WINTER WAR 30.11.1939 - 13.3.1940

Finnish Air Force Unit Organizations during the Winter War

Flying Regiment

The largest Finnish Air Force (FAF) flying formation was Flying Regiment (Lentorykmentti, LentoR). Regiment was composed of the following components:

Rykmentinkomentaja (Regiment Commander)

Esikunta (E/LentoR) (Regimental HQ)

Esikuntakomppania (EK/LentoR) (HQ Company)

Lentolaivue (LLv.) (Flying Squadron)
Laivueenkomentaja (Squadron Commander)
... Esikunta (E/LLv.) (HQ)
... Esikuntakomppania (EK/LLv.) (HQ Company)

... (one or more flying squadrons)

Ilmailuvarikkokomppania (Ilm.Var.K) (Aviation Depot Company)
which formed and kept up
----- Ilmailukenttävarikko (Ilm.KV) (Aviation Field Depot)
----- ----- Teknillinen joukkue (Technical Platoon)
----- ----- Ilmataisteluvälinejoukkue (Air Combat Ordnance Platoon)
----- ----- Erikoisvälinejoukkue (Special Equipment Platoon)
----- ----- Vartio- ja ilmatorjuntajoukkue (Guard and Anti-Aircraft Platoon)
----- ----- (2x 20 mm heavy AAMG, at Ilm.KV 2 only)
----- ----- Toimitusjoukkue (Delivery Platoon)

Kentänhuoltojoukkue (Khj.) (Airfield Maintenance Platoon)
... (various number, subordinated also to flying squadrons)

Täydennyslentorykmentti (T-LentoR) (Supplement Flying Regiment)
... (one or more supplement squadrons)

muita yksiköitä / other units
- radioasemia / radio stations
- ilmatorjuntayksiköitä / subordinated anti-aircraft units
- huolto- ja kuljetusyksiköitä / subordinated supply and transport units

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Supplement Flying Regiments and Training Squadrons

During the Winter War each of the three flying regiments had one Supplement Flying Regiment (Täydennyslentorykmentti, T-LentoR) under its command. Name was misleading because in practise all supplement regiments had initially only one training squadron instead of the planned two ones. T-LentoR 2 although had two training squadrons since late January 1940. Supplement flying regiments, training squadrons and pilot training in Finland are handled on page FAF Training Units 1939 - 1940.
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Supply of Flying Squadrons and Air-Bases

Aviation Depot Company (Ilmailuvarikkokomppania, Ilm.Var.K) formed and kept up Aviation Field Depot (Ilmailukenttävarikko, Ilm.KV) which was responsible of fuel, ammunition, spare part, accessory and special supply of flying squadrons. Full strength of the aviation field depot was 10 officers + 74 NCOs + 82 men = 166 men. Ilm.KV 4 which was mainly for Flying Squadron 16 (LLv.16) was to be smaller unit with the full strength of 8 + 41 + 52 = 101 men.

Each field depot had repair shop for larger or more demanding repairs and overhauls of planes not possible to do in squadrons. In practise Ilm.KV 1 repaired and overhauled all planes which operated to the direction of Karelian Isthmus. During the war it was reinforced with the command from Ilm.KV 2 of which repair shop mainly produced tools, engine and aircraft hoods, engine heaters, transport sleighs and snow roller equipment for the new squadrons and other flying regiments. All aviation field depots co-operated closely with the squadrons.

Aviation field depots during the Winter War were as follows:

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There were initially four aviation field depots but the fifth was formed at the beginning of February 1940 for training auxiliary aviation mechanics for the front squadrons. Central Aviation Depot (Ilmailuvarikko, Ilm.V) at Tampere was responsible of supplying Air Fighting School (ISK), training units and all combat units in western Finland west from the city line Loviisa - Lahti.

Airfield Maintenance Platoons (Kentänhuoltojoukkue, Khj.) were responsible of the overall supply of airfield or air-base they were assigned to. They were subordinated to flying squadrons. Their primary task was to keep ordered airfields in good condition and arrange accommodation for the flying and technical personnel. Also guarding and anti-aircraft arrangements were their duties. Platoons had a few trucks for transport duties.

Full strength of the platoon was one officer + 10 NCOs + 41 men = 52 men but the actual strength varied and typical platoons were usually only slightly bigger than half platoons. Already during the war was noticed that platoons were too small in strength. There were although also bigger platoons. At the beginning of the Winter War there were a total of 25 airfield maintenance platoons of which some were assigned to certain larger air-bases and named accordingly. For example LentoR 2 had the following five platoons in its disposal:

- Airfield Maintenance Platoon / Immola
- Airfield Maintenance Platoon / Mensuvaara
- Airfield Maintenance Platoon 22
- Airfield Maintenance Platoon 24
- Airfield Maintenance Platoon 26

Khj.26 was later at Säkylä preparing ice airfield on lake Pyhäjärvi for LLv.28 [MS].
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Anti-Aircraft Protection of Air-Bases

Anti-aircraft protection of air-bases was very weak during the whole Winter War. Squadrons had usually only a handful of obsolete Maxim MGs and Vickers or Lewis observer MGs taken away from abandoned planes. A typical temporary ice airfield had only two such light AAMGs (for example at Ruokolahti) which was a totally insufficient amount. This weakness forced Finns to use temporary ice airfields which were usually abandoned immediately after Soviets could spot them. Units changed their locations occasionally also for concealing their actual low number.

At the beginning of the Winter War LentoR 2 had only a total of 13 mixed type light AAMGs for the protection of its several air-bases. The sole Anti-Aircraft Platoon / Aviation Depot Company 2 received two 20 mm heavy AAMGs (20 It.K/30 BSW) on 7.12.1939 but they were subordinated straight away closer to the front where the squadrons of LentoR 2 operated.
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Flying Squadron

In 1939 the official numbers of aircraft in the different type Finnish Flying Squadrons (Lentolaivue or Laivue, LLv.) were as follows:

Additionally squadrons had training, liaison and target towing aircraft but usually not more than one or two planes at the same time. Squadron number's first digit indicated the flying regiment in which the squadron belonged to.

Squadrons had their own technical units for daily repairs and maintenance of aircraft and a small store units for spare parts, ammunition, fuel and special aviation gear. These were supplied by aviation field depot of their own flying regiment or some other ordered aviation field depot. Supply Chief [Huoltopäällikkö] was responsible of squadron's supply branch and had squadron's supply units under his command.

Mechanics belonged to squadron's technical branch under the command of squadron's Engineer [Insinööri] who was mechanical engineer officer. For each plane there were three professional mechanics and two auxiliary mechanics (reservists) of which another was responsible of weapons.

Weather Station Squad [Sääasemaryhmä] belonged to all squadrons at the beginning of war. Every day squad measured six times between 6:00 am and 20:00 pm the following parameters: air temperature, air pressure, the lowest level of clouds, direction of wind and speed of wind at cloud level. Information was published in a simple "weather message" [sääsanoma] which described the actual weather. Strength of the squad was only one NCO and two men. Squadrons formed during the war didn't necessarily have weather station squad of their own and in some cases airfield maintenance platoons did their job.

Squadron's Transport Platoon (Kuljetusjoukkue, Kulj.J) was responsible of all transportation inside squadron's operation area. Full platoon had less than 30 men and 21 motor vehicles, including three fuel trucks, special trucks and tractors. Weak civilian trucks and the lack of tools and many special items and equipment (like heaters) were a major problem especially to new squadrons formed during the war.
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Flight

Full squadron had usually three Flights [Lentue, Ltue] but their actual number varied between two and five depending on the unit. Flight had either two to four twin engine bombers, two to six dive bombers, reconnaissance and maritime planes or four to ten fighters.

On 22.1.1940 it was decided to equip reconnaissance squadrons with obsolescent fighter types. One or two flights remained Reconnaissance Flights [Tiedustelulentue] with about four planes each while Fighter Flight [Hävittäjälentue] had about six Gloster Gladiator II (GL) fighters which LLv.12 and 14 received between 12.2. - 1.3.1940. LLv.16 didn't have fighter flight during the Winter War.
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Detachment

Special combat Detachments [Osasto] formed temporarily during the war could have more planes than a flight but usually not much more than ten. There could be planes from other units or flights as well. Detachment was named after its Chief who was the oldest Flight Leader [Lentueenpäällikkö].
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Finnish Air Force Tactics during the Winter War

Finnish fighter tactics was mainly developed by Lt.Col. Richard Lorentz together with Capt. Gustaf Magnusson and some other younger pilots. Capt. Magnusson visited in Germany and France in the late 1930's and realized the main weaknesses of FAF. His reports to his superiors contained new fresh views and new tactical principles which were soon accepted and adopted by FAF. Tactical superiority explains much of the results Finnish pilots gained during the Winter War and also later during the Continuation War.

Some of Magnusson's proposals, for example concentrated leading of separate fighter formations and the use of radio intelligence, were so far-sighted ideas that they could not be used in practice before the summer 1944 because of weak radio equipment. Many unique tactical principles created in the 1930's and during the war are still used by FAF in the far modernized and further developed form.
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Tactical Formations

Finnish Air Force was among the first air forces in the world whose fighters adopted revolutionary and very flexible two plane formation called Patrol [Partio] in the late 1930's. Other formations used were four plane Swarm [Parvi] (two patrols) and six or eight plane Flight [Lentue]. This new division was especially efficient when patrols were staggered in height. The topmost fighter pair was called "top patrol" [lakipartio] and its task was to protect other fighters from surprises and help other fighters in troubles.

In Soviet Union similar kind of loose fighter formations and tactical use of fighters were adopted as late as in autumn 1943. Some better Soviet units had used or tested these earlier and found the benefits. During 1939 - 1940 a typical Soviet fighter and bomber formations used fixed three plane or larger formations and very formal tactical methods which eliminated much of their numerical superiority.

During the Winter War Finnish reconnaissance planes and bombers flew mostly alone or in a row and attacked targets individually or one by one because their numbers were so low. Officially bomber flights flew in three plane triangle formations with one plane leading.
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Combat Principles and Tactics

Before the Winter War all Fokker D.XXI (FR) fighters were gathered into one large fighter squadron of five flights for ensuring pilots' similar kind of training and the most efficient tactical use of aircraft. Because Soviet fighters were armoured, in most cases faster and at least as agile as the Finnish fighters Finnish pilots didn't eagerly fought against fighters - bombers were their primary targets. This does not mean that Finnish pilots would have avoided combat. All available targets were attacked if it was possible despite of the crushing numerical superiority of the enemy.

Dogfights were extremely dangerous with planes without armoured seat and self sealing fuel tanks. FR's "Achilles' heel" were its bad turning characters. Plane went easily to a so called "slip motion" (tip stall) in too tight turn which was followed by a violent spin. That was usually fatal only at low level because pilots were well trained to handle such situations. On the other hand the most experienced pilots could use it as a trick to make an enemy pilot believing he had hit.

During the early phases of war advanced Finnish fighter tactics surprised unescorted Soviet bombers. To ensure good firing results Finnish pilots were trained to open accurate MG fire at the distance of only 50 m (instead of the typical 100 - 150 m) and it was also carefully inspected that all fighter pilots were really capable of doing so. Machine guns were predirected to 150 - 200 m. At the beginning of the Winter War Finnish fighters had only ordinary MG and tracer bullets (usually the rightmost fuselage MG only had tracers) but later fighters received also armour piercing and ignition bullets.

Because all Finnish fighters were unprotected another important factor was to stay out of the bombers' defensive rear MG fire. That was possible only if a pilot flew a little lower than a bomber behind its tail. Usually both the leftmost and rightmost bombers in formation were attacked simultaneously. It was called "rolling tactics". Lurking left and right from behind the tail and firing short well aimed bursts against the rear MG gunner first and then to engines the fate of the bomber was usually soon sealed.

Fighter tactics didn't remain the same during the whole war and it was not quite similar for all fighter types. Squadrons developed all the time new better tactical methods. On 28.2.1940 the Commander of Flying Regiment 2 Lt.Col. R. Lorentz gave the following directive to Flying Squadron 26 (FAs):

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Evading Enemy Attacks

Diving away was the most typical method to avoid combat with Soviet fighters or leave the combat against overwhelming superiority. Although Fokker D.XXIs were obsolescent for dogfight they were stable, reliable and sturdy machines which could out-dive all Soviet fighters; even a straight dive at 4.000 m was possible. If a Soviet pilot followed too eagerly his plane easily broke up mid-air due to structural overspeed or he dived down to trees or ground. There were many such "aerial victories".

During Winter War Finnish Bristol Blenheim I and IV (BL) bombers were fast enough to avoid most Soviet fighters if not surprised. Typical way to evade attacking fighters was to slide below the horizon at full speed and continue flying very low - almost at the level of the highest trees. Finnish bomber pilots were also trained to manoeuvre with their planes and under attack they didn't just fly straight ahead like most Soviet bombers and bomber formations did under attack.

Rear MG gunners had no real chances of shooting armoured Soviet fighters down because the calibre of their defensive weapons (7.62 or 7.7 mm) was too ineffective and also the rates of fire too low. The only meaning of the rear counter fire was to interfere fighter pilots' aiming as long time as possible firing short bursts against the attacker. Rear gunner also gave advice to pilot telling from where and when enemy prepares to shoot.

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Total Combat Strength

(Liaison and trainer aircraft not included.)
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On 15.3.1940 total strength of FAF was 409 aircraft of which
225 planes in working order and 184 out of order (72 in units and 112 at VL).
Total number of training, liaison and transport planes was 178 of which only 91
in working order and 87 out of order (31 in units and 56 at VL). 58 combat planes
were written off from FAF inventory during the Winter War because of combat
and non-combat losses, accidents and serious damages.

During the Winter War State Aircraft Factory repaired a total of 145 aircraft
(17 in December 1939, 25 in January 1940, 54 in February and 49 during
March before 13.3.1940) (LEVAH).

Most of these figures are presented by Atso Haapanen (HAAAH2).
They contain certain minor conflicts which are due to mistakes in official records
of FAF. They although don't have effect on the table above which is based on
squadrons' own announcements.

Suur-Merijoki, 1.12.39- Imatra

Komentaja / Commander
Col. Y. Opas
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Dive bomber squadron.
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Reconnaissance squadron.
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Reconnaissance squadron.
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Reconnaissance squadron.
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Utti, 30.11.39- Immola, 27.12.39- Joutseno, 21.1.40- Selänpää (Valkeala)

Komentaja / Commander
Lt.Col. R. Lorentz
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Fighter squadron. Formed on 10.1.1940.
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Fighter squadron.
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Fighter squadron.
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Fighter squadron. Formed on 8.12.1939.
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Luonetjärvi

Komentaja / Commander
Lt.Col. T. Somerto
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Bomber squadron. Formed on 16.1.1940.
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Bomber squadron.
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Bomber squadron.
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Helsinki

Laivaston ilmakomentaja / Naval Air Commander
Lt.Col. G. von Behr

HQ of Naval Air Commander was formed from the peace-time Separate Flying Squadron (Er.LLv.).
Its flying part became LLv.36 which was subordinated to Naval Forces Staff
for maritime reconnaissance missions.
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Maritime reconnaissance squadron.
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Veitsiluoto (Kemi)

Komentaja / Commander
Maj. H. Beckhammar

Officially formed on 10.1.1940.
Subordinated to Swedish Volunteer Group (SFK) and later in February 1940 to Group SFr.
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Bomber / Joint Operation Flight
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Transport / Liaison Flight
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Lt.
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P. Sterner (-12.1.40 POW)
no named Flight Leader

no named Flight Leader