The oldest son of Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, Khaled was born 1949 somewhere in the desert. He entered the military hoping thereby to replace his father one day, but from early childhood on, it was apparent to his father that Khaled did not have the gray matter and cunning necessary to be Minister of Defense; yet, even his father agreed that, though unfit for the position, Khaled could carry on the family tradition of thievery and corruption. Khaled launched his career in the Air Force and rose through the ranks quickly, thanks to the influence of his family name.

In 1995, Prince Khaled wrote his memoirs, with British journalist Patrick Seale, about the Persian Gulf War in response to General Norman Schwarzkopf's 1992 account, "It Doesn't Take a Hero." The book was not his first reply to Schwarzkopf's account. In October 1992, he faxed a six-page public statement to scores of newspapers all over the world disagreeing with certain statements made by the American. Khaled called his book "Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander." Khaled is "particularly anxious to vent his personal frustrations over being the junior partner in an alliance of necessity with a heavy-handed superpower like the United States." (David Ottaway, Washington Post, July 24, 1994).

Khaled told his version of the Gulf War in his book which was so heavily promoted. The Khaled in that autobiography was like an intelligent prophet promoting goodwill everywhere. In reality, incidents of Khaled's incompetence and stupidity during the Gulf War were a running joke among commanders stationed there. Yet, his book almost claims that he, and not Schwarzkopf, liberated Kuwait from Saddam. It is notable to mention here that General Schwarzkopf had on several occasions asked General Khaled not to interfere with the Command Control Center of the War Operations. Khaled apparently volunteered his opinions so often that it irked those responsible for conducting the war.Ian Bruce, in a review of the book for The Herald, comments: "The   biography-cum-war-story amounts largely to a combination of carping over Western dominance of the military coalition, self-aggrandizement, and obvious fear that Western influence and the growing movement for democracy among more enlightened Arabs will lead to the toppling of a society dominated by nepotism and repression."

Khaled's military critics claim that he was not ready to be commander-in-chief of the Arab forces during the Gulf war. Schwarzkopf notes that the prince was chosen for his royal blood which gave him the authority to write checks. Schwarzkopf had to put up with lectures on strategy by the prince who never had combat experience, let alone command of an army. Anthony Beevor of "The Daily Telegraph" names Khaled main role as "bureaucracy-fixer." Except for one foray above ground, Khaled spent most of the war in his basement office in the Saudi Ministry of Defense. At the time, he acknowledged to reporter Georgie Anne Geyer that "the American forces were so vastly superior in numbers to the other 36 allied forces that the Americans would have to assume the major command."

As the General commanding the Arab Forces during the Gulf War, Khaled managed to benefit from the misery caused by this war. He was the sole supplier of every drop of water and every meal for over 750,000 soldiers and support staff for seven months. It is believed that Khaled walked away with $2 billion in commissions, excluding the hundreds of millions that went to his front men. Subhi al-Masri, one of Khaled's middle men, made $200 million in commissions or 10% of His Highness' profits. The story does not end here.

After the war, Khaled suffered from delusions of grandeur that he began challenging King Fahd. Without the king's approval or consultation with his father or King Fahd, Khaled delivered a speech declaring the doubling of the size of the Saudi Armed Forces. Khaled must have been blinded by the amount of commissions he would have made, so, through his speech, he hoped to make his dream a reality. That speech cost him his post and exiled to London where he remains today, enjoying the fruits of his hard work. The prince, who has a master's degree in political science from Auburn University, trained at the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst in Great Britain and at the U.S. Army Command General Staff College, the naval Postgraduate School, and the Air War College in the U.S. He also served for a short time, at age 37, as Active Air Defense commander. His promotion to this post at such a relatively young age is said to be because of his family ties. Despite this experience, it seems that King Fahd agrees with the critics.

Instead of asking Khaled to stay on as commander of the Saudi army after the war, the king asked the general to resign.

Khaled is a major player and benefactor in the Yamamah deal along with Bandar and King Fahd's youngest son Abdul Aziz. The deal represents the largest sum of money ever spent by a country to build its defenses. Not that Saudi Arabia needs the weapons. Under the leadership of Sultan, the Saud family buys arms to reap commissions, not to provide for Saudi Arabia's defense.

The world has witnessed what happened prior to the Gulf War. With all the money spent on weapons over so many years, Saudi Arabia was not even able to defend the narrow border it shared with Kuwait. The interesting part of the deal that has yet to be reported is the amount of money being dispensed to high officials in the British government, including MP's, officials of the companies involved, and some members of the media for the purpose of covering up the colossal commissions being paid. One day, this news will be made public and the world will realize that unless the corruption of al-Saud is stopped, their cancer will spread to societies who have long resolved corruption problems through strict laws and good choice of their political leaders.

Khaled and his half brother, Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the U.S., have been locked in an intense rivalry for decades vying for recognition as the person responsible for the success of various deals. Bandar thinks Khaled is an idiot (which is true) and Khaled thinks Bandar is a bastard (which is true). In his book, Khaled claims that his father, the defense and aviation minister, Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, chose him for a secret mission to China because of the prince's expertise in air defense. Khaled claims that he went to China to purchase long-range surface-to-surface missiles, without U.S. knowledge. In an interview published in the Washington Post on July 21, 1996, Bandar claims that it was his diplomatic and negotiating skills that procured the Chinese CSS-2 ballistic missiles.

Now retired from the military, 47-year-old Prince Khaled remains a key player in Saudi Arabia's military acquisitions and agent of Thomson-CSF, a French electronics group.

MEDIA MOGUL

In November 1995, Khaled bought rights to the name of once-respected "Al-Hayat," a newspaper with wide distribution in Europe and the Middle East, thus adding to his media holdings. He had already held majority shares in the company and had been leasing the license from the original owners since 1990. Since his takeover, "Al-Hayat" has taken a pro-Saudi editorial viewpoint. It does not publish anything contrary to the Saudi government line, and it actively promotes Saudi government policies. As managing editor, Khairallah Khairallah puts it, "Our main concern is not to be banned in Saudi Arabia because most of the advertising comes from the Saudi market. From time to time we have to take into consideration Saudi censorship."

Al-Hayat was a Lebanese newspaper whose credibility and diligence as protector of the freedom of speech cost its owner, Kamel Mroueh, his life in Beirut in 1975. Khaled first licensed the name al-Hayat from the Mroueh family led by Mr. Jamil Mroueh, a respected journalist who is trying hard to follow in the footsteps of his father and re-establish a newspaper whose emblem is : Freedom of the Press. Soon Khaled bought al-Hayat after realizing it could be a useful tool for skimming government money. He turned the newspaper, a symbol of the freedom of the press and democracy, into his personal podium. Now, al-Hayat never criticizes Saudi Arabia nor investigates the country's corrupt regime. Khaled, by buying this newspaper, has stifled one of the Middle East's forums which encouraged freedom of speech. The newspaper has become a Saud family tool, a tool for suppression and censorship. Today, al-Hayat has a budget of $15 million a year while earning revenues of less than $3 million. The newspaper budget almost looks like a microcosm of the Saudi budget.
Riad al-Rayyes, a respected publisher and syndicated columnist whose work appears in several Arab newspapers adds, " A decade ago, there were many parties to the Arab media -- the Iraqis, the Libyans, the Palestinians, independent businessmen. In those days, you had different voices, rightly or wrongly. Now there is only a monolith, one media state. Diversity has ended."

Prince Khaled also owns "Al-Wasat," a weekly paper dedicated to political news, published in London. Not to be confined to owning newspapers, he bought 15 per cent of the Saudi advertising agency Tihama for about $11.73 million. In this way, he can censor news both as an owner and as an advertiser. He also owns a channel on Arabsat which broadcasts via satellite to Arab countries.
Prince Khaled only buys media he can control. In November 1992, there was a rumor that he was planning to buy "The Observer" based in London. The London paper wanted $90million which was purported to be too high for the prince. An adviser for "Al-Hayat" replied, "He is not interested. A Western newspaper is not controllable." (The Guardian, November 30, 1992). The fact that a member of the royal family owns the above-mentioned media and that the newspapers, advertising agency, and satellite channel do not stray from official government policy lead many Arabs to believe that Saudi government money is paying for Khaled's ventures.

Khaled is one of others in the royal family that owns Arab press. They have a virtual monopoly. Abdul al-Bari Atwan, editor of "Al-Quds al-Arabi," the only mainstream Arab daily not own by the Saudis and, therefore, comments regularly on affairs in Persian Gulf states, notes, "The Saudis have bought up or are trying to buy up every single journalist, author and independent thinker in the Arab world.

Most Arab journalists are not paid well, and the Saudis offer high salaries. It's hard not to dream of working in the petro-dollar press. Those who do resist the money usually end up on the Saudi or Kuwaiti blacklists of prohibited writers." (The Guardian, November 30, 1992).

An Arab journalist adds, "I have a mortgage to pay and children to educate. I don't like it, but I have to work for the Saudis. What else can I do? Where else can I write?"

PROPERTY HOLDER

Before using his talents as a commander or buying out Arab newspapers, Khaled invested heavily in real estate. In 1990, he secretly paid $14.38 million for Wilson and Toni Lucom's ocean-to-lake estate on South Ocean Boulevard in Palm Beach, Florida. The named buyer was alleged shell company Ocean Bay Holdings LTD, based in the Bahamas. Not even the seller knew who was putting up the money. At the time, it was Palm Beach's most expensive home sale ever. At first, he planned to build a 3-floor, 53,000 square-foot mansion on the property, which would have been one of the largest residences on the island; instead, he carved it into 9 lots. He tried to sell one 2-acre lot for $6 million in October 1994, through Sotheby's. But when the property value dropped to $10.6 million, he decided to sell it. To show his appreciation to the Palm Beach Planning, Building, and Zoning staff, who were very accommodating to his wishes for developing the property, he give the director a $50,000 "tip."

Khaled also recently purchased this property in Bermuda from funds he misappropriated and embezzled as Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Forces during the Gulf War. Khaled paid $70m for this hotel which is being renovated in 1997 and 1998.

LITTON SCANDALOUS COWBOY

One of the photographs in "Desert Warrior" shows the prince, sporting cowboy hat and clothes, shaking hands with Charles "Tex" Thornton, the late Chairman of Litton Industries, a defense electronics supplier and shipbuilder. Last year the IRS began investigating whether Litton paid Prince Khaled at least $47 million dollars in bribes.

As part of a $1.7 billion air defense system construction program for Saudi Arabia, Litton issued a $214 million subcontract to a firm controlled by Wafic Said, the prince's alleged business agent, to build houses for Litton employees. Said's firm assigned that subcontract to Tag Systems in Liechtenstein, allegedly controlled by Said and Khaled through the Ojjeh family. Tag subcontracted a German firm to build the houses for $99 million. $47 million or more of the excess is said to have gone into Khaled's pocket. The prince owned land which he allegedly sold to Litton at inflated prices as a way to shield his receipt of bribe money.

Stephen Reddy, former Litton manager for the housing program, says, "Everybody at Litton knew Prince Khaled was in charge of Tag. The prince made every decision on the job." Khaled himself says that he "personally negotiated the broad outlines of the Litton air defense contract."

WESTLAND SCANDAL

The Litton affair seems to be part of a pattern. In 1992, Thomas Dooley, a former U.S.army lieutenant colonel, filed suit against Sikorsky and its parent corporation, United Technology Corporation, for wrongful demotion because he threatened to expose a bribery conspiracy involving Saudi princes Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, Bandar bin Abdul Aziz, Fahd bin Sultan, and Khaled bin Sultan. He claims that Bandar designated Ibrahim Al-Namlah to be Sikorsky's Saudi Arabia "contact." Dooley also alleged that Al-Namlah presented a letter from Sultan stating that he did not object to Sikorsky doing business with Namlah. The suit further charged that "In exchange for the sales, UTC allegedly agreed to pay bribes to Prince Khalid bin Sultan and Prince Fahd bin Sultan, also sons of Prince Sultan, through Namlah." The $6-billion contract for 13 Black Hawk helicopters was said to be inflated to account for the bribes.

Namlah was suppose to keep his share and slip the remainder to his business partners, Fahd and Khaled. In the contract, the complaint alleges, the bribes were disguised as "Maintenance Support Services and Personnel Support Services contract awards, commissions and consulting and service fees." Dooley claims to have a copy of the agreement signed on September 9, 1987.

TODAY'S KHALED

While exiled in London, Khaled works on swaying the opinion of and charm his way into London high society. His ignorance and uncharming manners make many squirm at his presence. He has such high regard for himself that he totally forgets his background and his education. In London, Khaled is a joke. He spends money lavishly and those who receive the most are his most ardent admirers, while those who see him as he is, void of smarts and princely stature, avoid his friendship. Donations to civic societies and museums have been pouring in from His Highness. Today, he is on the A-list because he is an such easy prey. But he does not care; he knows he can always dig deep into the government coffers whenever he wants. The Yamamah project is one example of that.

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