IRISC

International Research Institute into Spirituality and Change

Three months after the foot and mouth outbreak started, new clusters of the disease brought concerns that the virus would be active in the UK for a long time to come. From February 2001 the toll of new cases rose dramatically, but by May the Prime Minister felt confident enough that the outbreak was coming under control to call an election. Clusters of cases have broken out since then, possibly supporting the farmer’s criticisms of that decision at the time. I want to look in this chapter at some of the science that has been brought to bear on the control of the virus.

In today’s world it seems obvious that if we expose sick animals to the environment, then the sickness they carry may be passed on to other animals through bacteria or viruses. In the case of Foot and Mouth Disease, the infectious agent is viral, called Aphthovirus. The World Reference Laboratory for Aphthovirus is based at The Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, UK. Before the present outbreak there were a team of around 20 scientists working under Alex Donaldson, mainly in import / export testing and research. Up to 60 staff have been used during the outbreak to process samples. Aphthovirus belongs to the family of viruses known as Picornaviridae and has a over a hundred different strains with seven distinct serotypes. It is quite a small virus, about 25 nm (millionth of a millimetre) in diameter. Pan-Asian serotype O is thought to be responsible for the present outbreak. Dendrograms show that the type O outbreak strains in Asia predominately affect pigs, so pig infections are of the greatest concern.

From a farmer’s point of view, the disease causes a failure of beef animals to put on weight and a loss of milk in dairy cows. After a short illness, adult animals usually recover within 1 - 2 weeks (less than 5% die), and some may show only mild symptoms - such as sluggish behaviour, fever, profuse salivation, smacking of lips and yawning. Blisters are formed in the mouth, on the udders, and on the feet. They can be painful to the animals:- in the mouth they prevent feeding, on the udders they can cause permanent damage and are highly infective to young animals, and the foot lesions cause temporary lameness. Up to 50% of young animals may die as a result of infection.

Aphthovirus is preserved by freezing or refrigeration, and is for example stable in bull semen stored at low temperatures. It is resistant to many common disinfectants which are successful with bacterial infection. It is however very susceptible to acidity and alkalinity, being inactivated at pH < 6 or >9. It is also susceptible to raising the temperature, and is progressively inactivated at temperatures above 50 centigrade.

It is highly contagious over a wide range of cloven footed hosts, domestic and wild. Other animals such as hedgehogs are susceptible to foot and mouth and many non-susceptible animals can transmit the disease. There are several known vectors of transmission by direct or indirect contact of host with infected animals. A reason for the widespread fear of the disease is its persistence in the ecosystem - it can be carried by convalescent or vaccinated animals for a long time: up to 3 years in cattle, 5 years in buffalo, or several months in sheep. Research has shown that over 50% of cattle in contact with the virus become carriers - they will still harbour live viruses that can be passed on to other animals. This has been recorded in a wide range of secretions and excretions of animals. Of greatest concern and maximum duration is its persistence in the oesophago-pharyngeal fluid (the fluid in the throat) but virus has also been found elsewhere, including expired air, saliva, nasal secretions, tears, milk, semen, urine, faeces, and especially in the vesicles and lesions associated with the disease.

The virus can survive for considerable lengths of time away from a host. It can be spread by contact of many objects with the virus, including hides, hair, wool, hay straw, manure, animals (eg dogs, rabbits, rats, mice, birds, people) wind, vehicles. Bulk collection of milk has also been implicated. Experimental work on the O virus has indicated that up to 10 days may elapse between excretion of the virus and the host showing physical signs of the disease. Those who examine animals should be especially careful. Experiments at Pirbright have shown that when examining pigs, some of the foot and mouth virus can reach the human nose, and remain there for 24-48 hours. During this period the virus may be transferred to any other uninfected animals the person is handling or inspecting. More obvious routes of transfer through the handling of infected animals arise from failure to take precautions to disinfect hands or change clothing, or the failure to disinfect vehicles entering or leaving premises. This routine hygiene is particularly important as the incubation period is 2-14 days before symptoms show, but the animals can be infectious during this period.

A complication with diagnosis is that Aphthovirus infection cannot be differentiated clinically from other vesicular diseases. Swine vesicular disease, vesicular stomatitis and vesicular exanthema all show similar symptoms, so confirmation depends on laboratory tests. This is why there is a wait between suspicion and confirmation. In the early days of the outbreak the delay for laboratory confirmation of the disease was considerable. The tests work by the detection of Foot and Mouth viral antigen: they look for a substance that stimulates the production of viral antibodies by a host animal to give that animal immunity to a disease.

The preferred procedure is Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA). Tests of this type are widely used in laboratories, designed to detect specific antigens in animals or humans suffering from a wide range of viral diseases. For this test, antigens are "captured" by rabbit antiserum, bound by guinea pig antiserum which is then bound by rabbit anti-guinea pig serum conjugated to an enzyme. A colour reaction on addition of enzyme substrate indicates a positive reaction. Under ideal conditions a positive result can be obtained 4-5 hours after the sample reaches the laboratory. Like many other procedures this test depends upon a colour change in an enzyme which is not directly related to the virus or its antibody. These are so small that they are not visible to normal view, and no direct test have yet been found. This test is susceptible to interference from foreign bodies at different stages of the process. However the laboratories able to undertake this test are aware of these problems and have refined the procedure and include sufficient controls to give assurance of its validity.

If the ELISA test is unclear because there is only a small amount of agent in the sample, a further test called virus neutralisation (VN) is used, but this is slower and more prone to contamination as it depends on tissue culture. An economical test for screening large numbers of animals has been developed called the virus infection associated antigen (VIAA) test. However, although VIAA gives results within 24 hours and does not require sophisticated facilities, it is not much liked by the scientists responsible for testing as it is not sensitive enough to differentiate individual types of virus. Despite intensive research, no test has yet been developed sufficiently to differentiate infected from vaccinated animals, as both show the same viral antigens.

The tests require bio-containment facilities as they employ active antigens, and so specialist laboratory facilities are used. This technical problem restricted the serological testing of samples. Prior to the current outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, the Pirbright laboratory did about 400 serological tests a week. By the beginning of May they had responded to the need for faster confirmation of clinical suspicion and increased their capacity to 40,000 tests a week. The Centre for Applied Microbiological Research at Porton Down started providing serological testing capacity from the end of May and reached its capacity of 20,000 tests a week. Extra capacity at a regional laboratory at Penrith in Cumbria has been opened in July with an expected capacity of 40,000 tests a week by the end of July. Although test requirements are prioritised centrally, it is intended to undertake a systematic programme of blood sampling through animal health offices, rather than directly from private veterinary surgeons. It is hoped this screening will enable Infected Area status to be revoked as soon as possible.

Vaccination against the virus is practised in countries where a slaughter policy is considered unworkable. Where the disease is endemic and incidence high "ring" vaccination around an outbreak is used to try to contain it, beginning at the perimeter of a prescribed area and progressing towards the centre. The vaccination must be of the correct type as some strains of foot and mouth do not show cross-immunity. Diagnosis, typing, and vaccination must all be speedy - and the process is only of limited effectiveness as vaccinated animals can act as carriers of the disease for long periods.

If it is wished to establish a satisfactory level of immunity in an animal by vaccination, it is usual to give a primary course of two inoculations 2-4 weeks apart, followed by revaccination every 4-12 months. The shelf life of the vaccine is 1-2 years, but it is vital that every batch of vaccine is thoroughly tested for freedom from the infectious virus which is used in its production.

From a political point of view this involves heavy expenditure on diagnostic services, vaccination, etc. and it may also lead to consumer resistance to products from vaccinated animals or the loss of disease free status (although there are no known side effects for humans).

Because Aphthovirus is so contagious and difficult to confirm, in Britain the disease is scheduled and notifiable and the agreed prevention and control measures involve control and surveillance of animal movement, slaughter of infected, convalescent or contact animals which are burned or buried, and disinfection of premises and the infected environment. Any delay in these measures increases the chance of spread to neighbouring farms.

In contrast to Aphthovirus, another disease affecting British cattle which causes concern over the disposal of carcasses is Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). The only detectable macromolecule associated with this infection is a self replicating infectious protein - a prion - a protease resistant isoform of PrP. This has quite different characteristics from Aphthovirus. It is stable over a wide range of pH, and even the recommended decontamination methods for BSE are ineffective when the agent is protected by organic matter. Infectivity can survive interment in soil for three years, dry heat of 360 centigrade for an hour, or autoclaving (steam heat) of 134 centigrade for a quarter of an hour. Unlike Foot and Mouth, it is transmitted mainly by dietary exposure, there is thought to be only a slight risk of maternal transmission, and no evidence at all of horizontal transmission from infected animal to another in the herd.

Unfortunately currently OIE state there is no available diagnostic test for the agent, and there are no visible external changes, apart from behavioural changes. A technique developed in Geneva by Serano has reported a way to take prions in blood samples (where they are rarer by a factor of about a thousand than in the brain), mix them with ordinary protein and bombard them with ultrasound to multiply them in the test tube to detectable amounts, but as yet this is not generally available. Histopathological examination of the brain of clinically affected cases shows spongiform characteristics, and immunohistochemical tests can demonstrate the specific PrP. While OIE (Office International des Epizooties) says the epidemiological connection between new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans and BSE in cattle is not yet proven, it acknowledges it is a matter for concern and suggests that precautions be taken on the assumption it may be transmissible through the food chain.

A concern of relevance to this essay is that cattle slaughtered to control the Foot and Mouth outbreak may also be infected with BSE. They will not show clinical signs of this infection and there is no simple test that would demonstrate the infection. Examination of the brains of Foot and Mouth infected cattle would increase the possibilities of spread of that disease and is not routinely carried out. Since BSE has been found in British herds, it must be assumed as a precautionary measure that some of the culled animals are infected with BSE, although the precise number will not be known. The research noted in the first paragraph above suggests that burial of carcasses is not sufficient to destroy or control the prion causing BSE which can survive interment in soil for three years, although the changes after death of buried cadavers are sufficient to destroy all traces of Foot and Mouth within a short period.

MAFF commissioned risk assessments from DNV Consulting on the potential exposure to BSE infectivity from disposal of cattle due to Foot and Mouth Disease. If disposal is by burning the main route of exposure is through contamination of water supply from ground water, and other routes are through direct inhalation of smoke particles, consumption of unprocessed crops and contamination of water supply from surface water. The main cause of infectivity is incomplete combustion - and the report stated the effect was similar to rendering. Ground water may be contaminated by ash from pyres buried in pits and the prions becoming dissolved in water and getting into the water supply. This effect is reduced as the prion is hydrophobic and so tends to attach to solids rather than dissolve. If there were an organic layer the protein would be likely to attach and be retained, but this possible beneficial scenario is thought unlikely in pit burial.

The simulation suggested that Dairy cattle were approximately five times more infective than Beef cattle, and that burial of carcasses without burning increases the risk by about ten times in both cases. The main route of infectivity for buried carcasses is through contamination of ground water. Since cattle drink a lot more water than humans there is a significantly greater risk to cattle than to humans from this source (especially as there is predicted to be a "species barrier" that would make cattle more susceptible than humans to the PrP which causes the disease). A further risk assessment by DNV Consulting showed that for a pyre of about 1000 dairy cattle the total infectivity to cattle would be about 2 ID₅₀ units (2 units which have a 50% chance of causing infection) in the water supply: but since that would be spread among a large population drinking the water it was considered a small risk as any one animal would drink only a small fraction of that.

In Cumbria alone nearly 200,000 cattle have been culled. Logically if these were placed in burial pits, and there is a 10x greater infectivity of buried carcasses than for the ash from funeral pyres, the multiplication of the risk would represent a much more serious hazard. I could not find any risk assessments for BSE exposure by cattle drinking potentially contaminated water from this method of disposal. The very small amounts of PrP protein, even from a large burial site, would be difficult to detect in a large volume of water.

The power and the limitation of computers

Traditionally, much of the science applied to contain an outbreak like this depended on the pathology, biochemistry and microbiology outlined above. In the foot and mouth outbreak on the Isle of Wight in 1981 epidemiology (the systematic characterisation and exploration of patterns of disease, and the use of this information to resolve the problems) was applied to good effect. In the present outbreak this method was further employed and developed, based on the work of epidemiologists under Professor Roy Anderson. He is heading up a new (November 2000) interdisciplinary department of Infectious Disease Epidemiology at Imperial College. Briefly the changing pattern of infection is fed into a computer model which is then used to suggest the priority areas for allocation of resources to control the outbreak. It requires state of the art parallel computational facilities for large database analysis - and access to accurate statistical data charting the course of the infection.

The power of this method is that variables (such as the culling of contact animals over a given radius) can be changed in the calculations for the computer model and the results extrapolated in each scenario. The most favourable approach to control the disease and the required resources to preserve the maximum number of animals can then be adopted. Of course it cannot take account of variables which have not been included in the calculations or inadequacies in the input data, so the models have been constantly improved and refined during the outbreak.

A limitation of this method is that it is abstract and impersonal, removed from the emotive reality of farms, removed from the suffering and slaughter of animals, and completely removed from the demands of farmers and others involved to have their rights respected. Many within the veterinary profession distrust models such as these. The epidemiological approach models disease as a product of an interaction between an agent, a host and the environment. It treats all diseases as multifactorial with multiple causes (for example it includes calculations about the risk of exposure and / or susceptibility to the infective agent). Most veterinary practice works with a blinkered monocausal "scientific" approach: that the agent causes the disease, and the solution is devoted to destruction or eradication of the agent within the population by cure or culling. It distrusts the statistical nature of risk assessments or epidemiological study. Professionals as well as the public might be impressed by an empirical approach which depends upon observations, models and deductions, but that does not mean they find the statistics of risk by which computer models work amenable or rational.

Rather than accept the clear indications of the computer model that delays in slaughter had contributed to the rapid infectious transmission of the disease, some of the initial comments about the lack of links between outbreaks suggested they were due to insufficient tracings of movements, or that the outbreaks were "probably" triggered by the movements of farmers and their vehicles and exacerbated by farming practices which involve farmers travelling between several pockets of land. This causes understandable resentment with the members of the National Farmers Union and its spokesmen and women show their anger and upset. Meanwhile, off the farms, attention is much more focussed on the greater effect on the rural economy of the incomes of rural businesses, especially in tourism, and despite the risks of indirect spread of the disease, the effort has gone into saying that the countryside is "open for business".

Access to the information upon which decisions are made should be easy. There is a lot of information on the MAFF (now DEFRA) website. But the information is unclear. The risk assessments are of variable quality, and not all the assumptions that they make or the purposes they are intended to meet are clearly identified. Even the details of the cases are not always clear. Is the date of an outbreak the date the farmer suspected the disease, or the date the vet visited the farm, or the date it was reported to the ministry? If control by the methods employed is to be successful, the scientific advice is that speed is of the essence, and the date of first suspicion is the crucial time from the date of the cull. There can be no temporal mapping of the outbreak and its control if the basis of the data is not clear.

Accurate locational information should be easy as the farm and the farmer are named on the website. Each case is published with an address, although not usually a map reference. However there have been well-reported cases where the wrong farm has been culled. Such mistakes may be understandable if they are merely hasty action in the desire for a rapid response. More accurate locational information should prevent such mistakes in a country as well-mapped as Britain. However this is not the only locational problem. The information is reported by county. The locii of outbreaks do not respect political boundaries - and the rapid development of hot-spots means that resources need to be quickly focussed on relatively localised areas which may cross boundaries.

Much has been made of the "science" of how to contain the crisis and the Prime Minister’s reliance upon people like the Chief Scientific Advisor, Professor David King. Some confusion may have arisen because this advice has at times been in tension with MAFF and its reliance on the more traditional veterinary approach. Different sorts of information have been used in the press releases, most notably the epidemiological studies and the microbiological / pathological approach without any clarity about the differences between them - the former is a statistical approach while the latter is about scientific cause and effect. Technical problems have restricted serological testing, but rather than use less sensitive tests that would allow screening of large numbers of animals, there have been long delays while the capacity to allow the required number of the preferred tests has slowly been brought on board.

The comments of scientists and interpretation of computer models (and public perception of a doomsday scenario to the danger of the spread of the virus) caught the media attention for a while and helped to build up a popular mythology that labelled certain groups and individuals as dangers (for example, "the outbreak was caused and exacerbated by careless farmers" and "it was most probably brought into the country illegally in an animal product") and these groups easily become a metaphor or a whipping boy for the ills of society brought about by the economic effects of the crisis. The lack of and confusion between information has allowed the context for the suspicion of a cover-up with rumours of lost phials of virus and the situation so out of control that the truth cannot be revealed.

As many historians or philosophers of science point out, the distinction between irrational behaviour and rational science is not always convincing. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Thomas Kuhn pointed out that scientific ideas are often organised into sets of ideas: what he called paradigms. These define the knowledge that scientists working in a certain area consider acceptable and this then forms the framework for their models. Approaches that are "in tune" with the paradigm are then regarded as the "common sense" approach. It is only when a sufficiently severe crisis of confidence occurs so that everyone agrees it doesn’t look much like common sense that there is a radical change of ideas that Kuhn calls a paradigm shift. It is this crisis of confidence rather than observations or experiments proving results false that enable the science to develop.

In both medicine and veterinary science the focus is increasingly upon laboratory tests - the gross physiological examination and behaviour is felt to be less important than the molecular processes which the models say produce those physical changes. This is particularly true with a disease like Foot and Mouth where the clinical observations alone cannot give a diagnosis. Studies of specimens in a laboratory, or especially epidemiological models of disease on a computer, take the control and eradication of Foot and Mouth away from vets and farmers, with their animals in the fields, to people who probably have never been involved in farms or farming methods. The problems they find and solutions they propose are never likely to impact on the researchers in any personal way.

Media reporting of the limits to science is often concerned with specific issues - like the BSE crisis ‘caused’ by yesterday’s "breakthrough" of a miracle way of feeding cattle. It is often seen as a problem of an individual screwball scientist who has been allowed to get out of control, rather than a critique of the whole approach to the scientific enterprise. Politicians should rightly be embarrassed that events have shown the dangers of self-limiting and self-regulating "scientific" approaches that get out of control. During the last few generations some scientific paradigms about efficiency of agricultural production have achieved such a monopoly with the politicians that they have passed control to experts trained to the highest levels of specialised incompetence.

Technological innovation and costly equipment have allowed us to pursue the utopia of feeding a growing world population. It seems like a tweak here or there in methodology, a bit more advanced equipment, judicious addition of the right chemicals, improvement of the odd gene or two, and hey presto! We could end famine and poor nutrition. What has in fact happened is that a larger proportion of the worlds population is surviving on a level of nourishment that would formerly have been lethal, while the rich minority absorb even greater amounts of poisons and mutagens in their food, whilst contributing to the environmental degradation of our planet.

Perhaps the common sense approach needs to be reassessed. Many of the animals are being bred for slaughter, yet the culling required by the scientists to avert a deeper crisis seems an untimely and unnatural end. To us death as the outcome of infection with a known disease seems abnormal, even in an animal bred for slaughter. Could it be that we see it as a threat to our economic system: the waste of units of production in our industrialised agriculture? Even full compensation to the farmer doesn’t stop us seeing this as waste. Or is the threat to our faith in the invincibility of science, recognising as it does an inability of present knowledge to contain and eradicate this minuscule life form. Deep down we are convinced that something that small can’t be so difficult to beat! I think the threat goes deeper into our psyche even than that, it affects our dignity - "writing off" the animals as a total loss affects the self-image of farmers and farming and through them the self-image of our rural and indeed national economy and society - the indignity of producing only useless corpses to rot or burn.

It may be that the government is now preparing to make hard political decisions. What was MAFF has now only a minor role within DEFRA. There is no longer a ministry dedicated to agriculture. Farms and farming no longer have an undiluted voice at the highest levels of government. The rural economy has been demonstrated to have other factors which are very much more important than farming. Agricultural subsidy support accounts for a third of the annual farming income of £15 billion. If unsubsidised areas like pigs and potatoes are ignored, then for many farmers the subsidy can account for 50% of income. It may be that economics will dictate switching subsidies away from farming (modulation in EU jargon) to protection of the environment and the encouragement of alternative rural businesses. Even within the current CAP regime up to 20% of subsidies can be diverted, and it may be that more radical proposals will be brought forward.

The evidence for Aphthovirus as the causative agent for Foot and Mouth is compelling. There is an organic web to the disease - the infections are linked by direct or indirect contact, the agent is associated with the disease, the virulence, physiology and pathology are well documented. Computer models have shown up the shortcomings of MAFF’s initial response, and have offered a more sophisticated calculation of the resources needed to control the outbreak. The best approach to control cannot however be determined by even this knowledge, because for instance the prions for BSE might get into the food chain if standard methods to control Foot and Mouth alone are used to dispose of cattle after culling. Or again, the release of toxic substances, particularly dioxins, into the environment during mass incineration of carcasses on bonfires led to considerable protest, and after monitoring alternative methods of disposal were adopted. These alternative methods too will require careful monitoring.

It may seem that these are all eminently sensible "scientific" adjustments to the approach. But ultimately what happens is about power - and that power rests with those who emphasise the need to "cull out" the disease by mass slaughter. The threat that makes this necessary is that the health of the nation’s herd will be harmed, our animals no longer suitable for export. At a time when the agricultural industry is still reeling from the damage to its image and livelihood of BSE, and public uncertainty about genetically modified foods, such a threat is very easily heeded. The alternative method of control by vaccination, although understood by the public appears risky - risky because animals are likely to carry the disease for long periods, and risky because many members of the public feel uneasy about the safety of vaccination. They refuse to have their children vaccinated even though it is safer than the outcome of a unvaccinated child catching a disease, and there is consumer resistance to new and untried treatments for animals from whom our food is derived, however safe it may be claimed to be.

The long term negative effect of this apparently rational and responsible attempt to control the Foot and Mouth outbreak may in fact be for the public to call into question the foundations on which farming is based. It is a profound institutional crisis of the agro-industrial approach. There is an apparent abuse of power in mass slaughter of animals, the majority of which would only suffer fairly minor symptoms. Such abuse in a country known for protests about cruelty towards animals, is highly likely to find some members of the public willing to question the implementation of that process (even though much of the protest was the "not in my backyard" type of reaction).

For a number of years, various organisations have produced codes of conduct to regulate their activities. Farming is no exception. There are minimum standards of ethical obligation in the treatment of animals, recognised in law at least since the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876. The Farm Animal Welfare Council, is appointed by the Government and accepts that "in the majority of cases the farmers are the best guardians of their stock", but it identifies five freedoms: freedom from malnutrition, thermal and physical discomfort, injury and distress, fear and stress, and severe restriction on behaviour. Some pressure groups may also make many more recommendations. The government has to judge the right balance between welfare and efficiency - but it can be strongly influenced by public revulsion at what seems to be suffering by some of the animals kept in poor conditions or used in research. It is likely that DEFRA, representing a wide variety of non-agricultural interests, will be more open to hear those concerns than MAFF which was concerned with the farming industry.

Of course, suggesting that ethics is relevant at all may be contentious. In our society ethics may be an illusion or constraint that our pragmatic society can do better without. Pressure groups have ideals, and while scruple free individualism tolerates their right to express those views, pragmatic indifference exempts us from any duty towards meeting them, unless there is some obvious advantage in doing so. In any case, public pressure is an uncertain basis for ethics and action. When for example publicity about Phoenix the calf appeared to curtail the culling programme at one stage, that seemed a political decision. The best basis of action in stopping an epidemic is the adoption of an agreed strategy that will prevent the disease spreading. Even if that strategy has to be rigorous, it still must not be relaxed until a significant period after the last report of infection. Normality is not achieved by wishful thinking.

Thought for food

During this crisis has probably not been the best time to make a dispassionate evaluation of the objective risk of Foot and Mouth Disease, or to change the approach taken to control it. However it is imperative that once the crisis is over, the magnitude of the claimed risk is reassessed and the independence and competence of the "expert scientific standards" guaranteed. The different criteria by which the decisions were taken need to be clearly identified. There are good, even compelling, reasons for the cull. But weighty reasons dull the senses. It is important to reassess the ethical and scientific basis for this action. It is important to see if the research into alternatives is really as disappointing as it has been presented. It is important to have reassurance that those employed in the field had proper briefings about what was expected of them, proper co-ordination of their effort and all the resources they needed. The government promises us a Public Enquiry. It is to be hoped that its terms are as wide as possible.

Our agriculture is organised on free-market principles, with some state aid and safety nets. We have to expect farmers, as any other for-profit organisations, to operate in such a way as to maximise profit. But it is surely in order that any aid and regulation could be channelled in such a way that ensures basic environmental and ethical values are met. It is surely right that the farmers should receive a reasonable recompense for long hours and arduous work that provides the rest of us with the foods we need. Food retailers have the power to demand the lowest prices. The greatest pressure is felt on medium sized family run farms as farming continues to polarise between large agribusinesses which adapt their produce and methods to the demands of the retailers (with less consideration to the environmental cost) and small hobby holdings. Many farmers are having to diversify away from farming into tourism or cottage industries. Farmers find that farming and food production are the subject of criticism and even abuse in return for what is a hard and precarious occupation. Floods and now the outbreak of disease reaffirm the truth that there are no guaranteed harvests. A healthy respect for doubt (at least for doubt about what may do the greatest harm in the long term) may be our safeguard to prevent the error of ultimate final certainty (or at least the error of a science that knows only the certainties of its own rationality).

A second and related framework refers to the process and processing of religious experience. (Baillie and Reader 2001). Once again there are four stages. The beginning of a person's spiritual journey may ( or may not) begin with a specific experience or encounter, an event or singularity the power of which resists description or articulation. What we call conversion is of this order, but we must not interpret this too narrowly. Once this has occurred - at stage one - the question arises of how this event is to be interpreted and communicated to others. Such singularities resist this process and it could be argued that any attempts to turn them into words are bound to distort or betray the depth of the experience. (Derrida 1995) However, if this process is not undertaken, the individual remains alone and outside any faith tradition. Faith traditions are formulated as people share their experiences and begin to articulate them and this forms the second stage or level of the process. The words are inadequate, but are the best we can do. Further, we know that these experiences are interpreted and described in the terminology of the tradition with which the individual is familiar. So there is a back-and-forth movement between experience and description. Some people may never have the experience that is referred to in the discourse but may yet belong to the particular tradition. The problem is that the formulations and practices of the tradition become more concrete and foundational over time. They take over from experience the central role within the faith tradition and are seen to be the criteria by which new developments must be judged. These formulations are challenged as and when events occur, or people have new thoughts that no longer fit neatly within the established interpretations. I would describe this as the inherent uncertainties and chaos of life undermining or deconstructing the supposed certainties and formulations of the tradition and this occurs at the third stage of the process. For some the shocks and challenges may be too much and the traditions so inflexible that they have to be abandoned completely. The authority of the Bible is undermined by theories of evolution etc. However, for others there may remain enough in the tradition that still speaks to their experience to encourage them to try to reformulate or reconstruct that tradition - stage four. (Reader 1997). This is always a tricky enterprise as the guardians of the tradition will see this as threatening and subversive. It may be easier just to walk away and relocate somewhere else. The question here is whether the current crisis, probably interpreted as an environmental issue, can draw upon any resources from within the Christian tradition that can guide practical and moral responses. This has to be an open question to which the answers are still being sought. As I said initially I happen to believe that the most important resource that the Christian tradition can offer in this crisis is the space or opportunity for a wide range of people to examine this as a moral issue, where questions of value, of life and death, of order and chaos can and must be addressed. (Goodall and Reader, 1992). Christians may well find themselves part of a wider movement that resists any moves to reduce the issues to cold economics or a detached technological debate.

My final reflection is a sense that our culture through the dominant discourses that we employ, those of an instrumental reason, a search for calculability and supposed objectivity, relegates matters that are seen to be "the other of reason", i.e. feelings and indeed faith to a minor and impotent role. (Reader 2001). There is a polarisation between this narrow view of reason and an equally narrow view of faith and feeling that does damage to our understanding of ourselves and suppresses elements that should rightly form part of the current debate about what to do in the face of this crisis. This is so deeply embedded in our culture and in our language as well as our discourses that it is very difficult to break out of it. We see the fires burning and the carcasses being piled high and we know something is disturbingly wrong, but we can get no further because of the limitations of our own self-understanding. Yet there must be hope, perhaps for a wider vision of reason that enables open debate, a wider vision of faith and feeling that sees their investment in language and the promise of something better, and the fact that our encounter with the "other" lives summons us to a more human response. Each of these may offer us ways of handling the inevitable indeterminacy that results from attempts to reconstruct our tradition in the light of current challenges. The only land that we can inhabit requires of us greater degrees of self-awareness and a willingness to travel more lightly.

References.

Caroline Baillie and John Reader, forthcoming Paper on levels of knowledge development and consciousness in religion and science, 2001.

Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Polity Press, 1999), P78-9.

Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, (The University of Chicago Press 1995), P71.

Margaret Goodall and John Reader, Paper on Creating Spaces in The Earth Beneath, (S.P.C.K. 1992).

John Reader, Local Theology: Church and Community in Dialogue, (S.P.C.K. 1994), Pp20-22.

John Reader, Beyond All Reason: The Limits of Post-Modern Theology (Aureus 1997), Ppl50-156.

John Reader, forthcoming Ph.D thesis with University of Wales, Bangor (2001). Faith and Reason with specific reference to Habermas and Derrida.

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