Judge Richard Jones

Noted for Friday, July 18, 2003

Without Oral Argument

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

 

ROGER W. KNIGHT,                                    )

                                                                        )           No.  03-2-27325-2 SEA

                                    petitioner,                     )

                                                                        )           REPLY TO DSHS’S MEMORANDUM

            v.                                                         )           IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO

                                                                        )           RESTORE LICENSE AND TO FILE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, and                   )           OVERLONG BRIEF

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND               )

HEALTH SERVICES,                                    )

                                                                        )

                                    respondent.                  )

____________________________________)

 

            COMES NOW ROGER W. KNIGHT, to reply to DSHS’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Restore His License and to File Overlong Brief (State Memo).  Because the State presents very little argument in opposition to his Motion for Leave to File Overlong Brief, petitioner herein addresses that issue first.

1. OVERLONG BRIEF

            The State does not dispute any of the reasons for which Mr. Knight argues requires leave to file an overlong brief.  The State argues that there has been extensive litigation in the past and somehow this argues against an overlong brief.  Precisely because the State clearly intends to plead res judicata and collateral estoppel issues in its brief, Mr. Knight will need to devote several pages to such issues.  As to the list of cases cited by the State of Mr. Knight’s previous litigation, two of them, Knight v. Serpas, 9th Cir. No. 03-35016, W.D. Wash. No. C02-1641C and Knight v. City of Mercer Island, 9th Cir. No. 03-35116, W.D. Wash. No. C02-879L, would not have been brought had the State elected not to suspend Mr. Knight’s license based upon a bad service of process.

            None of this litigation would have happened had the State elected not to violate Mr. Knight’s rights set forth in the United States Constitution, the Washington Constitution, and the Antipeonage Act.  Every action taken by Mr. Knight has been in self defense against the felony defined by 18 U.S.C. §1581.  A claim that child support enforcement punishing insufficient employment offended the Antipeonage Act was found to be meritorious in Brent Moss v. Superior Court, (1996) 56 Cal. Rptr. 864, 868-870.  Therefore, a FELONY.  Lest anyone even think that coercion of labor and punishment of unemployment is not the essence of the Child Support Crusade and not the intent and effect of RCW 74.20A.320 as a remedy additional to contempt proceedings, arrest and imprisonment, this Court can take judicial notice under Evidence Rule 201 that this Court’s Family Court Commissioners ROUTINELY order noncustodial parents to make 5 or 10 job contacts each week and present proof of such contacts at the next hearing.  Example is State v. Dominique Allen Davis, King County Superior Court No. 01-3-08366-3 SEA.  Mr. Davis has been arrested and imprisoned at least once.  Given what RCW 9A.16.050 authorizes for self defense against a felony, Mr. Knight’s choice of nonviolent presentation of argument as to law should be respected, not punished.

            The State does not present any reason to deny Mr. Knight leave to use up to 40 pages to nonviolently present argument as to law.

2.  RESTORATION OF THE LICENSE

            The State cites Kansas v. United States, (10th Cir. 2000) 214 F. 3d. 1196 and argues that the Child Support Crusade as expressed in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) addresses very important government objectives.  Likewise, Mr. Knight cites the Antipeonage Act and argues that it too addresses very important government objectives, i.e., that we are not to enslave people for their debts and obligations, including their obligations to provide for their families.  Brent Moss found that Congress put it beyond debate that no such indebtedness justifies the usurpation of the citizen’s fundamental right to a completely free and voluntary system of labor.

            Kansas illustrates one of the reasons American courts traditionally require litigants to establish standing to challenge a statute: a person adversely affected by a statute is the person with the most incentive to present the best arguments against it.  Kansas wished to continue receiving federal funds to operate its welfare and child support systems.  However, some Kansans objected to being required to provide their Social Security numbers to renew their driver’s licenses and the requirement to report new hires.  Some folks are finally beginning to see that the Child Support Crusade is a threat to the rights of ALL citizens.  Thus Kansas engaged in the classic exercise in intentional government futility to satisfy these Kansans, by saying that they “tried” to fight it, but they, shucks, lost.  Kansas thus has “no choice” but to sell its citizens’ privacy rights for its bag of federal money.

            Wrong, of course.  A state can say no to the federal dough.  A primary purpose in replacing the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution is to free the federal government from dependence upon the states for funding.  It was NOT to provide the states with an additional tax collection agency and to provide Congress with the power to dictate state policy with its power of the purse.

            Kansas at 214 F. 3d 1200 finds:

            Finally, Kansas makes a few cursory arguments to the effect that the United States is requiring it to violate the privacy and procedural due process rights of its citizens.  These claims center around the requirements that the state keep a directory of new hires, and that it take automatic enforcement action against those parents found to be in arrears on child support.  Neither of these arguments is developed in the brief, . . .

 

Neither of these arguments is developed in the brief?  Perhaps it is because Kansas wanted the federal funds.  When such issues involve an attorney, judge, or police officer, it is called “conflict of interest”.  Kansas simply does not have the same incentives to present and fully develop such arguments in its brief that a noncustodial parent unable to comply with the support order would have.  The noncustodial parent might not care whether the state government receives any federal funds.  While a state is free to say no to the federal dough, the noncustodial parent or other licensed motorist is not as free to opt out of whatever program the state imposes while selling its sovereignty.

            Any precedent set by Kansas is poisoned by that state’s failure to fully and adequately brief the issues that affect noncustodial parents and other citizens.

            The State cites Kucera v. State, Dept. of Transportation, (2000) 140 Wash. 2d. 200, 209, 995 P. 2d. 63 and argues that it sets the standards for preliminary injunctions.  It appears that the State is interpreting Mr. Knight’s request for restoration of his license pending administrative review to be a request for preliminary injunction.  Fair enough.  We can evaluate this case on the basis of the Kucera criteria:

            The applicable requirements for issuance of a preliminary injunction are well settled:

“[O]ne who seeks relief by temporary or permanent injunction must show (1) that he has a clear legal or equitable right, (2) that he has a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of that right, and (3) that the acts complained of are either resulting in or will result in actual or substantial injury to him.”

 

Kucera at 140 Wash. 2d. 209 quoting Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, (1982) 96 Wash. 2d. 785, 792, 638 P. 2d. 1213 and Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, (1958) 52 Wash. 2d. 317, 319, 324 P. 2d. 1099.

            It does not take a great deal of argument to show that a license to operate motor vehicles when the party has a clean driving record is a clear legal and equitable right.  The ultimately unsuccessful criminal prosecution for DWLS by Mercer Island, the impoundment of his vehicle on several occasions, the restriction of his right to travel by motor vehicle without having to obtain a driver or “bum a ride” or use public transportation, indicates an actual and substantial injury to Mr. Knight for which he has a well grounded fear.

            Kucera on 140 Wash. 2d. 210 goes on to find:

Courts have generally found remedies to be inadequate in three circumstances: (1) the injury complained of by its nature cannot be compensated by money damages, (2) the damages cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty, and (3) the remedy at law would not be efficient because the injury is of a continuing nature.

 

That describes a license suspension where the party has a clean driving record and presents no greater danger to the public safety on the roads and highways operating a motor vehicle than any other person.  What is the monetary value of the injury already sustained by Mr. Knight for the license suspension based on a bad serve?  Mr. Knight hereby offers a settlement to all of the litigation the State complains of:  $1,000,000 and full restoration of the license to drive.  A portion of such settlement money equal to the current arrearage be paid into the Washington State Support Registry for disbursement to Mrs. Royanne Schmitz minus whatever amount the State still claims for reimbursement of public assistance.  The balance of the first $100,000 of the settlement money minus this initial support arrearage payment be deposited into a bank account with the instruction that $851.76 be paid by the bank through automatic withdrawal to the Support Registry for disbursement to Mrs. Royanne Schmitz.  Upon graduation from high school by Matthew Knight and by Axel Knight, these payments shall end and the remaining balance of such bank account shall be the property of Mr. Knight.  The remaining $900,000 of such settlement shall be immediately paid to Mr. Knight.  The State shall forgive any awards for sanctions, costs, and fees as imposed by any courts upset with Mr. Knight’s choice to nonviolently present argument as to law, and shall notify all appropriate state and federal agencies that Mr. Knight is no longer out of compliance with a support order.  Upon such terms, Mr. Knight will stipulate to the dismissal of all actions presently pending in the courts involving himself, the State, and its officers.

            Absent such settlement, we must continue on, and any remedy at law is inefficient because the injury, license suspension, is of a continuing nature.

3.  CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated herein, the Petitioner’s Motion for Leave to File Overlong Brief and the Petitioner’s Motion for Order Requiring Restoration of Driver’s License Pending Administrative Law Review should be granted.

Respectfully submitted, July 16, 2003,

                                                            ____________________________________

                                                            Roger W. Knight, pro se

                                                            Petitioner

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