good: and how great hopes and strong promises easily move them
LIV
How much authority a great Man has in restraining an excited Multitude
(mob)
LV
How easily things are managed in that City where the Multitude is not
corrupt, and that where there is equality a Principality cannot be established,
and where there is none a Republic cannot be established
LVI
Before great events occur in a City or a Province, signs come which foretell
them, or men who predict them
LVII
Together the Plebs are strong, dispersed they are weak
LVIII
The Multitude is wiser and more constant than a Prince
LIX
Which Alliances or Leagues can be trusted, whether those made with a Republic
or those made with a Prince
LX
How the Consulship and every other Magistracy in Rome ought to be (bestowed)
without any regard to age
When I consider how much honor is attributed to antiquity,
and how many times, not to mention many other examples, a fragment of
an antique statue has been bought at a great price in order to have it
near to one, honoring his house, being able to have it imitated by those
who delight in those arts, and how they then strive with all industry
to present them in all their work: and when I see, on the other hand,
the works of greatest virtu which Historians indicate have been accomplished
by ancient Kingdoms and Republics, by Kings, Captains, Citizens, Lawgivers,
and others who have worked themselves hard for their country, to be more
readily admired than imitated, or rather so much neglected by everyone
in every respect that no sign of that ancient virtu remains, I cannot
otherwise than wonder and at the same time be sad: and so much more when
I see in the civil differences that arise between Citizens, or in the
maladies which men incur, they always have recourses to those judgments
or to those remedies that have been judged or instituted by the ancients.
For the civil laws are nothing else but the decisions given by the ancient
Jurisconsults, which reduced to a system presently teach our Jurisconsults
to judge and also what is medicine if not the experience had by the ancient
Doctors, (and) on which the present Doctors base their judgments? None
the less in the instituting of Republics, in maintaining of States, in
the governing of Kingdoms, in organizing an army and conducting a war,
in (giving) judgment for Subjects, in expanding the Empire, there will
not be found either Prince, or Republic, or Captain, or Citizen, who has
recourse to the examples of the ancients. Which I am persuaded arises
not so much from the weakness to which the present education has brought
the world, or from that evil which an ambitious indolence has created
in many Christian Provinces and Cities, than from not having a real understanding
of history, and from not drawing that (real) sense from its reading, or
benefiting from the spirit which is contained in it. whence it arises
that they who read take infinitely more pleasure in knowing the variety
of incidents that are contained in them, without ever thinking of imitating
them, believing the imitation not only difficult, but impossible: as if
heaven, the sun, the elements, and men should have changed the order of
their motions and power, from what they were anciently. Wanting, therefore,
to draw men from this error, I have judged it necessary to write upon
all those books of Titus Livy which, because of the malignity of the times,
have been prevented (from coming to us), in order that I might judge by
comparing ancient and modern events what is necessary for their better
understanding, so that those who may read these Discourses of mine may
be able to derive that usefulness for which the understanding of History
ought to be sought. And although this enterprise may be difficult, none
the less, aided by those who have advised me to begin carrying this load,
I believe I can carry it so that there will remain for others a short
way to bring it to its destined place (end).
WHAT HAVE GENERALLY BEEN THE BEGINNINGS OF SOME CITIES,
AND WHAT WAS THAT OF ROME
Those who read what the beginning of the City of Rome was,
and of her Law-givers and how it was organized, do not wonder that so
much virtu had been maintained for so many centuries in that City, and
that afterward there should have been born that Empire to which that Republic
was joined. And wanting first to discuss its birth, I say that all Cities
are built either by men born in the place where they build it or by foreigners.
The first case occurs when it appears to the inhabitants that they do
not live securely when dispersed into many and small parties, each unable
by himself both because of the location and the small number to resist
attacks of those who should assault them, and they are not in time ((the
enemy coming)) in waiting for their defense: or if they should be, they
must abandon many of their refuges, and thus they would quickly become
the prey of their enemies: so much that in order to avoid these dangers,
moved either by themselves or by some one among them of greater authority,
they restrict themselves to live together in a place selected by them,
more convenient to live in and more easy to defend. Of these, among others,
have been Athens and Venice: the first under the authority of Theseus
was built by the dispersed inhabitants for like reasons: the other built
by many people (who) had come to certain small islands situated at the
head of the Adriatic Sea, in order to escape those wars which every day
were arising in Italy because of the coming of new barbarians after the
decline of that Roman Empire, began among themselves, without any particular
Prince who should organize them, to live under those laws which appeared
to them best suited in maintaining it (their new state). In this they
succeeded happily because of the long peace which the site gave to them
(for) that sea not having issue, where those people who were afflicting
Italy, not having ships with which they could invest them; so that from
a small beginning they were enabled to come to that greatness which they
now have.
The second case, when a city is built by foreign forces,
is caused by free men and by men who depend on others, such as the Colonies
sent either by a Republic or by a Prince to relieve their towns of (excessive)
inhabitants or for the defense of that country which they have newly acquired
(and) want to maintain securely and without expense; (thy Roman people
built many cities, throughout all their Empire) or they are built by a
Prince, not to live there but for his own glory, as was the City of Alexandria
built by Alexander. And because these cities at their origin do not have
their freedom, it rarely happens that they make great progress and are
able to be numbered among the chief Kingdoms. Such was the building of
Florence, for (it was built either by the soldiers of Sulla, or perhaps
by the inhabitants of the Mountains of Fiesole, who trusting in that long
peace which prevailed in the world under Octavian were led to live in
the plain along the Arno) it was built under the Roman Empire, and could
not in its beginning have any other growth that those which were conceded
to her through the courtesy of the Prince.
The builders of Cities are free when any people either under
a Prince or by themselves are constrained either by pestilence or by famine
or by war to abandon their native country, and seek new homes: These either
inhabit the cities that they find in the countries they acquire, as Moses
did, or they build new ones, as Eneas did. This is a case where the virtu
and fortune of the builder of the edifice is recognized, which is of greater
or less wonder according as that man who was the beginner was of greater
or less virtu. The virtu of whom is recognized in two ways: the first
is in the selection of the site, the other in the establishment of the
laws. And because men work either from necessity or from choice: and because
it is seen here that virtu is greater where choice has less authority
(results from necessity), it is (something) to be considered whether it
would be better for the building of a city to select sterile places, so
that men constrained to be industrious and less occupied with idleness,
should live more united, where, because of the poverty of the site, they
should have less cause for discord, as happened at Ragusa and in many
other cities built in similar places; which selection would without doubt
be more wise and more useful if men would be content to live of their
own (possessions), and not want to seek to command that of others.
However, as men are not able to make themselves secure except
through power, it is necessary to avoid this sterility of country and
locate it in very fertile places, where because of the fertility of the
site, it can grow, can defend itself from whoever should assault it, and
suppress whoever should oppose its aggrandizement. And as to that idleness
which the site should encourage, it ought to be arranged that in that
necessity the laws should constrain them (to work) where the site does
not constrain them (does not do so), and to imitate those who have been
wise and have lived in most amenable and most fertile countries, which
are apt to making men idle and unable to exercise any virtu: that to obviate
those which the amenity of the country may cause through idleness, they
imposed the necessity of exercise on those who were to be soldiers: of
a kind that, because of such orders, they became better soldiers than
(men) in those countries where nature has been harsh and sterile: among
which was the Kingdom of Egypt, which notwithstanding that the country
was most amenable, that necessity ordained by the laws was so great, that
most excellent men resulted therefrom: and if their names had not been
extinguished by antiquity, it would be seen that they would have merited
more praise than Alexander the Great, and many others of whom memory is
still fresh. And whoever had considered the Kingdom of Soldan and the
order of the Mamelukes, and of their military (organization) before it
was destroyed by Selim the Grand Turk, would have seen there how much
the soldiers exercised, and in fact would have known how much they feared
that idleness to which the benignity of the country could lead them if
they had not obviated it by the strongest laws. I say therefore that the
selection of a fertile location in establishing (a city) is more prudent
when (the results) of that fertility can be restricted within given limits
by laws.
Alexander the Great, wishing to build a city for his glory,
Dinocrates, the Architect came to him and showed him how he could do so
upon the mountain Athos, which place in addition to being strong, could
be arranged in a way that the City would be given human form, which would
be a marvelous and rare thing and worthy of his greatness: and Alexander
asking him on what the inhabitants would live, he replied that he had
not thought of it: at which he laughed, and leaving that mountain as it
was, he built Alexandria, where the inhabitants would stay willingly because
of the richness of the country and the convenience to the sea and of the
Nile.
Whoever should examine, therefore, the building of Rome
if he should take Eneas for its first ancestor, will know that that City
was built by foreigners: (but) if Romulus, it would have been built by
men native to the place, and in any case it would be seen to have been
free from the beginning without depending on anyone: it will also be seen
(as it will be said below) to what necessity the laws made by Romulus,
Numa, and the others had constrained them; so much so that the fertility
of the site, the convenience of the sea, the frequent victories, the greatness
of the Empire, could not corrupt her for many centuries, and they maintained
her full of so much virtu than any other republic has ever been adorned.
And because the things achieved by them and that are made notable by Titus
Livius, have taken place either through public Councils or private (individuals)
either inside or outside the City, I shall begin to discourse upon those
things which occured inside; and as for the public Council, which is worthy
of greater annotation, I shall judge, adding all that is dependent on
them; with which discourses this fast book, or rather this fast part will
be ended.
OF THE KINDS OF REPUBLICS THERE ARE, AND OF WHICH WAS THE
ROMAN REPUBLIC
I want to place aside the discussion of those cities that
had their beginning subject to others, and I will talk of those which
have had their beginning far removed from any external servitude, but
which (were) initially governed themselves through their own will, either
as Republics or as Principalities; which have had (as diverse origins)
diverse laws and institutions. For to some, at the beginning or very soon
after, their laws were given to them by one (man) and all at one time,
as those which were given to the Spartans by Lycurgus: Some have received
them by chance, and at several times, according to events, as Rome did.
So that a Republic can be called fortunate which by chance has a man so
prudent, who gives her laws so ordered that without having need of correcting
them, she can live securely under them. And it is seen that Sparta observed
hers (laws) for more than eight hundred years without changing them and
without any dangerous disturbance: and on the contrary that City has some
degree of unhappiness which (not having fallen to a prudent lawmaker)
is compelled to reorganize her laws by herself. And she also is more unhappy
which has diverged more from her institutions; and that (Republic) is
even further from them whose laws lead her away from perfect and true
ends entirely outside of the right path; for to those who are in that
condition it is almost impossible that by some incident they be set aright.
Those others which do not have a perfect constitution, but had made a
good beginning, are capable of becoming better, and can become perfect
through the occurrence of events. It is very true, however, that they
have never been reformed without danger, for the greater number of men
never agree to a new law which contemplates a new order for the City,
unless the necessity that needs be accomplished is shown to them: and
as this necessity cannot arise without some peril, it is an easy thing
for the Republic to be ruined before it can be brought to a more perfect
constitution. The Republic of Florence gives a proof of this, which because
of the incident of Arezzo in (the year) one thousand five hundred and
two (1502) was reorganized, (and) it was disorganized by that of Prato
in (the year) one thousand five hundred and twelve (1512).
Wanting therefore to discourse on what were the institutions
of the City of Rome and what events brought her to her perfection, I say,
that some who have written of Republics say there are (one of) three States
(governments) in them called by them Principality (Monarchy), of the Best
(Aristocracy), and Popular (Democracy), and that those men who institute
(laws) in a City ought to turn to one of these, according as it seems
fit to them. Some others (and wiser according to the opinion of many)
believe there are six kinds of Governments, of which those are very bad,
and those are good in themselves, but may be so easily corrupted that
they also become pernicious. Those that are good are three mentioned above:
those that are bad, are three others which derive from those (first three),
and each is so similar to them that they easily jump from one to the other,
for the Principality easily becomes a tyranny, autocracy easily become
State of the Few (oligarchies), and the Popular (Democracy) without difficulty
is converted into a licentious one (anarchy). So much so that an organizer
of a Republic institutes one of those three States (governments) in a
City, he institutes it for only a short time, because there is no remedy
which can prevent them from degenerating into their opposite kind, because
of the resemblance that virtu and vice have in this instance.
These variations in government among men are born by chance,
for at the beginning of the world the inhabitants were few, (and) lived
for a time dispersed and like beasts: later as the generations multiplied
they gathered together, and in order to be able better to defend themselves
they began to seek among themselves the one who was most robust and of
greater courage, and made him their head and obeyed him. From this there
arose the knowledge of honest and good things; differentiating them from
the pernicious and evil; for seeing one man harm his benefactor there
arose hate and compassion between men, censuring the ingrates and honoring
those who were grateful, and believing also that these same injuries could
be done to them, to avoid like evils they were led to make laws, and institute
punishments for those who should contravene them; whence came the cognition
of justice. Which thing later caused them to select a Prince, not seeking
the most stalwart but he who was more prudent and more just. But afterwards
when they began to make the Prince by succession and not by election,
the heirs quickly degenerated from their fathers, and leaving off from
works of virtu they believed that Princes should have nothing else to
do than surpass others in sumptuousness and lasciviousness and in every
other kind of delight. So that the Prince began to be hated, and because
of this hate he began to fear, and passing therefore from fear to injury,
a tyranny quickly arose. From this there arose the beginnings of the ruin
and conspiracies; and these conspiracies against the Prince were not made
by weak and timid men, but by those who because of their generosity, greatness
of spirit, riches, and nobility above the others, could not endure the
dishonest life of that prince.
The multitude therefore following the authority of these
powerful ones armed itself against the Prince, and having destroyed him,
they obeyed them as their liberators. And these holding the name of chief
in hatred, constituted a government by themselves, and in the beginning
(having in mind the past tyranny) governed themselves according to the
laws instituted by them, preferring every common usefulness to their conveniences,
and governed and preserved private and public affairs with the greatest
diligence. This administration later was handed down to their children,
who not knowing the changeability of fortune (for) never having experienced
bad (fortune), and not wanting to remain content with civil equality,
they turned to avarice, ambition, violation of women, caused that aristocratic
government (of the Best) to become an oligarchic government (of the Few)
regardless of all civil rights: so that in a short time the same thing
happened to them as it did to the Tyrant, for the multitude disgusted
with their government, placed itself under the orders of whoever would
in any way plan to attack those Governors, and thus there arose some one
who, with the aid of the multitude, destroyed them. And the memory of
the Prince and the injuries received from him being yet fresh (and) having
destroyed the oligarchic state (of the Few), and not wanting to restore
that of the Prince, the (people) turned to the Popular state (Democracy)
and they organized that in such a way, that neither the powerful Few nor
a Prince should have any authority. And because all States in the beginning
receive some reverence, this Popular State maintained itself for a short
time, but not for long, especially when that generation that had organized
it was extinguished, for they quickly came to that license where neither
private men or public men were feared: this was such that every one living
in his own way, a thousand injuries were inflicted every day: so that
constrained by necessity either through the suggestion of some good man,
or to escape from such license, they once again turn to a Principality;
and from this step by step they return to that license both in the manner
and for the causes mentioned (previously).
And this is the circle in which all the Republics are governed
and will eventually be governed; but rarely do they return to the same
(original) governments: for almost no Republic can have so long a life
as to be able often to pass through these changes and remain on its feet.
But it may well happen that in the troubles besetting a Republic always
lacking counsel and strength, it will become subject to a neighboring
state which may be better organized than itself: but assuming this does
not happen, a Republic would be apt to revolve indefinitely among these
governments. I say therefore that all the (previously) mentioned forms
are inferior because of the brevity of the existence of those three that
are good, and of the malignity of those three that are bad. So that those
who make laws prudently having recognized the defects of each, (and) avoiding
every one of these forms by itself alone, they selected one (form) that
should partake of all, they judging it to be more firm and stable, because
when there is in the same City (government) a Principality, an Aristocracy,
and a Popular Government (Democracy), one watches the other.[1]
Among those who have merited more praise for having similar
constitutions is Lycurgus, who so established his laws in Sparta, that
in giving parts to the King, the Aristocracy, and the People, made a state
that endured more than eight hundred years, with great praise to himself
and tranquillity to that City. The contrary happened to Solon who established
the laws in Athens, (and) who by establishing only the Popular (Democratic)
state, he gave it such a brief existence that before he died he saw arise
the tyranny of Pisistratus: and although after forty years his (the tyrants)
heirs were driven out and liberty returned to Athens, for the Popular
state was restored according to the ordinances of Solon, it did not last
more than a hundred years, yet in order that it be maintained many conventions
were made by which the insolence of the nobles and the general licentiousness
were suppressed, which had not been considered by Solon: none the less
because he did not mix it (Popular state) with the power of the Principate
and with that of the Aristocracy, Athens lived a very short time as compared
to Sparta.
But let us come to Rome, which, notwithstanding that it
did not have a Lycurgus who so established it in the beginning that she
was not able to exist free for a long time, none the less so many were
the incidents that arose in that City because of the disunion that existed
between the Plebs and the Senate, so that what the legislator did not
do, chance did. For, if Rome did not attain top fortune, it attained the
second; if the first institutions were defective, none the less they did
not deviate from the straight path which would lead them to perfection,
for Romulus and all the other Kings made many and good laws, all conforming
to a free existence. But because their objective was to found a Kingdom
and not a Republic, when that City became free she lacked many things
that were necessary to be established in favor of liberty, which had not
been established by those Kings. And although those Kings lost their Empire
for the reasons and in the manner discussed, none the less those who drove
them out quickly instituted two Consuls who should be in the place of
the King, (and) so it happened that while the name (of King) was driven
from Rome, the royal power was not; so that the Consuls and the Senate
existed in forms mentioned above, that is the Principate and the Aristocracy.
There remained only to make a place for Popular government for the reasons
to be mentioned below, the people rose against them: so that in order
not to lose everything, (the Nobility) was constrained to concede a part
of its power to them, and on the other hand the Senate and the Consuls
remained with so much authority that they were able to keep their rank
in that Republic. And thus was born (the creation) of the Tribunes of
the plebs,[2] after which creation the government of that Republic
came to be more stable, having a part of all those forms of government.
And so favorable was fortune to them that although they passed from a
Monarchial government and from an Aristocracy to one of the People (Democracy),
by those same degrees and for the same reasons that were discussed above,
none the less the Royal form was never entirely taken away to give authority
to the Aristocracy, nor was all the authority of the Aristocrats diminished
in order to give it to the People, but it remained shared (between the
three) it made the Republic perfect: which perfection resulted from the
disunion of the Plebs and the Senate, as we shall discuss at length in
the next following chapters.
WHAT EVENTS CAUSED THE CREATION OF THE TRIBUNES OF THE
PLEBS IN ROME, WHICH MADE THE REPUBLIC MORE PERFECT
As all those have shown who have discussed civil institutions,
and as every history is full of examples, it is necessary to whoever arranges
to found a Republic and establish laws in it, to presuppose that all men
are bad and that they will use their malignity of mind every time they
have the opportunity; and if such malignity is hidden for a time, it proceeds
from the unknown reason that would not be known because the experience
of the contrary had not been seen, but time, which is said to be the father
of every truth, will cause it to be discovered. It seemed that in Rome
there was a very great harmony between the Plebs and the Senate (the Tarquins
having been driven out), and that the nobles had laid aside their haughtiness
and had become of a popular spirit, and supportable to everyone even to
the lowest. This deception was hidden, nor was the cause seen while the
Tarquins lived, whom the nobility feared, and having fear that the maltreated
plebs might not side with them (the nobles) they behaved themselves humanely
toward them: but as soon as the Tarquins were dead, and that fear left
the Nobles, they begun to vent upon the plebs that poison which they had
kept within their breasts, and in every way they could they offended them:
which thing gives testimony to that which was said above that men never
act well except through necessity: but where choice abounds and where
license may be used, everything is quickly filled with confusion and disorder.
It is said therefore that Hunger and Poverty make men industrious, and
Laws make them good. And where something by itself works well without
law, the law is not necessary: but when that good custom is lacking, the
law immediately becomes necessary. Thus the Tarquins being dead through
fear of whom the Nobles were kept in restraint, it behooved them (the
Nobles) to think of a new order, which would cause the same effect which
the Tarquins had caused when they were alive. And therefore after many
confusions, tumults, and dangers of troubles, which arose between the
Plebs and the Nobility, they came for the security of the Plebs to the
creation of the Tribunes, and they were given so much preeminence and
so much reputation, that they then should always be able to be in the
middle between the Plebs and the Senate, and obviate the insolence of
the Nobles.
THAT DISUNION OF THE PLEBS AND THE ROMAN SENATE MADE THAT
REPUBLIC FREE AND POWERFUL
I do not want to miss discoursing on these tumults that
occurred in Rome from the death of the Tarquins to the creation of the
Tribunes; and afterwards I will discourse on some things contrary to the
opinions of many who say that Rome was a tumultuous Republic and full
of so much confusion, that if good fortune and military virtu had not
supplied her defects, she would have been inferior to every other Republic.
I cannot deny that fortune and the military were the causes
of the Roman Empire; but it indeed seems to me that this would not happen
except when military discipline is good, it happens that where order is
good, (and) only rarely there may not be good fortune accompanying. But
let us come to the other particulars of that City. I say that those who
condemn the tumults between the nobles and the plebs, appear to me to
blame those things that were the chief causes for keeping Rome free, and
that they paid more attention to the noises and shouts that arose in those
tumults than to the good effects they brought forth, and that they did
not consider that in every Republic there are two different viewpoints,
that of the People and that of the Nobles; and that all the laws that
are made in favor of liberty result from their disunion, as may easily
be seen to have happened in Rome, for from Tarquin to the Gracchi which
was more than three hundred years, the tumults of Rome rarely brought
forth exiles, and more rarely blood. Nor is it possible therefore to judge
these tumults harmful, nor divisive to a Republic, which in so great a
time sent into exile no more than eight or ten of its citizens because
of its differences, and put to death only a few, and condemned in money
(fined) not very many: nor can a Republic in any way with reason be called
disordered where there are so many examples of virtu, for good examples
result from good education, good education from good laws, and good laws
from those tumults which many inconsiderately condemn; for he who examines
well the result of these, will not find that they have brought forth any
exile or violence prejudicial to the common good, but laws and institutions
in benefit of public liberty. And if anyone should say the means were
extraordinary and almost savage, he will see the People together shouting
against the Senate, The Senate against the People, running tumultuously
throughout the streets, locking their stores, all the Plebs departing
from Rome, all of which (things) alarm only those who read of them; I
say, that every City ought to have their own means with which its People
can give vent to their ambitions, and especially those Cities which in
important matters, want to avail themselves of the People; among which
the City of Rome had this method, that when those people wanted to obtain
a law, either they did some of the things mentioned before or they would
not enroll their names to go to war, so that to placate them it was necessary
(for the Senate) in some part to satisfy them: and the desires of a free
people rarely are pernicious to liberty, because they arise either from
being oppressed or from the suspicion of going to be oppressed. And it
these opinions should be false, there is the remedy of haranguing (public
assembly), where some upright man springs up who through oratory shows
them that they deceive themselves; and the people (as Tullius Cicero says)
although they are ignorant, are capable of (appreciating) the truth, and
easily give in when the truth is given to them by a trustworthy man.
One ought therefore to be more sparing in blaming the Roman
government, and to consider that so many good effects which came from
that Republic, were not caused except for the best of reasons: And if
the tumults were the cause of creation of Tribunes, they merit the highest
praise, for in addition to giving the people a part in administration,
they were established for guarding Roman liberty, as will be shown in
the next chapter.
WHERE THE GUARDING OF LIBERTY IS MORE SECURELY PLACED,
EITHER IN THE PEOPLE OR IN THE NOBLES; AND WHICH HAVE THE GREATER REASON
TO BECOME TUMULTUOUS EITHER HE WHO WANTS TO ACQUIRE OR HE WHO WANTS TO
MAINTAIN
Among the more necessary things instituted by those who
have prudently established a Republic, was to establish a guard to liberty,
and according as this was well or badly place, that freedom endured a
greater or less (period of time). And because in every Republic there
exists the Nobles and the Populace, it may be a matter of doubt in whose
hands the guard is better placed. And the Lacedemonians, and in our times
the Venetians, placed it in the hands of the Nobles, but that of Rome
was placed in the hands of the Plebs. It is necessary therefore to examine
which of the Republics had made the better selection. And if we go past
the causes and examine every part, and if their results should be examined,
the side of the Nobles would be preferred since the liberty of Sparta
and Venice had a much longer life than that of Rome: And to come to the
reasons, I say (taking up first the part of the Romans) that thing (liberty)
which is to be guarded ought to be done by those who have the least desire
of usurping it. And without doubt, if the object of the Nobles and of
the Ignobles (populace) is considered, it will be seen that the former
have a great desire to dominate, and the latter a desire not to be dominated
and consequently a greater desire to live free, being less hopeful of
usurping it (liberty) than are the Nobles: so that the People placed in
charge to guard the liberty of anyone, reasonably will take better care
of it; for not being able to take it away themselves, they do not permit
others to take it away.
On the other hand, he who defends the Spartan and Venetian
arrangement, says that those who placed that guardianship in the hands
of the Powerful (Nobles), made two good points: The one, that they satisfy
more the ambitions of those who playing a greater part in the Republic,
(and) having this club in their hands, have more reason to be content;
the other, that they take away a kind of authority from the restless spirit
of the People which is the cause of infinite discussions and troubles
in a Republic, and apt to bring the Nobility to some (act of) desperation
which in times may result in some bad effects. And they give for an example
this selfsame Rome, where the Tribunes of the Plebs having this authority
in their hands, (and) the having of one Consul from the Plebs was not
enough for them (the People), but that they wanted to have both (the Consuls
from the Plebs). From this they afterward wanted the Censure, the Praetorship,
and all the other ranks of the Empire (Government) of the Republic. Nor
was this enough for them, but urged on by the same fury they began in
time to idolize those men whom they saw adept at beating down the Nobility:
whence arose the power of Marius and the ruin of Rome.
And truly whoever should discuss well both of these things
could be in doubt as to what kind of men may be more harmful to the Republic,
either those who desire to acquire that which they do not have, or those
who desire to maintain the honors already acquired. And in the end whoever
examines everything skillfully will come to this conclusion: The discussion
is either of a Republic which wants to create an Empire, as Rome, or of
one which is satisfied to maintain itself. In the first case it is necessary
for it to do everything as Rome did; in the second, it can imitate Venice
and Sparta, for those reasons why and how as will be described in the
succeeding chapter.
But to return to the discussion as to which men are more
harmful in a Republic, either those who desire to acquire, or those who
fear to lose that which they have acquired, I say that when Marcus Menenius
had been made Dictator, and Marcus Fulvius Master of the cavalry, both
plebeians, in order to investigate certain conspiracies that had been
formed in Capua against Rome, they were also given authority by the people
to be able to search out who in Rome from ambition and by extraordinary
means should endeavor to attain the Consulate and other houses (offices)
of the City. And it appearing to the Nobility that such authority given
to the Dictator was directed against them, they spread the word throughout
Rome that it was not the Nobles who were seeking the honors for ambition,
or by extraordinary means, but the Ignobles (Plebeians) who, trusting
neither to their blood (birth) nor in their own virtu, sought to attain
those dignities, and they particularly accused the Dictator: And so powerful
was this accusation, that Menenius having made a harangue (speech) and
complaining of the calumnies spread against him by the Nobles, he deposed
the Dictatorship, and submitted himself to that judgement (of himself)
which should be made by the People: And then the cause having been pleaded,
he was absolved; at which time there was much discussion as to who was
the more ambitious, he who wanted to maintain (his power) or he who wanted
to acquire it, since the desires of either the one or the other could
be the cause of the greatest tumults. But none the less more frequently
they are caused by those who possess (power), for the fear of losing it
generates in them the same desires that are in those who want to acquire
it, because it does not seem to men to possess securely that which they
have, unless they acquire more from others. And, moreover, those who possess
much, can make changes with greater power and facility. And what is yet
worse, is that their breaking out and ambitious conduct arouses in the
breasts of those who do not possess (power) the desire to possess it,
either to avenge themselves against them (the former) by despoiling them,
or in order to make it possible also for them to partake of those riches
and honors which they see are so badly used by the others.
WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A GOVERNMENT IN ROME
WHICH COULD ELIMINATE THE ENMITY BETWEEN THE POPULACE AND THE SENATE
We have discussed above the effects which were caused by
the controversies between the People and the Senate. Now these having
continued up to the time of the Gracchi, where they were the cause of
the loss of liberty, some might wish that Rome had done the great things
that she did without there being that enmity within her. It seems to me
therefore a thing worthy of consideration to see whether in Rome there
could have been a government (state) established that could have eliminated
the aforementioned controversies. And to desire to examine this it is
necessary to have recourse to those Republics which have had their liberty
for a long time without such enmities and tumults, and to see what (form)
of government theirs was, and if it could have been introduced in Rome.
For example, there is Sparta among the ancients, Venice
among the modern, (both) having been previously mentioned by me. Sparta
created a King with a small Senate which should govern her. Venice did
not divide its government by these distinctions, but gave all those who
could have a part in the administration (of its government) the name of
Gentlemen: In this manner, chance more than prudence gave them (the Venetians)
the laws (form of Government), for having taken refuge on those rocks
where the City now is, for the reasons mentioned above many of the inhabitants,
as they had increased to so great a number, with the desire to live together,
so that needing to make laws for themselves, they established a government,
(and) came together often in councils to discuss the affairs of the City;
when it appeared to them that they had become numerous enough for existing
as a commonwealth, they closed the path to all the others who should newly
come to live there to take part in their government: And in time finding
in that place many inhabitants outside the government, in order to give
reputation to those who were governing, they called them Gentlemen, and
the others Popolari. This form (of Government) could establish and maintain
itself without tumult, because when it was born, whoever then lived in
Venice participated in that government, with which no one could complain:
Those who came to live there later, finding the State firm and established
did not have cause or opportunity to create a tumult. The cause was not
there because nothing had been taken from them. The opportunity was not
there because those who ruled kept them in check and did not employ them
in affairs where they could pick up authority. In addition to this, those
who came to inhabit Venice later were not very many, or of such a great
number that these would be a disproportion between those who governed
and those who were governed, for the number of Gentlemen were either equal
to or greater than the others: so that for these reasons Venice could
establish that State and maintain it united.
Sparta, as I have said, being governed by a King and limited
Senate could thus maintain itself for a long time because there being
few inhabitants in Sparta, and the path having been closed to those who
should want to live there, and the laws of Lycurgus having acquired such
reputation that their observance removed all the causes for tumults. They
were able to live united for a long time, for Lycurgus had established
in Sparta more equality of substance and less equality in rank, because
equal poverty existed here and the Plebs were lacking ambitious men, as
the offices of the City were extended to few Citizens, and were kept distant
from the Plebs, nor did the Nobles by not treating them badly ever create
in them the desire to want them. This resulted from the Spartan Kings,
who, being placed in that Principate and living in the midst of that Nobility,
did not have may better means of maintaining their office, than to keep
the Plebs defended from every injury: which caused the Plebs neither to
fear nor to desire authority, and not having the dominion, nor fear of
it, there was eliminated the competition which they might have had with
the Nobility, and the cause of tumults, and thus they could live united
for a long time. But two things principally caused this union: The one,
the inhabitants of Sparta were few, and because of this were able to be
governed by a few: The other, that not accepting outsiders in their Republic,
they did not have the opportunity either of becoming corrupt or of increasing
so much that they should become unsupportable to those few who governed
her.
Considering all these things, therefore, it is seen that
it was necessary that the legislators of Rome do one of two things in
desiring that Rome be as quiet as the above mentioned Republic, either
not to employ the Plebs in war like the Venetians, or not to open the
door to outsiders like the Spartans, But they did the one and the other,
which gave the Plebs strength and increased power and infinite opportunities
for tumults. And if the Roman State had come to be more tranquil, it would
have resulted that she would have become even more feeble, because there
would have been cut off from her the means of being able to attain that
greatness which she achieved. So that Rome wanting to remove the causes
for tumults, would also take away the causes for expansion. And as in
all human affairs, those who examine them will indeed see that it is never
possible to avoid one inconvenience but that another one will spring up.
If therefore, you want to make a people numerous and armed in order to
create a great Empire, you will make it of a kind that you are not able
afterward to manage it in your own way: if you keep them either small
or disarmed in order to be able to manage them, (and), if you acquire
other dominion, you will not be able to hold them, or you will become
so mean that you will become prey to whoever assaults you. And therefore,
in every one of our decisions, there ought to be considered where the
inconveniences are less, and then take up the better proceeding, for there
will never be formed anything entirely clear of suspicion. Rome could
therefore, like Sparta, have created a Prince for life, and established
a limited Senate; but desiring to build a great Empire, she could not,
like Sparta, limit the number of her Citizens: which, in creating a King
for life and a small number in the Senate, would have been of little benefit
in connection with her unity. If anyone therefore should want to establish
a new Republic, he should have to consider if he should want it to expand
in dominion and power as did Rome, or whether it should remain within
narrow limits. In the first case, it is necessary to establish it as Rome,
and to give place to tumults and general dissensions as best he can; for
without a great number of men, and (those) well armed, no Republic can
ever increase, or if it did increase, to maintain itself. In thy second
case he may establish her as Sparta and Venice: but because expansion
is the poison of such Republics, he ought in every way he can prevent
her from making acquisitions, for such acquisitions, based on a weak Republic,
are entirely their ruin, as happened to Sparta and Venice, the first of
which having subjected almost all of Greece, showed the weakness of its
foundation with the slightest accident; for when there ensued the rebellion
of Thebes caused by Pelopidas, the other cities also rebelling, ruined
that Republic entirely.
Similarly Venice having occupied a great part of Italy,
and the greater part (obtained) not by war but by money and astuteness,
when it came to make a test of her strength everything was lost in one
engagement. I believe then that to create a Republic which should endure
a long time, the better way would be to organize internally like Sparta,
or like Venice locate it in a strong place, and of such power that no
one should believe he could quickly oppress her: and on the other hand,
it should not be so powerful that she should be formidable to her neighbors,
and thus she could enjoy its state (independence) for a long time. For
there are two reasons why war is made against a Republic: The one, to
become lord over her: the other, the fear of being occupied by her. These
two means in the above mentioned manner almost entirely removed (the reasons
for war), for it is difficult to destroy her, being well organized for
her defense, as I presuppose, it will rarely or never happen that one
can design to conquer her. If she remains within her limits, and from
experience it is seen that there is no ambition in her, it will never
happen that someone for fear of her will make war against her: and this
would be so much more so if there should be in her constitution or laws
(restrictions) that should prohibit her expansion. And without doubt I
believe that things could be kept balanced in this way, that there would
be the best political existence, and real tranquillity to a City. But
all affairs of men being (continually) in motion and never being able
to remain stable, it happens that (States) either remain stable or decline:
and necessity leads you to do many things which reason will not lead you
to do; so that having established a Republic adept at maintaining itself
without expanding, and necessity should induce her to expand, her foundations
would be taken away and her ruin accomplished more readily. Thus, on the
other hand, if Heaven should be so kind that she would never have to make
war, the languidness that should arise would make her either effeminate
or divided: which two together, or each one by itself, would be cause
of her ruin. Not being able, therefore, (as I believe) to balance these
things, and to maintain this middle course, it is necessary in organizing
a Republic to think of the more honorable side, and organize her in a
way that if necessity should induce her to expand, she may be able to
preserve that which she should have acquired. And to return to the first
discussion, I believe it is necessary to follow the Roman order and not
that of any other Republic (because I do not believe it is possible to
find a middle way between one and the other) and to tolerate that enmity
that should arise between the People and the Senate, accepting it as an
inconvenient necessity in attaining the Roman greatness. Because in addition
to the other reasons alleged, where the authority of the Tribunes is shown
to be necessary for the guarding of liberty, it is easy to consider the
benefit that will come to the Republic from this authority of accusing
(judiciary), which among others was committed to the Tribunes, as will
be discussed in the following chapter.
HOW MUCH THE FACULTY OF ACCUSING (JUDICIARY) IS NECESSARY
FOR A REPUBLIC FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF LIBERTY
No more useful and necessary authority can be given to those
who are appointed in a City to guard its liberty, as is that of being
able to accuse the citizen to the People or to any Magistrate or Council,
if he should in any way transgress against the free state. This arrangement
makes for two most useful effects for a Republic. The first is, that for
fear of being accused, the citizens do not attempt anything against the
state, and if they should (make an) attempt they are punished immediately
and without regard (to person). The other is, that it provides a way for
giving vent to those moods which in whatever way and against whatever
citizens may arise in the City. And when these moods do not provide a
means by which they may be vented, they ordinarily have recourse to extra
ordinary means that cause the complete ruin of a Republic. And there is
nothing which makes a Republic so stable and firm, as organizing it in
such a way that changes in the moods which may agitate it have a way prescribed
by law for venting themselves. This can be demonstrated by many examples,
and especially by that of Coriolanus, which Titus Livius refers to, where
he says that the Roman Nobility being irritated against the Plebs, because
it seemed to them the Plebs had too much authority concerning the creation
of the Tribunes who defended them, and Rome (as happened) experiencing
a great scarcity of provisions, and the Senate having sent to Sicily for
grain, Coriolanus, enemy of the popular faction, counselled that the time
had come (to be able) to castigate the Plebs and take away authority which
they had acquired and assumed to the prejudice of the Nobility, by keeping
them famished and not distributing the grain: which proposition coming
to the ears of the people, caused so great an indignation against Coriolanus,
that on coming out of the Senate he would have been killed in a tumultuary
way if the Tribunes had not summoned him to appear and defend his cause.
From this incident there is to be noted that which was mentioned above,
that it is useful and necessary for a Republic with its laws to provide
a means of venting that ire which is generally conceived against a citizen,
for if these ordinary means do not exist, they will have recourse to extraordinary
ones, and without doubt these produce much worse effects that do the others.
For ordinarily when a citizen is oppressed, even if he has received an
injustice, little or no disorder ensues in the Republic, because its execution
is done by neither private nor foreign forces which are those that ruin
public liberty, but is done by public force and arrangement which have
their own particular limits, and do not transcend to things that ruin
the Republic.
And to corroborate this opinion with examples, among the
ancient ones I want this one of Coriolanus to be enough, on which anyone
should consider how much evil would have resulted to the Roman Republic
if he had been killed in the tumults, for there would have arisen an offense
by a private (citizen) against a private (citizen); which offense generates
fear, fear seeks defense, for this defense partisans are procured, from
the partisans factions arise in the City, (and) the factions cause their
ruin. But the matter being controlled by those who had authority, all
those evils which could arise if it were governed by private authority
were avoided. We have seen in our time that troubles happened to the Republic
of Florence because the multitude was able to give vent to their spirit
in an ordinary way against one of her citizens, as befell in the time
of Francesco Valori, who was as a Prince in that City (and) who being
judged ambitious by many, and a man who wanted by his audacity and animosity
to transcend the civil authority, and there being no way in the Republic
of being able to resist him except by a faction contrary to his, there
resulted that he (Valori) having no fear except from some extraordinary
happening, began to enlist supporters who should defend him: On the other
hand, those who opposed him not having any regular way or repressing him,
thought of extraordinary ways, so that it came to arms. And where (if
it were possible to oppose him, Valori, by regular means) his authority
would have been extinguished with injury to himself only, but having to
extinguish it by extraordinary means, there ensued harm not only to himself,
but to many other noble citizens. We could also city in support of the
above mentioned conclusion the incident which ensued in Florence in connection
with Piero Soderini, which resulted entirely because there was not in
that Republic (means of making) accusations against the ambitions of powerful
citizens: for the accusing of a powerful one before eight judges in a
Republic is not enough; it is necessary that the judges be many because
the few always judge in favor of the few. So that if such a means had
been in existence, they would have accused him (Soderini) of evil while
yet alive, and through such means without having the Spanish army (called)
to come in, they would have given vent to their feelings; or if he had
not done evil they would not have had the audacity to move against him,
for fear that they would be accused by him: and thus both sides would
have ceased having that desire which was the cause of the trouble.
So that this can be concluded, that whenever it is seen
that external forces are called in by a party of men who live in a City,
it can be judged to result from its bad organization because there did
not exist within that circle of arrangements, a way to be able without
extraordinary means to give vent to the malignant moods that arise in
men, which can be completely provided by instituting accusations before
many judges and giving them reputation (authority). These things were
so well organized in Rome that in so many discussions between the Plebs
and the Senate, neither the Senate nor the Plebs nor any particular citizen,
ever attempted to avail (himself) of external force, for having the remedy
at home it was not necessary to go outside for it. And although the above
examples are amply sufficient to prove this, none the less I want to refer
to another recital by Titus Livius in his history, which refers to there
having been in Chiusi (Clusium), at that time a most noble City of Tuscany,
one Lucumones who had violated a sister of Aruntes, and Aruntes not being
able to avenge himself because of the power of the violator, went to seek
out the French (Gauls) who then ruled in that place which today is called
Lombardy, and urged them to come to Chiusi with arms in hand, pointing
out to them how they could avenge the injury he had received with advantage
to themselves: but if Aruntes could have seen how he could have avenged
himself by the provisions of the City, he would not have sought the barbarian
forces. But just as these accusations are useful in a Republic, so also
are calumnies useless and harmful, as we shall discuss in the next chapter.
AS MUCH AS ACCUSATIONS ARE USEFUL TO A REPUBLIC, SO MUCH
SO ARE CALUMNIES PERNICIOUS
Notwithstanding that the virtu of Furius Camillus when he
was liberating (Rome) from the oppression of the French (Gauls) had caused
the Roman citizens to yield him (top honors) without appearing to them
to have lost reputation or rank, none the less Manlius Capitolinus was
not able to endure that so much honor and glory should be bestowed on
him; for it seemed to him he had done as much for the welfare of Rome
by having saved the Campidoglio (Capitol), he had merited as much as Camillus,
and as for other warlike praises he was not inferior to him. So that filled
with envy, he was not able to sow discord among the Fathers (Senators)
he turned to the Plebs, sowing various sinister opinions among them. And
among other things he said was, that the treasure which had been collected
(together) to be given to the French (Gauls), and then was not given to
them, had been usurped by private citizens: and if its should be recovered
it could be converted to public usefulness, alleviating the plebs from
tribute or from some private debt. These words greatly impressed the Plebs,
so that Manlius begun to have concourse with them and at his instigation
(created) many tumults in the City: This thing displeased the Senate and
they deeming it of moment and perilous, created a Dictator who should
take cognizance of the case and restrain the rashness of (Manlius); whereupon
the Dictator had him summoned, and they met face to face in public, the
Dictator in the midst of the Nobles and Manlius in the midst of the Plebs.
Manlius was asked what he had to say concerning who obtained the treasure
that he spoke about, for the Senate was as desirous of knowing about it
as the Plebs: to which Manlius made no particular reply, but going on
in an evasive manner he said, that it was not necessary to tell them that
which they already knew, so that the Dictator had him put in prison. And
it is to be noted by this text how detestable calumnies are in free Cities
and in every other form of government, and that in order to repress them
no arrangement made for such a proposition ought to be neglected. Nor
can there be a better arrangement to putting an end to these (calumnies)
than to open the way for accusations, for accusations are as beneficial
to Republics as calumnies are harmful: and on the other hand there is
this difference, that calumnies do not need witnesses nor any other particular
confrontation to prove them so that anyone can be calumniated by anyone
else, but cannot now be accused, as the accuser has need of positive proof
and circumstances that would show the truth of the accusation. Men must
make the accusations before the Magistrates, the People, or the Councils:
calumnies (are spread) throughout the plaza and lodgings (private dwellings).
These calumnies are practiced more where accusations are used less and
where Cities are less constituted to receive them. An establisher of a
Republic therefore ought so to organize it that it is possible to accuse
every citizen without any fear and without any suspicion: and this being
done, and well carried out, he should severely punish the calumniators,
who cannot complain if they are punished, they having places open to them
to hear the accusations of those who had caluminated them in private.
And where this part is not well organized great disorders always follow,
for calumnies irritate but do not castigate citizens, and those who have
been irritated think of strengthening themselves, easily hating more than
fearing the things that are said against them.
¶ This part (as has been said) was well organized in
Rome, and has always been poorly organized in our City of Florence. And
as in Rome this institution did much good, at Florence this poor order
did much evil. And whoever reads the history of this City, will see how
many calumnies have been perpetrated in every time against those citizens
who occupied themselves in its important affairs. Of one, they said he
had robbed money from the Community; of another, that he had not succeeded
in an enterprise because of having been corrupted; and of yet another,
because of his ambitions had caused such and such inconvenience. Of the
things that resulted there sprung up hate on every side, whence it came
to divisions, from divisions to Factions (Sects), (and), from Factions
to ruin. If in Florence there had been some arrangement for the accusation
of citizens and punishment of calumniators, there would not have occurred
the infinite troubles that have ensued, for those Citizens who had been
either condemned or absolved, could not have harmed the City, and there
would have been a much less number accused than there had been calumniated,
as it could not have been (as I have said) as easy to accuse as to calumniate
any one. And among the other things that some citizens might employ to
achieve greatness have been these calumnies, which employed against powerful
citizens who opposed his ambition, did much for them; for by taking up
the past of the people, and confirming them the opinion which they had
of them (the nobles), he made them his friends.
And although we could refer to many examples, I want to
be content with only one. The Florentine army which was besieging Lucca
was commanded by Messer Giovanni Guicciardini, their Commissioner. It
was due either to his bad management or his bad fortune, that the fall
of that City did not ensue. But whatever the case may have been, Messer
Giovanni was blamed, alleging he had been corrupted by the Lucchesi: which
calumny, being favored by his enemies, brought Messer Giovanni almost
to the last desperation. And although, to justify himself because there
was no way in that Republic of being able to do so. From which there arose
great indignation among the friends of Messer Giovanni, who constituted
the greater part of the nobility, and (also) among those who desired to
make changes in Florence. This affair, both for this and other similar
reasons, grew so, that there resulted the ruin of the Republic.
Manlius Capitolinus was therefore a calumniator and not
an accuser; and the Romans showed in this case in point how the calumniators
ought to be punished. For they ought to be made to become accusers, and
if the accusation proves true either to reward them or not punish them;
but if it does not prove true, to punish them as Manlius was punished.
HOW IT IS NECESSARY FOR ONE MAN ALONE IN DESIRING TO ORGANIZE
A NEW REPUBLIC TO REFORM ITS INSTITUTIONS ENTIRELY OUTSIDE THE ANCIENT
ONES
And it may appear perhaps to some that I have gone too far
into Roman history, not having yet made any mention of the organizers
of this Republic, or of (having regard for) her institutions, her religion,
and her military establishment. And therefore, not wanting to keep in
suspense the minds of those who want to understand these matters, I say,
that many perhaps should judge it a bad example that the founder of a
civil society, as Romulus was, should first have killed his brother, then
have consented to the death of Titus Tatius, a Sabine, who had been chosen
by him to share the Kingdom; because of which it might be judged that
the citizens could, from ambition and the desire to rule, with the authority
of their Prince, attack those who should be opposed to their authority.
Which opinion would be correct, if the object he had in mind in causing
that homicide should be considered. But this must be assumed, as a general
rule, that it never or rarely occurs that some Republic or Kingdom is
well organized from the beginning, or its institutions entirely reformed
a new, unless it is arranged by one (individual only): rather it is necessary
that the only one who carries it out should be he who on whose mind such
an organization depends. A prudent Organizer of a Republic, therefore,
who has in mind to want to promote, not himself, but the common good,
and not his own succession but his (common) country, ought to endeavor
to have the authority alone: and a wise planner will never reprimand anyone
for any extraordinary activity that he should employ either in the establishment
of a Kingdom or in constituting a Republic. It is well then, when the
deed accuses him, the result should excuse him; and when it is good, as
that of Romulus, he will always be excused; for he ought to be reprehended
who is violent in order to destroy, and not he who does so for beneficial
reasons. He ought, however, to be so prudent and wise that the authority
which he has assumed, he will not leave to his heirs (or) any other: for
men being more prone to evil than to good, his successor could employ
for reasons of ambition that which should be employed for virtuous reasons
by him. In addition to this, even if one is adept at organizing, the thing
organized will not endure long if its (administration) remains only on
the shoulders of one individual, but it is good when it remains in the
care of many, and thus there will be many to sustain it. As the organization
of anything cannot be made by many because of the diverse opinions that
exist among them, yet having once understood this, they will not agree
to forego it. And that Romulus merited to be excused for the death of
his brother and that of his companion, and that what he had done he did
for the common good and not for his own ambition, is shown by his immediate
institution of a Senate with which he should consult, and according to
the opinions of which he would make his decision. And whoever considers
well the authority which Romulus reserved for himself, will see that he
did not reserve anything else other than the command of the army when
war was decided upon, and of convening the Senate. This was seen at that
time when Rome became free after the driving out of the Tarquins, where
there was no other innovation made on the ancient institutions except
that in place of an hereditary King there should be two Consuls (elected)
each year. Which gives testimony that all the institutions at the origin
of that City were more in conformity with a free and civil society than
with an absolute and tyrannical one.
Infinite examples could be given in corroboration of the
things mentioned above, such as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, and other founders
of Kingdoms and Republics, who were able to formulate laws for the common
good (only) by assigning the (necessary) authority to themselves: but
I want to omit these as they are already well known. I will refer only
to one not so well known, but which should be given consideration by those
who desire to be institutors of good laws, (and), this is that of Agis,
King of Sparta, who desiring to bring the Spartans back to those limits
which the laws of Lycurgus had delimited for them, (and), it seeming to
him that by deviating in part from them his City had lost much of that
ancient virtu, and consequently her power and dominion, was at once killed
by Spartan Ephors as a man who wanted to become a Tyrant. But Cleomenes
succeeding him in the Kingdom, there arose in him the same desire from
(reading) the records and writings of Agis that he found, in which his
thoughts and intentions were seen, (and) he recognized that he could not
render this good to his country, unless he should become alone in authority,
as it seemed to him he would not be able because of the ambitions of men
to provide the good for the many against the desires of the few: and seizing
a convenient opportunity had all the Ephors killed and those who could
oppose him: after which he completely restored the laws of Lycurgus. This
decision helped to revive Sparta and give to Cleomene that reputation
which was (equal) to that of Lycurgus, if it had not been for the power
of Macedonia and the weakness of the other Greek Republics. For after
this establishment (of the laws) he was soon assaulted by the Macedonians,
and finding that by herself (Sparta) was inferior in strength, and not
having anyone to whom he could have recourse, he was defeated, and his
plans (no matter how just and laudable) remained incompleted. Considering
all these things, therefore, I conclude that to establish a Republic it
is necessary that one must be alone, and Romulus merits to be excused
and not censured for the death of Remus and of Tatius.
AS MUCH AS THE FOUNDERS OF REPUBLICS AND KINGDOMS ARE LAUDABLE,
SO MUCH ARE THOSE OF A TYRANNY SHAMEFUL
Among all men who have been praised, the most lauded are
those who are heads and establishers of Religion. Next after them are
those who have founded Republics or Kingdoms. After these are celebrated
those who have commanded armies, (and) who have enlarged the (territory)
of their Kingdom of those of their country. To these should be added men
of letters, and because these are of many fields, they are celebrated
according to their degree (of excellence). To other men, the number of
whom is infinite, some degree of praise is given to them as pertain to
their art and profession. On the other hand, those men are infamous and
destroyers of Religion, dissipators of Kingdoms and Republics, enemies
of virtu, of letters, and of every other art which brings usefulness and
honor to human generations (mankind), such as are the impious and violent,
the ignorant, the idle, the vile and degraded. And no one will ever be
so mad or so wise, so wicked or so good, that selecting between these
two kinds of men, does not laud what is laudable, and censure what is
censurable. None the less, however, nearly all men deceived by a false
good or a false glory allow themselves to drift either voluntarily or
ignorantly into the ranks of those who merit more censure that praise.
And being able to establish either a Kingdom or a Republic with eternal
honor to themselves, they turn to Tyranny, nor do they see because of
this action how much fame, how much glory, how much honor, security, and
tranquil satisfaction of the mind, they lose; and how much infamy, disgrace,
censure, danger, and disquiet, they incur. And it is impossible that those
who live as private individuals in a Republic, or who by fortune or virtu
become Princes, if they read the history and the records of ancient events,
would do well living as private citizens in their country to live rather
as a Scipio than a Caesar; and those who are Princes, rather as Agesilaus,
Timoleon, and Dion, than as Nabis, Phalaris, and Dionysius, because they
will see these (latter) to be thoroughly disgraced and those (former)
most highly praised. They will also see that Timoleon and the others had
no less authority in their country than had Dionysius and Phalaris, but
they will see that they had had greater security for a longer time. Nor
is there anyone who deceives himself by the glory of Caesar, he being
especially celebrated by writers, for those who praised him were corrupted
by his fortune and frightened by the long duration of the Empire which,
ruling under his name did not permit that writers should talk of him freely.
But whoever wants to know what the writers would have said of him freely,
let him observe what they say of Cataline. And so much more is Caesar
to be detested, as how much more is he to be censured for that which he
did, than he who (just) intends to do evil. He will also see how Brutus
was extolled with so many praises; so that not being able to censure him
(Caesar) because of his power they extolled his enemy. Let he who has
become a Prince in a Republic also consider how much more praise those
Emperors merited who, after Rome became an Empire, lived under the laws
(and) as good Princes, than those who lived an in a contrary manner; and
he will also see that it was not necessary for the praetorian soldiers
or the multitudes of the legions to defend Titus, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrai
Trajan, Hadrian, Antoninus, and Marcus (Aurelius), because their customs,
the good will of the people, and the love of the Senate would defend them.
He will also see that the Eastern and Western armies were not sufficient
to save Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and so many other wicked emperors,
from those enemies which their bad customs and evil lives had raised up
against them.
And if the history of those men should be well considered,
it would be very instructive to any Prince in pointing out to him the
way to glory or censure, to security or fear. For of the twenty-six who
were Emperors from Caesar to Maximinius, sixteen were murdered. Ten died
in a natural way; and if among those who were murdered there may have
been some good men, such as Galba and Pertinax, they were killed by that
corruption that his predecessors had left among the soldiers. And if among
those who died in a natural way there were some wicked, such as Severns,
it resulted from their very great good fortune and virtu, which two things
are found together in few men. He will also learn from this lesson of
history how a good Kingdom can be organized, for all, except Titus, were
bad: (and) those who succeeded by adoption were all good, such as were
those five from Nero to Marcus (Aurelius). And when the Empire became
hereditary, it came to ruin. Let a Prince therefore place himself in the
times of Nero and Marcus, and let him compare them with those which preceded
and followed (that period) and afterward let him select in which (of the
two) he would want to be born and in which he would want to reign. For
in those times governed by good (Emperors), he will see a Prince secure
in thy midst of secure citizens, he will see the world full of peace and
justice, he will see the Senate with its authority, the Magistrates with
their honor, rich citizens enjoying their wealth, nobility and virtu exalted,
he will see every quiet and good; and on the other hand (he will see)
every rancor, every license, corruption, and ambition extinct; he will
see that golden era where everyone can hold and defend whatever opinion
he wishes: In the end, he will see the triumph of the world, the Prince
full of reverence and glory, the people full of love and security. Then
if he will consider the sorrowful times of the other Emperors, he will
see the atrocities from war, discords from seditions, cruelty in peace
and war, so many Princes slain by the sword, so many civil wars, so many
foreign wars, Italy afflicted and full of new misfortunes, her Cities
ruined and sacked: He will see Rome burned, the Capitol of its citizens
destroyed, the ancient temples desolate, ceremonies corrupted, the City
full of adulterers: he will see the sea full of exiles, the shores full
of blood. He will see innumerable cruelties take place in Rome, and nobility,
riches, honors, and above all virtu, accounted capital crimes. He will
see informers rewarded, servants corrupted against the masters, freemen
against their patrons, and those who should lack enemies, oppressed by
friends. And he will also recognize very well what obligations Rome, Italy,
and the world owed to Caesar. And without doubt (if he was born of man),
he would be dismayed at every imitation of those evil times, and burning
with an immense desire to follow the good. And truly, a Prince seeking
the glory of the world ought to desire to possess a corrupt City, not
to spoil it entirely like Caesar, but to reorganize it like Romulus. And
truly the heavens cannot give man a greater opportunity for glory, nor
could man desire a better one. And if to want to organize a City well,
it should be necessary to abolish the Principate, he who had failed to
(give her good laws) should merit some excuse. But he does not merit any
excuse who can hold the Principate and organize it. And in sum, let he
to whom the heavens gives the opportunity consider that there are two
ways: The one which will make him live securely and render him glorious
after his death, the other which will make him live in continual anxiety
and after death leave of himself an eternal infamy.
OF THE RELIGIONS OF THE ROMANS
Although Rome had Romulus as its original organizer and,
like a daughter, owed her birth and education to him, none the less the
heavens, judging that the institutions of Romulus were not sufficient
for so great an Empire, put it into the breasts of the Roman Senate to
elect Numa Pompilius as successor to Romulus, so that those things that
he had omitted, would be instituted by Numa. Who, finding a very ferocious
people and wanting to reduce them to civil obedience by the acts of peace,
turned to religion as something completely necessary in wanting to maintain
a civilization, and he established it in such a manner that for many centuries
there never was more fear of God than in that Republic, which facilitated
any enterprise which the Senate or those of great Roman men should plan
to do. And whoever should discuss the infinite actions of the people of
Rome (taken) all together, and of many Romans (individually) by themselves,
will see that those citizens feared much more the breaking of an oath
than the laws, like those men who esteem more the power of God than that
of man, as is manifestly seen in the examples of Scipio and of Manlius
Torquatus, for after the defeat that Hannibal had inflicted on the Romans
at Cannae, many citizens had gathered together (and) frightened and fearful
(and) had agreed to abandon Italy and take themselves to Sicily: when
Scipio heard of this, he went to meet them, and with bared sword in hand
he constrained them to swear not to abandon their country. Lucius Manlius,
father of Titus Manlius, who was later called Torquatus, had been accused
by Marcus Pomponius, a Tribune of the Plebs: and before the day of judgment
arrived, Titus went to meet Marcus, and threatening to kill him if he
did not swear to withdraw the accusation against his father, constrained
him to swear, and he (Marcus) from fear of having sworn withdrew the accusation
from him (Lucius). And thus those citizens whom (neither) the love of
their country and of its laws could keep in Italy, were kept there by
an oath that they were forced to take, and the Tribune put aside the hatred
that he had for his father, the injury that his son had done him, and
his honor, in order to obey the oath taken; which did not result from
anything else than from that religion which Numa had introduced in that
City. And whoever considers well Roman history will see how much Religion
served in commanding the armies, in reuniting the plebs, both in keeping
men good, and in making the wicked ashamed. So that if it were discussed
as to which Prince Rome should be more obligated, Romulus or Numa, I believe
that Numa would (rather) attain the higher rank; for where Religion exists
it is easily possible to introduce arms, but where there are arms and
not religion, it (religion) can only be introduced there with difficulty.
And it is seen that for Romulus to institute the Senate and to make the
other civil and military arrangements, the authority of God was not necessary,
but it was very necessary for Numa, who pretended he had met with a Nymph
who advised him of that which he should counsel the people; and all this
resulted because he wanted to introduce new ordinances and institutions
in that City, and was apprehensive that his authority was not enough.
And truly there never was any extraordinary institutor of laws among a
people who did not have recourse to God, because otherwise he would not
have been accepted; for they (these laws) are very well known by prudent
men, but which by themselves do not contain evident reasons capable of
persuading others. Wise men who want to remove this difficulty, therefore,
have recourse to God. Thus did Lycurgus, thus Solon, thus many others
who had the same aims as they.
The Roman people, therefore, admiring his (Numa's) goodness
and prudence, yielded to his every decision. It is indeed true that those
times were full of Religion, and those men with whom he (Numa) had to
work were coarse (which) gave him great facility to pursue his designs,
being able easily to impress upon them any new form. And without doubt
whoever should want to establish a Republic in the present era, would
find it more easy to do so among men of the mountains where there is no
civilization, than among those who are used to living in the City, where
civilization is corrupt, as a sculptor more easily extracts a beautiful
statue from crude marble than of one badly sketched out by others. Considering
all this I conclude therefore, that the Religion introduced by Numa was
among the chief reasons for the felicity of that City, for it caused good
ordinances, good ordinances make good fortune, and from good fortune there
arises the happy successes of the enterprises. And as the observance of
divine institutions is the cause of the greatness of Republics, so the
contempt of it is the cause of their ruin, for where the fear of God is
lacking it will happen that that kingdom will be ruined or that it will
be sustained through fear of a Prince, which may supply the want of Religion.
And because Princes are short lived, it will happen that that Kingdom
will easily fall as he (Prince) fails in virtu. Whence it results that
Kingdoms which depend solely on the virtu of one man, are not durable
for long, because that virtu fails with the life of that man, and it rarely
happens that it is renewed in (his) successor, as Dante prudently says:
Rarely there descends from the branches (father to son)
Human probity, and this is the will (of the one) who gives it, because
it is asked alone from him.
The welfare of a Republic or a Kingdom, therefore, is not
in having a Prince who governs prudently while he lives, but one who organizes
it in a way that, if he should die, it will still maintain itself. And
although crude men are more easily persuaded by new ordinances and opinions,
yet it is not impossible because of this to persuade civilized men, (and)
who presume themselves not to be crude. The people of Florence did not
seem either crude or ignorant, none the less Brother Girolamo Savonarola
was persuaded that he talked with God. I do not want to judge whether
that was true or not, because one ought not to talk of so great a man
except with reverence. But I may well say that an infinite (number) believed
him without they having seen anything extraordinary which would make them
believe, because his life, the doctrine, the subjects he took up were
sufficient to make them have faith. Let no one be dismayed, therefore,
if he is not able to attain that which had been attained by others, for
men (as was said in our preface) are born, live, and die, always in the
same way.
OF HOW MUCH IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE GIVEN RELIGION; AND HOW
ITALY, BECAUSE THE MEDIUM OF THE ROMAN CHURCH WAS LACKING, WAS RUINED
Those Princes or those Republics that want to maintain themselves
uncorrupted, have above everything else to maintain uncorrupted the servances
of Religion, and hold them always in veneration. For no one can have a
better indication of the ruin of a province than to see the divine institutions
held in contempt. This is easy to understand, when it is known upon what
the Religion of the fatherland is founded; for every Religion has the
foundation of its existence on some one of its principal institutions.
The life of the Gentile Religion was founded upon the responses of the
Oracles and upon the tenets of the Augurs and Aruspices; all their other
ceremonies, sacrifices, rites, depended on these. For they readily believed
that that God who could predict your future good or evil, should also
be able to concede it to you. From this arose their temples, their sacrifices,
their supplication, and all the other ceremonies venerating him; for the
Oracle of Delphi, the Temple of Jupiter Ammon, and other celebrated Oracles
kept the world in admiration and devotion. As soon as these began to speak
in the manner of the Potentates, and this falsity was discovered by the
people, men became incredulous and disposed to disturb every good institution.
The Princes of a Republic or a Kingdom ought therefore to maintain their
Republic's religions, and in consequence well and united. And therefore
they ought in all things which arise to foster it (even if they should
judge them false) to favor and encourage it: and the more prudent they
are, and the more they understand natural things, so much more ought they
to do this. And because this practice has been observed by wise men, there
has arisen the beliefs in the miracles that are celebrated in Religion,
however false; for the prudent ones have increased (their importance)
from whatever origin they may have derived and their authority gives them
credence with the people. There were many of these miracles in Rome, and
among others was that (which occurred) when the Roman soldiers were sacking
the City of Veienti, some of whom entered the Temple of Juno, and, standing
in front of her statue, and saying "WILL YOU COME
TO ROME?", it appeared to some that she had made a sign (of
assent), and to others that she had said yes. For these men, being full
of Religion, (which T. Livius demonstrated) when they entered the Temple
went in without tumult and completely devoted and full of reverence, seemed
to hear that response to their question which perhaps they had presupposed:
which opinion and belief was favored and magnified by Camillus and by
the other Princes of the City.
If the Princes of the Republic had maintained this Christian
religion according as it had been established by the founder, the Christian
States and Republics would have been more united and much more happy than
they are. Nor can any greater conjecture be made of its decline, than
to see that those people who are nearer to the Church of Rome, the head
of our Religion, have less Religion. And whoever should give consideration
to its foundations, and observe how much different present usage is from
them, should judge that without doubt her ruin or flagellation (chastisement)
is near. And because some are of the opinion that the well-being of Italian
affairs depend on the Church of Rome, I want to discuss those reasons
against them that occur to me, and I will present two most powerful ones,
which according to me are not controvertible. The first is, that by the
evil example of that court, this province has lost all devotion and all
Religion: so that it brings (with it) infinite troubles and infinite disorders;
for where there is Religion every good is presupposed, so too where it
is lacking the contrary is presupposed. We Italians therefore have this
obligation with the Church and with the Priests of having become bad and
without Religion; but we also have a greater one, which is the cause of
our ruin. This is that the Church has kept and still keeps this province
(country) of ours divided: and Truly any country never was united or happy,
except when it gave its obedience entirely to one Republic or one Prince,
as has happened to France and Spain. And the reason that Italy is not
in the same condition, and is not also governed by one Republic or one
Prince, is solely the Church, for having acquired and held temporal Empire,
she has not been so powerful or of such virtu that she was able to occupy
the rest of Italy and make herself its Prince. And on the other hand,
she has not been so weak that the fear of losing her dominion of temporal
things has made her unable to call in a power that could defend her against
those who had become too powerful in Italy, as was seen anciently by many
experiences, when through the medium of Charles the Great she drove out
the Lombards who already were the kings of almost all Italy, and when
in our times she took away the power of Venetians with the aid of France;
afterwards she drove out the French with the aid of the Swiss. The church
therefore not being powerful (enough) to occupy Italy, and not having
permitted that another should occupy her, has been the cause why she (Italy)
has not been able to be united under one head, but has been under so many
Princes and Lords, from which there has resulted so much disunion and
so much weakness, that she became prey not only to the powerful Barbarians,
but to anyone who should assault her. This we other Italians owe to the
Church of Rome, and to none others. And anyone who should want to observe
the truth of this more readily through experience, should need to be of
such great power that he should be sent to live at the Roman Court, with
all the power it has in Italy, over the towns of the Swiss, who today
are the only People who live accordingly to ancient customs both as far
as Religion and military institutions (are concerned) and he would see
that in a little time the evil customs of that Court would cause more
disorders in that province (country) than could spring up from any other
incident in any other time.
HOW THE ROMANS SERVED THEMSELVES OF RELIGION TO ESTABLISH
THE CITY AND TO CARRY OUT THEIR ENTERPRISES AND STOP TUMULTS
And it does not appear to me outside my purpose to refer
to some examples where the Romans served themselves of Religion in order
to reorganize the City and to further their enterprises. And although
there are many in (the writings of) Titus Livius, none the less I want
to content myself with these. The Roman people having created the Tribunes
with Consular Power, and all but one (selected from the) Plebs, and pestilence
and famine having occurred there that year, and certain prodigies coming
to pass, the Nobles used this occasion of the creation of the new Tribunes,
saying that the Gods were angered because Rome had ill-used the majesty
of its Empire, and that there was no other remedy to placate the Gods
than by returning the election of the Tribunes to its own (original) place;
from which there resulted that the Plebs frightened by this Religion created
all the Tribunes from the (class of the) Nobles.
¶ It was also seen at the capture of the City of the
Veienti, that the Captains of the armies availed themselves of Religion
to keep them disposed to an enterprise, when lake Albano had risen astonishingly
that year, and the soldiers being weary from the long siege (and) wanted
to return to Rome, the Romans insinuated that Apollo and certain other
(oracles) had given replies that that year the City of the Veienti should
be captured when Lake Albano should overflow: which event made the soldiers
endure the weariness of the war and the siege, being taken by this hope
of capturing the town, and they remained content to pursue the enterprise
so much that Camillus who had been made Dictator captured that City after
it had been besieged for ten years. And thus Religion well used was helpful
both in the capture of that City and for the restoration of the Tribuneships
to the Nobility, that without the said means either would have been accomplished
only with difficulty.
¶ I do not want to miss referring to another example
to this purpose. Many tumults had arisen in Rome caused by Terentillus
the Tribune, (because of) his wanting to promulgate a certain law for
the reasons which will be given in their place below: and among the first
remedies that were used by the Nobility was Religion, of which they served
themselves in two ways. In the first, they caused the sibylline books
to be exhibited, and to give a reply to the City, that through the medium
of civil sedition, there was impending that year the danger of (the City)
losing its liberty; which thing (although it was discovered by the Tribunes)
none the less put so much terror into the breasts of the Plebs that it
cooled (their desire) to follow them. The other mode was when one Appius
Erdonius with a multitude of bandits and servants numbering four thousand
men occupied the Campidoglio (Capitol) by night, so that it was feared
that the Equians and Volscians, perpetual enemies of the Roman name, should
have come to Rome and attacked her; and the Tribunes because of this did
not cease insisting in their pertinacity of promulgating the Terentillan
law, saying that that fear was fictitious and not true; (and) one Publius
Rubetius, a grave citizen of authority, went out from the Senate, (and)
with words partly lovingly and partly menacing, showed them (the people)
the danger to the City and the unreasonableness of their demands, so that
he constrained the Plebs to swear not to depart from the wishes of the
Consul. Whence the Plebs, forced to obey, reoccupied the Campidoglio:
but the Consul Publius Valerius being killed in that attack, Titus Quintius
was quickly made Consul, who in order not to allow the Plebs to rest,
or to give them time to think again of the Terentillan law, commanded
them to go out from Rome and go against the Volscians, saying that because
of that oath they had taken not to abandon the Consul they were obligated
to follow him: to which the Tribunes opposed themselves saying that that
oath was given to the dead Consul and not to him. None the less Titus
Livius shows that the Plebs for fear of Religion wanted more readily to
obey the Consul than believe the Tribunes, saying in favor of the ancient
Religion these words: "He feared that the age had not yet come, when
the Gods were to be neglected, nor to make interpretations of their oaths
and laws to suit themselves." Because of which thing, the Tribunes,
apprehensive of their losing all their liberty, made an accord with the
Consul to remain in obedience to him and that for one year there should
be no discussion of the Terentillan law and the Consuls, on the other
hand, should not draw on the Plebs for war outside (of Rome). And thus
Religion enabled the Senate to overcome that difficulty which without
it, they could never overcome.
THE ROMANS INTERPRETED THE AUSPICES ACCORDING TO NECESSITY,
AND WITH THEIR PRUDENCE MADE A SHOW OF OBSERVING RELIGION, EVEN WHEN THEY
WERE FORCED NOT TO OBSERVE IT, AND IF ANYONE RECKLESSLY DISPARAGED IT
THEY PUNISHED HIM
The Auguries not only ((as was discussed above)) were the
foundation in good part of the ancient Religion of the Gentiles, but they
were also the causes of the well-being of the Roman Republic. Whence the
Romans cared more for this than any other institution, and used it in
their Consular Comitii, in starting their enterprises, in sending out
their armies, in fighting engagements, and in every important activity
of theirs, whether civil or military: and they never would go on an expedition
unless they had persuaded the soldiers that the Gods promised them the
victory. And among the Aruspices there were in the armies certain orders
of Aruspices which they called Pollari (guardians of the Sacred Fowls).
And anytime they were ordered to fight an engagement with the enemy they
desired these Pollari make their Aruspices; and if the fowls pecked away,
they fought with a good augury: if they did not peck away, they abstained
from battle. None the less, when reason showed them that a thing ought
to be done, not withstanding the Aruspices should be adverse, they did
it anyway: but then they turned these (aruspices) with conditions and
in such a manner so adeptly, that it should not appear they were doing
so with disparagement to their Religion: which method was used by Consul
Papirus in a most important battle which he waged against the Samnites,
which afterward left them entirely weak and afflicted. For Papirus being
in the field encountered the Samnites, and as victory in battle appeared
certain to him, and because of this wanting to come to an engagement,
he commanded the Pollari that they make their Aruspices: but the fowls
did not peck away, and the Prince of the Pollari seeing the great disposition
of the army to fight and the thoughts to win which were in the Captain
and all the soldiers, and in order not to take away this opportunity from
the army of doing well, reported to the Consul that the Aruspices were
proceeding well, so that Papirus ordered out his squadrons; but some of
the Pollari having told certain soldiers that the fowls had not pecked
away, they in turn told it to Spurius Papirus nephew of the Consul; and
when he reported this to the Consul, he (the Consul) quickly replied that
he should attend to doing his duty well, and that as to himself and the
army the Aruspices were correct, and if the Pollarius had told a lie,
it would come back on him to his prejudice. And so that the result should
correspond to the prognostication, he commanded his legates that they
should place the Pollari in the front ranks of the battle. Whence it resulted
that in going against the enemy, a Roman soldier drawing a dart by chance
killed the Prince of the Pollari: which thing becoming known, the Consul
said that every thing was proceeding well and with the favor of the Gods,
for the army through the death of that liar was purged of every blame
and of whatever anger (the Gods) should have had against him. And thus
by knowing well how to accommodate his designs to the Aruspices, he (Papirus)
took steps to give battle without his army perceiving that he had in any
part neglected the institutions of their Religion.
Appius Pulcher acted in a contrary fashion in Sicily in
the first Punic war; for wanting to give battle to the Carthaginian army,
he caused the Pollari to make Aruspices, and when they reported to him
that those fowl did not peck away, he said "Let us see if they would
drink," and had them thrown into the sea: whence that giving battle
he lost the engagement; for which he was condemned at Rome, and Papirus
honored, not so much for the one having lost and the other having won,
but because the one had gone against the Aruspices in a prudent manner,
and the other fearfully. Nor did this method of making Aurispices have
any other object than to have the soldiers go into battle with confidence,
from which confidence almost always victory resulted. Which institution
was not only used by the Romans, but by those outsiders; of which it seems
to me proper to adduce an example in the following chapter.
HOW THE SAMNITES HAD RECOURSE TO RELIGION AS AN EXTREME
REMEDY FOR THE THINGS AFFLICTING THEM
The Samnites having been routed many times by the Romans,
and having lastly been defeated in Tuscany, and their armies destroyed
and Captains killed, and their allies such as the Tuscans, French (Gauls),
and Umbrians having also been defeated, so that "They were not
able to continue any longer with their own men or with those from outside,
yet would not abstain from the war, and instead of giving up the unsuccessful
defense of liberty, they would undertake one more attempt at victory before
being overcome". Whence they decided to make one last try: and
since they knew that to want to win it was necessary to induce obstinacy
into the courage of the soldiers, and that to induce it there was no better
means than Religion, they decided to repeat their ancient sacrifices through
the medium of Ovius Paccius their Priest, who arranged it in this form:
that a solemn sacrifice being made, (and), in the midst of the slain victims
and burning altars make all the heads of the army swear never to abandon
the fight; then they summoned the soldiers one by one and in the midst
of those altars and surrounded by many centurions with bared swords in
their hands, they made them first swear that they would not reveal the
things they saw or heard, then with execrable phrases and words full of
terror they made them swear and promise the Gods that they would go readily
wherever the Emperor should command them, and never to flee in battle,
and to kill whomever they should see fleeing; which oath if not observed
would be visited on the head of his family and on his descendants. And
some of them being frightened, (and) not wanting to swear, were quickly
put to death by the centurions: so that the others who followed, terrified
by the ferocity of the spectacle, all swore. And in order to make this
gathering of theirs more imposing, there being forty thousand men there,
they dressed half of them in white clothes with crests and plumes on the
helmets, and thus arrayed they took position at Aquilonia: Papirius came
against them, who in encouraging his soldiers said, "Those crests
cannot inflict wounds, and paint and gilding keep Roman javelins from
transfixing shields". And to weaken the opinion that his soldiers
had of the enemy because of the oath they had taken, he said that it (the
oath) was to inspire fear, and not courage, in those (who had taken it),
for it made them at the same time fear their own Citizens, their Gods,
and their enemies. And coming to the fight, the Samnites were defeated;
for the virtu of the Romans, and the fear conceived from the past routs
overcame whatever obstinacy they were able to assume by virtu of their
Religion and by the oath they had taken. None the less it is seen that
they (the Samnites) did not appear to have any other refuge, nor try other
remedies to be able to revive hope and reestablish their lost virtu. Which
fully testifies how much confidence can be obtained by means of Religion
well used. And although this part might perhaps be rather placed among
affairs of outside (peoples), none the less as this refers to one of the
most important institutions of the Republic of Rome, it has appeared to
me proper to commit this in this place so as not to divide this material
and have to return to it many times.
A PEOPLE ACCUSTOMED TO LIVING UNDER A PRINCE, IF BY SOME
ACCIDENT BECOMES FREE, MAINTAINS ITS LIBERTY WITH DIFFICULTY
Many examples derived from the records of ancient history
will show how difficult it is for a people used to living under a Prince
to preserve their liberty after they had by some accident acquired it,
as Rome acquired it after driving out the Tarquins. And such difficulty
is reasonable; because that people is nothing else other than a brute
animal, which ((although by nature ferocious and wild)) has always been
brought up in prison and servitude, (and) which later being left by chance
free in a field, (and) not being accustomed to (obtain) food or not knowing
where to find shelter for refuge, becomes prey to the first one who seeks
to enchain it again. This same thing happens to a people, who being accustomed
to living under governments of others, not knowing to reason either on
public defense or offense, not knowing the Princes or being known by them,
return readily under a yoke, which often times is more heavy than that
which a short time before had been taken from their necks: and they find
themselves in this difficulty, even though the people is not wholly corrupt;
for a people where corruption has not entirely taken over, cannot but
live at all free even for a very brief time, as will be discussed below:
and therefore our discussions concern those people where corruption has
not expanded greatly, and where there is more of the good than of the
bad (spoiled). To the above should be added another difficulty, which
is that the state which becomes free makes enemy partisans, and not friendly
partisans. All those men become its enemy partisans who avail themselves
of the tyrannical state, feeding on the riches of the Prince, (and) who
when they are deprived of the faculty of thus availing themselves, cannot
live content, and some are forced to attempt to reestablish the tyrancy
so as to recover their authority. It does not ((as I have said)) acquire
friendly partisans, for a free society bestows honors and rewards through
the medium of honest and predetermined rules, and outside of which does
not honor or reward anyone; and when one receives those honors and rewards
as appears to them he merits, he does not consider he has any obligation
to repay them: in addition to this that common usefulness which free society
brings with it, is not known by anyone ((while he yet possesses it)),
which is to be able to enjoy his own possessions freely without any suspicion,
not being apprehensive of the honor of his womenfolk, or that of his children,
and not to fear offer himself; for no one will ever confess himself to
have an obligation to one who only does not offend him.
Thus ((as was said above)) a free state that has newly sprung
up comes to have enemy partisans and not friendly partisans. And wanting
to remedy this inconvenience and these disorders which the above mentioned
difficulties bring with them, there is no remedy more powerful, nor more
valid, healthy, and necessary than (was) the killing of the sons of Brutus,
who, as history shows, together with other Roman youths were induced to
conspire against their country for no other reason than because they could
not obtain extraordinary advantages for themselves under the Consuls as
under the Kings; so that the liberty of that people appeared to have become
their servitude. And whoever undertakes to govern a multitude either by
the way of liberty (Republic) or by the way of a Principate, and does
not make sure of those who are enemies of that new institution, establishes
a short lived state. It is true that I judge those Princes unfelicitous
who, to assure their state when the multitude is hostile, have to take
extraordinary means; for he who has only a few enemies can easily and
without great scandals make sure of them, but he who has the general public
hostile to him can never make sure of them, and the more cruelty he uses,
so much more weak becomes his Principate; so that the best remedy he has
is to seek to make the People friendly. And although this discussion departs
from that written above, in speaking of a Prince here and of a Republic
there, none the less in order not to have to return again to this matter
I want to speak a little more.
A Prince, therefore, wanting to gain over to himself a people
who are hostile to him ((speaking of those Princes who have become Tyrants
in their country)), I say that they ought first to look into that which
the people desire, and he will find they always desire two things: the
one, to avenge themselves against those who are the cause of their slavery:
the other, to regain their liberty. The first desire the Prince is able
to satisfy entirely, the second in part. As to the first, there is an
example in point. When Clearchus, Tyrant of Heraclea, was in exile, a
controversy arose between the people and the Nobles of Heraclea, (and)
the Nobles seeing themselves inferior, turned to favor Clearchus, and
conspiring with him they placed him in opposition to the disposition of
the people of Heraclea, and (thus) took away the liberty from the people.
So that Clearchus finding himself between the insolence of the Nobles,
whom he could not in any way either content or correct, and the rage of
the People who could not endure having lost their liberty, he decided
suddenly to free himself from the nuisance of the Nobles, and to win the
people over to himself. And on this, taking a convenient opportunity,
he cut to pieces all the Nobles, to the extreme satisfaction of the People.
And thus, in this way, he satisfied one of the desires people had, that
is, to avenge themselves. But as to the desire of the people to regain
their liberty, the Prince, not being able to satisfy it, ought to examine
what are the reasons that make them desire to be free, and he will find
that a small part of them desire to be free in order to command, but all
the others, who are an infinite number, desire liberty also as to live
in security. For in all Republics in whatever manner organized, there
are never more than forty or fifty Citizens of a rank to command, and
because this number is small, it is an easy matter to assure oneself of
them, either by taking them out of the way, or by giving them a part of
so many honors as, according to their condition, ought in good part to
content them. The others, to whom it is enough to live in security, are
easily satisfied by creating institutions and laws which, together with
his power, gives realization to the general security of the people. And
when a Prince does this, and the people see that no one breaks such laws
by accident, they will begin in a very short time to live in security
and contentment. In example for this, there is the Kingdom of France,
which lives in security from nothing else other than those Kings being
bound by an infinite number of laws in which the security of his people
is realized. And whoever organized that state wanted that those Kings
should do ((in their own way)) with the arms and the money as they wanted,
but should not be able to dispose of any other thing otherwise than by
the laws that were ordained. That Prince, therefore, or that Republic,
that does not secure itself at the beginning of its state, should assure
itself at the first opportunity, as the Romans did. And he who should
allow this to pass will repent too late of not doing that which he ought
to have done. The Roman people, therefore, being not yet corrupted when
they recovered their liberty, were able to maintain it, after the sons
of Brutus were put to death and the Tarquins destroyed, with all those
remedies and institutions which have been discussed at another time. But
if that people had been corrupted, there never would have been found valid
remedies, in Rome or elsewhere, to maintain it (their liberty), as we
shall show in the next chapter.
A CORRUPT PEOPLE COMING INTO THEIR LIBERTY CAN MAINTAIN
ITSELF FREE ONLY WITH THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY
I judge that it was necessary that Kings should be eliminated
in Rome, or (else) that Rome would in a very short time become weak and
of no valor; for considering to what (degree of) corruption those Kings
had come, if it should have continued so for two or three successions,
(and) that that corruption which was in them had begun to spread through
its members; (and) as the members had been corrupted it was impossible
ever again to reform her (the state). But losing the head while the torso
was sound, they were able easily to return to a free and ordered society.
And it ought to be presupposed as a very true matter that a corrupted
City which exists under a Prince, even though that Prince with all his
lives (family) may be extinguished, can never become free; and that rather
it should happen that one Prince destroy the other, for (these people)
will never be settled without the creation of a new Lord, who by his goodness
together with his virtu will then keep them free: but that liberty will
last only during his life time, as happened at different times in Syracuse
to Dion and Timoleon, whose virtu while they lived, kept that City free:
but when they died, it returned to the ancient Tyranny. But there is no
more striking example to be seen than that of Rome, which after the Tarquins
had been driven out, was able quickly to resume and maintain that liberty;
but after the death of Caesar, Caligula, and Nero, and after the extinction
of all the line of Caesar, she could not only never maintain her liberty,
but was unable to reestablish it. And so great a difference in events
in the same City did not result from anything else other than (the fact
that) the Roman People in the time of Tarquin was not yet corrupt, and
in the latter time (Caesar's) it became very corrupt. For to keep her
sound and disposed to keep away from Kings at that time, it was enough
to make them swear that they should never consent that any of them should
ever reign in Rome; but in the time of the other (Caesar) the authority
of Brutus with all the Eastern legions was not enough to keep her disposed
to want to maintain that liberty which he, in imitation of the first Brutus,
had restored to her. Which resulted from that corruption which the party
of Marius had spread among the people, at the head of which was Caesar,
who was able so to blind the multitude that they did not recognize the
yoke which they themselves were placing on their necks.
And although this example of Rome is to be preferred to
any other example, none the less on this proposition I want to refer to
people known before our times. I say, therefore, that no incident ((although
grave and violent)) can ever restore Milan or Naples to freedom, because
those people are entirely corrupt. Which was seen after the death of Filippo
Visconti, who, wanting to restore liberty to Milan, did not know how and
could not maintain it. It was therefore a great good fortune for Rome
that no sooner had these Kings become corrupt than they were driven out,
and that before their corruption should pass into the vitals of that City;
which corruption was the cause of the infinite tumults which took place
in Rome ((men having good intentions)) (and which) did no harm, but rather
benefited the Republic. And this conclusion can be drawn, that where the
people is not corrupted, tumults and other troubles do no harm; but where
corruption exists, well ordered laws are of no benefit, unless they are
administered by one who, with extreme strength, will make them be observed
until the people become good (cured); I do not know if this ever happened,
or whether it be possible that it could happen; for it is seen ((as I
have said a little above)) that a City coming to decadence because of
the corruption of its people, if it ever happens that she is raised up
again, it happens through the virtu of one man who is then living, and
not by the virtu of the general public, that the good institutions are
sustained: and as soon as such a one is dead, they will return to their
pristine habits, as happened at Thebes, which by the virtu of Epaminondas,
while he was alive, was able to maintain the form of a Republic and Empire,
but after his death returned to its first disorders: the reason is this,
that one man cannot live so long that the time will be enough to bring
a City back to good habits which for a long time has had evil habits.
And if one of very long life or two continuous successors of virtu do
not restore it (the state), so one which lacks them ((as was said above))
is quickly ruined, unless it should be made to be restored through many
dangers and much bloodshed. For such corruption and little inclination
for a free society result from an inequality that exists in that City;
and wanting to bring them to equality, it is necessary to use the most
extraordinary means, which few know or want to use, as will be described
in more detail in another place.
IN WHAT WAY IN A CORRUPT CITY A FREE STATE CAN BE MAINTAINED,
IF THERE IS ONE THERE, OR IF NOT, HOW TO ESTABLISH IT
I believe it is not outside the purpose of this discussion,
nor too distant from that written above, to consider whether a free State
can be maintained in a City that is corrupted, or, if there had not been
one, to be able to establish one. On this matter I say that it is very
difficult to do either one or the other: and although it is almost impossible
to give rules ((because it will be necessary to proceed according to the
degrees of corruption)), none the less, as it is well to discuss every
thing, I do not want to omit this. And I will presuppose a City very corrupt,
where such difficulties come to rise very fast, as there are found there
neither laws or institutions that should be enough to check a general
corruption. For as good customs have need of laws for maintaining themselves,
so the laws, to be observed, have need of good customs. In addition to
this, the institutions and laws made in a Republic at its origin when
men were good, are not afterward more suitable, when they (men) have become
evil. And if laws vary according to circumstances and events in a City,
its institutions rarely or never vary: which results in the fact that
new laws are not enough, for the institutions that remain firm will corrupt
it. And in order to make this part better understood, I will tell how
the Government was established in Rome, or rather the State, and the laws
with which afterwards the Magistrates restrained the Citizens. The institution
of the State included the authority of the People, the Senate, thy Tribunes,
the Consuls, method of seeking and creating Magistrates, and the method
of making laws. These institutions were rarely or never varied by events.
The laws that restrained the Citizens varied, such as was the law of the
Adulterers, the Sumptuary, that of Ambition, and many others, according
as the Citizens from day to day became corrupt. But the institutions of
the State becoming firm, although no longer good for the corrupt (people),
those laws that were changed were not enough to keep men good, but would
have been of benefit if with the changes of the law the institutions should
have been modified.
And that it is true that such institutions in a City that
had become corrupt were not good, is expressly seen in these two principal
points. As to the creation of the Magistracies and the laws, the Roman
People did not give the Consulship and other high offices of the City,
except to those who asked for them. In the beginning these institutions
were good because no one asked for these (offices) except those Citizens
who judged themselves worthy, and having a refusal was ignominious: so
that in order to judge himself worthy every one worked well. However,
this system became pernicious in a corrupt City, for it was not those
who had more virtu, but those who had more power, who asked for the Magistracies,
and the less powerful ((no matter of how much virtu)) abstained from asking
from fear. This evil did not come on suddenly, but by degrees, as happens
with all other evils: for the Romans having subjugated Africa and Asia,
and reduced almost all of Greece to their obedience, had become assured
of their liberty, nor did they seem to have more enemies who should give
them fear. This security, and this weakness of her enemies, caused the
Roman people no longer to regard virtu in bestowing the Consulship, but
graciousness, drawing to that dignity those who knew better how to handle
men, not to those who knew better how to conquer their enemies: afterwards
they descended from those who had more graciousness to give it to those
who had more power. So that because of the defects of such institutions,
the good were entirely excluded from everything. A Tribune or some other
Citizen could propose a law to the people on which every Citizen could
speak in favor or against it before it should be adopted. This institution
was good when the Citizens were good, for it was always well that anyone
who intended some good for the public was able to propose it, and it was
well that everyone could speak his thoughts on it, so that the people,
having listened to all sides, could then select the best. But when the
Citizens had become bad such institutions became the worst, for only the
powerful proposed laws, (and) not for the common liberty, but for their
own power, and everyone for fear of them was not able to speak against
them: so that the people came to be deceived or forced into deciding their
own ruin.
It was necessary, therefore, if Rome wanted to maintain
herself free in her corruption, that she should have made new institutions,
just as she had made new laws in the process of her existence, for other
institutions and modes of living ought to be established in a bad people
as well as in a good one, nor can the form be the same in a people entirely
different. But because these institutions when they are suddenly discovered
no longer to be good have to be changed either completely, or little by
little as each (defect) is known, I say that both of these two courses
are almost impossible. For in the case of wanting to change little by
little a prudent man is required who sees this evil from a distance and
at its beginning. It is easily probable that no one such as these springs
up in a City: and even if one should spring up he is never able to persuade
others of that which he intends; for men living in one manner, do not
want to change, and the more so as they do not see the evil face to face,
but being shown to them as (mere) conjecture.
As to changing these institutions all at once when everyone
recognizes they are not good, I say that the defect which is easily recognized
is difficult to correct, for to do this it is not enough to use ordinary
means, as ordinary means are bad, but it is necessary to come to the extraordinary,
such as violence and arms, and before anything else to become Prince of
that City, and to be able to dispose of it as he pleases. And as the re-organization
of the political life of a City presupposes a good man, and the becoming
of a Prince of a Republic by violence presupposes a bad man; for because
of this it will be found that it rarely happens that a (good) men wants
to become Prince through bad means, even though his objectives be good;
or that a bad one, having become Prince, wants to work for good and that
it should enter his mind to use for good that authority which he had acquired
by evil means. From all the things written above, arises the difficulty
or impossibility of maintaining a Republic in a City that has become corrupted,
or to establish it there anew. And even if it should have to be created
or maintained, it would be necessary to reduce it more to a Royal State
(Monarchy) than to a Popular State (Republic), so that those men who because
of their insolence cannot be controlled by laws, should be restrained
by a Power almost Regal. And to want to make them become good by other
means would be either a most cruel enterprise or entirely impossible;
as I said above this is what Cleomenes did, who for wanting to be alone
(in the Government) killed the Ephors, and if Romulus for the same reasons
killed his brother and Titus Tatius, the Sabine, and afterwards they used
their authority well, none the less, it ought to be noted that one and
the other of these men did not have their subjects stained with that corruption
of which we have discussed in this chapter, and therefore they could desire
(good), and desiring it, conform their designs accordingly.
A WEAK PRINCE WHO SUCCEEDS AN EXCELLENT PRINCE CAN BE MAINTAINED,
BUT ANY KINGDOM CANNOT BE MAINTAINED IF A WEAK ONE IS SUCCEEDED BY ANOTHER
WEAK ONE
In considering the virtu and the mode of proceeding of Romulus,
of Numa, and of Tullus, the first three Kings of Rome, it will be seen
that Rome was favored by the greatest good fortune, having the first King
most ferocious and warlike, the next quiet and religious, the third similar
in ferocity to Romulus, and a greater lover of war than of peace. For
it was necessary in Rome that in the beginning there should spring up
an Organizer of civil institutions, but it then indeed was necessary that
the other Kings should reassume the virtu of Romulus, otherwise that City
would have become effeminate and prey to her neighbors. Whence it can
be noted that a successor not having as much virtu as the first, is able
to maintain a State which was erected by that man before him and can enjoy
his labors; but if it happens either that his life is a long one, or that
after him there should not spring up another who should reassume the virtu
of the first one, that Kingdom of necessity will be ruined. And so, on
the contrary, if two, one after the other, are of great virtu, it will
often be seen that they achieve most great things and that they will rise
with their fame to the heavens. David without doubt was a man most excellent
in arms, in doctrine, and in judgment, and so great was his virtu, that
having conquered and beaten down all his neighbors, he left a peaceful
Kingdom to this son Solomon, which he was able to preserve with the arts
of peace and of war, and he was able happily to enjoy the virtu of his
father. But he could not thus leave it to his son Rehoboam, who not being
like his grandfather in virtu, or like his father in fortune, remained
heir to the sixth part of the Kingdom only with great effort. Bajazet,
Sultan of the Turks, although he was more a lover of peace than of war,
was able to enjoy the efforts of his father Mahomet, who having like David
beaten his neighbors, left him a firm Kingdom and capable of being preserved
easily with the arts of peace. But if his own son Soliman, the present
lord, had been like his father and not his grandfather, that Kingdom would
have been ruined: but it was seen that this man was to surpass the glory
of his grandfather.
I say, therefore, through these examples, that it is possible
for a weak Prince succeeding an excellent one to preserve any Kingdom,
even if it should not be as that of France, which is maintained by its
ancient institutions: and those Princes are weak who are not able to endure
war. I conclude, therefore, with this discussion that the virtu of Romulus
was so great, that it was able to give time to Numa Pompilius to be able
to rule Rome with the arts of peace; but he was succeeded by Tullus, who
by his ferocity reassumed the reputation of Romulus; after whom there
followed Ancus, so gifted by nature that he was able to use peace and
endure war. And first he addressed himself to want to hold the ways of
peace, but he soon knew that his neighbors judging him effeminate esteemed
him little, so that he decided that if he wanted to maintain Rome he needed
to turn to war and imitate Romulus, and not Numa. Let all the Princes
who have a State take example from this, that he who imitates Numa may
keep it (the State) or not keep it, according as the times and fortune
may turn his way; but he who imitates Romulus, and is like him armed with
prudence and weapons, will keep it in any case, unless it is taken from
him by an obstinate (and) excessive force. And certainly it can be though
that, if Rome had not by chance had as her third King a man who had not
known how to recover with arms her reputation, she would never then have
been able, except with the greatest difficulty, to gain a foothold, nor
to achieve the results that she did. And thus as long as she lived under
Kings, she was subject to these dangers of being ruined under a weak or
bad King.
TWO CONTINUOUS SUCCESSIONS OF PRINCES OF VIRTU ACHIEVE
GREAT RESULTS; AND THAT WELL ORGANIZED REPUBLICS OF NECESSITY HAVE SUCCESSIONS
OF VIRTU; THEREFORE THEIR ACQUISITIONS AND EXPANSIONS ARE GREAT
After Rome had driven out her Kings, she was no longer exposed
to those perils which were mentioned above, resulting from a succession
of weak or bad Kings; for the highest (authority) was vested in the Consuls,
who came to that Empire not by heredity or deceit or violent ambition,
but by free suffrage, and were always most excellent men, from whose virtu
and fortune Rome had benefited from time to time, (and) was able to arrive
at her ultimate greatness in as many years as she had existed under her
Kings. For it is seen that two continuous successions of Princes of virtu
are sufficient to acquire the world, as was (the case of) Philip of Macedonia
and Alexander the Great. A Republic ought to be able to do so much more,
having the means of electing not only two successions, but an infinite
number of Princes of great virtu who are successors one after the other:
which succession of virtu is always well established in every Republic.
HOW MUCH BLAME THAT PRINCE AND REPUBLIC MERIT WHO LACK
THEIR OWN ARMS
Present Princes and modern Republics, who lack their own
soldiers in regard to defense and offense, ought to be ashamed of themselves
and to think from the example of Tullus that such a defect exists not
because of the lack of men suitable for the military, but that by their
own fault they have not known how to make soldiers of their men.[3]
For Tullus, after Rome had been at peace forty years, did not find a man
((when he succeeded to the Kingdom)) who had ever been in war. None the
less, planning to make war, he did not think of availing himself of the
Samnites, or of the Tuscans, or of others who were accustomed to bear
arms, but as a most prudent man decided to avail himself of his own people:
And such was his virtu that he was able quickly to make excellent soldiers
under his own government. And there is nothing more true than that (truth),
if there are no soldiers where there are men, this results from the defect
of the Prince, and not from any local or natural defect: of which there
is a very recent example: For everyone knows that in recent times the
King of England assaulted the kingdom of France, and did not take as soldiers
any other than his own people: and because that Kingdom had been for more
than thirty years without making war, he did not have either soldiers
or a Captain who had ever fought: none the less, he did not hesitate with
them to assault a Kingdom full of Captains and good armies, which had
been continually under arms in the wars in Italy. All of which resulted
from that King being a prudent man and that Kingdom well organized, that
in time of peace did not neglect the arrangements of war. The Thebans,
Pelopidas and Epaminondas, after having liberated Thebes, and rescued
her from the servitude of the Spartan Empire, finding themselves in a
City accustomed to servitude, and in the midst of an effeminate people,
did not hesitate ((so great was their virtu)) to put them under arms and
with them go to meet the Spartan armies in the field and conquered them:
and whoever writes says, that these two in a short time showed that men
of war were born not only in Lacedemonia, but in every other place where
men are born, as long as there was to be found one man who should know
how to train them in military service, as is seen (in the case) of Tullus
who knew how to train the Romans. And Virgil could not express this thought
better, and with other words shows how he adhered to that, when he said:
"And Tullus made of These men soldiers".
WHAT IS TO BE NOTED IN THE CASE OF THE THREE ROMAN HORATII
AND OF THE THREE ALBAN CURATII
Tullus, King of Rome, and Metius, King of Alba, agreed that
that people should be lord of those whose above mentioned three men should
overcome (those of) the others. All the Alban Curatii were killed, (and)
there remained only one of the Roman Horatii alive, and because of this
Metius, King of the Albans, with his subjects, remained subject to the
Romans. And when that Horatius returned as conqueror to Rome, meeting
his sister who was married to one of the three dead Curatii, and who was
weeping over the death of her husband, he killed her. Whence that Horatius,
because of this crime, was placed on trial and after much deliberation
was freed, more because of thy prayers of his father than because of his
own merits. Here three things are to be noted. One, that one should never
risk all his fortune with only part of his forces. Next, that in a well
organized City, the demerits (crimes) are never rewarded with merits.
The third, that proceedings are never wise where one ought to be doubtful
of their observance. For being in servitude means much to a City, that
it ought never to be believed that any of those Kings or of those People
should be content that three of their Citizens should make them subject,
as is seen Metius wanted to do, who although immediately after the victory
of the Romans confessed himself conquered and promised obedience to Tullus,
none the less, in the first expedition in which they were to come against
the Veienti, it is seen that he sought to deceive them, as one who sees
too late the imprudence of the proceeding undertaken by him. And because
this third point has been talked about much, we will talk only of the
other two in the following two chapters.
THAT ONE OUGHT NOT TO PUT IN PERIL ALL HIS FORTUNE AND
ALL HIS FORCES; AND BECAUSE OF THIS THE GUARDING OF PASSES IS OFTEN HARMFUL
It was never judged (to be) a wise proceeding to put into
peril all of one's fortune or all of one's forces. This may be done in
many ways. One is to do as Tullus and Metius did when they committed all
the fortune of their country and the virtu of so many men, as both of
these had in their armies, to the virtu and fortune of three of their
Citizens, which came to be only a minimum part of the forces of each of
them. Nor did they see that because of this proceeding all the labors
that their ancestors had endured in the establishment of the Republic
in order to have it exist free a long time, and to make her Citizens defenders
of their liberty, were as it were made in vain, it being in the power
of so few to lose it. Which action (on the part) of those Kings could
not be considered worse. This error is also almost always committed by
those who ((seeing the enemy)) plan to hold different places and guard
the passes. For almost always this decision will be damaging unless you
can thus conveniently keep all your forces (there) in that difficult place.
In this case such a procedure is to be taken: but being in a rugged place
and not being able to keep all your forces there, the procedure is damaging.
I am made to think thusly by the example of those who, when they are assaulted
by a powerful enemy, and their country being surrounded by mountains and
rugged places, never tried to combat the enemy in the passes and in the
mountains, but have gone out to meet them in front of these, or when they
did not wish to do that, have awaited him behind these mountains in easy
and not-rugged places. And the reason was, as it were, as alleged before;
for many men cannot be brought to the guarding of rugged places, not only
because it is not possible to live there a long time, but also because
being in narrow places capable of (admitting) only a few, it is not possible
to sustain an enemy who comes in a large body to hurl himself at you:
And it is easy for the enemy to come in large numbers, because his intention
is to pass and not stop, while to him who awaits him (the enemy) it is
impossible to wait with large numbers, having to quarter himself for a
longer time ((not knowing when the enemy may attempt to pass)) in narrow
and sterile places, as I have said. Having therefore lost that pass that
you had presupposed to hold, and in which your people and the army had
trusted, there will very often enter in the people and the rest of the
forces so much terror that, without being able to test the virtu of those
remaining, they are lost; and thus you have lost all your fortune with
only part of your forces.
Everyone knows with how much difficulty Hannibal crossed
the Alps which divide Lombardy from France, and with how much difficulty
he crossed those which divide Lombardy from Tuscany; none the less, the
Romans awaited him first on the Ticino and afterwards on the plains of
Arezzo; and they wanted rather that their army should be consumed by the
enemy in places where they themselves could conquer, than to lead it over
the Alps to be destroyed by the malignity of the site. And whoever reads
all the histories attentively will find very few Captians of virtu to
have held similar passes and for the reasons mentioned, and because they
cannot close them all, the mountains being like the fields and having
roads not only well known and frequented, but many other which, if not
known to outsiders, are well known to the people of the country, with
whose aid you will always be brought to any place against the wishes of
whoever opposes you. Of this a most recent example in the year one thousand
five hundred fifteen (1515) can be cited. When Francis King of France
planned to cross into Italy in order to recover the State of Lombardy,
the greater foundation of those who opposed his enterprise was that the
Swiss would stop him in the mountain passes. And as was seen from this
experience, that foundation of theirs was vain, for that King, leaving
aside two or three places guarded by them (Swiss), came by another unknown
road, and was already in Italy before they were aware of it. So that,
frightened, they retreated to Milan, and all the people of Lombardy adhered
to the French forces, having been proved wrong in their opinion that the
French would be held in the mountains.
WELL ORGANIZED REPUBLICS ESTABLISH REWARDS AND PENALTIES
FOR THEIR CITIZENS, BUT NEVER COMPENSATE ONE (AT THE EXPENSE) OF THE OTHER
The merits of Horatius had been very great, having by his
virtu conquered the Curatii. None the less such a homicide displeased
the Romans so much, that he was brought to trial for his life, notwithstanding
that his merits were so great and so recent. Which thing, to whoever should
consider it only superficially, would seem to be an example of the ingratitude
of the people. None the less, whoever should examine it closer, and with
better consideration will look for what the orders of the Republic ought
to be, will blame that people rather for having absolved him than for
having wanted to condemn him: and the reason is this, that no well-ordered
Republic ever cancels the misbehavior of its citizens by their merits;
and having rewarded one for having acted well, if that same one afterwards
acts badly, it castigates him without having regard to any of his good
actions. And if these orders are well observed, a City will exist free
for a long time; if otherwise, it will quickly be ruined. For if to a
citizen who has done some eminent work for the City, there is added to
his reputation of that which he acquired, and audacity and confidence
of being able to do some wrong without fear of punishment, he will in
a short time become so insolent as to put an end to all civil law. But
wanting that the punishment for evil actions be feared, it is very necessary
to observe rewarding good, as is seen was done by Rome. And although a
Republic may be poor and can give only a little, it ought not to abstain
from giving that little, because every little gift given to someone in
recompense for a good deed, no matter how big (the deed), will always
be esteemed very greatly by whoever receives it as an honorable thing.
And the history of Horatius Codes and that of Mutius Scaevola are well
known; how one held back the enemy on a bridge until it was cut, (and)
the other burned his hand having erred in wanting to murder Porsenna,
King of the Tuscans. For these two eminent deeds two measures of land
were given to each of those men by the public. The history of Manlius
Capitolinus is also well known. For having saved the Campidoglio from
the Gauls who were besieging it, this man was given a small measure of
flour by those who had been besieged inside with him, which reward ((according
to the value that was then current in Rome)) was great and of quality;
(but) when Manlius afterward, either from envy or from his evil nature,
moved to raise up sedition in Rome, and seeking to gain over the People
to himself, he was, without regard to any of his merits, thrown precipituously
from that Campidoglio which he had previously with so much glory saved.
WHOEVER WANTS TO REFORM AN ANCIENT STATE INTO A FREE CITY,
SHOULD RETAIN AT LEAST A SHADOW OF THE ANCIENT FORMS
He who desires or wants to reform the State (Government)
of a City, and wishes that it may be accepted and capable of maintaining
itself to everyone's satisfaction, it is necessary for him at least to
retain the shadow of ancient forms, so that it does not appear to the
people that the institutions have been changed, even though in fact the
new institutions should be entirely different from the past ones: for
the general mass of men are satisfied with appearances, as if it exists,
and many times are moved by the things which appear to be rather than
by the things that are. The Romans knew this necessity in the beginning
of their free existence, (and) for this reason, had in place of one King
created two Consuls, (and) did not want them to have more than twelve
Lictors so as not to exceed the number that ministered to the Kings. In
addition to this, an annual sacrifice was made in Rome, which could not
be done except by the King in person, and as the Romans wishing that the
People should not desire any of the ancient things because of the absence
of the King, created a chief for the said sacrifice, whom they called
the King of sacrifice, and placed him under the high priest. So that the
people through this means came to be satisfied with that sacrifice and
never to have reason, for lack of them, to desire the return of the King.
And this ought to be observed by all those who want to abolish an ancient
(system of) living in a City and bring it to a new and more liberal (system
of) living. For as new things disturb the minds of men, you ought to endeavor
that these changes retain as much as possible of the ancient (forms);
and if the magistrates change both in number and in authority and in duration
(of term) from the ancients, the names at least ought to be retained.
And this ((as I have said)) ought to be preserved by whoever wants to
organize an absolute power into a Republic or a Kingdom; but he who wants
to establish an absolute power, which by authors is called a Tyranny,
ought to change everything, as will be mentioned in the following chapter.
A NEW PRINCE IN A CITY OR PROVINCE TAKEN BY HIM OUGHT TO
ORGANIZE EVERYTHING ANEW
Whoever becomes Prince either of a City or a State, and
more so if his foundations are weak, and does not want to establish a
civil system either in the form of a Kingdom or a Republic, (will find)
the best remedy he has to hold that Principality is ((he being a new Prince))
to do everything anew in that State; such as in the City to make new Governors
with new titles, with new authority, with new men, (and) make the poor
rich, as David did when he became King, who piled good upon the needy,
and dismissed the wealthy empty-handed. In addition to this he should
build new Cities, destroy old ones, transfer the inhabitants from one
place to another, and in sum, not to leave anything unchanged in that
Province, (and) so that there should be no rank, nor order, nor status,
nor riches, that he who obtains it does not recognize it as coming from
him; he should take as his model Philip of Macedonia, father of Alexander,
who, by these methods, from a petty King became Prince of Greece. And
those who write of him tell how be transferred men from Province to Province,
as the Mandrians (Shepherds) move their sheep. These methods are most
cruel and hostile to every system of living, not only Christian, but human,
and should be avoided by every man; and he should want rather to live
as a private individual than as a King at the (expense of the) ruin of
men. None the less, he who does not want to take up the first path of
good, must, if he wants to maintain himself, follow the latter path of
evil. But men take up certain middle paths which are most harmful, for
they do not know how to be entirely good or entirely bad, as the following
chapter will show by example.
VERY RARELY DO MEN KNOW HOW TO BE ENTIRELY GOOD OR ENTIRELY
BAD
When Pope Julius II in the year one thousand five hundred
and five (1505) went to Bologna to drive the house of Bentivogli out of
that State, of which they had held the Principate (of that State) for
a hundred years, he wanted also to remove Giovanpagolo Baglioni from Perugia,
of which he was Tyrant, (and) to be the one who planned to eliminate all
the Tyrants who were occupying the lands of the Church. And having arrived
at Perugia with this purpose and decision known to everyone, he did not
wait to enter in that City with his army that was protecting him, but
entered unarmed, notwithstanding that Giovanpagolo was inside with large
forces that he had gathered for defense. And thus, brought by that fury
which governed all his actions, with only his simple guard he placed himself
in the hands of the enemy, whom he then carried off with him, leaving
a governor in that City who should administer it for the Church. The temerity
of the Pope and the cowardice of Giovanpagolo were noted by the prudent
men who were with the Pope, nor could they understand whence it happened
that he (Baglioni) did not with his perpetual fame attack his enemy at
once and enrich himself with booty, there being with the Pope all the
Cardinals with their valuables. Nor could it be believed that he abstained
either from goodness or that his conscience restrained him; for no regard
of piety could enter in the heart of a riotous man, who had kept his sister,
and had put to death his cousins and nephews in order that he could reign
there: but it is concluded that men do not know how to be entirely bad
or perfectly good, and that when an evil has some greatness in it or is
generous in any part, they do not know how to attempt it. Thus Giovanpagolo,
who did not mind being publicly (called) incestuous and a parricide, did
not know how, or to say more correctly, did not dare ((even having a justifiable
opportunity)) to make an enterprise where everyone would have admired
his courage and which would have left an eternal memory of himself, being
the first who would have shown the Prelates how little esteemed are they
who live and reign as they do, and would have done an act, the greatness
of which would have overcome every infamy and every danger that could
have resulted from it.
FOR WHAT REASONS THE ROMANS WERE LESS UNGRATEFUL TO THEIR
CITIZENS THAN THE ATHENIANS
Whoever reads of the things done by Republics will find
in all of them some species of ingratitude against their citizens, but
he will find less in Rome than in Athens, and perhaps in any other Republic.
And in seeking the reasons for this, speaking of Rome and Athens, I believe
it was because the Romans had less reason to suspect their citizens than
did the Athenians. For in Rome ((discussing the time from the expulsion
of the Kings up to Sulla and Marius)) liberty was never taken away from
any of its citizens, so that in that (City) there was no great reason
to be suspicious of them, and consequently (no cause) to offend them inconsiderately.
The very contrary happened in Athens, for her liberty having been taken
away by Pisistratus in her most florid time and under the deception of
goodness, so soon then as she became free, remembering the injuries received
and her past servitude, she became a harsh avenger not only of the errors
of her citizens, but even the shadow of them. From which resulted the
exile and death of so many excellent men: From this came the practice
of ostracism and every other violence which that City at various times
took up against her Nobility. And it is very true what these writers say
of that Civil Society, that when they have recovered their liberty, they
sting their people more severely than when they have preserved it. Whoever
would consider, therefore, what has been said, will not blame Athens for
this, nor praise Rome, but he will blame only the necessity resulting
from the difference of events which occurred in those Cities. For whoever
will consider things carefully, will see that if Rome had had her liberty
taken away as it was in Athens, Rome would not have been any more merciful
toward her citizens than was the latter. From which a very real conjecture
can be made of that which occurred after the expulsion of the Kings against
Collatinus and Publius Valerius, of whom the first ((although he was found
in liberating Rome)) was sent into exile for no other reason than for
having the name of the Tarquins, and the other having only given suspicion
by building a house on Mount Celius, was also made to be an exile. So
that it can be judged ((seeing how severe Rome was in these two suspicions))
that she would have been ungrateful as Athens was, if she had been offended
by her citizens as she was in her early times and before her expansion.
And so as not to have to return again to this matter of ingratitude, I
shall say that which will occur in the following chapter.
WHICH IS MORE UNGRATEFUL, A PEOPLE OR A PRINCE
It appears to me apropos of the above written matter to
discuss with example who practiced this ingratitude more, a People or
a Prince. And to discuss this part further, I say that this vice of ingratitude
arises either from avarice or from suspicion: For when a People or a Prince
has sent out one of its Captains on an important expedition, where that
Captain ((having won)) has acquired great glory, that People or that Prince
is bound in turn to reward him: and if in place of a reward they, moved
by avarice, either dishonor or offend him, not wanting ((held back by
this cupidity)) to take the trouble, they make an error that has no excuse,
but will leave behind for them an eternal infamy. Yet many Princes are
found who err in this way. And Cornelius Tacitus tells the reason in this
sentence; An injury is more apt to be repaid than a benefit, where
gratitude is onerous and exultation is had in revenge. But when they
do not reward one; or ((to say it better)) they offend one, moved not
by avarice, but by suspicion, then both the People and Prince merit some
excuse. And much is read of this ingratitude shown for such reasons, for
that Captain who by his virtu has conquered an Empire for his Lord, overcoming
the enemy and filling himself with glory and his soldiers with riches,
of necessity acquires so much reputation with his soldiers, with his enemies,
and with the Prince's very own subjects, that that victory can be distasteful
to that Lord who had sent him. And because the nature of men is ambitious
and suspicious, and puts no limits on the fortune of anyone, it is not
impossible that the suspicion which is suddenly aroused in the Prince
after the victory of his captain, may not by itself have been increased
by some of his actions or expressions made insolently. So that the Prince
cannot think otherwise than to secure himself: and to do this thinks of
either having him die or taking away from him that reputation which he
gained among his army and the people, and with all industry show that
the victory was not due to the virtu of that (Captain), but by chance
and cowardice of the enemy, or by the wisdom of other Captains who had
been with him in that action.
After Vespasian, while in Judea, was declared Emperor by
his army, Antonius Primus, who was to be found with another army in Illyria,
took his side, and came into Italy against Vitellius who reigned in Rome,
and with the greatest virtu routed two armies of Vitellius and occupied
Rome, so that through the virtu of Antonius, Mutianus, who had been sent
by Vespasian, found everything achieved and all difficulties overcome.
The reward which Antonius received was that Mutianus took away from him
the command of the army, and little by little reduced his authority in
Rome to nothing: so that Antonius went to find Vespasian who was yet in
Asia, by whom he was received in such a fashion, that in a brief time,
having been reduced to no rank, died almost in despair. And histories
are full of such examples.
In our own times anyone now living knows with what industry
and virtu Gonsalvo Ferrante, fighting in the Kingdom of Naples for Ferrando
King of Aragon against the French, had conquered and won that Kingdom,
and was rewarded for his victory by Ferrando, who departed from Aragon
and came to Naples, where he first took away from him the command of the
armed forces, then took away from him the fortresses, and then took him
with him to Spain, where in a short time he died unhonored.
And this suspicion, therefore, is so natural in Princes
that they cannot defend themselves against them, and it is impossible
for them to show gratitude toward those who, by victory under their ensigns,
have made great conquest. And if a Prince cannot defend himself from them,
is it not a miracle or something worthy of greater consideration, that
a people does not also defend itself; for a City which exists free has
two objectives, one conquering, the other maintaining itself free, and
it happens that because of excessive love for both of these it makes errors.
As to the errors made in conquering, they will be spoken of in their proper
place. As to the errors made in maintaining itself free, among others
they are those of offending those Citizens whom it ought to reward, and
of having suspicion of those in whom it ought to have confidence. And
although these things in a Republic already corrupted cause great evils,
and which many times rather leads to tyranny, as happened in Rome under
Caesar who took by force that which ingratitude denied him, none the less
in a Republic not yet corrupted they are the cause of great good, and
make for a longer free existence, maintaining itself because the fear
of punishment makes men better and less ambitious.
It is true that among all the people who ever had an Empire
for reasons discussed above, Rome was the least ungrateful, for it can
be said there is no other example of her ingratitude than that of Scipio;
for Coriolanus and Camillus were both made exiles because of the injuries
that the one and the other had inflicted on the Plebs: But he one was
never pardoned for having always preserved a hostile spirit against the
People: the other was not only recalled (from exile), but for the rest
of his life was adored as a Prince. But the ingratitude shown to Scipio
arose from a suspicion that the Citizens begun to have of him that was
never had of others, which (suspicion) arose from the greatness of the
enemy that Scipio conquered, from the reputation which that victory in
such a long and perilous war had given him, from the rapidity of it, from
the favor which his youth, his prudence, and his other memorable virtues
had acquired for him. These were so many, that for no other reason, the
Magistrates of Rome feared his authority, which displeased intelligent
men as something unheard of in Rome. And his manner of living appeared
so extraordinary that Cato the elder, reputed a saint, was the first to
go against him, and to say that a City could not be called free where
there was a Citizen who was feared by the Magistrates. So that if the
people of Rome in this case followed the opinion of Cato, they merit the
excuse that I said above was merited by those People and those Princes
who, because of suspicion, are ungrateful. Concluding this discourse,
therefore, I say that using this vice of ingratitude for either avarice
or suspicion, it will be seen that the People never use it from avarice,
and from suspicion much less than do Princes, having less reason for suspicion,
as will be told below.
WHAT MEANS A PRINCE OR A REPUBLIC OUGHT TO USE TO AVOID
THIS VICE OF INGRATITUDE, AND WHAT THAT CAPTAIN OR THAT CITIZEN OUGHT
TO DO SO AS NOT TO BE TOUCHED BY IT
A Prince, to avoid the necessity of having to live with
suspicion or to be ungrateful, ought to go on his expeditions in person,
as those Roman Emperors did in the beginning, as does the Turk in our
times, and as those of virtu have done and still do. For winning, the
glory and the conquests are all theirs: and when they do not ((the glory
belonging to others)) it does not appear to them to be able to use that
conquest unless they extinguish that glory in others which they have not
known how to gain for themselves, and to become ungrateful and unjust
is without doubt more to their loss than to their gain. But when either
through negligence or little prudence they remain idle at home and send
a Captain, I have no precept to give them, then, other than that which
they know by themselves. But I will say to that Captain, judging that
he will not be able to escape the stings of ingratitude, that he must
do one of two things: either immediately after the victory he must leave
the army and place himself in the hands of the Prince, guarding himself
from any insolent and ambitious act, so that he (the Prince) despoiled
of every suspicion has reason either to reward him or not to offend him,
or if he does not please to do this, to take boldly the contrary side,
and take all those means through which he believed that that conquest
is his very own and not of his Prince, obtaining for himself the good
will of his soldiers and of the subjects, and must make new friendships
with his neighbors, occupy the fortresses with his men, corrupt the Princes
(Leaders) of his army, and assure himself of those he cannot corrupt,
and by these means seek to punish his Lord for that ingratitude that he
showed toward him. There are no other ways: but ((as was said above))
men do not know how to be all bad, or all good. And it always happens
that immediately after a victory, he (a Captain) does not want to leave
his army, is not able to conduct himself modestly, does not know how to
use forceful ends (and) which have in themselves something honorable.
So that being undecided, between the delays and indecision, he is destroyed.
As to a Republic wishing to avoid this vice of ingratitude,
the same remedy cannot be given as that of a Prince; that is, that it
cannot go and not send others on its expeditions, being necessitated to
send one of its Citizens. It happens, therefore, that as a remedy, I would
tell them to keep to the same means that the Roman Republic used in being
less ungrateful than others: which resulted from the methods of its government,
for as all the City, both the Nobles and Ignobles (Plebeians) devoted
themselves to war, there always sprung up in Rome in every age so many
men of virtu and adorned with various victories, that the People did not
have cause for being apprehensive of any of them, there being so many
and one guarding another. And thus they maintained themselves wholesome
and careful not to show any shadow of ambition, nor give reason to the
People to harm them as ambitious men; and if they came to the Dictatorship,
that greater glory derived rather from their laying it down. And thus,
not being able by such methods to generate suspicion, they did not generate
ingratitude. So that a Republic that does not want to have cause to be
ungrateful ought to govern as Rome did, and a Citizen who wants to avoid
its sting ought to observe the limits observed the limits observed by
the Roman Citizens.
THAT ROMAN CAPTAINS WERE NEVER EXTRAORDINARILY PUNISHED
FOR ERRORS COMMITTED; NOR WERE THEY YET PUNISHED WHEN, BY THEIR IGNORANCE
OR BAD PROCEEDINGS UNDERTAKEN BY THEM, HARM ENSUED TO THE REPUBLIC
The Romans were ((as we discussed above)) not only less
ungrateful than other Republics, but were even more merciful and considerate
in punishing their Captains of the armies than any other. For if their
error had been from malice, they castigated them humanely: if it was through
ignorance, they did not punish them but rewarded and honored them. This
manner of proceeding was well considered by them, for they judged that
it was of great importance to those who commanded their armies to have
their minds free and prompt and without any outside regard as to how they
took up their duties, that they did not want to add anything, which in
itself was difficult and dangerous, believing that if these were added
no one would be able to operate with virtu. For instance, they sent an
army into Greece against Philip of Macedonia, and into Italy against those
people who first overcame them. This Captain who was placed in charge
of such an expedition would be deeply concerned of all the cares that
go on behind those activities, which are grave and very important. Now,
if to such cares should be added the many examples of the Romans who had
been crucified or otherwise put to death for having lost the engagement,
it would be impossible for that Captain, among such suspicions, to be
able to proceed vigorously. Judging, therefore, that the ignominy of having
lost would be a great punishment for such a one, they did not want to
frighten him with other greater penalties.
As to errors committed through ignorance, here is an example.
Sergius and Virginius were besieging Veii, each in charge of part of the
army, of which Sergius was on the side whence the Tuscans could come,
and Virginius on the other side. It happened that Sergius being assaulted
by the Faliscans among other people, preferred being routed and put to
flight before sending to Virginius for help: And on the other hand, Virginius
waiting for him (Sergius) to be humiliated, would rather see the dishonor
of his country and the ruin of the army, than to succor him. A truly bad
case, and worthy to be noted, and of creating a poor conjecture of the
Roman Republic, if both of them had not been castigated. It is true that
where another Republic would have punished them with a capital penalty,
it (Rome) punished them with a monetary fine. Which was done, not because
their errors merited greater punishment, but because the Romans wanted
in this case, for the reasons already mentioned, to maintain their ancient
customs.
As to errors (committed) through ignorance, there is no
more striking example than that of Varro, through whose temerity the Romans
were routed at Cannae by Hannibal, where that Republic was brought in
danger of its liberty, none the less because it was ignorance and not
malice, they not only did not castigate him, but honored him, and on his
return to Rome, the whole Senatorial order went to meet him, (and) not
being able to thank him for the battle, they thanked him for returning
to Rome and for not having despaired of Roman affairs.
When Papirus Cursor wanted to have Fabius put to death for
having, against his command, combatted with the Samnites, among the other
reasons which were assigned by the father of Fabius against the obstinacy
of the Dictator was this, that in any defeat of its Captains, the Roman
People never did that which Papirus in victory wanted to do.
A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE OUGHT NOT TO DEFER BENEFITING MEN
IN THEIR NECESSITY
Although the Romans succeeded happily in being liberal to
people, yet when danger came upon them from Porsenna coming to assault
Rome in order to restore thy Tarquins, the Senate apprehensive of the
plebs who might want to accept the Kings than to sustain a war, in order
to assure themselves (of the plebs), relieved them of the salt gabelle
and all other taxes, saying that the poor did much for the public benefit
if they reared their children, and that because of this benefice that
people should submit itself to endure siege, famine, and war: let no one
who trusts in this example defer in gaming the people over to himself
until the time of danger, for it will not succeed for him as it succeeded
for the Romans; for the people in general will judge not to have gotten
that benefit from you, but from your adversaries, and becoming afraid
that once the necessity is past, you would take back from them that which
by force you gave them, they will have no obligation to you. And the reason
why this proceeding turned out well for the Romans was because the State
was new, and not yet firm, and that the people had seen that other laws
had been made before for their benefit, such as that of the appeal to
the Plebs: so that they could persuade themselves that that good which
was done, was not caused so much by the coming of the enemy as much as
the disposition of the Senate to benefit them: In addition to this the
memory of the Kings, by whom they had been ill-used and injured in many
ways, was fresh. And as similar occasions rarely occur, so it rarely occurs
that similar remedies do good. Therefore Republics as well as Princes
ought to think ahead what adversities may befall them, and of which men
in adverse times they may have need of, and then act toward them as they
might judge necessary ((supposing some case)) to live. And he who governs
himself otherwise, whether Prince or Republic, and especially a Prince,
and then on this fact believes that if danger comes upon him, he may regain
the people for himself by benefits, deceives himself, because he not only
does not assure himself, but accelerates his ruin.
WHEN AN EVIL HAS SPRUNG UP EITHER WITHIN A STATE OR AGAINST
A STATE, IT IS A MORE SALUTARY PROCEEDING TO TEMPORIZE WITH IT THAN TO
ATTACK IT RASHLY
The Roman Republic growing in reputation, strength, and
empire, its neighbors which at first had not thought how much harm that
new Republic would be able to bring to them, commenced ((but too late))
to recognize their error, and wanting to remedy that which at first they
had not remedied, they (arranged) for forty peoples (tribes) to conspire
against Rome: whence the Romans among the usual remedies made by them
in urgent perils, wanted to create a Dictator, that is, to give power
to one man who, without any consultation, should be able to decide, and
without any appeal should be able to execute his decisions: This remedy
which formerly was useful and a means of overcoming imminent perils, was
also always most useful in all those incidents which sprung up at any
time against the Republic in the expansion of the Empire. On which subject
it will first be discussed, that when an evil springs up either within
a Republic or against a Republic, whether from intrinsic or extrinsic
causes, and has become so great that it begins to make (everyone) afraid,
it is a much more safe procedure to temporize with it than to try to extinguish
it. For almost always those who try to crush it, make its force greater,
and make that evil which is suspected from it to be accelerated. And incidents
similar to these arise more frequently in a Republic from intrinsic and
extrinsic causes, as it often occurs that it allows a Citizen more power
than is reasonable, or the corrupting of a law is begun which is the nerve
and life of a free society: and this error is allowed to run so far, that
it is a more harmful procedure to want to remedy it than to let it go
on. And it is so much more difficult to recognize these evils when they
first arise, as it seems more natural to men always to favor the beginning
of things: And such favors are accorded more to those accomplishments
which have in them some virtu or are done by young men, than to any other
thing: for if some young noble is seen to spring up in a Republic who
has in him some extraordinary virtu, the eyes of all the Citizens begin
to turn toward him, and they agree without regard (to consequences) to
honor him: so that if there is any stitch of ambition in him, the assemblage
of favors which nature and these incidents give him, he will soon come
to a place that when the Citizens see their error, they will have few
remedies to stop him, and they wanting so much to employ that which they
have, do nothing other than to accelerate his power.
Of this many examples can be cited, but I want to give only
one of our City (of Florence). Cosimo De'Medici, from whom the house of
Medici in our City owed the beginning of its greatness, came into such
reputation by the favor which his prudence and the ignorance of the other
Citizens gave him, that he begun to bring fear to the State, so that the
other Citizens judged it dangerous to offend him and still more dangerous
to allow him to go on. But Niccolo Da Uzzano living in those times, who
was held to be a man most expert in civil affairs, and having made the
first error in not recognizing the dangers that could arise from the reputation
of Cosimo, never permitted while he lived that a second (error) be made,
that is, that it should be attempted (to want) to destroy him, judging
that such an attempt would be the ruin of their State, as in fact was
seen after his death; for those Citizens (who remained) not observing
these counsels of his, made themselves strong against Cosimo and drove
him out of Florence. Whence there resulted that, his party resentful of
this injury, a little later called him back and made him Prince of the
Republic, to which rank he could never have ascended without that manifest
opposition. This same thing happened in Rome to Caesar who was favored
by Pompey and the others for his virtu; which favor a little while later
was converted to fear: to which Cicero gives testimony, saying that Pompey
had too late begun to fear Caesar. Which fear caused them to think of
remedies, and the remedies they took accelerated the ruin of the Republic.
I say, therefore, that since it is difficult to recognize
these evils when they spring up, this difficulty caused by the deception
which things give in the beginning, it is the wiser proceeding to temporize
with them when they are recognized than to oppose them. For by temporizing
with them, they will either extinguish themselves, or the evil will at
least be deferred for a longer time. And Princes ought to open their eyes
to all these things which they plan to do away with, and be careful by
their strength and drive not to increase them instead of decreasing them,
and not believe that by blowing at a thing, it can be done away with,
or rather to suffocate the plant by blowing on it. But the force of the
evil ought to be well considered, and when they see themselves sufficient
to oppose it, to attack it without regard (to consequences), otherwise
they should let it be, and in no way attempt it. For it will happen as
was discussed above, and as it did happen to the neighbors of Rome, to
whom after Rome had grown so much in power, it was more salutary to seek
to placate her and hold her back with methods of peace, than with methods
of war to make her think of new institutions and new defenses. For their
conspiracy did nothing other than to make them united, more stalwart,
and to think of new ways by which in a short time they expanded their
power: Among which was the creation of a Dictator, by which new institution
they not only overcame the imminent dangers, but was the cause of obviating
infinite evils in which, without that remedy, that Republic would have
been involved.
THE DICTATORIAL AUTHORITY DID GOOD AND NOT HARM TO THE
ROMAN REPUBLIC; AND THAT THE AUTHORITY WHICH CITIZENS TAKE AWAY, NOT THOSE
ARE GIVEN THEM BY FREE SUFFRAGE, ARE PERNICIOUS TO CIVIL SOCIETY
Those Romans who introduced into that City the method of
creating a Dictator have been condemned by some writers, as something
that was in time the cause of tyranny in Rome; alleging that the first
tyrant who existed in that City commanded her under this title of Dictator,
saying if it had not been for this, Caesar could not under any public
(title) have imposed his tyranny. Which thing was not well examined by
those who held this opinion and was believed beyond all reason. For it
was not the name or the rank of Dictator that placed Rome in servitude,
but it was the authority taken by the Citizens to perpetuate themselves
in the Empire (government): and if the title of Dictator did not exist
in Rome, they would have taken another; for it is power that easily acquires
a name, not a name power. And it is seen that the Dictatorship while it
was given according to public orders and not by individual authority,
always did good to the City. For it is the Magistrates who are made and
the authority that is given by irregular means that do injury to Republics,
not those that come in the regular way. As is seen ensued in Rome where
in so much passage of time no Dictator did anything that was not good
for the Republic. For which there are very evident reasons: First, because
if a Citizen would want to (offend and ) take up authority in an irregular
manner, it must happen that he have many qualities which he can never
have in an uncorrupted Republic, for he needs to be very rich and to have
many adherents and partisans, which he cannot have where the laws are
observed: and even if he should have them, such men are so formidable
that free suffrage would not support them. In addition to this, a Dictator
was made for a (limited) time and not in perpetuity, and only to remove
the cause for which he was created; and his authority extended only in
being able to decide by himself the ways of meeting that urgent peril,
(and) to do things without consultation, and to punish anyone without
appeal; but he could do nothing to diminish (the power) of the State,
such as would have been the taking away of authority from the Senate or
the people, to destroy the ancient institutions of the City and the making
of new ones. So that taking together the short time of the Dictatorship
and the limited authority that he had, and the Roman People uncorrupted,
it was impossible that he should exceed his limits and harm the City:
but from experience it is seen that it (City) always benefited by him.
And truly, among the other Roman institutions, this is one
that merits to be considered and counted among those which were the cause
of the greatness of so great an Empire: For without a similar institution,
the Cities would have avoided such extraordinary hazards only with difficulty;
for the customary orders of the Republic move to slowly ((no council or
Magistrate being able by himself to do anything, but in many cases having
to act together)) that the assembling together of opinions takes so much
time; and remedies are most dangerous when they have to apply to some
situation which cannot await time. And therefore Republics ought to have
a similar method among their institutions. And the Venetian Republic ((which
among modern Republics is excellent)) has reserved authority to a small
group (few) of citizens so that in urgent necessities they can decide
on all matters without wider consultation. For when a similar method is
lacking in a Republic, either observing the institutions (strictly) will
ruin her, or in order not to ruin her, it will be necessary to break them.
And in a Republic, it should never happen that it be governed by extraordinary
methods. For although the extraordinary method would do well at that time,
none the less the example does evil, for if a usage is established of
breaking institutions for good objectives, then under that pretext they
will be broken for evil ones. So that no Republic will be perfect, unless
it has provided for everything with laws, and provided a remedy for every
incident, and fixed the method of governing it. And therefore concluding
I say, that those Republics which in urgent perils do not have resort
either to a Dictatorship or a similar authority, will always be ruined
in grave incidents. And it is to be noted in this new institution how
the method of electing him was wisely provided by the Romans. For the
creation of a Dictator being of some discredit to the Consuls, as the
Chiefs of the City had to come to the same obedience as others, (and)
wanting that the authority for such election should remain in the consuls,
believing that if an incident should arise that Rome would have need of
this Regal power, by doing this voluntarily by themselves (Consuls), it
would reflect on them less. For the wounds and every other evil that men
inflict on themselves spontaneously and by choice, pain less in the long
run than do those that are inflicted by others. In later times, however,
the Romans, in place of a Dictator, used to give such authority to the
Consul, in these words: Let the Consuls see that the Republic suffers
no detriment. But to return to our subject, I conclude, that the neighbors
of Rome seeking to oppress her, caused her to institute methods not only
enabling her to defend herself, but enabling her with more strength, better
counsels, and greater authority to attack them.
THE REASON WHY THE CREATION OF THE DECEMVIRS IN ROME WAS
HARMFUL TO THE LIBERTY OF THAT REPUBLIC, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT WAS CREATED
BY PUBLIC AND FREE SUFFRAGE
The election of the Ten citizens (Decemvirs) created by
the Roman people to make the laws in Rome, who in time became Tyrants,
and without any regard took away her liberty, appears to be contrary to
what was discussed above, that that authority which is taken by violence,
not that which is given by suffrage, harms the Republics. Here, however,
the methods of giving authority and the time for which it is given, ought
to be considered. For when free authority is given for a long time ((calling
a long time a year or more)) it is always dangerous and will produce effects
either good or bad, according as those upon whom it is conferred are good
or bad. And if the authority given to the Ten and that which the Dictators
have are considered, it will be seen beyond comparison that that of the
Ten is greater. For when a Dictator was created there remained the Tribunes,
Consuls, (and) the Senate, with all their authority, and the Dictator
could not take it away from them; and even if he should have been able
to remove anyone from the Consulship, or from the Senate, he could not
suppress the Senatorial order and make new laws. So that the Senate, the
Consuls, and the Tribunes, remaining with their authority, came to be
as his guard to prevent him form going off from the right road. But in
the creation of the Ten all the contrary occurred, for they annulled the
Consuls and the Tribunes, and they were given authority to make laws and
do every other thing as the Roman People had. So that, finding themselves
alone, without Consuls, without Tribunes, without the appeal to the People,
and because of this not having anyone to observe them, moved by the ambitions
of Appius, they were able in the second year to become insolent. And because
of this, it ought to be noted that when (we said) an authority given by
free suffrage never harmed any Republic, it presupposed that a People
is never led to give it except with limited powers and for limited times:
but when either from having been deceived or for some other reason it
happens that they are induced to give it imprudently and in the way in
which the Roman people gave it to the Ten, it will always happen as it
did to them (Romans). This is easily proven, considering the reasons that
kept the Dictators good and that made the Ten bad: and considering also
how those Republics which have been kept well ordered have done in giving
authority for a long (period of) time, as the Spartans gave to their King,
and how the Venetians give to their Doges; for it will be seen in both
these methods, guardians were appointed who watched that the Kings (and
the Doges) could not ill use that authority. Nor is it of any benefit
in this case that the people are not corrupted, for an absolute authority
in a very brief time corrupts the people, and makes friends and partisans
for itself. Nor is it harmful either to be poor or not to have relatives,
for riches and every other favor quickly will run after power, as we will
discuss in detail in the creation of the said Ten.
CITIZENS WHO HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE HIGHER HONORS OUGHT NOT
TO DISDAIN THE LESSER
The Romans had made Marcus Fabius and C. Manlius Consuls,
and had won a glorious engagement against the Veienti and the Etruscans,
in which, however, Quintus Fabius brother of the Consul, who the previous
year had himself been Consul, was killed. Here, then, ought to be considered
how much the institutions of that City were adept at making her great,
and how much the other Republics deceived themselves in deviating (themselves)
from her methods. For although the Romans were great lovers of glory,
none the less they did not esteem it a dishonorable thing to obey presently
those whom at another time they had commanded, and to serve in that army
of which they had been Princes. Which custom is contrary to the opinion,
orders, and practices of the Citizen of our times: and in Venice this
error still holds that a Citizen having had a high rank would be ashamed
to accept a lesser, and the City consents to them what she cannot change.
Which thing, however honorable it should be for a private (citizen) is
entirely useless for the public. For a Republic ought to have more hope,
and more confidence in a Citizen who descends from a high rank to govern
a lesser, than in one who rises from a lower rank to govern a higher one.
For the latter cannot reasonably be relied upon unless he is surrounded
by men, who are of such respectability or of such virtu, that his inexperience
can be moderated by their counsel and authority. And if in Rome there
had been the same customs as are in Venice, and other modern Republics
and Kingdoms, where he who had at one time been Consul should never want
to enter the army except as Consul, there would have arisen infinite things
prejudicial to a free society, both because of the errors that new men
would make, and because of their ambition which they could have indulged
in more freely, not having men around them in whose presence they should
be afraid to err, and thus they would have come to be more unrestrained,
which would have resulted entirely to the detriment of the public.
WHAT TROUBLES THE AGRARIAN LAW BROUGHT FORTH IN ROME; AND
HOW TROUBLESOME IT IS TO MAKE A LAW IN A REPUBLIC WHICH GREATLY REGARDS
THE PAST BUT CONTRARY TO THE ANCIENT CUSTOMS OF THE CITY
It was the verdict of ancient writers that men afflict themselves
in evil and weary themselves in the good, and that the same effects result
from both of these passions. For whenever men are not obliged to fight
from necessity, they fight from ambition; which is so powerful in human
breasts, that it never leaves them no matter to what rank they rise. The
reason is that nature has so created men that they are able to desire
everything but are not able to attain everything: so that the desire being
always greater than the acquisition, there results discontent with the
possession and little satisfaction to themselves from it. From this arises
the changes in their fortunes; for as men desire, some to have more, some
in fear of losing their acquisition, there ensues enmity and war, from
which results the ruin of that province and the elevation of another.
I have made this discussion because it was not enough for the Roman Plebs
to secure themselves from the Nobles through the creation of the Tribunes,
to which (desire) they were constrained by necessity, that they soon ((having
obtained that)) begun to fight from ambition and to want to divide with
the Nobles their honors and possessions, as things more esteemed by men.
From this there arose the plague that brought forth the contentions about
the Agrarian law, and in the end was the cause of the destruction of the
Roman Republic. And because well-ordered Republics have to keep the public
(State) rich and its Citizens poor, it was apparent that there was some
defect in that law in the City of Rome, which either was now drawn in
the beginning in such a way that it required to be redrawn every day,
or that it was so long deferred in the making that it became troublesome
in regard to the past, or if it had been well ordered in the beginning,
it had become corrupted in its application. So that whatever way it may
have been, this law could never be spoken of in Rome without that City
going upside down (from turmoil). This law had two principal articles.
Through the first it provided that each Citizen could not possess more
than so many jugeri of land, through the other that the fields
which were taken from the enemy should be divided among the Roman people.
This, therefore, came to make two strong offenses against the Nobles,
for those who possessed more land than the law permitted ((of whom the
Nobles were the greater part)) had to be deprived of it, and by dividing
the possessions of the enemy among the Plebs, it deprived them (Nobles)
that means of enriching themselves. Since this offense came to be against
the powerful men, and who thought that by going against it they were defending
the public, whenever ((as I have said)) this was brought up, that City
would go upside-down, and the Nobles with patience and industry temporized,
either by calling out the army, or by having that Tribune who proposed
it opposed by another Tribune, or sometimes by yielding in part, or even
by sending a Colony to that place that was to be distributed, as happened
in the countryside of Antium, about which a dispute spring up from this
law; a Colony drawn from Rome was sent to that place, to whom the said
countryside was assigned. Concerning which Titus Livius used a notable
remark, saying that it was difficult to find in Rome one who would give
his name to go to the said Colony; so much more ready were the Plebs to
defend the things in Rome than to possess them in Antium.
This mood concerning this law thus troubled them for a time,
so that the Romans begun to conduct their armies to the extreme parts
of Italy, or outside of Italy, after which time it appeared that things
settled down. This resulted because the fields that the enemies of Rome
possessed being far removed from the eyes of the Plebs, and in a place
where it was not easy to cultivate them, became less desirable; and also
the Romans were less disposed to punish their enemies in such a way, and
even when they deprived them of some land from their countryside, they
distributed Colonies there. So that for these reasons this law remained,
as it were, dormant up to the time of the Gracchi, by whom it being revived,
wholly ruined the liberty of Rome; for it found the power of its adversaries
redoubled, and because of this (revival) so much hate developed between
the Plebs and the Senate, that it came to arms and bloodshed beyond every
civil limit and custom. So that the public Magistrates not being able
to remedy them, nor either faction having further confidence in them,
recourse was had to private remedies, and each of thy factions decided
to appoint a chief (for themselves) who would defend them. In these troubles
and disorders the Plebs came and turned to Marius with his reputations,
so that they made him Consul four times; and with few intervening intervals
that his Consulship continued so that he was able by himself to make himself
Consul another three times. Against which plague thy Nobility, not having
any remedy, turned their favor to Sulla, and having made him Head of their
party, arrived at civil war, and after much bloodshed and changes of fortune,
the Nobility remained superior. Later, in the time of Caesar and Pompey,
these moods were revived, for Caesar making himself Head of the party
of Marius, and Pompey of that of Sulla; (and) coming to arms Caesar remained
superior, who became the first Tyrant in Rome, so that City was never
again free.
Such, therefore, was the beginning and the end of the Agrarian
law. And although elsewhere we showed that the enmity in Rome between
the Senate and the Plebs should maintain Rome free, because it gave rise
to those laws which favored liberty, and therefore the result of this
Agrarian law may seem different from such a conclusion, I say that I do
not on that account change my opinion, for so great is the ambition of
the Nobles, that if it is not beaten down in various ways and means in
a City, it will soon bring that City to ruin. So that if the contentions
about the Agrarian law took three hundred years in bringing Rome to servitude,
she would perhaps have been brought to servitude much sooner if the Plebs
with this law and their other desires had not always restrained the ambitions
of the Nobles. It is also to be seen from this how much more men esteem
property than honors, for the Roman Nobility, always yielded without extraordinary
trouble to the Plebs in the matter of honors, but when it came to property,
so great was its obstinacy in defending it, that the Plebs in order to
give vent to their appetites had recourse to those extraordinary proceedings
which were discussed above. The movers of these disorders were the Gracchi,
whose intentions should be praised more than their prudence. For to want
to remove an abuse that has grown up in a Republic, and enact a retrospective
law for this, is a badly considered proceeding, and ((as was discussed
above at length)) does nothing else than to accelerate that evil which
leads to that abuse; but by temporizing with it, either the evil comes
much later, or by itself in time ((before its end comes)) it will extinguish
itself.
WEAK REPUBLICS ARE IRRESOLUTE AND DO NOT KNOW HOW TO DECIDE;
AND IF THEY TAKE UP ANY PROCEEDING, IT RESULTS MORE FROM NECESSITY THAN
FROM ELECTION
Because of a very great pestilence occurring in Rome, it
appeared to the Volscians and the Equeans that the time had come for them
to be able to attack Rome, these two people raised a large army and assaulted
the Latins and the Ernicians, and their country being laid waste, the
Latins and Ernicians were constrained to make it (to be) known to Rome,
and pray that they might be defended by the Romans, but the Romans being
afflicted by the pestilence, answered them that they should take up the
proceeding of defending themselves with arms, for they were not able to
defend them. In which is recognized the generosity and prudence of that
Senate, that in every circumstance they always wanted to be the one that
should be Prince of (make) the decisions which her subjects had to take;
nor were they ever ashamed to decide something contrary to their mode
of living or to other decisions previously made by them, whenever necessity
should compel them. I say this, because at other times the same them,
whenever necessity should compel them. I say this, because at other times
the same Senate had forbidden the said people to arm and defend themselves,
so that to a less prudent Senate it would then have seemed to them a falling
from their dignity to concede to them this defense. But that (Senate)
always judged things as they ought to be judged, and always took the less
objectionable proceeding as the better; for they knew the evil of not
being able to defend their subjects, and they knew also the evil of letting
them arm themselves without them (the Romans), for the reasons given and
many others that are understood: none the less knowing that they (thy
Latins and Ernicians) had in any case armed themselves from necessity,
having the enemy upon them, they took the honorable course and decided
to let them do what had to be done with their permission, so that having
once disobeyed from necessity, they might not accustom themselves to disobeying
from choice.
And although this would appear to be a proceeding that every
Republic ought to have taken, none the less weak and ill-advised Republics
do not know how to assume it, nor how to gain honor in a similar necessity.
The Duke of Valentino had taken Faenza and made Bologna submit to his
terms. Afterwards wanting to return to Rome by way of Tuscany, he sent
one of his men to Florence to ask passage for himself and his army. In
Florence they consulted how this thing should be managed, but everyone
counselled that it not be conceded to them. The Roman way was not followed
in this, for the Duke being very well armed, and the Florentines disarmed
so that they could not prohibit the passage, it was much more to their
honor that it should appear that he (the Duke) passed with their permission
than by force; for as it was they had nothing but shame, which would have
in part been less if they had managed otherwise. But the worst part that
weak Republics have, is to be irresolute; so that all the proceedings
they take are taken by force, and if anything good should be done by them,
they do it by force and not by their prudence. I want to give two other
examples of this which occurred in our times in the State (Government)
of our City in the year one thousand five hundred (1500).
King Louis XII of France having retaken Milan, wanting to
restore Pisa in order to obtain the fifty thousand ducats that had been
promised him by the Florentines after such restitution, he sent his armies
toward Pisa captained by Monsignor De Beaumont, who, although French,
was none the less a man in whom the Florentines had great confidence.
This Captain placed himself and his army between Cascina and Pisa in order
(to go) to assail the walls, where delaying several days to organize themselves
for the capture, Pisan Orators (Ambassadors) came to Beaumont and offered
to give up the City to the French army, with terms that under the pledge
of the King he promise not to put them into the hands of the Florentines
until four months after (the surrender). This proceeding was completely
refused by the Florentines, so that after beginning the siege, it followed
that (he had to raise it and) he had to retire in shame. Nor was the proceeding
refused for any other reason than the mistrust of the faith of the King,
into whose hands they had been forced to place themselves because of their
weak counsel; and on the other hand, while they did not trust him, neither
were they able to see that it would have been easier for the King to restore
Pisa to them after he had gone inside the City, and if he did not restore
it to expose his mind (perfidy); but not having (the City) he could promise
it to them and they would be forced to buy that promise: So that it would
have been much more useful to them to have consented that Beaumont should
have taken it (Pisa) under any promise, as was seen in the subsequent
experience in the year MDII (1502) when Arezzo having rebelled, Monsignor
Imbault was sent by the King of France to the succor of the Florentines
with French forces, who, arriving near Arezzo, soon began to negotiate
an accord with the Arentines who were (willing) to give up the town under
certain pledges similar to those (asked) by the Pisans. This proposal
was rejected in Florence: when Monsignor Imbault learned of this, and
it appeared to him that the Florentines little understood him, he began
to hold negotiations for the treaty (of surrender) on his own without
the participation of the Commissioners so that he could conclude it in
his own way; and under it, he entered with his forces into Arezzo, making
the Florentines understand that they were fools and did not understand
the things of the world: that if they wanted Arezzo, they should let the
King know, who was much better able to give it to them with his forces
inside that City rather than (with them) outside. In Florence they did
not cease abusing and censuring the said Imbault, nor did they stop until
they realized that if Beaumont had been like Imbault, they would have
had Pisa as (they had) Arezzo.
And so to return to the subject, irresolute Republics never
take up good proceedings except by force; for their weakness never allows
them to decide where there is any doubt, and if that doubt is not dispelled
by some violence which pushes the, they always remain in suspense.
THE SAME INCIDENTS OFTEN HAPPEN TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE
And it is easily recognized by those who consider present
and ancient affairs that the same desires and passions exist in all Cities
and people, and that they always existed. So that to whoever with diligence
examines past events, it is an easy thing to foresee the future in any
Republic, and to apply those remedies which had been used by the ancients,
or, not finding any of those used, to think of new ones from the similarity
of events. But as these considerations are neglected or not understood
by those who govern, it follows that the same troubles will exist in every
time.
The City of Florence, having after the year XCIV (1494)
lost part of her Empire, such as Pisa and other lands, was obliged to
make war against those who occupied them: and because he who occupied
them was powerful, there followed that they spent much in the war without
any fruit: from the great spending there resulted great taxes, from the
taxes infinite complaints from the people: and as this war was managed
by a Magistracy of Ten Citizens who were called the "Ten of the War",
the general public begun to hold them in aversion as those who were the
cause of the war, and its expenses, and began to persuade themselves that
if the said Magistracy were remoted, the path for war would be removed:
so that if they had to do it (reappoint the Ten) again, they would allow
their (terms) to expire without making changes and commit their functions
to the Signoria. Which decision was so pernicious that it not only did
not end the war as the general public had persuaded itself it would, but
removed those who were managing it with prudence, and there followed so
great disorders that in addition to Pisa, Arezzo, and many other places
were lost: so that the people perceiving their error, (and) that the cause
of the malady was the fever and not the doctor, re-established the Magistracy
of the Ten.
This same mood had arisen in Rome against the (name of the)
Consuls; for that people, seeing one war arise from another, and not ever
being able to have any repose, where they should have believed it had
arisen from the ambition of neighbors who wanted to oppress them, they
thought it had arisen form the ambition of the Nobles, who, being unable
to castigate the Plebs within Rome where they were defended by the power
of Tribunate, wanted to lead them outside Rome (where they were) under
the Consuls in order to oppress them, (and) where they would not have
any aid: And because of this, they thought that it was necessary either
to remove the Consuls or somehow to regulate their power, so that they
should not have authority over the People either at home or abroad. The
first who tried (to introduce) this law was one Terentillus, a Tribune,
who proposed that there ought to be created (a Council of) five men who
should examine the power of the Consuls and to limit it. This greatly
excited the Nobility, as it appeared to them the majesty of the Empire
would decline completely, so that no rank in that Republic would remain
to the Nobility. None the less, so great was the obstinacy of the Tribunes
that the dignity of the Consuls was extinguished: and after some other
regulations they were finally content rather to create Tribunes with Consular
power than to continue the Consuls, holding so much more in hatred their
dignity than their authority. And thus they continued for a long time,
until they recognized their error and returned to the Ten as the Florentines
(did), (and) also re-established the Consuls.
THE CREATION OF THE DECEMVIRATE IN ROME, AND WHAT IS TO
BE NOTED IN IT; AND WHERE IT WILL BE CONSIDERED AMONG MANY OTHER THINGS
HOW A REPUBLIC CAN BE SAVED OR RUINED BECAUSE OF SIMILAR ACCIDENTS
As I want to discuss in detail the incidents that arose
in Rome because of the creation of the Decemvirate, it does not appear
to me superfluous to narrate first all that ensued because of such creations,
and then to discuss those parts which are notable (actions) in it, which
are many and (worthy) of much consideration, both by those who want to
maintain a Republic free as well as by those who should plan to subjugate
her. For in such a discussion will be seen the many errors made by the
Senate and the Plebs prejudicial to liberty, and the many errors made
by Appius, Chief of the Decemvirate, prejudicial to that Tyranny which
he had intended to have established in Rome. After much discussion between
the People and the Nobility concerning the adoption of new laws in Rome
through which the liberty of that State should be firmly established,
by agreement they sent Spurius Posthumus with two other Citizens to Athens
for copies of those laws that Solon gave to that City, so as to be able
to base the (new) Roman laws upon them. These men having gone and returned,
they arrived at the appointing of the men who should examine and establish
the said laws, and they created the Decemvir (Ten Citizens) for a year,
among whom Appius Claudius, a sagacious but turbulent man, was appointed.
And in order that they might create such laws without any regard (to authority),
they removed all the other Magistracies from Rome, and particularly the
Tribunes and the Consuls, and also took away the appeal to the people:
so that this new Magistracy (of the Ten) became absolute Princes (Masters)
of Rome. Next Appius took over to himself all the authority of his other
colleagues because of the favor he exercised toward the Plebs; for he
had made himself so popular with his demonstrations, that it seemed a
wonder that he should have so readily taken on a new nature and new genius,
having before that time been held to be a cruel persecutor of the Plebs.
These Ten conducted themselves civilly, not having more than ten Lictors
who walked before the one who had been placed in charge over them. And
although they had absolute authority, none the less, having to punish
a Roman Citizen for homicide, they cited him before (the sight of) the
People and made them judge him.
They (The Ten) wrote the laws on ten tablet, and before
confirming them exposed them to the public, so that all could read and
discuss them, and so that they might know if there was any defect in order
to be able to amend them before confirming them. Upon this Appius caused
a rumor (to be spread) throughout Rome, that, if to these ten tablets
there were to be added two others, perfection would be given to them,
so that this opinion gave the People the opportunity to reappoint the
Ten for another year: to which the People willingly agreed, as much so
as not to reappoint the Consuls, as also because they hoped to remain
without Tribunes, who were the judges of their causes, as was said above.
Proceedings being taken, therefore, to re-establish it (The Ten), all
the Nobility moved to seek these honors, and among the first was Appius:
and he showed so much humanity toward the Plebs in asking for it, that
he begun to be suspected by his companions: For they could not believe
so much graciousness could exist with so much haughtiness. And being
apprehensive of opposing him openly, they decided to do it by artifice:
and although he was the youngest of them all, they gave him the authority
to propose the future Ten to the People, believing that he would observe
the limitations of the others of not proposing himself, it being an unaccustomed
and ignominious thing in Rome. He in truth changed the impediment
into an opportunity, and nominated himself among the first, to the astonishment
and displeasure of all the Nobles. He then nominated nine others to his
liking. Which new appointments made for another year, begun to show their
error to the People and to the Nobility. For Appius quickly put an
end to his alien character, and begun to show his innate haughtiness,
and in a few days he filled his colleagues with his own spirits. And in
order to frighten the people and the Senate, in place of the twelve Lictors,
they created one hundred and twenty. For some days the fear was equal
(on both sides), but then they begun to disregard the Senate and beat
the Plebs, and if any beaten by one (Decemvir) appealed to another, he
was treated worse in the appeal than he had in the first instance. So
that the Plebs recognizing their error began, full of affliction, to look
to the Nobles, And to capture the aura of liberty, where they had feared
servitude, to which condition they had brought the Republic. And this
affliction was welcome to the Nobility, That likewise weary of the
present, they desired the Consuls. The days that ended the year had
come: the two tables of the laws were made, but not published. From this,
the Ten took the opportunity to continue their Magistracy, and begun to
retain the State through violence and make satellites of the Noble youth,
to whom they gave the possessions of those they had condemned: By which
gifts these youths were corrupted, and preferred their license to their
complete liberty.
It happened at this time that the Sabines and Volscians
moved war against the Romans, from the fear of which the Ten Began to
discuss the weakness of their State, for without the Senate they could
not wage war, and to assemble the Senate seemed to them they would lose
their State. But being compelled to they took up this last proceeding,
and assembling the Senate, many of the Senators spoke against the haughtiness
of the Ten, and in particular Valerius and Horatius: and their authority
would have been entirely extinguished except that the Senate, because
of envy of the Plebs, was unwilling to show its authority, thinking that
if the Ten resigned the magistracy voluntarily, it would be possible that
the Tribune of the Plebs might be re-established. Deciding on war, therefore,
they sent out two armies, led in part by the said Ten. Appius remained
to govern the City: whereupon it happened that he became enamorated of
Virginia, and wanting to take her off by force, her father Virginius killed
her in order to save her from him: whence tumults ensued in Rome and in
the armies, which, having come together with the remnants of the Roman
Plebs, went to Mount Sacer, where they stayed until the Ten resigned the
Magistracy and the Tribunes and Consuls were re-established, and Rome
restored to the form of its ancient liberty.
It is to be noted from this text, therefore, that the evil
of creating this Tyranny first arose in Rome for the same reasons that
give rise to the greater part of Tyrannies in Cities: and this (results)
from the too great desire of the people to be free, and from the too great
desire of the Nobles to dominate. And if they do not agree to make a law
in favor of liberty, but one of the parties throws its (influence) in
favor of one man, then a Tyranny quickly springs up. The People and the
Nobles of Rome agreed to create the Ten, and create them with such authority,
from the desire which each of the parties had, one to extinguish to Consular
office, the other (to extinguish that of) the Tribunate. The Ten having
been created, it seemed to the Plebs that Appius had come to (the side
of) the People and should beat down the Nobles, (and) the People turned
to favor him. And when a People is led to commit this error of giving
reputation to one man because he beats down those whom he hates, and if
this man is wise, it will always happen that he will become Tyrant of
that City. For (together) with the favor of the People he will attend
to extinguishing the Nobility, and after they are extinguished he will
turn to the oppression of the People until they are also extinguished;
and by the time the People recognize they have become enslaved, they will
not have any place to seek refuge. This is the path all those have taken
who established Tyrannies in Republics: and if Appius had taken this path,
his tyranny would have taken on more vitality and would not have been
overthrown so readily. But he did everything to the contrary, nor could
he have governed more imprudently, that in order to hold the tyranny he
made enemies of those who had given it to him and who could maintain it
for him, and made friends of those who were not in accord to give it to
him and could not maintain it for him; and he lost those who were his
friends, and sought to have as friends those who could not be his friends;
for although the Nobles desired to tyrannize, yet that part of the Nobility
which finds itself outside of the Tyrancy is always hostile to the Tyrant;
nor can he ever win them all over to him because of the great ambition
and avarice that exists in them, the Tyrant not having riches and honors
enough to be able to satisfy them all. And thus Appius in leaving the
People and attaching himself to the Nobles, made a most obvious error,
both for the reasons mentioned above, and because, in wanting to hold
a thing (government) by force, the one who does the forcing needs to be
more powerful than he who is forced. Whence it arises that those Tyrants
who have the general public as friends and the Nobles as enemies, are
more secure, because their violence is sustained by a greater force than
that of those men who have the People as an enemy and the Nobility as
a friend. For with that favor (of the people) the internal forces are
enough to sustain him, as they were enough for Nabis, Tyrant of Sparta,
when Greece and the Roman People assaulted him; who, making sure of a
few Nobles, and having the People as a friend, he defended himself with
them; which he could not do if he had them as an enemy. But the internal
forces of the other rank not being enough because there are few friends
within it, he must seek (aid) outside. And this may be of three kinds;
the one, foreigners as satellites who would guard your person; another,
to arm the countryside (and) have them perform the duty that the Plebs
should do; the third, to ally oneself with powerful neighbors who would
defend you. Whoever has these means and observes them well, although he
has the People as his enemy, is able in some way to save himself. But
Appius could not accomplish this winning of the countryside over to himself,
the countryside and Rome being one and the same thing, and he did not
know how to do what he might have done; so that he was ruined at the outset.
The Senate and the People made very great errors in this creation of the
Decemvirs; for although in that discussion made above of the Dictator,
that those Magistrates that are self-constituted, not those whom the People
create, are harmful to liberty; none the less the People ought, when they
create the Magistrates, do it in such a way that they should have some
regard to becoming bad (abusing their power). But where they should have
proposed safeguards for maintaining them good, the Romans removed them,
(and) only created the Magistracy (of Ten) in Rome and annulled all the
others because of the excessive desire ((as we said above)) that the Senate
had to extinguish the Tribunes, and the Plebs to extinguish the Consuls;
this blinded them so that they both contributed to such disorders. For
men, as King Ferrando said, often act like certain smaller birds of prey,
in whom there is so much desire to pursue their prey to which nature incites
them, that they do not observe another larger bird which is above them
about to kill them.
It is to be recognized through this discussion, therefore,
as we proposed in the beginning, the error which the Roman people made
in wanting to save their liberty, and the errors of Appius in wanting
to seize the Tyrancy.
TO JUMP FROM HUMILITY TO PRIDE AND FROM MERCY TO CRUELTY
WITHOUT PROFITABLE MEANS, IS AN IMPRUDENT AND USELESS THING
In addition to other means ill-used by Appius in order to
maintain his tyranny, that of jumping from one quality to another was
of no little moment. For his astuteness in deceiving the Plebs by simulating
to be a man of the People was well used: those means were also well used
in which he caused the Ten to be reappointed: that audacity in nominating
himself against the expectation of the Nobility was also well used: the
naming of colleagues suitable to him was also well used: but in doing
this ((according as was said above)) what he did was not well used in
changing his nature so quickly, and from being a friend showing himself
to be the enemy of the Plebs, from being humane to being haughty, from
easy (of access) to difficult; and to do this so very readily, that without
any excuse everyone should know the falseness of his spirit. For whoever
at one time has appeared to be good and wants for purposes of his own
to become bad, ought to do it by proper means (gradually), and in a way
that they should be conducive to the opportunities, so that before his
changed nature takes away old favors from him, it may give him some new
ones that his authority may not be diminished; otherwise, finding himself
discovered and without friends, he will be ruined.
HOW EASILY MAN MAY BE CORRUPTED
It should be noted also in the matter of the Decemvirate
how easily men are corrupted and make themselves become of a contrary
nature, even though (they are) good and well educated; (and), considering
how those youths whom Appius had chosen to surround him begun, for the
little advantages that followed from it, to be friendly to that tyranny,
and that Quintus Fabius, one of the number of the second Ten, being a
very good man, (but) blinded by a little ambition and persuaded by the
malignity of Appius, changed his good habits into the worst, and became
like, him. Which, if well examined, the Legislators of Republics or Kingdoms
will more promptly restrain human appetites and take away from them the
hope of being able to err with impunity.
THOSE WHO COMBAT FOR THEIR OWN GLORY ARE GOOD AND FAITHFUL
SOLDIERS
From the above written treatise it also is to be considered
what a difference there is between a contented army which combats for
its own glory, and that which is ill disposed and which combats for the
ambitions of others. For where the Roman armies were usually victorious
under the Consuls, they always lost under the Decemvirs. From this example
there can be recognized part of the reasons of the uselessness of mercenary
soldiers, who have no other reason which keeps them firm but a small stipend
which you give to them. Which reason is not, and can never be, enough
to make them faithful, nor so much your friends that they be willing to
die for you. For in those armies where there is not that affection toward
the man for whom they combat which makes them become his partisans, there
can never be so much virtu which would be enough to resist even an enemy
of little virtu. And because this love cannot arise in any contest except
from his own subjects, it is necessary in wanting to keep a State, or
to want to maintain a Republic or a Kingdom, that he arm himself with
his own subjects, as is seen to have been done by all those others who,
with their armies, have made great advances. The Roman armies under the
Ten had the same virtu as before: but because there was not in them the
same disposition, they did not achieve their usual results. But as soon
as the Magistracy of the Ten was extinguished and they begun to fight
as free men, that same spirit returned in them, and consequently their
enterprises had their happy endings according to their ancient custom.
A MULTITUDE WITHOUT A HEAD IS USELESS, AND ONE OUGHT NOT
TO THREATEN FIRST, AND THEN SEEK AUTHORITY
Because of the incident of Virginia the Roman Pleb was led
armed to the sacred mountain (Mons Sacer). The Senate sent its Ambassadors
to ask by what authority they had abandoned their Captains and retired
to the Mountains. And so much was the authority of the Senate esteemed
that, the Plebs not having their chiefs among them, no one dared to reply.
And T. Livius says that they did not lack material to reply, but they
did lack someone who should make the reply. Which thing demonstrates in
point the uselessness of a multitude without a head. This disorder was
recognized by Virginius, and by his order twenty military Tribunes were
created who would be their chiefs to reply to and convene with the Senate.
And having requested that (the Senators) Valerius and Horatius should
be sent to them, to whom they would tell their wants, they (the Senators)
would not turn to go unless the Ten first had resigned their Magistracy:
and having arrived on the mountain where the Pleb was, these things were
demanded of them, that they wanted the re-establishment of the Tribunes
of the Plebs, (and) that an appeal to the people from every Magistracy
should be allowed, and that all of the Ten should be given up to them
as they wanted to burn them alive. Valerius and Horatius lauded the first
of their demands: they censured the last as impious, saying; You condone
cruelty, yet fall yourselves into cruelty, and counselled them to
leave off making mention of the Ten, and to attend to taking from them
their authority and power, and that afterwards there would not be lacking
the means of satisfying them (their vengeance). From which it is recognized
openly how foolish and little prudent it is to ask for a thing, and to
say at first, I want to do evil with it: for one ought not to show his
mind, but to want in every way to seek to obtain that which he desires.
For it is enough to ask from one his arms, without saying I want to kill
you with them; for when you have the arms in your hands then you will
be able to satisfy your appetite.
IT IS A BAD EXAMPLE NOT TO OBSERVE A LAW THAT HAS BEEN
MADE, AND ESPECIALLY BY THE AUTHOR OF IT; AND IT IS MOST HARMFUL TO RENEW
EVERY DAY NEW INJURIES IN A CITY AND TO THE ONE WHO GOVERNS IT
The accord having taken place and Rome restored to its ancient
form, Virginius cited Appius before the People to defend his cause. He
complied accompanied by many Nobles. Virginius commanded that he be put
in prison. Appius begun to shout and appeal to the People. Virginius said
that he was not worthy of having that (right of) appeal which he had destroyed,
nor to have as defender that People whom he had offended. Appius replied
that they (the People) had no (right) to violate that appeal which they
had established with so much desire. He was incarcerated, however, and
before the day of judgment (came) he killed himself. And although the
wicked life of Appius should merit every punishment, none the less it
was little consistent to violate the laws, and more so one recently made.
For I do not believe there is a worse example in a Republic than to make
a law and not to observe it, and much more when it is not observed by
those who made it.
Florence, after ninety four (1494), having had its State
(Government) reorganized with the aid of Brother Girolamo Savonarola ((whose
writings show the doctrine, prudence, and the virtu of his spirit)) and
among other provisions for the security of the Citizens having had a law
enacted which enabled an appeal to the People from the verdicts which
the (Council of) Eight and the Signoria should give in cases affecting
the State ((which passage took more time and was attained with the greatest
difficulty)); it happened that a little after the confirmation of this
(law), five Citizens were condemned to death by the Signoria on account
of (acts against) the State, and when they wanted to appeal, they were
not permitted to do so and the law was not observed. Which took away from
the Brother more reputation than any other incident; for if that (right
of) appeal was useful, he should have had it observed: if it was not useful,
he ought not to have had it passed. And so much more was this incident
noted, inasmuch as the Brother, in so many preachings that he made after
that law was broken, never condemned those who broke it, or excused them,
as one who did not want to condemn a thing that suited his purpose, yet
was not able to excuse it. This, having uncovered his ambitions and partisan
spirit, took away his reputation and caused him many troubles.
A State also offends greatly when every day it renews in
the minds of its Citizens new moods because of new injuries which it inflicts
on this one and that one, as happened in Rome after the Decemvirate. For
all of the Ten and other Citizens were accused and condemned at different
times, so that a great fright existed in the Nobility, judging that there
would never be an end to such condemnations until all the Nobility was
destroyed. And great evils would have been generated in that City, if
it had not been foreseen by the Tribune Marcus Duellius, who issued an
edict that for one year it would not be licit to cite anyone or to accuse
any Roman Citizen; this reassured all the Nobility. Here it is seen how
harmful it is to a Republic or to a Prince to keep the minds of their
subjects in a state of fear by continuing penalties and suspended offenses.
And without doubt no more pernicious order can be held; for men who begin
to be apprehensive of having done a capital evil, will secure themselves
from perils in every way, and become more audacious and have less regard
in attempting new things. It is necessary, therefore, either never to
offend any one or to make the offense at a stroke, and afterwards to reassure
men and give them cause to quiet and firm the spirit.
MEN JUMP FROM ONE AMBITION TO ANOTHER, AND FIRST THEY SEEK
NOT TO BE OFFENDED, THEN TO OFFEND OTHERS
The Roman People having recovered their liberty, (and) having
returned to their original rank, and having obtained even greater reputation
from the many new laws made in corroboration of their power, it appeared
reasonable that Rome would for some time become quiet. None the less from
experience the contrary was seen, for every day new tumults and new disorders
sprung up. And as Titus Livius most prudently renders the cause whence
this arose, it does not appear to me outside my purpose to refer in point
to his words, where he says that the People or the Nobility always increased
their haughtiness when the other was humiliated; and the Plebs remaining
quiet within bounds, the young Nobles began to offend them; and the Tribunes
were able to make few remedies, because they too were violated. The Nobility,
on the other hand, although it seemed to them that their young men were
too ferocious, none the less took care to see that if (the law) should
be transgressed, it should be transgressed by their own and not by the
Plebs. And thus the desire of defending liberty caused each to prevail
(raise itself) in proportion as they oppressed the other. And the course
of such incidents is, that while men sought not to fear, they begun to
make others fear, and that injury which they ward off from themselves,
they inflict on another, as if it should be necessary either to offend
or to be offended. From this may be seen one way among others in which
Republics ruin themselves, and in what way men jump from one ambition
to another, and how very true is that sentence which Sallust placed in
the mouth of Caesar, That all evil examples have their origin in good
beginnings. Those ambitious Citizens ((as was said before)) who live
in a Republic seek in the first instance not to be able to be harmed,
not only by private (citizens), but even by the Magistrates: in order
to do this, they seek friendships, and to acquire them either by apparently
honest means, or by supplying them money or defending them from the powerful:
and as this seems virtuous, everyone is easily deceived and no one takes
any remedy against this, until he, persevering without hindrance, becomes
of a kind whom the Citizen fear, and the Magistrates treat with consideration.
And when he has risen to that rank, and his greatness not having been
obviated at the beginning, it finally comes to be most dangerous in attempting
to pit oneself against him, for the reasons which I mentioned above concerning
the dangers involved in abating an evil which has already grown much in
a City; so that the matter in the end is reduced to this, that you need
either to seek to extinguish it with the hazard of sudden ruin, or by
allowing it to go on, enter into manifest servitude, unless death or some
accident frees you from him. For when the Citizens and the Magistrates
come to the above mentioned limits and become afraid to offend him and
his friends, it will not take much effort afterwards to make them judge
and offend according to his will. Whence a Republic, among its institutions,
ought to have these, to see that its Citizens under an aura of good are
not able to do evil, and that they should acquire that reputation which
does good and not harm to liberty, as will be discussed by us in its proper
place.
MEN, ALTHOUGH THEY DECEIVE THEMSELVES IN GENERAL MATTERS
DO NOT DECEIVE THEMSELVES IN THE PARTICULARS
The Roman People ((as was said above)) having become annoyed
with the Consular name, and wanting to be able either to choose as Consuls
men of the Plebs, or to limit their authority, the Nobility in order not
to discredit the Consular authority by either change, took the middle
course, and were content that four Tribunes with Consular power be created,
who could come from the Plebs as well as from the Nobles. The Plebs were
content with this, as it seemed to them to destroy the Consulship and
give them a part in the highest ranks. From this a notable case arose,
that when it came to the creation of these Tribunes, and they could have
selected all Plebs, the Roman people chose all Nobles. Whence Titus Livius
says these words: The results of this election show how different minds
are when in contention for liberty and for honors, differing according
to certain standards when they (have to) make impartial judgments.
And in examining whence this can happen, I believe it proceeds from men
deceiving themselves in general matters, (and) not so much in particular
matters. As a general thing, it appeared to the Roman Pleb that it merited
the Consulship because they were the majority in the City, because they
bore more of the danger in war, (and) because they were the ones who with
their arms maintained Rome free and made it powerful: and this desire
seeming to them to be reasonable ((as has been said)), they turned to
obtain this authority by whatever means. But when they had to make a judgment
of their particular men, recognized their weaknesses, and judged that
none of them should merit that which all together it seemed to them they
merited. So that ashamed of them (their own), they had recourse to those
who merited it. Of which decision Titus Livius, deservingly admiring it,
said these words: Where is there now this modesty and equity, and this
loftiness of spirit, which once pervaded all the people?
In corroboration of this there can be cited another notable
example which ensued in Capua after Hannibal had defeated the Romans at
Cannae: while all Italy was aroused by this defeat, Capua was still in
a state of tumult because of the hatred that existed between the People
and the Senate: and Pacovius Calanus finding himself at that time in the
supreme Magistracy, and recognizing the peril to which that City was exposed
because of the tumults, endeavored through his rank to reconcile the Plebs
with the Nobility: and having come to this decision, he had the Senate
assemble, and narrated to them the hatred which the People had against
them, and the dangers to which they were exposed of being killed by them,
if the City was given up to Hannibal, as the power of the Romans was afflicted:
afterwards he added that if they wanted to leave the managing of this
matter to him, he would do so in a way that they would be united together;
but, as he wanted to do so, he would lock them inside the palace, and
by seemingly giving the people the power to castigate them he would save
them. The Senate yielded to this thought, and he called the people to
talk to them; and having shut up the Senate in the palace, (and) said
to them that the time had come to be able to subdue the haughtiness of
the Nobility and avenge themselves for the injuries received from them
(the Senate), having them all shut up under his custody: but because he
believed they would not want their City to remain without a government,
it would be necessary ((if they wanted to kill the old Senators)) to create
new ones. And, therefore, he had put all the names of the Senators into
a bourse and would begin to draw them in their presence, and that one
after another of those drawn would die after they should find his successor.
And beginning to draw one, at his name, there was raised a very great
noise, calling him haughty, cruel and arrogant: but when Pacovius requested
that they make the exchange, the haranguing completely stopped: and after
some time one of the Plebs was nominated, at whose name some begun to
whistle, some to laugh, some to speak ill in one way and some in another:
and thus there followed one after the other, that all those who were named
were judged by them unworthy of the Senatorial rank: so that Pacovius
taking this occasion said: Since you judge that this City would be badly
off without a Senate, and you cannot agree to make the exchange of Senators,
I think it would be well if you reconciled together, because the fear
in which the Senators have been has so humbled them that you will now
find in them that humanity which you seek for elsewhere. And they agreeing
to this, there ensued the union of these orders, and they discovered,
when they were constrained to come to the particulars, the deception.
After one thousand four hundred fourteen (1414) when the
Princes of the City had been driven from Florence, and no other government
having been instituted, but rather a certain ambitious license, and public
affairs going from bad to worse, many of the populari seeing the
ruin of the City and not understanding the cause, they blamed the ambitions
of some powerful one who would feed the disorders in order to be able
to make a State to his own liking and take away their liberty: and there
were those who went through the loggias and the plazas speaking ill of
many Citizens, and threatening them that if they should ever find themselves
(members) of the Signoria, they would uncover this deceit of theirs and
would castigate them. It often happened that ones like these did ascend
to the supreme Magistracy, and when they had risen to that position and
saw things more closely, they recognized whence disorders arose, and the
dangers that hung over them, and the difficulty of remedying them. And
seeing that the times and not the men were causing the disorders, they
quickly were of another mind and acted otherwise, because the knowledge
of things in particular had taken away that deception which, in the general
consideration, they had presupposed. So that those who at first ((when
he was a private citizen)) heard him speak, and afterwards saw them remain
quiet in the supreme Magistracy, believed that this resulted not by the
more real knowledge of things, but from their having been perverted and
corrupted by the Nobles. And as this happened to many men and many times,
there arose among them a proverb, which said: These men have one mind
in the plaza and another in the palace. Considering, therefore, all that
has been discussed, it is seen that the quickest possible way to open
the eyes of the People, is by finding a way ((seeing that a generality
deceives them)) in which they should have to descend to particulars, as
did Pacovius in Capua and the Senate in Rome. I believe also that it can
be concluded that no prudent man ought ever to disregard popular judgment
in particular matters, (such as) the distribution of dignities and honors,
for in this only the People do not deceive themselves, and if they do
some times, it will be rare when they deceive themselves more often than
do the few men who have to make such distributions. Nor does it seem to
me to be superfluous to show in the following chapter the order which
the Senate held in order to deceive the People in its distributions.
WHOEVER WANTS A MAGISTRACY NOT TO BE GIVEN TO A VILE OR
WICKED ONE, WILL HAVE IT ASKED BY A MAN MORE VILE AND MORE WICKED, OR
BY ONE MORE NOBLE AND MORE GOOD
When the (Roman) Senate became apprehensive that the Tribunes
with Consular power should be created from plebeian men, they took one
of two courses: either they caused the more reputable men of Rome to be
designated, or by suitable means they (surely) corrupted some sordid and
most ignoble Plebeians, who mixed with the plebeians of better quality
who usually asked for these offices, so that even they should ask for
them. This latter course caused the Plebs to be ashamed of themselves
to give it to the latter, and the first (course) made them ashamed to
take it away from the former. All of which confirms the proposition of
the preceding discussion, where it is shown that the people deceive themselves
in general matters, but they do not deceive themselves in particular matters.
IF THOSE CITIES WHICH HAD THEIR BEGINNING FREE AS ROME,
HAVE HAD DIFFICULTY IN FINDING LAWS THAT WOULD MAINTAIN THEM, THOSE THAT
HAD THEIR BEGINNING IN SERVITUDE HAVE ALMOST AN IMPOSSIBILITY
How difficult it is in establishing a Republic to provide
all those laws that should maintain her free, is very well shown by the
progress of the Roman Republic, which notwithstanding that it was established
with many laws, first by Romulus, and afterwards by Numa, by Tullus Hostilius,
and by Servius, and lastly by the Ten Citizens created for such a purpose,
none the less in managing that City new needs were always discovered and
it was necessary to create new ordinances; as happened when they created
the Censors, who were one of those provisions that aided in keeping Rome
free during the time she existed in liberty. For having become arbiters
of the customs of Rome, they were the most potent cause why the Romans
had retarded the further corruption of themselves. In the creation of
this Magistracy they indeed made one error at the start, creating them
for five years: but a short time later it was corrected by the prudence
of the Dictator Mamercus, who, through new laws, reduced the said Magistracy
to eighteen months: which the Censors who were then (aging) in office
took so badly, that they deprived Mamercus from (treating with) the Senate:
which thing was greatly censured both by the Plebs and the Fathers: and
as history does not show whether Mamercus was able to defend himself against
this, it must be assumed either that history is defective, or that the
institutions of Rome in this part were good; for it is not well that a
Republic should be so constituted that a Citizen in order to promulgate
a law conforming to a free society could be oppressed without any remedy.
But returning to the beginning of this discussion I say,
that for creating such a new Magistracy it ought to be considered that,
if those Cities which had their beginnings in liberty but become corrupt
by themselves, like Rome, have great difficulty in finding good laws for
maintaining themselves free, it is not to be wondered at if those which
had their beginnings in servitude find it, not difficult, but impossible
ever to organize themselves so that they are able to live securely and
quietly; this, as is seen, happened to the City of Florence which, for
having had its beginnings subject to the Roman Empire, and having always
existed under the government of others, remained subject for a long time
and without any thought to (freeing) itself: afterward when the opportunity
arrived for her to breathe free, she began to make her institutions, which
being mixed with ancient ones that were bad, could not be good: and thus
she had gone on managing herself for two hundred years of which there
exists a true record, without ever having a State (Government) by which
she could truly be called a Republic. And these difficulties which existed
in her, have always existed in those Cities that have had beginnings similar
to hers. And although many times ample authority was given by public and
free suffrage to a few Citizens to be able to reform her, yet they have
never organized her for the common good, but always in favor of their
own party: which made not for order, but for major disorders in that City.
And to come to some particular example I say, that among other things
that have to be considered by an establisher of a Republic is to examine
into whose hands he places the authority of blood (death) over its own
Citizens. This was well constituted in Rome, for there one could ordinarily
appeal to the People; and even if an important event should occur where
the deferring of an execution through the medium of an appeal should be
dangerous, they had recourse to the Dictator, who executed it immediately:
to which refuge they never had recourse except in necessity. But Florence
and other Cities born as she was ((in servitude)) had this authority placed
in a foreigner, who, sent by a Prince performed such an office. When they
afterwards came into liberty, they kept this authority in a foreigner,
whom they called Captain. Which ((because he was able easily to be corrupted
by powerful Citizens)) was a pernicious thing. But afterwards changing
itself through the changes of governments which they organized, they created
the Eight Citizens who should perform the office of that Captain. Which
arrangement from bad became worse, for the reasons mentioned at other
times, that the few were always ministers of the few and more powerful
(citizens).
The City of Venice is guarded from that (abuse), which has
(a Council) of Ten Citizens who are able to punish any Citizen without
appeal. And as this was not enough to punish the powerful even though
they had the authority, they established (the Council) of Forty: And in
addition the Council of the Pregadi ((which is the highest council)) had
the power to castigate them. So that lacking an accuser, there was not
lacking a judge to keep powerful men in check. It is no wonder, therefore,
seeing that in Rome (laws) were made by herself with many prudent men,
new causes sprung up every day for which she had to make new laws to maintain
her free existence, which, if, in other Cities which had disordered beginnings,
such difficulties sprung up, they could never reorganize themselves.
A COUNCIL OR MAGISTRATE OUGHT NOT TO BE ABLE TO STOP THE
ACTIVITIES OF A CITY
When T. Quintus Cincinnatus and Gnaius Julius Mentus were
Consuls in Rome, being disunited, they stopped all the activities of that
Republic. When the Senate saw this, they advised the creation of a Dictator,
in order that he do that which, because of their (Consuls) discords, they
could not do. But the Consuls disagreeing on every other thing, were in
accord only on this: not to want to create a Dictator. So that the Senate
not having any other remedy had recourse to the aid of the Tribunes, who,
with the authority of the Senate, forced the Consuls to obey. Here first
is to be noted the usefulness of the Tribunes, who were not only useful
in restraining the ambitions which the powerful had against the Plebs,
but also that which they employed among themselves. The other, that there
ought never to be established in a City the ability of a few to interrupt
any of its decisions which are ordinarily necessary in maintaining the
Republic. For instance, if you give authority to a Council to make a distribution
of honors and offices, or to a Magistracy the administration of a business,
it is proper either to impose on them the necessity that they must do
it in any case, or to arrange that if they did not want to do it themselves,
that another can and ought to do it: otherwise this constitution would
be defective and dangerous, as was seen it was in Rome, if the authority
of the Tribunes could not have been opposed to the obstinacy of those
Consuls.
In the Venetian Republic, the grand Council distributes
the honors and offices. It sometimes happened that the general public,
either from contempt or from some false suggestions, did not create the
successors to the Magistrates of the City and to those who administered
their outside Empire. This resulted in a very great disorder, because
suddenly both the subject lands and the City itself lacked their legitimate
judges, nor could they obtain anything if the majority of that council
were not satisfied or deceived. And this inconvenience would have brought
that City to a bad end if it had not been foreseen by the prudent Citizens,
who taking a convenient opportunity made a law that all the Magistrates
who are or should be inside or outside the City should never vacate their
offices until exchanges with their successors were made. And thus was
removed from that council the evil of being able with peril to the Republic
to stop public activities.
A REPUBLIC OR A PRINCE OUGHT TO FEIGN TO DO THROUGH LIBERALITY,
THAT WHICH NECESSITY CONSTRAINS THEM
Prudent men always make the best of things in their actions,
although necessity should constrain them to do them in any case. This
prudence was well employed by the Roman Senate when they decided that
a public stipend be given to the fighting men, it having been the military
custom of they maintaining their own selves. But the Senate seeing that
war could not be made for any length of time in this manner, and, because
of this, they could neither besiege towns nor lead armies to a distance,
and judging it to be necessary to be able to do the one and the other,
decided that the said stipends be given: but they did it in such a way
that they made the best of that which necessity constrained them to do;
and this present was so accepted by the Plebs, that Rome went upside down
with joy; for it seemed to them to be a great benefit which they never
hoped to have, and which they would never have sought by themselves. And
although the Tribunes endeavored to cancel this decree, showing that it
was something that aggravated and not lightened the burden ((it being
necessary to impose tributes to pay this stipend)), none the less they
could not do much to keep the Plebs from accepting it: which was further
increased by the Senate by the method by which they assigned the tributes,
for those that were imposed on the Nobles were more serious and larger,
and the first (required) to be paid.
TO REPRIMAND THE INSOLENCE OF A POWERFUL ONE WHO SPRINGS
UP IN A REPUBLIC, THERE IS NO MORE SECURE AND LESS TROUBLESOME WAY THAN
TO FORESTALL HIM THOSE WAYS BY WHICH HE COMES TO POWER
It will be seen from the above written discourse, how much
credit the Nobility had acquired with the Plebs because of the demonstrations
made to their benefit, both by the stipends ordered, as well also as the
method of imposing the tributes. If the Nobility had maintained themselves
in this order they would have removed every cause for tumult in that City,
and this would have taken away from the Tribunes that credit which they
had with the Plebs, and consequently their authority. And, truly, there
cannot exist in a Republic, and especially in those that are corrupt,
a better method, less troublesome and more easily opposed to the ambitions
of any Citizen, than to forestall him those ways by which he observes
to be the paths to attain the rank he designates. Which method, if it
had been employed against Cosimo De'Medici, would have been a much better
procedure for his adversaries than to have driven him out of Florence:
for if those Citizens who were competing against him had taken his style
of favoring the People, they would have succeeded without tumult and without
violence in drawing from his hands the arms which he availed himself of
most.
Piero Soderini had made a reputation for himself in the
City of Florence alone by favoring the General Public; this among the
People gave him the reputation as a lover of liberty in the City. And
certainly it would have been an easier and more honest thing for those
Citizens who envied him for his greatness, (and) less dangerous and less
harmful to the Republic, for them to have forestalled him in the ways
by which he made himself great, than to want to oppose him in such a way
that with his ruin, all the rest of the Republic should be ruined; for
if they had taken away from his hands those arms which made him strong
((which they could have done easily)) they could have opposed him in all
the councils and all the public deliberations boldly and without suspicion.
And if anyone should reply that if those Citizens who hated Piero made
an error in not forestalling him the ways with which he gained reputation
for himself among the People, Piero also made an error in not forestalling
him those ways by which his adversaries made him be feared: for which
Piero merits to be excused, as much because it was difficult for him to
have done so, as also because it was not honest for him: For the means
with which he was attacked were to favor the Medici, with which favors
they beat him and, in the end, ruined him. Piero, therefore, could not
honestly take up this part in order that he could destroy that liberty
by his good name, to which he had been put in charge to guard: Moreover,
these favors not being able to be done suddenly and secretly, would have
been most dangerous for Piero; for whenever he should be discovered to
be a friend of the Medici, he would have become suspect and hated by the
People: whence there arose more opportunities to his enemies to attack
him than they had before.
In every proceeding, therefore, men ought to consider the
defects and perils which it (presents), and not to undertake it if it
should be more dangerous than useful, notwithstanding the result should
conform to their decision: for to do otherwise in this case it would happen
to them as it happened to Tullius (Cicero), who, wanting to take away
the favors from Marcantonio, increased them for him: for Marcantonio having
been judged an enemy of the Senate, and having gathered together that
great army in good part from the soldiers who had been followers of Caesar's
party, Tullius, in order to deprive him of those soldiers advised the
Senate to give authority to Octavian and send him with the army and the
Consuls against him (Antony) and join the latter (Octavian), and thus
Marcantonio remaining bereft of favor, would easily be destroyed. Which
(thing) turned out to the contrary, for Marcantonio won over Octavian
to himself, who, leaving Tullius and the Senate, joined him. Which (thing)
brought about the complete destruction of the party of the Aristocracy
(Patricians). Which was easy to foresee, and that which Tullius advised
should not have been believed, but should have kept account always that
name which, with so much glory, had destroyed his enemies and acquired
for him the Principality of Rome, and they ought never to have believed
they could expect anything from his supporters favorable to liberty.
THE PEOPLE MANY TIMES DESIRE THEIR RUIN, DECEIVED BY A
FALSE SPECIES OF GOOD: AND HOW GREAT HOPES AND STRONG PROMISES EASILY
MOVE THEM
After conquering the City of the Veienti, there entered
into the Roman People the idea that it would be a useful thing for the
City of Rome if one half of the Romans should go and live at Veii, arguing
that because that City was rich in countryside, full of buildings, and
near to Rome, it could enrich the half of the Roman Citizens and not disturb
any civil activities because of the nearness of the location. Which thing
appeared to the Senate and the wiser Romans so useless and so harmful,
that they said freely they would rather suffer death than consent to such
a decision. So that this subject coming up for debate, the Plebs were
so excited against the Senate that it would have come to arms and bloodshed
if the Senate had not made itself a shield of some old and esteemed Citizens,
reverence for whom restrained the Plebs so that they did not proceed any
further with their insolence. Here, two things are to be noted. The first,
that many times, deceived by a false illusion of good, the People desire
their own ruin, and unless they are made aware of what is bad and what
is good by someone in whom they have faith, the Republic is subjected
to infinite dangers and damage. And if chance causes People not to have
faith in anyone ((as occurs sometimes, having been deceived before either
by events or by men)), their ruin comes of necessity. And Dante says of
his proposition in the discussion he makes in De Monarchia (On Monarchy),
that the People many times shout, Life to their death and death to
their life. From this unbelief it sometimes happens in Republics that
good proceedings are not undertaken, as was said above of the Venetians
who, when assaulted by so many enemies could not undertake a procedure
of gaining some of them over to themselves by giving to them things taken
from others; because of this war was moved against them and a conspiracy
of (other) Princes made against them, before their ruin had come.
Considering therefore what is easy and what is difficult
to persuade a People to, this distinction can be made: either that which
you have to persuade them to represents at first sight a gain or a loss,
or truly it appears a courageous or cowardly proceeding: and if, in the
things that are placed in front of the people, there is seen a gain even
though it is concealed under a loss, and if it appears courageous even
though it is hidden beneath the ruin of the Republic, it will always be
easy to persuade the multitude to it: and thus it will always be difficult
to persuade them of those proceedings where either some usefulness or
loss is apparent, even though the welfare and benefit (of the Republic)
were hidden under it. This that I have said is confirmed by infinite examples,
Roman and foreign, modern and ancient.
For, from this, there arose the evil opinion that sprung
up in Rome of Fabius Maximus, who could not persuade the Roman people
that it was useless to that Republic to proceed slowly in that war, and
to sustain the attack of Hannibal without engaging in battle, because
that people judged this proceeding cowardly, and did not see what usefulness
there should be in that, and Fabius did not have sufficient cause to demonstrate
it to them: and the People are so blinded on these ideas of bravery, that
although the Roman People had made that error of giving authority to the
Master of the horse of Fabius to enable him to engage in battle, even
though Fabius did not want to, and that because of this authority the
Roman camp would have been broken up except for the prudence of Fabius
which remedied it; this experience was not enough for them, for they afterwards
made Varro Consul, not for any of his merits but for having promised throughout
all the plazas and public places of Rome to rout Hannibal anytime he should
be given the authority. From this came the battle and defeat of Cannae,
and almost caused the ruin of Rome. I want to cite on this proposition
another Roman example. Hannibal had been in Italy eight or ten years,
had filled this province with killings of Romans, when M. Centenius Penula
came to the Senate, a very base man ((none the less he had some rank in
the military)), and offered them that if they gave him authority to be
able to raise an army of volunteers in any place in Italy he wished, he
would in a very short time give them Hannibal, either taken or dead. The
demands of this man appeared foolish to the Senate: none the less thinking
that if they should deny him this, his request would be later known by
the People, that there might arise some tumult, envy, and ill will against
the Senatorial order, they conceded it to him; desiring rather to put
in danger all those who followed him than to cause new indignation to
spring up among the People, knowing how much a like proceeding would be
accepted and how difficult it would be to dissuade them. This man, therefore,
with an unorganized and undisciplined multitude went to meet Hannibal,
and he no sooner had come to the encounter than he, with all his followers,
were routed and killed.
In Greece in the City of Athens, Nicias, a most serious
and prudent man, never could persuade that people that it would not be
good to go and assault Sicily, so that this decision taken against the
will of the wise caused the complete ruin of Athens. When Scipio was made
Consul and desired the province of Africa, he promised to everyone the
ruin of Carthage; when the Senate did not agree to this because of the
verdict of Fabius Maximus, he threatened to bring it before the People,
as he very well knew that such decisions were liked by the People.
On this proposition an example can be given of our own City,
as it was when Messer Ercole Bentivogli, commander of the Florentine forces,
together with Antonio Giacomini, after having defeated Bartolomeo D'Alvino
at San Vincenti, went to besiege Pisa: which enterprise was decided upon
by the People on the brave promises of Messer Ercole, although many of
the wise Citizens censured it: none the less there was no remedy, being
pushed by that desire of the general public which was based on the brave
promises of the commander.
I say, therefore, that there is no easier way to ruin a
Republic where the People have authority, than to involve them in a brave
enterprise: because where the People are of any importance, they will
always accept them, nor will there be anyone of contrary opinion who will
know any remedy. But if the ruin of the City results from this, there
also and more often results the ruin of the particular Citizens who are
in charge of such enterprises: for the People having expected victory,
if defeat comes, they do not blame fortune or the impotence of those who
commanded, but their wickedness and ignorance, but most of the times they
either kill or imprison them, or exile them, as happened to infinite Carthaginian
Captains and to many Athenians. Nor do any victories that they might have
had in the past benefit them, because they are all cancelled by the present
defeat, as happened to our Antonio Giacomini, who, not having conquered
Pisa as he promised and the People expected, fell into such popular disgrace
that, notwithstanding his past infinite good works, he (was allowed to)
live more because of the humanity of those who had authority who defended
him from the People than for any other reason.
HOW MUCH AUTHORITY A GREAT MAN HAS IN RESTRAINING AN EXCITED
MULTITUDE (MOB)
The second notable item mentioned in the text of the above
chapter is, that nothing is so apt to restrain an excited multitude (mob)
as the reverence (inspired) by some man of gravity and authority who encounters
them; and not without reason Virgil says:
When they saw a man of grave aspect and strong with
merit
They became silent, and stood with eager ears.
Therefore, he who is in charge of an army, or he who finds
himself in a City where a tumult has arisen, ought to present himself
there with as much grace and as honorably as he can, attiring himself
with the insignia of his rank which he holds in order to make himself
more revered. A few years ago Florence was divided into two factions,
who called themselves, thusly, the Frateschi (Brotherly) and Arrabiati
(Angered); and coming to arms, the Frateschi were defeated, among whom
was Pagolantonio Soderini, a Citizen greatly reputed in those times; and
during those tumults the People went armed to his house to sack it, Messer
Francesco, his brother, then Bishop of Volterra and today Cardinal, by
chance found himself in the house; who, as soon as he heard the noise
and saw the disturbance, dressed himself in his most dignified clothes
and over them put on his Episcopal surplice, and went to meet those armed
ones, and with his person and his words stopped them: which (thing) was
talked about and celebrated throughout the City for many days.
I conclude, therefore, that there is no sounder or more
necessary remedy to restrain an excited multitude than the presence of
a man who by his presence appears and is revered. It is seen, therefore,
((to return to the preceding text)) with how much obstinacy the Roman
Plebs accepted that proceeding of going to Veii because they judged it
useful, but did not recognize the danger that existed underneath this;
and that the many tumults which arose there would cause troubles, if the
Senate with serious men (and) full of reverence had not restrained their
fury.
HOW EASILY THINGS ARE MANAGED IN THAT CITY WHERE THE MULTITUDE
IS NOT CORRUPT, AND THAT WHERE THERE IS EQUALITY A PRINCIPALITY CANNOT
BE ESTABLISHED, AND WHERE THERE IS NONE A REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED
Although above there has been much discussed that which
is to be feared or to be hoped for in corrupt Cities, none the less it
does not seem to me outside this subject to consider a decision of the
Senate concerning the vow that Camillus had made to give the tenth part
of the plunder of the Veienti to Apollo: which plunder having come into
the hands of the Roman Pleb, and being unable otherwise to review the
account of it, the Senate made and edict that everyone should present
to the Republic the tenth part of that which they had plundered. And although
such a decision was not put into effect, the Senate afterwards having
taken other ways and means for satisfying Apollo in fulfillment for the
Pleb, none the less from such decisions it is seen how much the Senate
confided in them (the People), and how they judged that no one would not
present exactly all that which was commanded of them by the edict. And
on the other hand, it is seen how the Pleb did not think of evading the
edict in any part by giving less than they ought, but to relieve themselves
of this by showing open indignation. This example, together with many
others that have been recited above, show how much goodness and religion
there was in that People, and how much good there was to be hoped for
from them. And, truly, when this goodness does not exist, no good is to
be hoped for, as can be hoped for in those provinces which, in these times,
are seen to be corrupt, as is Italy above all others, even though France
and Spain have their part of such corruption. And, if in those provinces,
there are not seen as many disorders as arise in Italy every day, it derives
not so much from the goodness of the people ((which in good part is lacking))
as from having a King who keeps them united, not only by his virtu, but
by the institutions of those Kingdoms which are yet unspoiled.
In the province of Germany this goodness and this religion
is seen to exist in great (measure) in those People, which makes for the
existence of many Republics in freedom, and they so observe the laws that
no one from inside or outside dares to attack them. And that this is true
that in their kingdom there yet exists a good part of that ancient goodness,
I would like to give an example similar to that given above of the Senate
and the Roman Pleb. When it occurred in those Republics that they had
to spend any quantity of money for public account, those Magistrates or
Councils who had the authority imposed on all the inhabitants of the City
(a tax) of one or two percent of what each one had of value. And such
decision being made in accordance with the laws of the land everyone presented
himself before the collectors of this impost, and first taking an oath
to pay the right sum, he threw into a box provided for that purpose that
which it appeared to him according to his conscience he ought to pay:
to which payment there was no witness other than he who paid. From which
it can be conjectured how much goodness and how much religion still exists
in those people. And it ought to be noted that every one paid the true
amount, for if it had not been paid, the impost would not have yielded
that amount which they had planned in accordance with previous ones that
had been taken, and if they had not yielded (this amount), the fraud would
be recognized, and if it had been recognized other means than this would
have been taken. Which goodness is much more to be admired in these times
as it is very rare; rather, it is seen to be remaining only in that province:
which result from two things; the one, that they do not have great commerce
with their neighbors, for others have not come to their homes nor have
they gone to the homes of others, but have been content with those goods,
live on those foods, clothe themselves with the wool which the country
provides, which has taken away any reason for intercourse and (consequently)
the beginning of any corruption: hence they have not been able to take
up the customs of the French, of the Spanish, or of the Italians, which
nations all together are the corrupters of the world. The other cause,
is that that Republic, whose political existence is maintained uncorrupted,
does not permit that any of its Citizens to be or live in the manner of
a Gentleman, instead maintain among themselves a perfect equality, and
are the greatest enemies of those Lords and Gentlemen who are in that
province: and if, by chance, any should come into their hands, they kill
them as being Princes of corruption and the cause of every trouble.
And to clarify what is (meant by) this name of Gentleman,
I say that those are called Gentlemen who live idly on the provisions
of their abundant possessions, without having any care either to cultivate
or to do any other work in order to live. Such as these are pernicious
to every Republic and to every Province: but more pernicious are those
who, in addition to the above mentioned fortune, also command castles,
and have subjects who obey them. Of these two sorts of men, the Kingdom
of Naples, the Lands of Rome, the Romagna, and Lombardy, are full. From
which it happens that there never has been a Republic in those provinces,
nor any political existence (system), because such kinds of men are all
enemies of every civil society. And in provinces so constituted, to want
to introduce a Republic would be impossible. But only an arbiter (monarch)
would recognize it, and he would have no other means but to establish
a Kingdom: the reason is this, that when the body of people is so corrupted
that the laws are not sufficient to restrain it, there needs to be established
there that superior force, which is the Royal hand that, with absolute
and full power, places a restraint to the excessive ambitions and corruption
of the Powerful. This (cause) is verified by the example of Tuscany, where
one sees in a small extent of land there have existed for a long time
three Republics, Florence, Siena, and Lucca; and although the other Cities
of that Province are in a way subject to these, yet, by their spirit and
their institutions, it is seen that they maintain, or attempt to maintain,
their liberty: all of which arises from there not being any lords of castles
in that province, and few or no Gentlemen: but there exists so much equality,
that it would be easy for a prudent man who had knowledge of ancient civilizations,
to introduce a civil government there. But its misfortunes have been so
great, that up to these times not any one has come forth who has been
able to or known how to do it.
From this discussion, therefore, this conclusion is drawn,
that he who would want to establish a Republic where there are many Gentlemen,
cannot do so unless first he extinguishes them all; and that he who would
want to establish a Kingdom or a Principality where there is great equality,
will never be able to do so unless he withdraws from that equality many
of the ambitious and unquiet spirits, and makes them Gentlemen in fact
and not in name, giving them castles and possessions, as well as giving
them aid of men and money, so that surrounded by these he can through
them maintain his power, and they through his support can maintain their
ambitions, and the others constrained to endure that yoke which force
and nothing else could make them endure. And, because of this, there being
a proportion of those who force and those who are forced, each man will
remain firm in his rank. And as the establishing of a Republic in a province
better adapted to being a Kingdom, or to establishing a Kingdom in one
better adapted to being a Republic, is a matter for one who in brains
and authority is rare, there have been many who have wanted to do so,
but few only who have known how to bring it about. For the greatness of
the undertaking in part frightens them and in part stops them, so that
they fail in the very beginning. I believe that this opinion of mine,
that a Republic cannot be established where there are Gentlemen, appears
contrary to the experience of the Venetian Republic, in which none could
have any rank except those who were Gentlemen. To which it is answered
that this example does not oppose it, for the Gentlemen in that Republic
are more so in name than in fact, as they do not have great incomes from
possessions, their riches being founded on commerce and movable property:
and, in addition, none of them have castles or any jurisdiction over men;
but in them that name of Gentleman is a name of dignity and reputation,
without being based on those things on which men are called Gentlemen
in other Cities. And as other Republics have all their divisions (of classes)
under various names, so Venice is divided into Gentlemen and Popolari,
and wants that the former can have all the honors, from which all others
are entirely excluded. This does not cause disorders in those towns for
the reasons mentioned at other times. Republics, therefore, can be established
where a great equality exists or can be established, and, on the contrary,
a Principality can be established where a great inequality exists; otherwise
they will lack proportion and have little durability.
BEFORE GREAT EVENTS OCCUR IN A CITY OR A PROVINCE, SIGNS
COME WHICH FORETELL THEM, OR MEN WHO PREDICT THEM
Whence it arises I do not know, but from ancient and modern
examples it is seen that no great event ever takes place in a City or
a Province that has not been predicted either by fortune tellers, by revelations,
by prodigies, or by other celestial signs. And in order for me not to
go distant from home in proving this, everyone knows how the coming of
King Charles VIII of France into Italy was predicted by Brother Girolamo
Savonarola, and how in addition to this it was said throughout Italy that
at Arezzo there had been seen in the air men-at-arms battling together.
In addition to this, everyone knows how, before the death of Lorenzo De'Medici
the elder, the Duomo was hit in its highest part by a bolt from the skies
which very greatly damaged that edifice. Also everyone knows how, a little
while before Piero Soderini, who had been made Gonfalonier for life by
the Florentine people, had been driven out and deprived of his rank, the
palace was struck in the same manner by a (lightning) stroke. I could
cite other examples in addition to these, which I will omit to avoid tedium.
I shall narrate only that which T. Livius tells of before the coming of
the French (Gauls) to Rome, that is, how one Marcus Creditus, a Pleb,
reported to the Senate that, passing at midnight through the Via Nova
(New Road), he had heard a voice louder than human which admonished him
that he should report to the Magistrates that the Gauls were coming to
Rome. The cause of this I believe should be discussed and interpreted
by a man who has knowledge of natural and supernatural things, which I
have not. But it could be, as some Philosophers hold, that this air being
so full of spirits, having an intelligence which by natural virtu foresee
future events, and having compassion for men, so that they can warn them
by such signs to prepare for defense. But, however it may be, such is
the truth, (and) that always after such incidents there follows things
extraordinary and new in the provinces.
TOGETHER THE PLEBS ARE STRONG, DISPERSED THEY ARE WEAK
There were many Romans ((after the ruin of their country
had ensued because of the passage of the Gauls)) who had gone to live
at Veii contrary to the constitution and orders of the Senate, which,
in order to remedy this disorder, commanded through its public edicts
that everyone within a certain time and under certain penalties should
return to inhabit Rome. Which edict at first was made light of by those
against whom it was made, but afterwards when the time came for obeying
it, they all obeyed. And Titus Livius said these words, From being
ferocious when together, fear made them individually obedient. And
truly this part of the nature of the multitude cannot be better shown
than by this sentence. For the multitude many times is audacious in speaking
against the decision of their Prince: but afterwards, when they see the
penalty in sight, not trusting one another, they run to obey. So that
it is certainly to be seen that whatever may be said of a People about
their good or bad disposition, ought not to be held of great account,
if you are well prepared to be able to maintain your authority if they
are well disposed, and if they are ill-disposed, to be able to provide
that they do not attack you. This refers to those evil dispositions which
the People have from causes other than their having lost either their
liberty or their Prince much loved by them, but who is still living: for
the evil dispositions that arise from these causes are formidable above
every thing, and have need of great remedies to restrain them: their indispositions
from other (causes) are easily managed if they do not have Chiefs to whom
they have recourse, for, on the one hand, there is nothing more formidable
than a multitude loose and without a Head, and on the other hand, there
is nothing weaker, because whenever they have arms in their hands it is
easy to subdue them, if you have a shelter which enables you to avoid
their first attack: for when their spirits are cooled down a little, and
each one sees that he has to return to his house, they begin to be distrustful
of themselves, and to think of their individual safety either by fleeing
or surrendering themselves. A multitude so excited, therefore, in wanting
to escape these perils, has promptly to make a Head among themselves,
who would control it, keep it united, and think of its defense, as the
Roman plebs did when, after the death of Virginius, they departed from
Rome, and to save themselves created twenty Tribunes from among themselves:
and if they do not do this, it will always happen as T. Livius said in
the above written words, that all together they are strong, but when each
one then begins to think of his own peril, they become vile and weak.
THE MULTITUDE IS WISER AND MORE CONSTANT THAN A PRINCE
Nothing is more vain and more inconstant than the multitude,
so our T. Livius and all other Historians affirm. For it often occurs
in narrating the actions of men to observe the multitude to have condemned
some one to death, and that same (multitude) afterwards weeping and very
much wishing him back; as is seen the Roman people did in the case of
Manlius Capitolinus, who, having condemned him to death, afterwards most
earnestly desired him back. And the words of the author are these: As
soon as they knew there was no peril from, they desired to have him back.
And elsewhere, where he tells of the incidents which arose in Syracuse
after the death of Hieronymus, nephew of Hiero, says: It is the nature
of multitude, either to serve humbly, or to dominate haughtily. I
do not know, in wanting to defend a thing which ((as I have said)) is
accused by all writers, if I were to undertake a cause so hard and full
of difficulty, that I would have either to abandon it in shame, or to
go on with it burdensomely. But however it may be, I do not judge, or
will ever judge, it to be a defect to defend any opinion with arguments,
without wanting to employ either authority or force.
I say, therefore, the individual men, and especially Princes,
can be accused of that defect which the writers accuse the multitudes;
for anyone who is not controlled by the laws, will make the same errors
as a loose multitude. And this can be easily observed, for there are and
there have been many Princes, but of the good and wise ones there have
been only a few, I say, of those Princes who have been able to break that
restraint which could control them; among whom are not those Kings who
arose in Egypt in that ancient period when that province was governed
by laws, nor those who arose in Sparta, nor those who have risen in France
in our times, which Kingdom is more regulated by laws than any other Kingdom
of our times of which there is knowledge. And these Kingdoms which arise
under such constitutions are not to be placed in that number whence the
nature of each man individually has to be considered, and to see if he
is like the multitude; for alongside them there ought to be placed a multitude
controlled by laws in the same way as they (the Kings) were, and the same
goodness will be found in them as we see in (the Kings), and we will see
that they serve neither haughtily nor humbly; as was the Roman People,
who while the Republic remained incorrupt, never served humbly or ruled
insolently, but rather with its institutions and Magistracies held its
rank honorably. And when it was necessary to spring up against a powerful
one who was harming them, they did so, as was seen with Manlius and the
Ten, and others who sought to oppress them; and so also when it was necessary
for the public safety to obey the Dictators and Consuls. And if the Roman
People desired Manlius Capitolinus after his death, it is not to be wondered
at, for they desired his virtu, which had been such that the memory of
them brought compassion to everyone, and would have had the power to cause
that same result in any Prince, for it is the verdict of all writers that
virtu is lauded and admired even in ones enemies: and if so much desire
could have restored him, the Roman people would have given him the same
judgment as they did when they took him from prison, a little before they
condemned him to death: and as was also seen of Princes held to be wise,
who have had some persons put to death and then greatly regretted it,
as Alexander with Clitus and his other friends, and Herod with Mariamne:
But that which our Historian says of the nature of the multitude, he does
not say of those who were regulated by laws, such as were the Romans,
but of an unbridled multitude, as was that of Syracuse, which made those
errors which infuriated and unbridled men make, and as Alexander and Herod
did in the abovementioned cases.
The nature of the multitude, therefore, is not to be blamed
any more than that of Princes, for they all err equally when they all
are able to err without control. Of which, in addition to what I have
said, there are many examples, both from among the Roman Emperors and
from among other Tyrants and Princes, where so much inconstancy and recklessness
of life is observed, as is ever found in any multitude. I conclude therefore,
contrary to the common opinion which says that the People, when they are
Princes, are changeable and ungrateful, affirming that there are no more
of these defects in them than there are in particular Princes: And to
accuse the People and the Princes together can be the truth; but to except
the Princes would be a deception: For a People that commands and is well
organized will be stable, prudent, grateful, and not otherwise than a
Prince, or even better than a Prince, although he be esteemed wise. And
on the other hand, a Prince loosened from the (control) of the laws, will
be ungrateful, inconstant, and more imprudent than a people. And that
difference in their proceedings arises, not from the different nature,
((for it is the same in everyone, and if there is an advantage for good,
it is in the People)) but from the more or less respect they have for
the laws under which one and the other live. And whoever considers the
Roman people will see that for four hundred years they have been enemies
of the name of Royalty and lovers of glory and of the common good of their
country: He will see so many examples employed by them which testify to
the one thing and the other. And if anyone should allege to me the ingratitude
that they (the Roman people) showed against Scipio, I will reply that
which was discussed above at length on this subject, where it has been
shown that people are less ungrateful than Princes. But as to prudence
and stability, I say, that a people is more prudent, more stable, and
of better judgment than a Prince: And not without reason is the voice
of the people like that of God, for a universal opinion is seen causes
marvelous effects in its prognostication, so that it would seem that by
some hidden virtu, evil or good is foreseen. As to the judging of things,
it is rarely seen that when they hear two speakers who hold opposite views,
if they are of equal virtu, they do not take up the the better opinion,
and they are capable of seeing the truth in what they hear. And if ((as
has been said above)) they err in things concerning bravery, or which
appear useful, a Prince also errs many times in his own passions, which
are much greater than those of the people. It will also be seen that in
the election of their magistrates, they make by far a better selection
than a Prince, but a people will never be persuaded that it is better
to bring to that dignity a man of infamous and corrupt habits: to which
a Prince may be persuaded easily and in a thousand ways. It will be seen
that when a people begin to hold a thing in horror, they remain in that
opinion for many centuries, which is not seen in a Prince. And on both
of these two things, the testimony of the Roman people will suffice for
me, who, in so many hundreds of years, in so many elections of Consuls
and Tribunes, they did not make four elections of which they had to repent.
And ((as I have said)) they held the name of Royalty in so much hatred,
that no obligation to any of its Citizens who should seize that title
would enable him to escape the merited penalty. In addition to this, it
will be seen that the Cities where the people are Princes, make the greatest
progress in the shortest time and much greater than those who have always
been under a Prince, as Rome did after the driving out of the Kings, and
Athens did after they were free of Pisistratus. Which cannot arise except
that those governments of the people are better than those of the Princes.
Nor do I want that there should be opposed to my opinion
all that which our Historian has said in the aforementioned text and in
any other; for if there should be discussed all the disorders of the People,
all the disorders of the Princes, all the glories of the People, all those
of the Princes, it will be seen that the People are far superior in goodness
and in glory. And if Princes are superior to the people in instituting
laws, forming civil governments, make new statutes and ordinances, the
People are so much superior in maintaining the institutions which will
add to the glory of those who established them.
And in sum to epilogue this material, I say that the States
of the Princes have lasted a long time, the States of the Republics have
lasted a long time, and both have had need to be regulated by laws; for
a Prince who can do what he wants is a madman, and a People which can
do as it wants to is not wise. If, therefore, discussion is to be had
of a Prince obligated by laws, and of a People unobligated by them, more
virtu will be observed in the People than in Princes: if the discussion
is to be had of both loosened (from such control), fewer errors will be
observed in the People than in the Princes, and those that are fewer have
the greater remedies: For a licentious and tumultuous People can be talked
to by a good man, and can easily be returned to the good path: (but) there
is no one who can talk to a Prince, nor is there any other remedy but
steel (sword). From which the conjecture can be made of the maladies of
the one and the other: that if words are enough to cure the malady of
the People, and that of the Prince needs the sword, there will never be
anyone who will not judge that where the greater cure is required, they
are where the greater errors exist. When a People is indeed unbridled,
the foolishness that they do is not to be feared, nor is fear to be had
of the present malady, but of that which can arise, a Tyrant being able
to rise up amidst so much confusion. But the contrary happens in the case
of bad Princes, where the present evil is feared, and there is hope for
the future, men persuading themselves that the (termination) of their
lives can make liberty spring up. Thus the difference between the one
and the other is seen, that one concerns things that are, the other of
things that will be. The cruelties of the multitude are (directed) against
those whom they fear will oppose the common good, those of a Prince are
(directed) against those whom he fears will oppose his own good. But the
opinion against the People arises because everyone speaks evil of the
people freely and without fear even while they reign; of the Princes they
talk with a thousand fears and a thousand apprehensions. And it does not
appear to me to be outside this subject ((for this matter draws me there))
to discuss in the following chapter whether alliances made with a Republic,
or those made with a Prince, can be trusted.
WHICH ALLIANCES OR LEAGUES CAN BE TRUSTED, WHETHER THOSE
MADE WITH A REPUBLIC OR THOSE MADE WITH A PRINCE
As there occurs every day that Princes or Republics make
leagues and friendships between themselves, and also similarly alliances
and accords are drawn between a Republic and a Prince, it appears to me
proper to examine whose faith is more stable, and which ought to be held
more in account, that of a Republic or that of a Prince. In examining
everything, I believe that in many cases they are the same, and in some
there is a difference. I believe, therefore, that accords made by force
will not be observed either by a Prince or by a Republic: I believe that
when fear of (losing) the State comes to pass, both will break the faith
in order not to lose it, and will serve you ingratitude. Demetrius, who
was called Conqueror of Cities, had given infinite benefits to the Athenians:
it happened that later, having been routed by his enemies and taking refuge
in Athens as a City friendly and obligated to him, was not received by
her: which saddened him much more than had the loss of his forces and
his army; Pompey, having been routed by Caesar in Thessaly, took refuge
in Egypt with Ptolemy, who, in the past he had reinstated in his Kingdom,
but was put to death by him. Which instances, it is seen, have the same
reasons; none the less it was more humanely employed by a Republic and
with less injury, than by the Prince. Where there is fear, therefore,
there will be found in each the same (loss of) faith. And if in either
a Republic or a Prince it is found that they observe the faith even if
ruin may be expected, this also may arise from similar reasons. For it
can very well occur that a Prince, who is a friend of a powerful Prince
(and) who may not then have the opportunity to defend him, can hope that
with time he (the latter) will restore his Principality to him; or believe
he will find either faith or accords with his enemies. Of this kind have
been the Princes of the Kingdom of Naples who have followed the French
side. And as for Republics, Saguntum in Spain was of this kind, which
hazarded her own ruin in order to follow the Roman side, and with Florence
in MDXII (1512) in order to follow the French side. And I believe, taking
everything into account, that in such cases where danger is imminent,
there will be found greater stability in the Republics than in Princes:
For even if the Republics had the same spirit and the same wants as Princes,
their movements being slower will always make them take longer to form
resolutions than Princes, and because of this they will be less prompt
in breaking their faith.
Alliances are broken for usefulness. In this, Republics
are more careful in the observance of accords than Princes. And it is
possible to cite examples where a minimum of usefulness has caused a Prince
to break his faith, and where a great usefulness has not caused faith
to be broken by a Republic; as was that proceeding which Themosticles
proposed to the Athenians, to whom in his speech he said he had a counsel
that would be of great usefulness to their country, but could not tell
it so as not to disclose it for discovering it would take away the opportunity
of doing it. Whence the people of Athens elected Aristedes to whom he
should confide the matter, and according to which they would later decide
as it might appear to them: whereupon Themosticles showed that the fleet
of all Greece, although they were under their faith, was in such a position
that they could easily win it for themselves or destroy it, which would
make the Athenians the arbiters of that Province. Whence Aristedes reported
back to the people that the proposal of Themosticles was most useful,
but most dishonest: for which reason the people rejected it entirely,
which would not have been done by Philip the Macedonian and the other
Princes who had looked for more usefulness, and who had gained more by
breaking the faith than by any other means.
Of the breaking of pacts because of some cause for non-observance,
I will not speak, as it is an ordinary thing: but I will talk of those
that are broken for extraordinary reasons, where I believe, from the things
said, that the people make fewer errors than Princes, and because of this,
they can be trusted more than Princes.
HOW THE CONSULSHIP AND EVERY OTHER MAGISTRACY IN ROME OUGHT
TO BE (BESTOWED) WITHOUT ANY REGARD TO AGE
And it is to be seen from the course of History that the
Roman Republic, after the Consulship came to the Pleb, admitted all its
Citizens (to this dignity) without regard to age or blood (birth), even
though the regard to age never existed in Rome as they always went to
find virtu, whether it was in young men or old. This is seen from the
testimony of Valerius Corvinus who was made Consul at twenty three years
(of age); and Valerius said, talking to his soldiers, that the Consulship
was the reward of virtu, not of blood. Which thing can be much
discussed, whether or not it is well considered. As to blood (birth),
this was conceded because of necessity, and this same necessity which
existed in Rome would also be found in every City that wanted to have
the same success as Rome had, as has been said at another time; for hardships
cannot be given to men without reward, nor can the hope of obtaining the
reward be taken away without peril. And it was proper, therefore, that
the plebs should have the hope of obtaining the Consulship, and that they
should nourish this hope for a time, without attaining it: When afterward
the hope was not enough, they had to arrive at that result (the Consulship).
The City that does not admit its Plebs to any of its glory, can treat
them in their own way, as has been discussed elsewhere; but that City
which wants to accomplish that which Rome did, cannot make this distinction.
And given that it is so (as regards birth), the question of age needs
no reply, rather it is necessarily disposed of; for in electing a young
man to a rank which has need of the prudence of an old man, it happens
((the multitude having to elect him)) that he should come to that rank
through some noble action that he should make. And when a young man is
of such great virtu as to have made himself known by some notable thing,
it would be a very harmful thing if that City should not then be able
to avail itself of him, and that it should have to wait until he should
have aged (and) that age deprive him of that vigor of spirit and activity
of which (at that age) his country should avail itself, as Rome availed
itself of Valerius Corvinus, of Scipio, of Pompey, and of many other who
triumphed when very young.
1. That is, an Executive,
a House of Lords or Senate (originally sitting as a Judiciary), and a
Commons or House of Representatives or Legislature each acting to check
and balance the other.
2. A judiciary.
3. Establish a National
Army or Militia, rather than rely on Mercenaries.
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