Trial Report: Seven

Friday morning saw another bomb threat at the Pretoria High Court. Once again the threat came from a man stating that if the prosecution of Basson did not cease the bombs would go off. Meanwhile a few blocks away Blinkwater Van Rensberg was due to appear in the magistrate's court on connection with the earlier bomb threats. The magistrate's court too received a threat. For some hours the Pretoria CBD was virtually brought to a standstill. This prompted Basson to hold a press conference in which he appealed to those issuing the threats to stop.

The prosecution went ahead after no bombs could be found on the premises. The former Surgeon General, Gen. Niel Knobel, continued to give testimony throughout the week.

Knobel gave evidence on the destruction of the drugs and chemical agents, which allegedly took place in January 1993. The destruction of the agents followed an instruction by the defence minister, Gene Louw, to stop all work on irritants and incapacitants. Louw was briefed on the CBW programme on January 8, less than a week before the foreign affairs minister was due to sign the new non-proliferation treaty. He was told what stocks of chemicals were on hand and what progress had been made with the new-generation teargas.

Louw ordered that defensive projects - such as procurement of protective clothing by Armscor - go ahead and that the SADF not declare that it had CR - also known as pepper gas - (which in terms of the treaty may not be used in a war situation, though it may be applied in riot situations, provided it has been declared, and in limited quantities). At a CCC meeting on January 29, 1993, in Cape Town, Basson reported that the chemicals had been destroyed, though not entirely as ordered. It appears from the documentation and from testimony in court that all samples that were taken from the drums allegedly thrown in the sea, had been taken in Basson's presence or on his instruction, and in some cases had been taken by him and handed in for analysis at a later stage.

Knobel explained that 1 000 kg of Product M (methaqualone) specified on the destruction certificate included the 500kg received from Croatia just two months earlier. The 912,5kg of BX was the MDMA, 37kg of Product C was cocaine - which had at one time been seriously considered as an incapacitant, but found wanting and not been further developed. The BZ was also a "potential" incapacitant. Knobel was not able to identify 1kg of P, which also appeared on the certificate.

Knobel testified extensively about the structures of authority of the Project and it was noted that a National Security Management System meeting in 1987, attended by Magnus Malan, Adriaan Vlok, minister of law and order at the time, police commissioner Johan Coetzee, security police chief Johan van der Merwe, NIS director-general Niel Barnard, Knobel and SADF chief of staff operations Van Loggerenberg, had been briefed by Basson on potential riot control methods, including the New Generation Teargas (CR or pepper gas). The Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan told the meeting that if any branch of the security forces needed the product, they should contact Basson directly. He would also be able to advise them on the most effective use of the NGTG and about protective measures to be taken.

Knobel did confirm during testimony that there had never been any authorisation for the encapsulation of any of the incapacitants.

Knobel was questioned about the destruction of the project documentation and the attempts to capture the information on optical disks. It was revealed that on January 7, 1993, a ministerial decision was taken that Project Coast's technology and research should be captured on CD-Rom, and all paper documents destroyed. The disks were to be handed to Knobel for safekeeping, lest the information ever be needed again. Basson was to personally supervise the transfer of technology and would be assisted by Dr Cobus Bothma, as well as the managing directors of Delta G Scientific, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and scientists from both companies. Nowhere within the SADF lay the capability for this task, so, on Basson's recommendation, Data Imaging (a company owned by Philip Mijburgh) was contracted to do the work. The job cost the state some R600 000.

At a CCC meeting in January 1994, Basson's successor, Colonel Ben Steyn, certified that the work had been completed, the documents destroyed as ordered under Basson's personal supervision, and the disks handed to Knobel. The disks were alleged to contain the full record of Project Coast and had to be preserved "at all costs" on orders of the Defence Minister. Basson personally told Knobel all the paper documents relating to the project had been destroyed. At an unspecified date after this the American authorities reportedly showed an unwelcome interest in the disks, requesting access to them. President de Klerk refused this request, and the NIA then ordered that security surrounding the disks be stepped up even further, since they were a potential target for espionage. When Basson was arrested in January 97, Knobel was asked to evaluate the documents found in two steel trunks seized by National Intelligence. He and in some cases, Ben Steyn, scrutinised the documents, and Knobel soon realised that the bulk of them contained highly classified technological and scientific details related to Coast.

The fraud charges against Basson were also raised. Knobel explained that Chemical Agent Monitors had been needed by the troops on the Angolan border who had reported the use of strange smoke bombs. A British company, Graseby Ionics, had developed CAM, which was apparently so effective that they had not even notified their NATO allies that they had it. Basson, with the help of a collaborator at the factory and a senior CBW scientist, had been able to acquire the 25 CAMs as well as 150 portable detection systems. Payment had been made via RL Buffham to ABC Export. Unfortunately, the first delivery had been detected by British Intelligence and payment for the final consignment had to be made via a different route. R200 010 had been paid to CSD in England and CHF75 000 paid to Dr Chu for services rendered, including a viability study for an RRL marketing arm in Europe, as well as research on peptide synthesis in Europe, specifically the companies, individuals and organisations involved in the process, which led to contact being made with Medalfa in Germany, which later supplied Coast with peptides. Basson had supplied this information to Knobel after inquiries.

Monday 22 November 1999: Knobel testified about the protective clothing that he had understood had been purchased under the auspices of the project. It became apparent through the prosecutions questioning that Knobel had not been aware of the procurement and payment channels that Basson had used. The purchase of a peptide synthesiser for the project was also raised. It emerged that the Swiss national, Dr. David Chu, owner of Medchem Forchungs, was to assist in the purchase of this equipment and that Basson was to use his East German contacts as well. It emerged later that an Iranian who had assisted the South Africans on a number of occasions was also to be involved in the deal.

Tuesday 23 November 1999: Knobel told the court that although Project Coast security was substantially no different from any other top secret SADF project, it differed in one important respect and that was that Basson was entirely responsible for decision making about the daily, weekly and monthly running of the programme. The Co-ordinating Control Committee did not want to know which individuals or countries Basson dealt with, or even details of foreign bank accounts used. The important thing was that foreign agents and suppliers were never to know the SADF was involved. Handling of funds was crucial to the project's security. Foreign intelligence services would easily enough have been able to make the link between a huge outflow of money from South Africa and a specific supplier, unless the deals were well disguised. Knobel acknowledged that the SADF, like the SAP and other State departments, routinely used bank accounts in the names of friendly foreign nationals for secret projects, and said the entire procurement process, as well as the moving of funds, was largely left to Basson - provided he operated within the broad guidelines laid down by the CCC. The CCC understood that Basson's activities might include having to lie, steal and bribe officials.

Knobel told the court that the SADF had both moral and practical obligations to protect foreign collaborators, and that there would have been no problem if money from the project fund was used to help them provide a plausible cover story. If documents were created to back up the cover story, that would also have been acceptable. Roger Buffham was used as an example. As a former MI6 member (which Knobel says he never knew) Buffham had invaluable connections in the Russian and East German intelligence communities and was also able to supply equipment to the project.

Project security was so successful, Knobel said, that in 12 years, not a single leak occurred. Indeed, both the American and British secret services had been stunned that the project had been run for so long without any foreign intelligence service picking up the slightest hint about its existence. Even the National Intelligence Service only learned of Coast's existence at an advanced stage of the project, Knobel claimed. This appears to be in contradiction to the earlier evidence that Basson had briefed the NIS in 1987.

Countries that had assisted in procurement included Russia, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, China, the UK, East Germany, the US, Iran and Libya, though Knobel said he was not aware of Libya's contribution.

Despite the vigilance of British and American banks in regard to money laundering, the financial transactions for Coast had never aroused suspicion, and until the Croatian deal, no project funds had ever been lost.

The defence put it to Knobel that the American secret service had met Basson through NIS in order to establish the CBW capabilities of Iran, which the defence claimed, proved how extensive Basson's CBW knowledge is. Knobel said he was aware of such a meeting, following the 1994 briefing on Project Coast to FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, but he could only remember that the Americans had questions about the Russian programme.

Knobel testified about the chain of command and told the court that Basson had taken orders directly from Gen. Kat Liebenberg (deceased). The defence put it to Knobel that not only did Basson carry out his duties as project officer of the CBW programme but, following orders from Liebenberg, had also been responsible for establishing Special Forces agents abroad.

Later in the day, in response to questions about the South African Medical Service, Knobel revealed that he had personally been involved in the large-scale supply of medical supplies to Unita. Prompted by the defence, he said huge amounts of critical medicines were kept in stock by SAMS at all times, since they would have to supply drugs to the entire country, in the event of a national crisis. As these drugs approached or reached their expiry date, instead of being destroyed, as law requires, they were shipped to Unita in bulk. The SADF also had an agreement with major pharmaceutical manufacturers that instead of destroying their expired stock, it would be given to the military, and this, too, found its way to Unita - and Renamo. Medicine sent to Unita had, however, been repackaged by members of 7 Medical Battalion, to disguise the source (pharmaceutical companies and SADF) as well as to provide user-friendly dosages with precise instructions for use.

Basson's reappointment was dealt with by the defence team, which claimed that Basson's reinstatement had been at the request of the British and the Americans and had been personally dealt with by then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki.

The matter of the privatisation of the front companies, Delta G Scientific and RRL was also dealt with in some detail.

Wednesday 24 November 1999:

Although fraught with exchanges between prosecution and defence, Knobel continued to testify. On matters related to the payments made by Basson on various occasions, Knobel told the court that the increasingly elaborate and complicated explanations offered by Basson for financial transactions, bore scant if any resemblance to the responses given in writing to the Office for Serious Economic Offences. Knobel made the court aware that if the current explanations are the correct ones, Basson should have used them in answering OSEO. Having not done so, he had in effect tainted Knobel's own evidence, offered to OSEO, the Truth Commission and indeed the High Court, since Knobel had accepted the answers provided by Basson as being truthful.

The defence told the court that much of the work related to chemical agents was done, not at Delta G Scientific, but at laboratories built at the Special Forces Headquarters. These labs were under the control of EMLC until 1986, after which - 1988, 89 and 90 - it was used, the defence claims, for the highly sophisticated tests required for weaponisation of the incapacitants. No pyrolytic or pyrotechnical tests were carried out at Delta G - all tests to find the best delivery system for the incapacitants were done at Speskop. Knobel said that he was unaware that tests of this nature were conducted at these facilities. At one stage the labs were destroyed in a fire and, according to the defence, the equipment was replaced with the assistance of Roger Buffham.

Testimony continued about the purchase of the Chemical Agent Monitors and the peptide synthesiser.

Court was adjourned until Friday 26 November when Mike Kennedy of the National Intelligence Agency and Etienne Lamprechts, formerly of the Office for Serious Economic Offences, will testify.

The prosecution will only resume re-examination of Knobel once they have examined the transcripts of the evidence. There has been some delay in this regard since the prosecution team does not have sufficient funds to purchase the daily transcripts from the transcription services.

Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]