Alister McGrath, in this second volume in his Scientific Theology trilogy, continues what he calls �an essentially linear argument from nature to theory,� with a reflection on reality, and the engagement of science, and a scientific theology, with reality. As McGrath conceives it, a scientific theology is one that seeks to give an account of reality. He stresses repeatedly the a posteriori as opposed to a priori nature of theology. This means that theology (like science as well) responds to reality, in its development and formulations. In this substantial volume, McGrath seeks to outline what he terms a �critical realism� as the approach which is to be preferred in understanding how reality is to be engaged. He draws a parallel between critical realism in the natural sciences and the critical realism as a program for a scientific theology.
As he sets out in this second volume, McGrath asserts, �This volume defends the view that knowledge arises through a sustained and passionate attempt to engage with a reality that is encountered or made known�� (4). To achieve this end, he critiques both postmodernism and the Enlightenment project and its implicit foundationalism. He first sets out to show the incoherence of the postmodern assertion that truth and value are wholly social constructs. To do this, he interacts with Richard Rorty, who develops Michael Foucault�s criticisms. Rorty makes the assertion that values have social impact merely because they are believed to be true by a consensus of society, not because they actually correspond to reality. McGrath counters that this consensus of society contains within it an implicit scientific realism at its root, undermining Rorty�s assertions (this discussion is much more in depth than I can reproduce here, and I refer you to pp. 5-11). Having stated his disagreement with Rorty, McGrath goes on to make a case for critical realism as being the foundation for the natural sciences.
The second major development upon which McGrath focuses is on the demise of foundationalism, the basing of beliefs on a set of �basic beliefs� which are held to be universal truths, available to all people at all times, an approach which rests upon the philosophy of Descartes. A major strain of �foundationalism� has held that experience provides this foundation, and this type of defense has affinity with Schleiermacher�s theology grounded on human self-consciousness, and the feeling of absolute dependence. McGrath details the demise of foundationalism by pointing to its downfall in mathematics, the area where it should be most effective. He notes the work of Frege, who began by asserting that all mathematics is founded in �logic.� But, the philosopher Bertrand Russell pointed out to him a paradox in mathematics that showed the weakness of this proposal. To cite an example used by McGrath, assume A is the set of all sets that �are not their own elements.� Then, the basic truth A includes A leads to a contradiction, because for A to be itself, it defies its own definition that it is the set of sets that are not their own elements. Thus, a paradox is found in mathematics that cannot be avoided, for A = A becomes an impossibility (see McGrath�s discussion, p. 27-8).
McGrath is finally led to conclude, �To stress this point: criteria for scientific knowledge must be grounded in what nature will permit, thus possessing an a posteriori rather than a priori character� (38). What goes along with this assertion is the view that truths are mediated by tradition. There is no way to access �universal� truth, for we cannot assume our minds are a �tabula rasa� as did Descartes. Instead, McGrath uses the illustration of Neurath�s boat as a way to understand tradition: Tradition is like a boat, and we are like sailors in the boat on the sea. We can make changes to the boat, piece by piece, even to the point of having an entirely new boat, but this can be only done through a gradual reconstruction. This communicates the idea that tradition is unavoidable as an element in our reasoning, but also that tradition is living, and can be modified as necessary in response to reality. He further emphasizes that in rejecting foundationalism, he is not advocating a rejection of realism or a turn to relativism. Instead, it is to emphasize the a posteriori nature of scientific and theological reflection.
In light of the demise of foundationalism, the belief in �universal� truths, and in acknowledgement of the role of tradition in knowledge, McGrath once again turns to natural theology, which played a key role in his first volume. Here, he again asserts that natural theology provides a way to enter into dialogue with other religions. He writes, �The important point about a natural theology is that it offers us an interpretive grid by which other traditions may be addressed on the common issues of existence, enabling the coherence and attractiveness of the Christian vision to be affirmed� (75). In this way, natural theology provides the �trans-traditional rationality� that is so central to a Christian understanding of the world.
Returning to the theme of �realism� in Chapter 9, McGrath makes the assertion that the foundations for realism can be found in the natural sciences. Realism, he contends, is the working philosophy of the natural sciences, and is the only philosophy that �does not �make the success of science a miracle�.� (124) He goes on to discuss other alternatives to realism, and also to make a detailed case for realism in the sciences, a discussion which I will not duplicate here. His developing picture of realism is one in which �there is indeed a �reality� independent of the human mind, which the mind is capable of grasping, while fully conceding that:
1. Our grasp of reality is always less than total;
2. Our descriptions of reality must be held to be revisable, in the light of closer approximations to the essential properties of things;
3. Models or other constructs may be required when representing or analyzing this reality, or its aspects, without in any way calling that reality into question.� (122-3)
This means that the social location of the theologian or scientist is neither marginalized nor absolutized. It is seen to be a factor, but not the decisive one, in scientific or theological thinking. It is precisely this agenda that he goes on to discuss in chapter 10.
McGrath begins to put forward a developing picture of critical realism. Notes the contribution of N.T. Wright, who talks of �the spiraling path of appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence �critical�)� (196). This represents a holding on to the ideas of truth, objectivity and rationality, even if in a chastened form. McGrath investigates many forms and paths of critical realism, including the relationship between critical realism and Christian spirituality, and a number of other developments and uses. One fellow advocate of critical realism whom McGrath cites is John Polkinghorne, a fellow �scientist-theologian,� with a background in particle physics.
In McGrath�s proposal concerning critical realism, one important component is the understanding of reality as being �stratified.� This means that there is an acknowledgement of different �levels� of reality, built upon each other, and dependent upon each other, yet at the same time, not reducible to a single level. This �stratified� reality can be seen reflected in the layers of science noted by Bhaskar, whose critical realism McGrath is highly dependent upon: Psychological sciences, Social sciences, Biological sciences, Molecular sciences. McGrath believes that this view of reality as stratified confirms the operations of the natural sciences. He then looks at the implications of this important element of critical realism for theology, and asserts, �The stratified understanding of reality affirmed by critical realism thus allows us to argue that the natural sciences investigate the stratified structures of contingent existence at every level open to human inquiry, while a theological science addresses itself to God their creator who is revealed through them� (227). He further asserts that a stratified understanding of reality in relation to theology means �the creative and redemptive being of God is the most fundamental of all strata of reality� (228). Thus, asserting as he frequently does that ontology is determinative of methodology, and that God lies at the foundation of all reality, he turns the traditional notion of science as the �apex� of the sciences on its head, in asserting instead that theology lies at its base. He also asserts that this �stratification� of reality is seen reflected in a stratification that also has appeared in theology, such as in Barth�s threefold form of the Word of God, or in Torrance�s three levels of theological reflection. Thus, the stratification seen here is not merely a theological construct, but mirrors a stratification that is to be found in reality.
In the final chapter in this second volume, McGrath sets out his proposal for critical realism in a scientific theology, systematizing and applying the insights he has so-far built. Early on, he notes the basic theme of �encountering reality,� a theme which he sees as central to both natural and theological sciences, and anchored in a doctrine of creation, referring back to the foundation he set down in the first volume of his Scientific Theology. He sets out the agenda for a scientific theology by noting four major characteristics of a scientific theology are that it: �1. takes the form of a coherent response to an existing reality; 2. is an a posteriori discipline; 3. takes account of the unique character of its object; 4. offers an explanation of reality� (246). He also significantly adds a fifth point, that a scientific theology is Christocentric, in order to respect and reflect the inner logic of Christianity. He goes on to give a detailed defense and elaboration of each of his points, and how it is integral to a scientific theology. Here we shall give a (brutally brief) summary of his elaboration of these five points.
McGrath begins by asserting that a scientific theology is a coherent response to an existing reality. This point, at once, reflects a fundamental congruity between theology and the natural sciences, in its approach to reality. This point is made deliberately against (and in conversation with) theological anti-realism, seen in the work of Don Cupitt and Ludwig Feuerbach, which asserts that theological language is not about �reality� but about �ourselves.� Affirming the theological realism of Barth and T.F. Torrance, McGrath asserts instead that God has genuinely given himself to be known, and returning to his often recurring theme of the renewed importance of a natural theology founded on a strong doctrine of creation, asserts that God has revealed himself through an embedding of divine ordering in creation, as well as in an embodiment in Christ. This deliberately affirms the �reality� of the referents of theological language, independent of theological investigation.
McGrath�s second characteristic of a scientific theology is that it is an a posteriori discipline. In this point, he deliberately affirms that if there is a reality independent of our theological investigation of it, we must then respond to that reality, offering an account of that reality. This leads him to the somewhat paradoxical notion that theological investigation �begins with actual knowledge of God� (269). To illustrate the importance of this point, he takes a historical look at the incarnation and a priori notions of God, noting that the incarnation did not fit with a priori notions of God, and necessitated a shift in understandings of God. He asserts, �The history of Jesus of Nazareth once forced, and still forces, the redrawing of conceptual boundaries and mental horizons, demanding that we rethink and refashion our understanding of such matters as God, and human nature and destiny� (275), and he sees Luther�s theology of the cross as just such a theological endeavor. This means that a scientific theology requires that speculations be restrained, and anchored in reality, in that it must respond to the �specific form� taken by God, instead of mere human instinct or logic.
The third characteristic of a scientific theology which McGrath puts forth is a �response to its distinctive object.� Here, the emphasis is on the fact that theology must be accommodated to the specific nature of God, as opposed to a general human understanding. He explores the Buber-Brunner strategy of I-Thou and dialogical personalism as an illustration of how our theology reflects the nature of God.
Reiterating his theme again, McGrath�s fourth characteristic of a scientific theology is that it offers an explanation of reality. This point is made to uplift deliberately the �explanatory� role of a scientific theology to give an account of reality. This takes the functional shape of connecting the beliefs of Christianity with the experience of Christians.
The fifth point, which McGrath feels led to make, even though it is not applicable to the more generic �science and religion� discussion in the same way as his other four, is that a scientific theology must be Christocentric. He asserts that this point is essential, for Christ is the distinctive and central point of Christianity, and makes four points to illustrate this centrality: Christ is the historical point of departure for Christianity, Christ reveals God, Christ is the bearer of salvation, and Christ defines the shape of the redeemed life. (299-300) Because Christ is at the foundation of the Christian faith, �it follows that the coherence of any resulting theology will be determined by the adequacy of its representation of Christ within that system� (301). McGrath notes that Creation is fundamentally bound up with Christ, and also repeatedly reaffirms that what is �embedded� in creation is �embodied� in Christ, uplifting the decisive importance of Christ, not apart from the rest of theology, but as integral and continuous with it. He concludes, �A scientific theology which is truly a Christian theology can be so only when it focuses on Christ as it is in Christ that the fullness of the God who is known partially through the created order is to be encountered (Colossions 2:9)� (313).
McGrath�s careful defense of �critical realism� rigtly calls into question a na�ve view of realism that is often defended in evangelical circles. Under the perceived threat of Kantian and Enlightenment philosophy, many theologians and Christians often feel the need to �circle the wagons� around a realist world view. Many theologians and historians have noted the role of Scottish Common Sense Realism in Colonial America, through the time of the Awakenings, as well as in much of current evangelical thought. McGrath�s through investigation into �critical realism,� and into the demise of foundationalism should serve as a call for sustained critical reflection on our understanding of reality, and our access to it. Through his coherent proposal, he allows a clearly �realist� perspective to be maintained while at the same time the insights that can be gained from both Enlightenment and post-modern philosophy to be appropriated constructively and critically.
I believe that in setting forth his agenda for a scientific theology as an encounter with reality, McGrath as built a strong foundation for the theological enterprise. His proposal takes into account the historical development of theology, which at the same time upholds that history without making it divine. He also acknowledges the importance of experience, as something needing explanation, and as something based in and part of reality.
One of the distinctive, and I believe central, aspects of McGrath�s scientific theology is his revival of natural theology. His first volume carefully rebuilt an understanding of natural theology that is firmly anchored in the doctrine of creation. This second volume has continued and extended that emphasis, for natural theology has again enabled him to argue for the reality of a world to which our words and thoughts can refer, and also provides an explanation for our ability to comprehend and investigate that reality, based on the nature of God embedded in reality, and mirrored in humanity. I found this recurring revival of what is otherwise an often neglected topic to be refreshing, and also instructive, because it brings together a number of theological streams, from creation to revelation to anthropology, and places them in a coherent picture which can be understood and utilized. I look forward to the third volume in the series, Theory, where McGrath will conclude (at least for now) the trajectory of this masterful treatise on theological method with an investigation of the role of theory in science, and in theology. |
