The first of these issues is the linking of the fate of the Palestinians in Lebanon to the
final settlement.
The second consists of 'Arafat's effort to secure a presence in Lebanon via the
Palestinians, a presence that will create room for pressure on the Israeli-Syrian-
Lebanese track.
The third consists of 'Arafat's effort to enhance his position among Palestinians
abroad who are opposed to him.
The Palestinian people in Lebanon represent the main pivot on this map, due to their
sheer numbers (350,000 people) as well as due to their liveliness and ability to express
their political ideas, stemming from the fact that the Palestinian camps are outside the
security and political influence of the Lebanese Authorities.
The same source explains the details of 'Arafat's return to the Lebanese stage,
especially to 'Ayn al-Hulwah, the largest Palestinian camp in Lebanon. He says: "Two
developments that occurred at the end of last year troubled 'Arafat and led him to speed
up the implementation of his decision to return to the Palestinian stage in Lebanon in
terms of politics and security."
"The first of these developments was the participation of Lieutenant-colonel Munir
al-Miqdah, who is responsible for security and information in Fatah, in the Damascus
conference opposed to the Palestinian National Authority.
'Arafat considered this as a dangerous development in al-Miqdah's opposition, because
this issue began having political dimensions after being limited only to security matters.
The Fatah leadership, which until then used to send stipends to al-Miqdah, declared his
dismissal and began dealing with him as if he is a political obstacle that needs to be
eliminated, because he began to form a challenge against 'Arafat's authority in the
Palestinian camps in Lebanon.
Truly, the Gaza leadership decided to take one of the following two options regarding
al-Miqdah: Either to bring him back to Fatah after containing him, or to get rid of him.
During his visit to Lebanon, [head of the political department of the PLO] Faruq Qaddumi
chose the first option by bringing al-Miqdah back to 'Arafat's Fatah ranks.
The second development consists of the appearance of an effort in places ranging from
Jordan to Beirut to create a political authority for the Palestinian diaspora, especially
for the Palestinians in Lebanon. This was accompanied by a European interest in general
and a French, American, and Canadian one in particular to follow the situation of the
Palestinians living in Lebanon, especially in camps in the north and south of the country.
Within this context, a number of foreign official and unofficial delegations arrived in
Lebanon during last summer and winter to get acquainted with the Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon and their living standards in their camps.
These two developments forced 'Arafat to personally request from the Fatah leadership
in Lebanon the introduction of the following measures:
Sultan Abu-al-'Aynan was asked to give instructions to the security apparatus in Fatah
to expand its security work for gathering information from within all the camps as well as
from the Lebanese community. This request also includes the gathering of information
especially about other Palestinian forces and maintaining security surveillance on Hamas
[the Islamic Resistance Movement] and the Islamic Jihad in the camps as well as in
al-Biqa' and south Lebanon.
'Arafat appointed Abu-Khalid al-'Arabiyah as a full-time coordinator of relations
between the Fatah leaderships in Gaza and Lebanon and asked him to prepare a report on the
funds needed in the Lebanese camps in 1999.Indeed, Abu-Khalid prepared a report, which
contained the following points:
"1.The allocation of an annual budget to the Lebanese camps was resumed and
the 1999 budget was immediately paid. Estimates differ on the amount of the budget that
'Arafat ordered to be allocated to the Lebanese camps in 1999.While some Arab sources
close to 'Arafat say that this amount did not exceed the limit of $800,000, other sources
from the Palestinian opposition indicate that the amount ranges between five and eight
million dollars.
"2. The salaries of Fatah officials of rank A in Lebanon were raised by 75
percent with effect from the beginning of this year.
"3. Approval was issued for the adding of another 2,500 new Fatah members
in Lebanon as suggested by Sultan Abu-al-'Aynan within the framework of strengthening
Fatah's standing in the camps, especially in 'Ayn al-Hulwah. "4. Some $50,000
from the Gaza administration's coffers was allocated as a reward to the special forces
that Abu-al-'Aynan relies on for the protection of the main centers in 'Ayn al-Hulwah
camp.
"5. Fatah distributed some weapons in the Sidon region.
"6. A suggestion Sultan Abu-al-'Aynan made to the Fatah administration in
Gaza at the beginning of this year was approved. The suggestion consists of a plan to
reorganize the Palestinian camps in Lebanon in a way that enables Fatah to confront the
duties put before it in these camps.
The plan envisages that the Gaza administration will appoint a military committee in
the Lebanese camps consisting of the following individuals: Sami 'Akkawi, (official in
charge of the security of armed struggle); Mahir Shabaytah, deputy director in charge of
the Sidon region; Khalid al-Shayib, official in charge of the militia forces; and Muhammad
Zaydan, an official in the militia forces...
As a matter of fact, the success of 'Arafat's plan to unite the organizational body of
Fatah did not bring an end to all the internal disputes. After eliminating the rifts
inside Fatah, financial and ethical scandals began appearing inside the organization.
These scandals most often affect the performance of the organization regarding the
responsibilities put before it. 'Arafat tried to curtail corruption in Fatah in Lebanon,
so he secretly deputized a Fatah officer named Jamal al-Dayikh for this purpose. However,
this appointment ended in an assassination attempt against al-Dayikh.
Information in this regard indicates that the party behind the detonation of a bomb
targeting Jamal al-Dayikh is a group of Fatah officers in 'Ayn al-Hulwah, about whom Jamal
sent a fax to 'Arafat a day before his killing, exposing their financial, ethical, and
organizational violations.
It appears that these officers learned about this fax and planned to attack him with a
bomb that left him disabled and not dead. No one but professional people resort to the
using of such "disciplinary" bombs (as put by military terminology) for carrying
out murder and assassination attempts, something that the 'mafia' of officers in Fatah are
known for.
Other rifts also appeared recently among the groups that Sultan Abu-al-'Aynan succeeded
to unite with Fatah's military body inside 'Ayn al-Hulwah camp. The most important of
these rifts happened when the so-called 'Abu-'Abd al-Bayruti' group stationed in Bustan
al-Yahudi broke away from Fatah and joined Hamas.
However, all these rifts occurred as a means to blackmail 'Arafat in order to obtain
high working budgets, as happened in the case of al-Miqdah, who got a high price for his
return. In any case, according to a recent report that Abu-al-'Aynan sent to the Gaza
administration, Fatah has covered a long distance in reviving its influence on two levels:
The first is related to its existence in 'Ayn al-Hulwah, and the second, to the
reactivation of its organization in Lebanon."
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