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Fifty years ago almost to the day, Robert Schuman presented his vision of a "European Federation" for the preservation of peace. This heralded a completely new era in the history of Europe. European integration was the response to centuries of a precarious balance of powers on this continent which again and again resulted in terrible hegemonic wars culminating in the two World Wars between 1914 and 1945. The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions.
Fifty years on, Europe, the process of European integration, is
probably the biggest political challenge facing the states and
peoples involved, because its success or failure, indeed even
just the stagnation of this process of integration, will be of
crucial importance to the future of each and every one of us, but
especially to the future of the young generation. And it is this
process of European integration that is now being called into
question by many people; it is viewed as a bureaucratic affair
run by a faceless, soulless Eurocracy in Brussels - at best
boring, at worst dangerous.
Not least for this reason I should like to thank you for the
opportunity to mull over in public a few more fundamental and
conceptional thoughts on the future shape of Europe. Allow me, if
you will, to cast aside for the duration of this speech the
mantle of German Foreign Minister and member of the Government -
a mantle which is occasionally rather restricting when it comes
to reflecting on things in public - although I know it is not
really possible to do so. But what I want to talk to you about
today is not the operative challenges facing European policy over
the next few months, not the current intergovernmental conference,
the EU's enlargement to the east or all those other important
issues we have to resolve today and tomorrow, but rather the
possible strategic prospects for European integration far beyond
the coming decade and the intergovernmental conference.
So let's be clear: this is not a declaration of the Federal Government's position, but a contribution to a discussion long begun in the public arena about the "finality" of European integration, and I am making it simply as a staunch European and German parliamentarian. I am all the more pleased, therefore, that, on the initiative of the Portuguese presidency, the last informal EU Foreign Ministers' Meeting in the Azores held a long, detailed and extremely productive discussion on this very topic, the finality of European integration, a discussion that will surely have consequences.
Ten years after the end of the cold war and right at the start of
the age of globalization one can literally almost feel that the
problems and challenges facing Europe have wound themselves into
a knot which will be very hard to undo within the existing
framework: the introduction of the single currency, the EU's
incipient eastern enlargement, the crisis of the last EU
Commission, the poor acceptance of the European Parliament and
low turn-outs for European elections, the wars in the Balkans and
the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy not only
define what has been achieved but also determine the challenges
still to be overcome.
Quo vadis Europa? is the question posed once
again by the history of our continent. And for many reasons the
answer Europeans will have to give, if they want to do well by
themselves and their children, can only be this: onwards to the
completion of European integration. A step backwards, even just
standstill or contentment with what has been achieved, would
demand a fatal price of all EU member states and of all those who
want to become members; it would demand a fatal price above all
of our people. This is particularly true for Germany and the
Germans.
The task ahead of us will be anything but easy
and will require all our strength; in the coming decade we will
have to enlarge the EU to the east and south-east, and this will
in the end mean a doubling in the number of members. And at the
same time, if we are to be able to meet this historic challenge
and integrate the new member states without substantially denting
the EU's capacity for action, we must put into place the last
brick in the building of European integration, namely political
integration.
The need to organize these two processes in
parallel is undoubtedly the biggest challenge the Union has faced
since its creation. But no generation can choose the challenges
it is tossed by history, and this is the case here too. Nothing
less than the end of the cold war and of the forced division of
Europe is facing the EU and thus us with this task, and so today
we need the same visionary energy and pragmatic ability to assert
ourselves as was shown by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman after
the end of the Second World War. And like then, after the end of
this last great European war, which was - as almost always - also
a Franco-German war, this latest stage of European Union, namely
eastern enlargement and the completion of political integration,
will depend decisively on France and Germany.
Two historic decisions in the middle of last
century fundamentally altered Europe's fate for the better:
firstly, the USA's decision to stay in Europe, and secondly
France´s and Germany's commitment to the principle of
integration, beginning with economic links.
The idea of European integration and its
implementation not only gave rise to an entirely new order in
Europe - to be more exact, in Western Europe - but European
history underwent a fundamental about-turn. Just compare the
history of Europe in the first half of the 20th century with that
in the second half and you will immediately understand what I
mean. Germany's perspective in particular teaches a host of
lessons, because it makes clear what our country really owes to
the concept and implementation of European integration.
This new principle of the European system of
states, which could almost be called revolutionary, emanated from
France and her two great statesmen Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet.
Every stage of its gradual realization, from the establishment of
the European Coal and Steel Community to the creation of the
single market and the introduction of the single currency,
depended essentially on the alliance of Franco-German interests.
This was never exclusive, however, but always open to other
European states, and so it should remain until finality has been
achieved.
European integration has proved phenomenally
successful. The whole thing had just one decisive shortcoming,
forced upon it by history: it was not the whole of Europe, but
merely its free part in the West. For fifty years the division of
Europe cut right through Germany and Berlin, and on the eastern
side of the Wall and barbed wire an indispensable part of Europe,
without which European integration could never be completed,
waited for its chance to take part in the European unification
process. That chance came with the end of the division of Europe
and Germany in 1989/90.
Robert Schuman saw this quite clearly back in
1963: "We must build the united Europe not only in the
interest of the free nations, but also in order to be able to
admit the peoples of Eastern Europe into this community if, freed
from the constraints under which they live, they want to join and
seek our moral support. We owe them the example of a unified,
fraternal Europe. Every step we take along this road will mean a
new opportunity for them. They need our help with the
transformation they have to achieve. It is our duty to be
prepared."
Following the collapse of the Soviet empire the
EU had to open up to the east, otherwise the very idea of
European integration would have undermined itself and eventually
self-destructed. Why? A glance at the former Yugoslavia shows us
the consequences, even if they would not always and everywhere
have been so extreme. An EU restricted to Western Europe would
forever have had to deal with a divided system in Europe: in
Western Europe integration, in Eastern Europe the old system of
balance with its continued national orientation, constraints of
coalition, traditional interest-led politics and the permanent
danger of nationalist ideologies and confrontations. A divided
system of states in Europe without an overarching order would in
the long term make Europe a continent of uncertainty, and in the
medium term these traditional lines of conflict would shift from
Eastern Europe into the EU again. If that happened Germany in
particular would be the big loser. The geopolitical reality after
1989 left no serious alternative to the eastward enlargement of
the European institutions, and this has never been truer than now
in the age of globalization.
In response to this truly historic turnaround
the EU consistently embarked upon a far-reaching process of
reform:
- In Maastricht one of the three essential
sovereign rights of the modern nation-state - currency, internal
security and external security - was for the first time
transferred to the sole responsibility of a European institution.
The introduction of the euro was not only the crowning-point of
economic integration, it was also a profoundly political act,
because a currency is not just another economic factor but also
symbolizes the power of the sovereign who guarantees it. A
tension has emerged between the communitarization of economy and
currency on the one hand and the lack of political and democratic
structures on the other, a tension which might lead to crises
within the EU if we do not take productive steps to make good the
shortfall in political integration and democracy, thus completing
the process of integration.
- The European Council in Tampere marked the
beginning of a new far-reaching integration project, namely the
development of a common area of justice and internal security,
making the Europe of the citizens a tangible reality. But there
is even more to this new integration project: common laws can be
a highly integrative force.
- It was not least the war in Kosovo that
prompted the European states to take further steps to strengthen
their joint capacity for action on foreign policy, agreeing in
Cologne and Helsinki on a new goal: the development of a Common
Security and Defence Policy. With this the Union has taken the
next step following the euro. For how in the long term can it be
justified that countries inextricably linked by monetary union
and by economic and political realities do not also face up
together to external threats and together maintain their security?
- Agreement was also reached in Helsinki on a
concrete plan for the enlargement of the EU. With these
agreements the external borders of the future EU are already
emerging. It is foreseeable that the European Union will have 27,
30 or even more members at the end of the enlargement process,
almost as many as the CSCE at its inception. Thus we in Europe
are currently facing the enormously difficult task of organizing
two major projects in parallel:
1. Enlargement as quickly as possible. This
poses difficult problems of adaptation both for the acceding
states and for the EU itself. It also triggers fear and anxiety
in our citizens: are their jobs at risk? Will enlargement make
Europe even less transparent and comprehensible for its citizens?
As seriously as we must tackle these questions, we must never
lose sight of the historic dimension of eastern enlargement. For
this is a unique opportunity to unite our continent, wracked by
war for centuries, in peace, security, democracy and prosperity.
Enlargement is a supreme national interest,
especially for Germany. It will be possible to lastingly overcome
the risks and temptations objectively inherent in Germany's
dimensions and central situation through the enlargement and
simultaneous deepening of the EU. Moreover, enlargement -
consider the EU's enlargement to the south - is a pan-European
programme for growth. Enlargement will bring tremendous benefits
for German companies and for employment. Germany must therefore
continue its advocacy of rapid eastern enlargement. At the same
time, enlargement must be effected carefully and in accordance
with the Helsinki decision.
2. Europe's capacity to act. The institutions of the EU were created for six member states. They just about still function with fifteen. While the first step towards reform, to be taken at the upcoming intergovernmental conference and introducing increased majority voting, is important, it will not in the long term be sufficient for integration as a whole. The danger will then be that enlargement to include 27 or 30 members will hopelessly overload the EU's ability to absorb, with its old institutions and mechanisms, even with increased use of majority decisions, and that it could lead to severe crises. But this danger, it goes without saying, is no reason not to push on with enlargement as quickly as possible; rather it shows the need for decisive, appropriate institutional reform so that the Union's capacity to act is maintained even after enlargement. The consequence of the irrefutable enlargement of the EU is therefore erosion or integration.
Fulfilling these two tasks is at the heart of the current
intergovernmental conference. The EU has pledged to be able to
admit new members by 1 January 2003. Following the conclusion of
Agenda 2000, the aim now is to put in place the institutional
preconditions for the next round of enlargement. Resolving the
three key questions - the composition of the Commission, the
weighting of votes in the Council and particularly the extension
of majority decisions - is indispensable for the smooth
continuation of the process of enlargement. As the next practical
step these three questions now have absolute priority.
Crucial as the intergovernmental conference is
as the next step for the future of the EU, we must, given Europe's
situation, already begin to think beyond the enlargement process
and consider how a future "large" EU can function as it
ought to function and what shape it must therefore take. And that's
what I want to do now.
***
Permit me therefore to remove my Foreign
Minister's hat altogether in order to suggest a few ideas both on
the nature of this so-called finality of Europe and on how we can
approach and eventually achieve this goal. And all the
Eurosceptics on this and the other side of the Channel would be
well advised not to immediately produce the big headlines again,
because firstly this is a personal vision of a solution to the
European problems. And, secondly, we are talking here about the
long term, far beyond the current intergovernmental conference.
So no one need be afraid of these ideas.
Enlargement will render imperative a
fundamental reform of the European institutions. Just what would
a European Council with thirty heads of state and government be
like? Thirty presidencies? How long will Council meetings
actually last? Days, maybe even weeks? How, with the system of
institutions that exists today, are thirty states supposed to
balance interests, take decisions and then actually act? How can
one prevent the EU from becoming utterly intransparent,
compromises from becoming stranger and more incomprehensible, and
the citizens' acceptance of the EU from eventually hitting rock
bottom?
Question upon question, but there is a very
simple answer: the transition from a union of states to full
parliamentarization as a European Federation, something Robert
Schuman demanded 50 years ago. And that means nothing less than a
European Parliament and a European government which really do
exercise legislative and executive power within the Federation.
This Federation will have to be based on a constituent treaty.
I am well aware of the procedural and
substantive problems that will have to be resolved before this
goal can be attained. For me, however, it is entirely clear that
Europe will only be able to play its due role in global economic
and political competition if we move forward courageously. The
problems of the 21st century cannot be solved with the fears and
formulae of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Of course, this simple solution is immediately
criticized as being utterly unworkable. Europe is not a new
continent, so the criticism goes, but full of different peoples,
cultures, languages and histories. The nation-states are
realities that cannot simply be erased, and the more
globalization and Europeanization create superstructures and
anonymous actors remote from the citizens, the more the people
will cling on to the nation-states that give them comfort and
security.
Now I share all these objections, because they
are correct. That is why it would be an irreparable mistake in
the construction of Europe if one were to try to complete
political integration against the existing national institutions
and traditions rather than by involving them. Any such endeavour
would be doomed to failure by the historical and cultural
environment in Europe. Only if European integration takes the
nation-states along with it into such a Federation, only if their
institutions are not devalued or even made to disappear, will
such a project be workable despite all the huge difficulties. In
other words: the existing concept of a federal European state
replacing the old nation-states and their democracies as the new
sovereign power shows itself to be an artificial construct which
ignores the established realities in Europe. The completion of
European integration can only be successfully conceived if it is
done on the basis of a division of sovereignty between Europe and
the nation-state. Precisely this is the idea underlying the
concept of "subsidiarity", a subject that is currently
being discussed by everyone and understood by virtually no one.
So what must one understand by the term "division
of sovereignty"? As I said, Europe will not emerge in a
political vacuum, and so a further fact in our European reality
is therefore the different national political cultures and their
democratic publics, separated in addition by linguistic
boundaries. A European Parliament must therefore always represent
two things: a Europe of the nation-states and a Europe of the
citizens. This will only be possible if this European Parliament
actually brings together the different national political elites
and then also the different national publics.
In my opinion, this can be done if the European
parliament has two chambers. One will be for elected members who
are also members of their national parliaments. Thus there will
be no clash between national parliaments and the European
parliament, between the nation-state and Europe. For the second
chamber a decision will have to be made between the Senate model,
with directly-elected senators from the member states, and a
chamber of states along the lines of Germany's Bundesrat. In the
United States, every state elects two senators; in our Bundesrat,
in contrast, there are different numbers of votes.
Similarly, there are two options for the
European executive, or government. Either one can decide in
favour of developing the European Council into a European
government, i.e. the European government is formed from the
national governments, or - taking the existing Commission
structure as a starting-point - one can opt for the direct
election of a president with far-reaching executive powers. But
there are also various other possibilities between these two
poles.
Now objections will be raised that Europe is already much too complicated and much too intransparent for the citizen, and here we are wanting to make it even more complicated. But the intention is quite the opposite. The division of sovereignty between the Union and the nation-states requires a constituent treaty which lays down what is to be regulated at European level and what has still to be regulated at national level. The majority of regulations at EU level are in part the result of inductive communitarization as per the "Monnet method" and an expression of inter-state compromise within today's EU. There should be a clear definition of the competences of the Union and the nation-states respectively in a European constituent treaty, with core sovereignties and matters which absolutely have to be regulated at European level being the domain of the Federation, whereas everything else would remain the responsibility of the nation-states. This would be a lean European Federation, but one capable of action, fully sovereign yet based on self-confident nation-states, and it would also be a Union which the citizens could understand, because it would have made good its shortfall on democracy.
However, all this will not mean the abolition of the nation-state.
Because even for the finalized Federation the nation-state, with
its cultural and democratic traditions, will be ir-replaceable in
ensuring the legitimation of a union of citizens and states that
is wholly accepted by the people. I say this not least with an
eye to our friends in the United Kingdom, because I know that the
term "federation" irritates many Britons. But to date I
have been unable to come up with another word. We do not wish to
irritate anyone.
Even when European finality is attained, we
will still be British or German, French or Polish. The nation-states
will continue to exist and at European level they will retain a
much larger role than the Länder have in Germany. And in such a
Federation the principle of subsidiarity will be constitutionally
enshrined.
These three reforms - the solution of the
democracy problem and the need for fundamental reordering of
competences both horizontally, i.e. among the European
institutions, and vertically, i.e. between Europe, the nation-state
and the regions - will only be able to succeed if Europe is
established anew with a constitution. In other words: through the
realization of the project of a European constitution centred
around basic, human and civil rights, an equal division of powers
between the European institutions and a precise delineation
between European and nation-state level. The main axis for such a
European constitution will be the relationship between the
Federation and the nation-state. Let me not be misunderstood:
this has nothing whatsoever to do with a return to
renationalisation, quite the contrary.
The question which is becoming more and more
urgent today is this: can this vision of a Federation be achieved
through the existing method of integration, or must this method
itself, the central element of the integration process to date,
be cast into doubt?
In the past, European integration was based on the "Monnet method" with its commun-itarization approach in European institutions and policy. This gradual process of integration, with no blueprint for the final state, was conceived in the 1950s for the economic integration of a small group of countries. Successful as it was in that scenario, this approach has proved to be of only limited use for the political integration and democratization of Europe. Where it was not possible for all EU members to move ahead, smaller groups of countries of varying composition took the lead, as was the case with Economic and Monetary Union and with Schengen.
Does the answer to the twin challenge of enlargement and
deepening, then, lie in such a differentiation, an enhanced
cooperation in some areas? Precisely in an enlarged and thus
necessarily more heterogeneous Union, further differentiation
will be inevitable. To facilitate this process is thus one of the
priorities of the intergovernmental conference.
However, increasing differentiation will also
entail new problems: a loss of European identity, of internal
coherence, as well as the danger of an internal erosion of the EU,
should ever larger areas of intergovernmental cooperation loosen
the nexus of integration. Even today a crisis of the Monnet
method can no longer be overlooked, a crisis that cannot be
solved according to the method's own logic.
That is why Jacques Delors, Helmut Schmidt and
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing have recently tried to find new answers
to this dilemma. Delors' idea is that a "federation of
nation-states", comprising the six founding states of the
European Community, should conclude a "treaty within the
treaty" with a view to making far-reaching reforms in the
European institutions.
Schmidt and Giscard's ideas are in a similar vein, though they
place the Euro-11 states at the centre, rather than just the six
founding states. As early as 1994 Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble
proposed the creation of a "core Europe", but it was
stillborn, as it were, because it presupposed an exclusive,
closed "core", even omitting the founding state Italy,
rather than a magnet of integration open to all.
So if the alternative for the EU in the face of
the irrefutable challenge posed by eastern enlargement is indeed
either erosion or integration, and if clinging to a federation of
states would mean standstill with all its negative repercussions,
then, under pressure from the conditions and the crises provoked
by them, the EU will at some time within the next ten years be
confronted with this alternative: will a majority of member
states take the leap into full integration and agree on a
European constitution? Or, if that doesn't happen, will a smaller
group of member states take this route as an avant-garde, i.e.
will a centre of gravity emerge comprising a few member states
which are staunchly committed to the European ideal and are in a
position to push ahead with political integration? The question
then would simply be: when will be the right time? Who will be
involved? And will this centre of gravity emerge within or
outside the framework provided by the treaties? One thing at
least is certain: no European project will succeed in future
either without the closest Franco-German cooperation.
Given this situation, one could imagine Europe's further
development far beyond the coming decade in two or three stages:
First the expansion of reinforced cooperation between those
states which want to cooperate more closely than others, as is
already the case with Economic and Monetary Union and Schengen.
We can make progress in this way in many areas: on the further
development of Euro-11 to a politico-economic union, on
environmental protection, the fight against crime, the
development of common immigration and asylum policies and of
course on the foreign and security policy. In this context it is
of paramount importance that closer cooperation should not be
misunderstood as the end of integration.
One possible interim step on the road to
completing political integration could then later be the
formation of a centre of gravity. Such a group of states would
conclude a new European framework treaty, the nucleus of a
constitution of the Federation. On the basis of this treaty, the
Federation would develop its own institutions, establish a
government which within the EU should speak with one voice on
behalf of the members of the group on as many issues as possible,
a strong parliament and a directly elected president. Such a
centre of gravity would have to be the avant-garde, the driving
force for the completion of political integration and should from
the start comprise all the elements of the future federation.
I am certainly aware of the institutional
problems with regard to the current EU that such a centre of
gravity would entail. That is why it would be critically
important to ensure that the EU acquis is not jeopardized, that
the union is not divided and the bond holding it together are not
damaged, either in political or in legal terms. Mechanisms would
have to be developed which permit the members of the centre of
gravity to cooperate smoothly with others in the larger EU.
The question of which countries will take part
in such a project, the EU founding members, the Euro-11 members
or another group, is impossible to answer today. One thing must
be clear when considering the option of forming a centre of
gravity: this avant-garde must never be exclusive but must be
open to all member states and candidate countries, should they
desire to participate at a certain point in time. For those who
wish to participate but do not fulfil the requirements, there
must be a possibility to be drawn closer in. Transparency and the
opportunity for all EU member states to participate would be
essential factors governing the acceptance and feasibility of the
project. This must be true in particular with regard to the
candidate countries. For it would be historically absurd and
utterly stupid if Europe, at the very time when it is at long
last reunited, were to be divided once again.
Such a centre of gravity must also have an
active interest in enlargement and it must be attractive to the
other members. If one follows Hans-Dietrich Genscher's tenet that
no member state can be forced to go farther than it is able or
willing to go, but that those who do not want to go any farther
cannot prevent others from doing so, then the centre of gravity
will emerge within the treaties. Otherwise it will emerge outside
them.
The last step will then be completion of
integration in a European Federation. Let's not misunderstand
each other: closer cooperation does not automatically lead to
full integration, either by the centre of gravity or straight
away by the majority of members. Initially, enhanced cooperation
means nothing more than increased intergovernmentalization under
pressure from the facts and the shortcomings of the "Monnet
Method". The steps towards a constituent treaty - and
exactly that will be the precondition for full integration -
require a deliberate political act to reestablish Europe.
This, ladies and gentlemen, is my personal vision for the future: from closer cooperation towards a European constituent treaty and the completion of Robert Schuman's great idea of a European Federation. This could be the way ahead!
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