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Trial Report: Eight

On Friday the court heard evidence from an unnamed National Intelligence Agency agent. The agent told the court how the surveillance of Basson's house on the day of his arrest in January 1997, had led to the discovery of the trunks of project documents found at the house of a close associate of Basson, Samuel Bosch. A day later, during the cross examination of Gen. Knobel, the defence alleged that these trunks had been packed and stored at Bosch's house by Philip Mijburgh in April 1995, while Basson was in Libya.

During the testimony of another National Intelligence agent from the counter intelligence unit, it was said that the scientific value of the documents found in the trunks was assessed by General Niel Knobel and Colonel Ben Steyn, Basson's successor at SAMS. Later, they were also evaluated by Dr Andr� Immelman (formerly the head of research at RRL) and Dr Daan Goosen. The intelligence agent told the court that some four months after Basson's arrest, on Saturday, May 10, 1997, he was called to the Sunnyside offices of attorney Ernst Penzhorn, where he and another senior NIA member were handed another two trunks of documents. These were found to contain classified documents relating to the SADF and Project Coast, various documents relating to Delta G Scientific, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, Protechnik, Technotek, Sefmed, Infladel, Medchem Consolidated Investments, Global Management, Contresida and Data Imaging, personal documents and foreign currency in various denominations in a number of plastic bank bags. They found 4 000 Spanish pesetas, 26 000 Italian lira, 50 Finnish marks, 200 Seychelles rupees, 125 Russian roubles, 25 Netherlands guilders, 220 French francs, 1,08-million Polish zloty, Austrian shillings and coins from a large number of countries, including America and the Cayman Islands. A single Libyan bank note was also found. He had found 205 reports related to 177 biological research projects, which included details of technology, names of scientists and toxins.

The cross-examination of Gen. Knobel continued on Monday 29 November with Knobel being asked to answer questions about the acquisition of a peptide synthesiser by the project. Defence counsel for Basson, Adv. Jaap Cilliers, put it to Knobel that the peptide synthesiser allegedly bought by Project Coast and installed at the Speskop laboratory was not, as Knobel said he had been led to believe, needed for AIDS research, but for research into "one of the most dangerous aspects of chemical warfare".

The equipment, he claimed, could be used to alter brain and motor functions - and the results would be long-term, if not permanent. For example, according to Cilliers, by tampering with brain peptides, the aggression level of a normally placid person could be increased to above-normal levels, turning the subject into an "uncontrollable monster". Conversely, a highly aggressive person could be turned into a meek and mild one. The potential of this research, according to Cilliers, was the "biggest single fear" of the international community in respect of CBW, as the implications for the human race are terrifying should the process be abused.

That, said Cilliers, was the background to Project Coast getting rid of the peptide synthesiser (by swapping it for 500kg of methaqualone in the 1992/93 Croatian deal). Following the 1991 political decision not to proceed with weaponisation of the incapacitants, and by implication halt all "offensive" research, there was no longer a need for the synthesiser. Knobel has no knowledge of research into the field of permanent altering of brain functions, and does not remember this motivation for the swap. He was also unable to tell the court who had been responsible for the AIDS research that he believed was being conducted at Delta G, or what the research entailed.

During both cross-examination and re-examination Knobel confirmed that he had not been aware of the nature of research conducted at the front companies.

Payment of 130 000 Swiss Francs to David Chu, which Basson explained to OSEO was for prostaglandins, Cilliers now says was actually to obtain a substance called Varsu Active, a chemical used to stretch arteries - and used, by some countries, he claimed, as an incapacitant. He told the court that the drug causes a sudden and dramatic drop in blood pressure, which in turn causes recipients to collapse. Project Coast had acquired the substance for possible addition to the CR - but tests showed it caused the lungs and trachea to contract to a life-threatening degree, so the research was halted. As a precursor to the Croatian methaqualone deal, Cilliers says, a large quantity of BZ - a derivative of the other incapacitants researched by Coast - was bought. Knobel said he was aware that in January 1993, 1 000kg of BZ was on Coast's stock books, but that the Croatian deal, approved in October 1992 by the CCC, was only in respect of methaqualone. According to Cilliers, the deal was for chemicals and technology, acquired through the offices of Swiss intelligence chief General Peter Regli and Swiss agent Jurg Jacomet, later investigated by Swiss authorities for various other deals, including some involving nuclear weapons/technology. Knobel believed the deal was for methaqualone only, and with Croatian dissidents.

On Wednesday 1 December National Intelligence Agency deputy director-general Mike Kennedy testified. A 34-year veteran of intelligence work, he has been involved in counter-intelligence and counter-espionage regarding weapons of mass destruction since the 1970s, when South Africa first developed a nuclear capability. During the 80s, the focus of his work shifted towards CBW.

Although the NIA did not receive its first official briefing about Project Coast until the end of 1993, Kennedy said the agency was aware of Coast's existence from the mid to late 1980s. This had come about as the result of a number of people being detained in SA as foreign intelligence services tried to obtain information about South Africa's CBW programme through espionage. The NIA knew enough to brief FW de Klerk in November 1989 - one month after he became state president - about the existence of the CBW programme and about allegations of abuse, even though at that stage, the programme had not been officially disclosed to the NIA.

During both the initial November 1989 briefing of De Klerk, and another in January 1990, De Klerk gave Kennedy instructions to investigate the alleged abuses in Coast.

In the line of duty, Kennedy has been thoroughly briefed by CBW experts attached to foreign intelligence sources, mainly defectors from the former USSR.

In cross-examination, Kennedy confirmed that he was aware Basson had "close contacts" with the Libyan intelligence community, and that some members of this service had stayed at Basson's home for some months. He did not know, but could not dispute, that some Libyan intelligence agents had also stayed with Basson's mother for a "lengthy period".

Kennedy is also aware that at one stage, according to Jaap Cilliers, Basson brought a "high-level" Libyan into South Africa to visit Nelson Mandela. However, he has no knowledge of the claim that Basson bypassed passport and immigration control in the process.

Kennedy acknowledged that the Americans and British who were briefed on Project Coast were "amazed" at the level of sophistication Basson told them the programme had attained. They had judged it to be second only to that of the former Soviet Union, not in size, but in sophistication and level of scientific advance. Kennedy agreed that the aspect that most amazed them was Basson's briefing on the research done on, and his personal knowledge of, the mood/personality altering brain peptides.

The defence placed on record that they do not dispute that the 4 000 red and black capsules seized by Sanab during the three sting operations in January 1997 that culminated in Basson's arrest, contained MDMA.

The court is now in recess and the trial will resume on 24 January 2000.

 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa
Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]

 
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