CAPITALISM. (From capital: ME. capital; LL. capitellum, head of a column or pillar; dim. of caput, head). Nineteenth and twentieth-century Sociology applies this term to the socioeconomic system whose motivating force is the accumulation of capital.

Different schools of sociology give different interpretations to the content and historical role of this economic system. Positivist sociologists find such regimes not only in modern times but in antiquity and the Middle Ages as well. Marxists see in c. a "socioeconomic formation," a necessary and inevitable stage in universal historical evolution. Sociologists of the economic neo-liberal school (*liberalism) consider the capitalist system the goal and final stage of world history. All of these perspectives suffer from an economic reductionism, viewing the crisis of contemporary society as limited to the crisis of specific socioeconomic systems (whether "capitalist" or "socialist"). The socioeconomic regime is part of a far more complex social structure that comprises the concrete historical sociocultural system of a given time.

The economic base of c. is the private ownership of the means of production and the exploitation of wage labor. (*property, worker ownership) The principal classes are the bourgeoisie (*) and the proletariat (the working class), although over time both have undergone radical changes in composition.

N.H. strongly condemns the amoral and exploitative character of this system. Humanists support the interests of workers who are struggling against the direction of present-day c. Contemporary c. is responsible for generating growing unemployment and marginalizing wide sectors of society across vast regions of the world.

CASTE. (Fr. caste; Port. casta, breed, race, caste, from L. castus, pure, chaste). Social and religious class in despotic societies of the ancient Orient and pre-Columbian America (priests, warriors, farmers, artisans, etc.). In general, castes are divided into higher and lower levels. The position of each human being is determined by heredity, based on the c. of his or her parents, with all mobility between levels prohibited.

Remnants of the c. system still exist in some states in India, Japan, and some other Asian countries. The government of India has granted members of the lower castes opportunities for access to educational institutions, employment, and land in order to support their integration into society and to erase the remnants of the c. system.

CENTERS FOR HUMANIST COMMUNICATION. Humanist meeting centers in communities and neighborhoods which serve as gathering places for activities of grassroots organizations and various action fronts (*). Before such a center is opened an effort is usually made to initiate a modest local publication to facilitate a dialog among the residents of the area and to announce community events, disseminate proposals, etc.

CENTRISM. (From center: OFr. centre; L. centrum; Gr. kentron, sharp point, spur, point about which circle is described). A specific political or ideological current more or less equidistant from the "extremes" or more radicalized positions (*radicalism). As a rule, c. prefers the path of compromise, reduction in conflict, pacification, appeasement. With some frequency c. is accused of sacrificing principles, being too soft, or cowardice. In reality, this current always plays an important role, occupying a central space between movements of the right and left. Within any given party or movement there may exist centrist or moderate groups located between opposing flanks or wings. In most cases, traditional orientations of non-confrontation and dialogue are part of c., though in some instances c. can play a reactionary role.

CHARITY. (OFr. charité, from L. caritas, benevolence, affection, high regard; from carus, dear, costly, loved). For some philosophical and religious currents c. is synonymous with compassion. Distinguished from tolerance (*). A moral quality involving the practice of an active love (*) directed toward all beings in need, especially human beings. Includes experiencing the pain of the other as one’s own pain and the intention to offer appropriate help and cooperation. It is part of the ethical foundation of all universal religions (*religion). C. permits the overcoming of tribal, state, and class hostility and intolerance. It requires moving beyond the habit of dividing human beings into "us" and "them," and is a characteristic proper to the humanist personality.

Various activities of humanitarianism (*) are also inspired by feelings of c.

CHAUVINISM. (Fr. chauvinisme, from Nicolas Chauvin, a sergeant in the army of Napoleon I who in 1815 acquired notoriety for his bellicose attachment to the lost imperial cause). A radical form of extremist nationalism (*) characteristic of powers seeking to justify before public opinion wars of occupation, conquest, plunder, as well as "ethnic cleansing" and other such crimes. C. proclaims the superiority of the victor over the vanquished, the strong over the weak, the exploiter over the exploited, etc. More often than not, c. displays a racist face, proclaiming the superiority of one race over others.

Contemporary humanism strives to unmask and condemns c. as an anti-human ideology and practice that privileges nation and race over the human being, incites one group against another, and glorifies violence (*) as a method for resolving conflicts.

CHOICE. (ME. chois, choise; OFr. chois, choix, choice, from choisir, to choose). 1) A decision or election made between two or more options. The possibility of c. reveals the degree of liberty (*) that exists in human actions. For N.H., every choice is made within some set of existing conditions, and for this reason we always speak of freedom within concrete situations, within conditions, and not in abstract terms. The act of avoiding or postponing a c. is also a c. 2) Related to the human capacity to make free decisions with a knowledge of the circumstances, to set goals for action and appropriate means for achieving them. Reflects the level of freedom or liberty (*) of human beings and of the society to which they belong. Accordingly, it determines the authenticity or falseness of an action. N.H. contributes to the development of practical life habits that allow making and implementing choices among options in a conscious manner, independent of external pressures. 3) System of political and social laws introduced by the Humanist Party in a number of countries (plebiscitary c., optional military service, women’s reproductive c.; sexual c., etc.).

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY. Ideological and political movement of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It arose at the seat of Catholicism, stemming from Pope Leo XIII’s famous 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum (although at the beginning of the twentieth century the ecclesiastical hierarchy preferred to use the term Christian Socialism or social-Christianity).

Only in the course of the struggle against fascism, especially during and after the Second World War, did the Holy See put its seal of approval on official use of the term c.d., allowing its supporters to unite politically and form Christian Democrat parties in many countries of Europe and Latin America, and subsequently in some countries of Africa and Asia. In the 1950s these parties affiliated in the International Federation of Christian Democrat parties. These parties came to power in many countries including Germany, Italy, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, and other countries of both Europe and the Americas. The collapse of the Christian Democrat party in Italy in the early 1990s seriously accentuated the crisis in the Christian Democratic movement. The theoretical basis of c.d. rests on the social doctrine of the Catholic Church and on ecumenicalism, which allows the c.d. movement to extend its influence into those sectors of the population that adhere to Protestantism in its various manifestations. The philosophical work of the French neo-Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain, especially his doctrine of integral humanism (*Christian Humanism), have exerted great influence on the political concepts of c.d.

CHRISTIAN HUMANISM. (See etymology at human being). A form of philosophical humanism (*).

The following exposition of C.H. is excerpted from the section "Christian Humanism" in the book On Being Human: Interpretations of Humanism from the Renaissance to the Present by Salvatore Puledda:

"The reinterpretation of Christianity as a humanism developed in the first half of this century as part of a vast and wide-ranging process, which began in the nineteenth century and continues even today, of revising Christian doctrines to adapt them to the modern world – a world toward which the Catholic Church has held since the Counter Reformation a position of clear rejection if not outright condemnation. It is commonly thought that the Church begins to change its attitude following the Rerum Novarum encyclical of Pope Leo XIII (1891) . . . With this encyclical the Church adopted a social doctrine that could be set against liberalism and socialism . . . authorizing the formation of mass-scale Christian Democratic or Christian Socialist parties . . . and presented itself as the bearer of a vision, a faith, and a moral system able to answer to the most profound needs of the modern person.

It was out of this attempt to redefine and reintroduce Christian values (appropriately updated for the modern world) that "Christian Humanism" emerged, a current whose first important proponent is often considered to be the French thinker Jacques Maritain (1882-1973).

Maritain was first a follower of Henri Bergson and then espoused the ideas of revolutionary socialism. Dissatisfied with both philosophies, in 1906 he converted to Catholicism. He was one of the most notable exponents of what was called "neo-Thomism" – that current of modern Catholic thought that could be traced directly back to Saint Thomas Aquinas and through him to Aristotle, whose philosophy Aquinas had attempted to reconcile with Christian dogmas.

Maritain, whose position was radically opposed to the general tendency of modern thought, took a great leap backward, as it were, past the Renaissance, to reconnect with the philosophical thought of the Middle Ages. This was necessary, he believed, because it was within the humanism of the Renaissance that he identified the seeds that had grown into the crisis, indeed the breakdown, of modern society – a crisis of which Nazism and Stalinism were the most terrible expressions. Maritain did not of course explicitly propose to reestablish the values of the Middle Ages and the Christian world view associated with that time; his objective was to reestablish, after all the difficulties experienced in the Middle Ages, the continuation of Christianity’s historical evolution, which, in Maritain’s view, had been interrupted and blocked by modern secular and lay thought.

In his 1936 book Integral Humanism: Temporal and Spiritual Problems of a New Christendom, Maritain examines the evolution of modern thought from the crisis of medieval Christianity to the bourgeois individualism of the nineteenth century and the totalitarianism of the twentieth. In this evolution he sees the tragedy of "anthropocentric humanism" (as he calls it), which has taken shape since the Renaissance. This humanism, which has led to a progressive de-Christianization of the West, is, according to Maritain, a metaphysics of "freedom without grace." . . .

These are the stages of this progressive decay:

As regards man, one can note that in the beginnings of the modern age, with Descartes first and then with Rousseau and Kant, rationalism had raised up a proud and splendid image of the personality of man, inviolable, jealous of his immanence and his autonomy and, last of all, good in essence. (Integral, 28).

But this rationalist pride, this arrogance, which first eliminated all traditional and transcendent values and then, with idealism, absorbed into itself even objective reality, bore within it the seeds of its own destruction. First Darwin and then Freud dealt mortal blows to the optimistic vision of perpetual progress of anthropocentric humanism. With Darwin (1809–1882), humanity discovered that no biological disjuncture exists between itself and the ape. Even more, no real metaphysical discontinuity exists between humanity and the ape – that is, there is no radical difference of essence, no true qualitative leap. With Freud (1856–1939), humankind discovered that its deepest motivations are actually dictated by "a radically sexual libido and an instinct for death" (Integral, 29). At the end of this destructive dialectical process, Maritain concluded, the doors had been opened to the modern totalitarianisms of fascism and Stalinism:

After all the dissociations and dualisms in the age of anthropocentric humanism, we are now witnessing a dispersion, a final decomposition. This does not prevent man from claiming sovereignty more than ever. But this claim is no longer made for the individual person, for he no longer knows where to find himself, he sees himself only as torn apart from society and fragmentized. Individual man is ripe for abdication... in favor of collective man, in favor of that great historic image of humanity which for Hegel, who gave us the theology of it, consisted in the State with its perfect juridic structure, and which for Marx will consist in Communist society with its immanent dynamism (Integral, 30).

Against an anthropocentric humanism that he describes in this way, Maritain sets a c. h., which he defines as "integral" or "theocentric." He says:

We are thus led to distinguish two kinds of humanism: a truly Christian or theocentric humanism (*); and an anthropocentric humanism, for which the spirit of the Renaissance and that of the Reformation are primarily responsible . . .

The first kind of humanism recognizes that God is the center of man; it implies the Christian conception of man, sinner and redeemed, and the Christian conception of grace and freedom . . . The second kind . . . believes that man himself is the center of man, and therefore of all things. It implies a naturalistic conception of man and of freedom . . . [O]ne understands [why] anthropocentric humanism merits the name of inhuman humanism, and that its dialectic must be regarded as the tragedy of humanism (Integral, 27–28).

To theocentric humanism understood in this way Maritain entrusts the task of constructing a "new Christianity" that will be able to return modern secular society to the values and spirit of the Gospel. Maritain’s Christian interpretation of humanism was enthusiastically embraced by certain segments of the Church as well as various lay groups. It inspired a number of Catholic movements committed to social action and political life and so turned out to be an effective ideological weapon, especially against Marxism. But this interpretation also received witheringly effective criticism from nonconfessional philosophical spheres. The first difficulty to be pointed out was that the rationalist tendency that had appeared in post-Renaissance philosophy and that Maritain had denounced in Descartes, Kant, and Hegel could in fact be traced to the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas himself. This tendency, which had led to the crisis and eventual defeat of Reason, was not the product of Renaissance humanism but of Thomism and late Scholasticism; the rationalism of the Cartesian philosophy that lies at the foundation of modern thought is much more closely connected to Saint Thomas than to the Neoplatonism and mystical Hermeticism of the Renaissance. The roots of modern philosophy’s "arrogance of Reason" should be sought instead, these critics pointed out, in the attempt by Thomism to construct an intellectualist and abstract form of theology. In their view, Maritain had carried out a massive work of mystification and camouflage, almost a game of philosophical prestidigitation, attributing to the Renaissance the historical responsibility that in actuality belonged to late-medieval thought. In the second place, the crisis of values, the existential vacuum that had appeared in European thought with Darwin, Nietzsche, and Freud, was not, argued Maritain’s critics, a consequence of Renaissance humanism, but on the contrary derived from the persistence of medieval Christian ideas within modern society. The tendency toward dualism and dogmatism, the sense of guilt, the rejection of the body and sexuality, the devaluation of women, the fear of death and Hell – all these things are the remnants of medieval Christianity, which long after the Renaissance continue to exert a powerful influence on Western thought. In fact, critics argued, it was these tendencies, strongly reaffirmed in the Reformation and the Counter Reformation, that have determined the sociocultural environment in which modern thought took shape. The schizophrenia of the present-day world (a schizophrenia upon which Maritain insisted) derived, these critics argued, from the simultaneous coexistence of both human and antihuman values. The "destructive dialectic" of the West could best be explained, then, as a painful and frustrated attempt to free itself from the conflict between these warring values."

CIVIL WAR. (Fr. civil; L. civilis, pertaining to a citizen, from civis, a citizen). Armed struggle between factions or groups within the same country that breaks out in crisis as the result of conflicts they are unable to resolve by peaceful means: political, social, inter-ethnic, interfaith, etc. This is the cruelest and most abhorrent form of war, and imposes the greatest sacrifices on defenseless parts of the population: women, children, the elderly, the disabled. C.W. is also disastrous ecologically because of the extent of the destruction it generates.

C.W. is a consequence of divisions in society that form opposing sides, and these sides attempt to resolve serious contradictions by means of violence imposed by armed minorities on all of society. In many cases it is difficult to distinguish c.w. from revolution when the latter is carried out in the form of an armed struggle and accompanied by mass terror. C.W. is bloody and leads to great loss of life. Frequently it is provoked by foreign intervention in the internal affairs of another country.

At the present time there are civil wars in Cambodia, the Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, and Tadjikistan.

Humanists take a position against civil wars and in favor of the resolution of internal conflicts in each country by means of negotiations and compromises that acknowledge the legitimate interests of all contending parties and thus avoid the shedding of blood and public catastrophe.

CLASS. (L. classis, a class or division of the Roman people; Gr. klesis, a calling, summons, from kalein, to call). Modern usage of this term came from the language of the natural sciences between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, where it designated groups of things, plants, or animals; adopted by economists of the seventeenth century who proposed founding a science of economic relations). More or less large groups of people distinguished among themselves by their relationship to the means of production: some possess it (bourgeoisie (*), landowners, bankers, etc.); others have nothing except the strength of their labor (employees, laborers, agricultural workers, etc.). These groups are also distinguished by the different positions they hold in the system of division of labor (some organize and manage, others produce and follow orders); by their different forms of income (investment income, land rent, salary) and by the differing amounts of their wealth and income (wealthy, middle income, poor). They are further distinguished by their different forms of interaction with power and the State (dominant classes and exploited classes). The classes are also differentiated by their level of education and culture, although these differences are secondary.

Society is divided not only into classes but also into different levels or strata, and groups. In today’s world, the working class, agricultural workers, and the middle strata are, for now, the most numerous. The upper bourgeoisie and the landowners are the wealthiest. People are not always capable of properly evaluating their social status, tending to overestimate it. Thus, many of the poor or working class consider themselves middle class.

Marxists regarded the working c. as the most revolutionary and progressive. The history of the international workers movement is rich in fiery revolutionary battles and great strikes. Today, the class struggle has moved beyond the old forms of radicalism (*) and taken on a character of more or less peaceful struggle. The ideas of social harmony and compromise prevail over the idea of revolution (*) and open class confrontation.

New modes of distribution of property and power as well as changes in social status and standard of living are the principal objectives of the relationship between classes at the present moment.

COALITION. (From coalesce: L. coalescere, to grow together; co, together, and alescere, to grow up, from alere, to nourish). 1) Political or military alliance of two or more states against a common enemy (e.g., the Triple Entente of the First World War; the anti-Hitler alliance or c. of the Second World War). 2) Agreement for common action among parties and public figures.

The politics of c. produces advantages for each participant, is frequently based on compromise and mutual concessions, but can also have serious disadvantages if one power seeks to dominate the alliance.

A c. can be an official union of several individuals, political groups, or states against others in order to achieve a common objective. C. members maintain their autonomy and act based on the coincidence of their interests. A c. is formed on the basis of mutual compromise and has a temporary character. With the achievement of the objective or a change of circumstances, the c. ceases to exist or collapses. In other cases, the development of the c. can lead to the organic fusion of its members.

A c. of states can have an economic, political, or military character, and the union may vary in scope: bilateral, subregional, regional, or international. Thus, the United Nations, was born as a c. of states struggling against fascism during the Second World War. The OAS (Organization of American States) was formed as a c. to avert the danger of extra-continental aggression.

COLD WAR. Military and ideological confrontation between the USSR along with its satellites on one side, and the Western bloc led by the United States on the other. The C.W. lasted from the end of the Second World War until the annulment of the Treaty of Warsaw and the collapse of the USSR. The C.W. with its arms race was considered by both sides a preparation for an eventual third world war, and it involved continuous actions taken to weaken the position of the other side, most of them initiated in the third world. The C.W. was manifested in the militarization of the economy and politics; in psychological warfare and diplomatic pressure; in continual local conflicts and wars such as the Soviet invasions of Hungary in 1956, of Czechoslovakia in 1968, of Afghanistan in 1979; in the Cuban missile crisis in 1961; in the US interventions in Central America and Vietnam; in the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt in 1956, etc.

The C.W. ultimately overwhelmed the economy of the USSR and contributed to its collapse, but also weakened the economy of the United States and accelerated the moral crisis of Western society, aggravating the world environmental crisis and provoking other global disasters.

In the mid-1990s, we are experiencing a resurgence of certain political and psychological aspects of the C.W. in the regional conflicts in the Balkans, the Far East, and some zones of the European Common Market. All of this demands a renewed intensity on the part of the anti-war movement. Humanists condemn the mentality of the C.W., as well its military expression in wars disguised as "local conflicts."

COLLECTIVISM. (From collective: L. collectivus, collective, from collectus, pp. of colligere, to collect). Pertaining to any association or group of individuals. A doctrine, social system, and political movement whose ideals are the holding of goods and services in common and which seeks to transfer to the State the control of the distribution of wealth.

This is a highly contradictory movement, which contributed to the rise of the socialist, communist, and anarchist movements as well as to a number of nationalist movements. It starts by opposing the social to the individual, giving priority to the collective. Framing things through such a dilemma presents difficulties, because society cannot be reduced to a biological organism or species, nor the human being to an animal. Historically, c. represented a reaction against an excessive individualism (*). Historical experience has shown, however, the theoretical and practical inconsistency of the postulates of both c. and individualism, demonstrating their limitations and negative consequences when either pole of this dilemma is chosen to the exclusion of the other.

In reality, the interests of the human being as a personality are not and can never be antagonistic to the necessities of social progress. The integral development of the person, of each person’s capabilities, is an inalienable condition of the evolution of society. If, on the contrary, the human being is reduced to the condition of being merely a cog in a collective machine, ultimately this will lead to the death of the civilization.

C. proceeds from moral principles and feelings of solidarity (*) among people in their work, their community life, their political struggle, and their cultural pursuits. It is antithetical to individualism and selfishness. The traditions of c. largely determine the actions of the person toward society, toward other persons, and orient social conduct, contributing to the formation of certain humanist values (mutual aid, mutual respect, solidarity).

In some cases the acceptance of the priority of collective and more broadly viewed social interests (including those of the state) can end up crushing the freedom and existential interests and needs of the individual. Such a characteristic is typical of totalitarian societies (*totalitarianism).

In principle, the traditions of healthy c. are the true foundation of human coexistence and of the humanization of personal and social life. There is no humanism without c., although not every manifestation of c. has a genuinely humanist character.

N.H. views the essence of real c. as a conscious and sincere solidarity among free persons and the organizations that express their vital interests.

COLONIALISM. (From colony: Fr. colonie; L. colonia, a colony, from colonus, colonist, farmer, inhabitant; colere, to cultivate, dwell). A doctrine that tends to legitimize the political and economic domination of a territory or nation by the government of a foreign state. This is the term normally applied to the process initiated in the fifteenth century with the European conquest, settlement, and exploitation of territories in the Americas, the Orient, and Africa. Colonial activities originated with Spain, Portugal, England, France, and the Netherlands. From 1880 to the beginning of the twentieth century, the search for new markets and raw materials provoked a renewal of c. and the partition of Africa among the great European powers, especially England and France (*neocolonialism, imperialism).

COMMUNISM. (Fr. communisme, from L. communis, common). Social system in which property is the common possession of all the people in accordance with the principle: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his need." During a large part of the nineteenth century c. was synonymous with socialism, but following "The Communist Manifesto" of 1848 and other works by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, these two terms gradually diverged. In the theory of Marxism, socialism (*) represents a stage that will be succeeded by the communist society. Marxism (*) interpreted as Marxism-Leninism (*) posits a strong distinction between socialist and communist parties.

COMMUNITY FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT. A N.H. social and cultural organization founded by Silo (*Siloism), emerging in Argentina and Chile during the period of military dictatorships. Initial organization began in the 1970s, and the founding documents were published on January 8, 1981. Outspoken criticism of violence (*), discrimination (*), and authoritarianism (*) by this organization earned it frequent opposition and persecution. Simply for belonging to it, members were dismissed from their jobs, jailed, or exiled. The institution will continue to remember the assassination of some of its militants at the hands of paramilitary gangs, among them the notorious "Triple A" (Argentine Anticommunist Association). Following numerous incidents of harassment and detention, its founder was the target of several assassination attempts, among them one on December 8, 1981. Many participants and sympathizers of this organization were exiled to countries in Europe, where they continued their activities. Persecution of N.H. organizations has continued, but now that the social context has changed, they can no longer be falsely accused of "guerrilla tactics" or "subversion" as they were in decades past. Today, the most reactionary sectors of the right and religious fundamentalists of various kinds limit themselves to defamatory rhetoric, attempts to manipulate the communications media and to censor and remove from circulation the writings, declarations, and documents of this movement (*Centers for Humanist Communication; World Center for Humanist Studies; Humanist Center of Cultures; Humanist Associations and Clubs; Humanist Forum; Humanist International; Humanist Movement).

COMPANY–SOCIETY. In "Company and Society: Foundations of a Humanist Economy" ("Empresa y Sociedad: Bases de una Economía Humanista"), José Luis Montero de Burgos explains the humanist position, which is at odds with the traditional concept of ownership (*) of things. Ownership of things (in this case, the company) has given power (*) over other people to a few. Inverting this, the power of the people should give ownership of access to company profits, and in no case should such power be exercised over people. But where does power originate? Power comes in exchange for the risk taken by capital, but no less for the risk taken by labor, so that no one factor alone can be the owner of the company; rather power comes through receiving or earning management positions, through earning the power to make decisions.

Power has traditionally been tied to "the investor who puts up the money," to the owner of the company, or to the landowner. A more recent trend is for this power to be transferred to a team of executives. But if this team of executives does not satisfy Capital with the rate of return produced, it runs the serious risk that Capital will replace it with another team more capable of attaining the objective, which is solely to make a profit. In any case, power remains with Capital. Moreover, given that the modern company is conceived dynamically, its growth and its capacity to compete are linked to financial resources, which it cannot always raise on its own. The current tendency in the evolution of power, only incidentally in the hands of technical management, is in the direction of financial power, toward the power of money, since it is on this that the future of the company depends. Banks can sink a prosperous company simply by denying it credit. And the reason they can do this is because they are not accountable to anyone for such decisions. Here we have what could be termed, using an astronomical metaphor, the "strong attractor" of power. The growing power of money is linked to the continuously diminishing power of work. In general, workers have exerted pressure in the direction of improving their wages and working conditions, and company owners in the direction of reinvesting profits in the company, to expand or strengthen it, or to pay dividends to Capital. And in this confrontation, workers are giving increasing importance to job security. In turn, new technologies are continually raising productivity, thus requiring ever fewer workers. In addition, the constant changes in the marketplace demand rapid adaptations, so that owners continue to press for the elimination of obstacles to firing or laying off workers. Furthermore, in industrial and commercial modernization, many companies are downsizing, with some ending up in bankruptcy, both of which leave workers unemployed. The monstrous and unbridled increase in speculative activities is also taking a toll. Speculative activities produce no benefits for society. They are possible because power in companies rests solely with Capital. We know that speculation consists of purchasing things (land, currency, stocks, companies, products) to be sold later at a higher price, with the intention of profiting from the difference between purchase price and selling price, but without the products in question undergoing through this process any change useful to society. Only the price changes. When the object of speculation is the national currency, we see the State itself making use of funds that belong to all citizens, but distributing them to speculators.

If we accept that things cannot be the sources of power over people, the structure of financial or corporate power as conceived today loses its foundation. Thus, a different basis of power must be found that will permit the free and dynamic creation of new enterprises. This is congruent with section I of the Humanist Statement (*), in which power is based on risk. In this case, on the entrepreneurial risk of the those who take part in the company, all who participate through either their capital or their labor. We may, then, inquire about these risks:

The investors run a risk. They can lose everything, or at least a part of the capital invested. Therefore, they have the right to participate in decisions, the right to exercise some control in the company, which is earned by this human situation of risk, not because capital gives them power. If their investment were not at risk of being lost, those providing it would lack grounds for claiming any power of management. Their real risk is the basis of their power.

There is risk for the workers. If the company fails they lose their jobs. And we should not minimize this risk. When workers lose their jobs, they lose stability in their employment. They must look for new employment. They also lose their economic stability, since unemployment insurance, when it exists, does not equal their former income, nor is it guaranteed indefinitely or until they find new work. They lose their social stability because, in such circumstances, social relations deteriorate. They lose their moral stability, because they cease doing work that is useful to society and justifies their income. Their own sense of human worth and dignity, which impels them not to be social parasites, is in jeopardy; if they accept this situation passively, the risk of the moral humiliation or degradation that goes with being out of work becomes a reality. Therefore, workers have much to lose if the company fails. They, like capital, run economic risk, and thus have a right to self-management, to control their own human situation without any need to buy shares to justify their power.

The foregoing discussion is not without significance from a conceptual point of view. It represents a turning upside down of today’s rationale of ownership, which says: "Ownership (of things), hence power (over people)." If power is based on risk, then the old model is inverted and now says: "Power, hence ownership." That is to say: power (linked to economic risk), hence ownership of things (i.e., access to ownership of the profits of the business, not access to power over people).

In today’s world there are three alternative economic forms:

1) Capitalism (*), based on private enterprise, in which the ideological structure is nourished by present-day neo-liberalism, which promotes economic deregulation. It requires a market economy, of which work forms a part, and favors accumulations of capital, which for the most part end up flowing into the hands of ever-fewer: the rich. The union system involves freedom to organize.

2) Socialism (*), based on state ownership of the means of production. It borrows its ideological structure from Marxism; it favors a planned economy, controlled by the state apparatus; it eliminates the market for labor, replacing it with bureaucratic measures; and it allows accumulation of capital by only one entity: the State. In theory, implementing this proposal is a first step toward the development of self-management in business enterprise, which is congruent with the principles of socialism. There is a single union, controlled by the state apparatus.

3) Cooperativism (*), which favors cooperation in enterprise and is equally suited to capitalist and socialist environments, but lacks its own socioeconomic ideology. It offers no satisfactory solution to the situation of workers who do not enjoy co-ownership, and does not ordinarily provide effective ways to accumulate capital; such enterprises have to rely on "soft" credit, dependent indirectly on the State and in practice provided by entities that, whether or not they are banks, are connected to the official apparatus. It does not have its own system of unionism.

Another recent alternative is social democracy, a compromise between socialist and capitalist positions. But existing forms of social democracy are not applicable to developing countries because they require stable unionization, nor are they acceptable in a human sense, requiring as they do the existence of a powerful social class which accumulates capital.

If we consider the social problem from a biological perspective, it seems logical to assume that the appropriation of resources by human beings must be coherent with nature, and also with their own specific conditions.

All living beings acquire resources to carry out their vital functions through appropriations of two types: one type might be called "private" or individual, and the second are forms "in common," such as might be observed in ants. Even within a single biological community, both types can coexist. But nature has also developed, in addition to these two kinds of appropriation, what Montero de Burgos calls "generic appropriation," under which all resources are potentially available to any life form and form of appropriation, private or common, and in which resources are thus subordinated to a higher level of appropriation, and open, therefore, to a redistribution of these resources that permits the continuity of life.

Humankind, for its part, has rationalized both forms of appropriation, converting them into private or common property, respectively. But it has yet to develop the idea of generic property, which encompasses both forms, giving flexibility to them and, of course, removing from them the kind of permanence that each of the two previously discussed modes now possesses. In short, as generic property, the resources of the planet are neither the private property of those who have access to them nor the common property of humankind, but rather generic property. That is: all human beings ought to have ownership of all things.

A paradigmatic example of generic property is air, which is not of course the private property of anyone, but neither is it the common property of humanity. All living beings who need it must have access to air, and human beings cannot appropriate something that does not belong to them exclusively, but rather is open to each and every member of the species, and to each and every living being. Air, by virtue of their need to breathe, is the generic property of all living beings.

Let us see now to what property type that very specialized form of property we call the human body corresponds. Of course, it could well be affirmed that the human body is not the common property of humanity, much less of the State. The initial subjective tendency is to designate it the private property of the subject of that body. But in reality, and in accordance with the notion of generic property, I am not the owner of my body, although for obvious reasons of emotional attachment I have the right to decide all matters concerning my body or, to put it another way, I have the right to control my body, at least in principle.

To clarify this point, let us suppose that I come upon a person who is injured and thus incapable of taking care of him or herself. If there is no one else, this wounded person requires that my body assist him or her in surviving that situation. By reason of need, the wounded person activates the principle of generic property on his or her own behalf, and assumes the right of management of my body. Of course, I can refuse to let my body be of assistance, but in that case I am "stealing" something, denying the person what is his or hers. On the other hand, if I decide to help, taking the person to a hospital for example, once the person is there, all needs satisfied, I recover the right to manage my body. Thus, the human body is but another resource of generic property of human beings, although one over which the subject of that body has priority. In reality, it is a property shared with the persons whom the activity of my body affects (e.g. my family), although normally their control is secondary.

To be able to resolve this same hypothetical problem in the case of traditional private property we would need to introduce some moral or legal obligation that is separate from the concept of ownership. Generic property, on the other hand, has the virtue that in and of itself it resolves satisfactorily the hypothetical case we have been considering.

Certainly, Nature does not assign access to resources by the same rational process as in the currently prevailing rules used by human beings: ownership, hence power; quite the contrary, in Nature: power, hence ownership. That power, on levels below the human species, is physical strength in its broadest sense. Power, hence ownership, is the instrument that Nature constantly and continually uses in the struggle for life. That strength or power is what maintains appropriation, which declines as that strength declines. In the case of humankind, that strength has to be not natural but human strength, and the dialectic becomes: human power, hence ownership. What this would mean is:

a) Need, hence ownership, so that every human need attains satisfaction.

b) Work, hence ownership, so that work is the normal way by which human beings gain access to resources.

c) Risk, hence ownership, so that the one who runs the risk will have not only the power necessary to overcome any difficulties that arise but also sufficient stimulus to incur the risk, if that is what society needs. In the relation company-society, this proposal is coherent with a way of understanding power that, as the source of resources, is linked to the human value of economic risk.

CONFORMITY. (From conform: OFr. conformer; L. conformare, to fashion, form). 1) Characteristic feature in social behavior of uncritical or blind acceptance of the existing order and the dominant ideology, values, and norms. 2) Psychological trait of individuals who subordinate themselves to group pressure, adapting to the opinions of the majority. Inability to form a position of one’s own or to make independent decisions.

The social behavior of c. has great importance for the State bureaucracy (*) because, of course, c. reinforces its power, paving the way for manipulation (*).

For N.H., an appropriate formation of the personality implies overcoming c., learning to choose for oneself beyond the prejudices that prevail in contemporary society.

CONSENSUS. (From consent: L. consensus, from consentio, to be of one mind, to agree; com-, with, and sentire, to think, feel, or perceive). Unanimous agreement by all those who make up a corporation or group. A contract formed by agreement of all parties. This coincidence of opinions regarding a problem of mutual interest allows the undertaking of common action.

A certain level of c. of opinion and actions is essential to any form of social relations. In the broadest sense, c. represents the degree of harmony and conscious solidarity, an overcoming of conflicts, differences, and enmity. C. is also a way of achieving objectives; it reflects compromise, reaching agreement, a desire for mutual understanding, and a minimizing of contradictions among the parties.

In positivist sociology, c. was interpreted as solidarity conceived of rationally.

The principle of c. or unanimity is widely used in the parliamentary and representative activities of elected bodies, as well as diplomatic relations. Achieving the principle of c. renders moot the procedure of voting, which imposes the will of the majority and disregards the point of view of the minority. In this sense, the attainment of c. reinforces human solidarity, because it respects the experience and legitimate interests of all parties, and not merely one part of society.

There is no complete and absolute c., just as there is no way of assimilating and identifying all of the interests in play. Any given c. is relative and frequently short-lived. C. by formal majority can abuse the interests of the minority.

The principle of c. is a method that avoids voting, allowing full and exhaustive discussion in order to resolve disagreements and thus to ensure a spirit of cooperation within a group. There is no social process that does not include different forms and degrees of c. The richer and more consistent the degree of c. that is achieved, the more harmonious the social development will be. In today’s world, a humanist orientation which includes all people as human beings may well be the healthiest form of social c.

CONSERVATISM. (From conserve: L. conservare, to keep, preserve). Political doctrine that favors maintaining and continuing the existing regime, fetishizing tradition and the past, rejecting any change in economic and social relations. Defense of existing structures, including reactionary and archaic forms. As a rule, this philosophy corresponds to the controlling elite, which does not want to lose its power, wealth, or the privileges it has accumulated. Conservatives frequently act under the banner of defending law and order, defending the status quo. Historically, conservatives and liberals (*) have contended for power over long periods, although liberals have also frequently resorted conservative positions when other forces threatened their control.

During the times of the bourgeois revolutions (*bourgeoisie), c. came into being as an aristocratic and at times clerical movement to preserve feudal privileges, expressing the interests of the great landowners and their clients. For these reasons, since its beginnings it has opposed liberalism, defending the traditions, privileges, and properties of the church, especially the Catholic Church, but later the Anglican, Eastern Orthodox, and other churches as well. C. was an unrelenting enemy of movements for independence in North America, Latin America, and Greece. Following the French Revolution, c. opposed the revolutions in Spain, Portugal, and Naples, as well as the movement to liberate and unify Italy (the Risorgimento). The political history of Europe and America in the nineteenth century was plagued by struggles between conservatives and liberals. In the twentieth century, especially the second half, this antagonism has weakened as the opponents have gradually assimilated each others’ values and ideas and the classical conservative movement has disappeared from the political scene of most American and European states.

CONSUMERISM. (From consume: OFr. consumer; L. consumere, to eat, use up, waste, destroy; from com-, together, and sumere, to take; sub, under, and emere, to buy, take). The purchase of things that are then depleted or worn out with use. We often speak of the "consumer society," indicating the phenomenon taking place in advanced industrial societies in which the primary needs of most of the population are satisfied and intense advertising promotes ever-newer consumer products that incite continual spending. This is a very pronounced characteristic that demonstrates the inability of contemporary society to be mobilized by values and other intangibles that promote the creation of productions related to the development of the personality and culture. C. is leading society down a blind alley toward demographic and ecological disaster. At the root of this orientation are the traditions of hedonism and eudaemonism (from the Greek eudaimon: pursuit of pleasure, wealth, things). C., the enemy of any form of spirituality, places the highest value not on the human being but on money, things, luxury, the satisfaction of whims, fashion, etc.

The ruling elite issues propaganda through all possible forms of media to promote and implant the cult of c., striving to enmesh people in a web of purchases, borrowing, and games of the stock-market, and debasing and lowering the level of their interests and needs until they become completely object-oriented. Of course, everyone wants to live in abundance and to have all necessary things and products, but people’s true interests are immeasurably broader and higher than simple c., than this slavery to things.

Unfortunately, c. has and continues to enslave the will of enormous masses of people. Opposing this dangerous tendency is difficult but absolutely necessary. N.H. sees the struggle against c. as an important task: the human being is not a consumer but a creator. (*alienation).

COOPERATION. (From cooperate: LL. cooperatus, pp. of cooperari, to work together, co-, with, and operari, to work, from opus, operis, work, operation). 1) Relationships formed in the process of joint activity, which stimulates and multiplies the results of common actions. C. presupposes shared interests and objectives and a knowledge of suitable means for achieving them in practical activity. In this sense it forms an essential part of the social and political activity of N.H. C. includes the interchange of experience and taking personal initiative by co-participants in a joint action. 2) Forms of collective production and group or collective ownership.

The social movement known as cooperativism uses a method of economic action through which people who have common interests form an enterprise in which everyone shares equally in management and profits. The idea of converting this method of action into a social system (as a complex web of cooperatives for the production, distribution, and consumption of goods) reached a peak in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. Its influence was particularly strong in Anglo-Saxon countries in small industry and agriculture and to a lesser extent in the service sector. Projects to transform the whole society on the basis of cooperative ownership (cooperative socialism) were distorted by certain practices under which many of these organizations (in need of credit and certain tax exemptions) became subject to control under which they wound up being reorganized into conventional corporations. In other cases, State control transformed them into simple appendages of the political regime. Meanwhile, the general direction of scientific and technological development has tended to decrease the efficacy of this kind of system for management and distribution of profits. Even so, cooperative activity is highly developed in a number of countries, and there are cases of very efficient cooperatives of great complexity (for example, the Mondragón cooperative in Spain) . In today’s world, we should not underestimate the importance of cooperatives in social life, and in keeping with these new times there is an ongoing revaluation of this model, adapted to the application of new technologies. (*worker ownership)

CORPORATIVISM. (From corporate: L. corporatus, pp. of corporare, to make into a body, from corpus, corporis, a body). Ideological current that regards the corporation (an association of persons belonging to a profession or form of activity) as the basis of society, and the corporate regime as the ideal system.

The corporative system of organization of society was imposed in its most explicit and definitive form in fascist Italy, the Portugal of Salazar, and Brazil under Vargas (Estado Novo, 1937–1945). In this system, corporations of interests (industrialists, merchants, bankers, farmers, etc.) had official representation in legislative bodies at the expense of the elective or parliamentary representation proper to democracies. In turn, ideological and political control over the corporations tended to turn them into instruments of totalitarian power (*totalitarianism).

N.H. sees in c. a danger to the dignity and liberties of the human being, because this system attempts to subordinate human rights to corporative rights, dissolving the human members into the corporation as if it were a superhuman entity.

COSMOPOLITANISM. (From cosmopolitan: Gr. kosmopolites, a citizen of the world; kosmos, world, and polites, a citizen). Ideological current that regards the human being as a citizen of the world. C. emerged during the French Revolution of 1789, in part as a reaction to the formation of the nation state and, subsequently, to the Napoleonic wars of occupation. It was, in effect, a position critical of the official chauvinism (*) of the times.

In Russia (from 1936-37 until Perestroika), c. was considered an attitude opposed to the interests of the State. The accusation that one was a sympathizer of c. became a pretext for the cruelest kind of political repression and a mask that hid covered the official anti-Semitism of the USSR. Defenders of human rights were declared to be cosmopolitans, and the UN charter a subversive document. Humanism has always expressed, and continues to express in N.H., its support for the idea of overcoming barriers and borders of any type between human beings, supporting the idea of a world that is simultaneously one and diverse.

C. is opposed to patriotism and nationalism. C. is frequently confused with internationalism (*), the difference between them being that internationalism tends to minimize national traditions and values in favor of worldwide projects, while c. seeks to harmonize and combine international with existing national traditions and values. In large measure, internationalism reflects the interests of the worldwide bourgeoisie; c. in contrast begins by giving priority to the unity of the interests of the oppressed on a world scale, opposing imperialism (*) and the dictates of the superpowers.

In today’s conditions, c. could best be oriented toward attaining an international consensus for the resolution of global problems: hunger, health care, disarmament, ecology, and demographics.

CRITIQUE. (Fr. critique, from Gr. kritikos (supply techne, art), critical, from krinein, to separate, discern, judge). Method of analysis and evaluation of reality, of social and individual activity, that makes it possible to establish a correspondence or divergence between intentions and actions; promises and their fulfillment; words and deeds; theory and practice.

The ability to evaluate critically the environment in which one acts and to subject one’s own experience and conduct to critical analysis is an indispensable condition for the formation of the personality and an essential element in education. The degree of development of the critical and self-critical attitude in society characterizes that society’s strength or weakness, its capacity or incapacity to improve, advance, and develop itself. Criticism is the starting point for all innovation (*) and forms part of the driving force for development and all scientific-technical, artistic, and social progress.

The critical method facilitates an understanding of previous errors and ways to move beyond them; it can help to clarify the essence of the current crisis in the development of both the personality and society.

This method should not be made an absolute, however, since carrying it to extremes allows shifting the responsibility for one’s own errors onto others and onto society as a whole. Moreover, taking self-criticism as an absolute can destroy a person’s dignity, overwhelming him or her with doubts and guilt.

N.H. places the highest value on the practice of reasonable and balanced criticism, in personal daily life as well as in sociopolitical, artistic, and theoretical activity, considering it one of the pillars of liberty. In today’s mass society, criticism expressed in the media is of particular importance.

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We invite everyone to participate with us in putting into practice the moral principle that says: "Treat others as you would like to be treated."
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