Trial Report: Six

Court proceedings began this week with the ruling that the State may not use the record of Basson's bail proceedings following his arrest on fraud charges in 1997. That hearing was held in camera, at the behest of various State departments, in the interest of "national security" and to avoid any possibility that information revealed might contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Hartzenberg found that by using transcripts of Basson's 1993-1997 evidence to the Office for Serious Economic Offences to cross-examine him, the State had behaved in an "unseemly" manner, using the OSEO evidence not to prove that Basson would not stand trial but to lay the ground for questioning in future court proceedings.

The State had also acted unfairly in refusing to allow Basson access to the documents used during his cross-examination, and Dawie Fouche, who had questioned Basson during the OSEO probe, ought not to have acted as prosecutor in the bail hearing.

The former Surgeon General and Manager of Project Coast took the stand on Monday and continued to testify throughout the week. He testified extensively about the privatisation of the two main front companies of the project: Delta G Scientific and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and spoke about the origin of the programme.

Knobel told the court that the programme had been initiated in response to threats believed to have been posed by the conflict in Angola and said that Basson had been tasked with collecting information about chemical and biological warfare programmes abroad.

According to Knobel, Basson's initial investigation indicated that the existing conventions governing CBW were totally inadequate and had not kept pace with scientific developments and that there were no effective control measures.

The project was approved after Basson's initial intelligence gathering and a decision made to make use of front companies in order to establish a CBW capability. To this end RRL and Delta G Scientific were established along with INFLADEL in 1984 as the information and technology arm of the project. In 1990, the company's tasks were assumed by SEFMED INFORMATION SERVICES, which served until 1994 as the information front. Sefmed had offices in both London and Basle. Initially, Infladel also handled the financial and management functions, with SADF funds being channelled through it, but these functions were subsequently transferred to D JOHN TRUTER FINANCIAL CONSULTANTS. The project took some time to get off the ground, and as the need arose, additional front companies were set up. Approval had to be obtained on an annual basis from the Minister of Defence to do so.

Knobel explained that Delta G's task was offensive chemical research, while RRL was responsible for the defensive biological programme. Tests were carried out on their behalf by a "private company", Protechnik Laboratories, while another "private" company, Lifestyle Management, had been contracted to do the physiological research.

The annual project budget had to be approved by a co-ordinating Control Committee (CCC) of which Basson was the secretary. Security was such that the members of the CCC never visited the front companies and relied upon Basson for all and any information relating to the project, financial and otherwise.

With regard to the privatisation of Delta G and RRL, Knobel explained that the companies had ultimately been sold to the major shareholders, Philip Mijburgh in the case of Delta G and Wynand Swanepoel in the case of RRL, for security reasons. He also explained that both transactions had involved the cancellation on contracts resulting in large payments to the facilities by the SADF at the time of privatisation. In terms of the privatisation agreements all SADF contracts with Delta G were to be terminated by 31 August 1991. This raises a question about the SADF contract to manufacture 1000kg of MDMA (ecstasy) in 1992 and 1993. Knobel also referred to much research having been done on AIDS at Delta G.

Knobel claimed to have no knowledge of Basson, Mijburgh and Swanepoels' interests in companies outside of the official fronts, nor of their interests in companies related to the project but not officially part of the project. He also stated that he should have known about these business interests.

Knobel told the court in detail of all the inquiries that had been launched into Basson's affairs including the investigation by the Office for Serious Economic Offences and a series of internal SADF inquiries. In each case when Knobel was required to provide answers to questions about the project and Basson's activities he had turned to Basson to provide the answers, trusting him implicitly.

On Wednesday 17 November, just three hours into court proceedings the security at the Pretoria High Court received a bomb threat, the same phone call was made within a few minutes to the Office of the Judge President, Bernard Ngoepe; the high court switch board and the Head Office of the Justice Department. The caller said that three bombs had been placed on different levels of the court building and would be detonated if the prosecution of Dr. Basson did not stop before noon. The court was evacuated and the bomb disposal unit brought in to search the building. While the search was underway a further call was received from the same person stating that the occupants of the building ere still standing too close to the building and would be injured in the blast. No bombs were found.

Court resumed at 2pm with continued testimony from Gen. Knobel. Knobel testified about the answers he had provided to the Office for Serious Economic Offences admitting that although the OSEO had instructed him not to ask Basson for answers, he had done so since Basson was the only person who knew the answers to the questions posed. These related to companies that Knobel had no knowledge of such as Intramex and Wisdom Erf 82.

Knobel also admitted that although he was Basson's superior in respect of Project Coast, from March 1981 to December 1989, Basson reported to the head of Special Forces on operational matters. Though responsible to the CCC on all aspects of Coast, for operational application of the products made under the project Basson got his orders from Magnus Malan, the SADF chief, the head of Special Forces, Chief of Staff Intelligence, the police commissioner, head of the security police or the head of National Intelligence. The CCC merely "noted" such operational use.

Knobel went on to explain what has become known as the 'Croatian deal'. In terms of this agreement Basson was to procure methaqualone from certain Croatian officials, including the Minister of Energy Affairs in 1992. It would appear from Knobel's testimony that the substance was indeed transferred to South Africa and that two of the four officials involved in the transaction received payment. However the deal then went wrong and the intermediary assisting the South Africans, Jurg Jacomet, was arrested and his accounts frozen. Basson was later arrested in Switzerland when he attempted to intervene and to get the money back. It is significant that the substance was procured a few months before it was supposed to have been destroyed in January 1993.

Basson's arrest in Switzerland was related to his involvement with a Danish Intelligence agent in the interception of fraudulent Vatican bearer bonds, supposedly intended for the purchase of weapons for Croatia. Basson was arrested when he attempted to cash the bonds at a Swiss bank.

Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]