How a U.S. company props up the House of Saud
By WILLIAM D. HARTUNG
William D. Hartung is a Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute at
the New School for Social Research in New York City and the author of
"And Weapons for All" (Harper Collins, 1995). The author would
like to thank his colleague Jennifer Washburn for providing research
assistance in the preparation of this article. (19K)
On November 13, 1995, a bomb exploded at the headquarters of the
Saudi Arabian National Guard and an adjacent building that housed a U.S.
military training mission. The bomb killed five Americans and wounded
thirty more. President Clinton tried to paint the bombing as just another
senseless act of terrorism perpetrated by armed Islamic extremists. But
the target was chosen much more carefully than that.
The Saudi National Guard is a 55,000-man military force
whose main job is to protect the Saudi monarchy from its own
people. A January 1996 article in Jane's Defence Weekly describes the
Saudi Arabian National Guard as "a kind of Praetorian Guard for the
House of Saud, the royal family's defense of last resort against internal
opposition. "
The Saudi National Guard uses arms from the United
States. That is well known. But few Americans are aware that the U.S.
government has subcontracted the training of the Saudi National
Guard to roughly 750 retired U.S. military and intelligence personnel
employed by the Vinnell Corporation of Fairfax, Virginia.
In this context, the November bombing was certainly brutal, but
it was far from senseless. As one retired American military officer
familiar with Vinnell's operations put it, "I don't think it was an
accident that it was that office that got bombed. If you wanted to make a
political statement about the Saudi regime, you'd single out the
National Guard, and if you wanted to make a statement about American
involvement, you'd pick the only American contractor involved in training
the guard: Vinnell."
The story of this obscure American company shows how the U.S.
government, even after Ollie North and Iran-contra, still relies on
unaccountable private companies to do its dirty work around the world,
short-circuiting democracy at home and abroad in the process. If anyone
believed that the era of covert policymaking by the United States had
ended, Vinnell' s role in Saudi Arabia proves otherwise.
As one of Vinnell's former presidents says, the company didn't
start out as a "spook outfit." Founded in 1931 as a small Los
Angeles-area construction company, the firm profited from contracts for
the L.A. freeway system. Some of Vinnell's best-known projects are
decidedly civilian in character, including work on the Grand Coulee Dam
and the construction of L.A.'s Dodger Stadium. But by the end of World War
II, the company was already dabbling in military and intelligence work.
Vinnell's first overseas contract involved shipping supplies to Chinese
Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek as part of his futile attempt to beat back the
revolutionary forces of Mao Tse-tung. The company soon embarked on a
booming military construction business in Asia, building military
airfields in Okinawa, Taiwan, Thailand, South Vietnam, and Pakistan.
Vinnell's Asian adventures marked its emergence as a global
company more than willing to do a little intelligence work on the side. In
his memoir, Ropes of Sand, former CIA operative Wilbur Crane Eveland
describes how he used his Vinnell connection as a cover during his tours
of duty in Africa and the Middle East in the early 1960s, noting that
company founder Albert Vinnell expressed his willingness to help the
agency any way he could (for a fee, of course). Eveland returned the favor
by negotiating contracts for Vinnell to do construction services on oil
fields in Iran and Libya, bribing the appropriate officials along the way.
Vinnell's big break in the military/intelligence field came
during the U.S. invasion of Vietnam, when the company won hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of business doing everything from building
military bases to repairing armored personnel carriers to running military
warehouses. At the peak of its involvement, Vinnell had 5,000 employees in
Vietnam, but not all of them were engaged in straightforward military
operations. Several retired Army and Marine officers familiar with
Vinnell's work in Vietnam have indicated that the company ran several
"black" (secret) programs.
In a March 1975 interview with The Village Voice, a Pentagon
official described Vinnell as "our own little mercenary army in
Vietnam" and asserted that "we used them to do things we either
didn't have the manpower to do ourselves, or because of legal
problems." The official indicated that one of Vinneli's jobs was as
"rear security forces, " assigned to "clean up" U.S.
military bases in Vietnam during the U.S. withdrawal: "How they
'cleaned up' was pretty much up to them . . . . If we figured an area was
certain to be overrun by the VC [Viet Cong] . . . they were to demolish
everything and anything."
Vinnell nearly demolished its own financial viability in
Vietnam. Vinnell posted losses every year from 1970 through 1974, and in
January 1975 the company filed a reorganization plan with the California
Department of Corporations in which it proposed to sell voting control in
the company to a Lebanese investor for the modest sum of $500,000. With
this dismal financial picture looming in the background, the firm' s
February 1975 contract for $77 million to train the Saudi National
Guard brought Vinnell back from the brink of bankruptcy and kept it from
being sold.
The Vinnell-Saudi training deal drew considerable fire,
both in the press and on Capitol Hill.
On February 9, 1975, Peter Arnett filed a piece for the
Associated Press that raised questions about the propriety of a private
U.S. company serving as a hired protection service for an undemocratic
regime. When Arnett asked one of Vinnell's men in Riyadh whether he viewed
himself as a mercenary, the question drew a classic bureaucratic response:
"We are not mercenaries because we are not pulling the triggers. We
train people to pull the triggers. Maybe that makes us executive
mercenaries."
This setup was a bit too blatant even for the more hawkish
members of Congress. Senator Henry Jackson of Washington and Armed
Services committee chairman John Stennis of Mississippi demanded hearings
on the contract, which Jackson purported to find "completely
baffling. " Meanwhile, a reform-minded young Congressman from
Wisconsin named Les Aspin aired charges that the $77 million Saudi contract
may have been greased with a $4.5 million payment to a middleman. The
hearings were held, but the contract to train the Saudi National
Guard was allowed to stand.
By 1979, when a rebellion rocked the Saudi regime and
opposition forces occupied the Grand Mosque at Mecca, Vinnell's
"executive mercenaries" were called out from behind the scenes.
The Washington Post reported at the time that in the final stages of
storming the Mosque, the Saudi princes who were running the
military operation relied on "advice from the large U.S. military
training mission" (including Vinnell contract employees) and were
"in frequent telephone contact with U. S. officials." Counterspy
magazine further reported that when the initial National Guard assault
failed, Vinnell personnel were brought to Mecca to "provide the
tactical support needed to capture the Mosque. "
During the 1980s, things returned to "normal" in Saudi
Arabia, with strict controls on freedom of expression of the rights of
women, public beheadings of common criminals, and the maintenance of a
fiercely anti-communist, pro-U.S. foreign policy. These same practices
continue to this day.
Vinnell's role as the regime's principal security
"prop" was barely discussed in the U.S. media, but the company
did figure indirectly in the biggest intelligence scandal of the decade,
Iran-contra. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Gadd, who went on to become the
chief operations officer for Ollie North and Richard Secord's private
weapons air-drop service for the Contras, was hired by Vinnell for his
first job out of the Air Force. According to Steven Emerson's 1988 book,
Secret Warriors, Gadd's work at Vinnell involved setting up a private,
"black" air- transport service called Sumairco, which was to be
dedicated solely to secret U.S. Army operations. Gadd left Vinnell after a
few months, taking Sumairco with him. He also used his stopover at Vinnell
to get started on two other "special services" companies,
American National Management and Eagle Aviation Services, which were
secretly involved in the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada and other U.S.
military operations.
That someone like Gadd would use Vinnell as his transition from
serving in the armed forces to joining the nether world of private
companies involved in covert operations on behalf of the U.S. government
is not surprising. Although Vinnell is one of hundreds of companies that
do work for the CIA and military intelligence agencies, its strong ties to
Saudi Arabia and its experience in military training and logistics
make it a central player in this still burgeoning field.
Today, the biggest question regarding Vinnell's ongoing
operations is the same one that was posed twenty years ago: Why is a U.S.
company using retired U.S. military and intelligence personnel to defend a
corrupt monarchy in Saudi Arabia? What's in it for the monarchy is
obvious: protection from rebels and democrats who might want to change the
kingdom's form of government. On this front, Vinnell must be busier than
ever. Human Rights Watch reported that in 1994, "Saudi Arabia witnessed
the largest roundup in recent history of opposition activists and a new
low in the dismal human-rights record of the Kingdom." The
organization's report for 1995 cited "further deterioration in human-
rights observance," including a harsh crackdown on peaceful Islamist
organizations. Political parties and demonstrations are outlawed, there is
no independent free press, and there has been a systematic crackdown on
peaceful Islamic dissenters.
This January, Saudi officials tried to get Britain to
deport Mohammed al-Mas'ari. His London-based Committee for the Defense of
Legitimate Rights has been faxing reports about the Riyadh government to
contacts within Saudi Arabia. The none-too-subtle message conveyed
to Conservative Prime Minister John Major's government was that if Mas'ari
was allowed to continue operating, Britain's future arms sales and other
commercial contracts with Saudi Arabia might suffer. "The Saudi
regime is a mafia that has enormous wealth under its control and
doesn't want to give it up," Mas'ari told The New York Times.
"We want to have an elected, accountable government with a real rule
of law and an independent judiciary."
Supporters of Mas'ari's organization operating within Saudi
Arabia do not fare well. On August 11, 1995, the Saudi regime
beheaded Abdalla al-Hudhaif, who was convicted by a secret tribunal of
offenses ranging from firearms possession to distributing leaflets
criticizing the government to allegedly throwing acid at a security
officer. Human Rights Watch notes that this last allegation against
Hudhaif is the only violent act alleged against the peaceful Islamist
opposition in Saudi Arabia during the government's continuing
crackdown on their activities. Since peaceful means of expressing
disagreement with the current Saudi ruling circle are
systematically blocked, violent outbursts like the bombing of the Saudi
National Guard headquarters are more likely to occur. When they do, Saudi
Arabia's Vinnell-trained internal security forces will be on hand to
quash them.
As for Vinnell and its employees, their main interest in Saudi
Arabia is undoubtedly the money. A retired Marine officer who did five
years with Vinnell in Saudi Arabia reports that he was able to save
up several hundred thousand dollars to buy a retirement home in cash. An
official familiar with the work of another U.S. firm that recently got a
contract to train the Saudi Navy says that employees at the firm
"feel like they've died and gone to heaven, because the Saudis will
never run out of money." But the myth of Saudi Arabia as a
bottomless source of cash has worn thin lately. Billions of dollars in
weapons purchases from the United States plus the cost of the 1991 Persian
Gulf War have driven the Saudi budget into deficit for the first
time ever. But that hasn't affected Vinell yet; the Saudis recently
renewed its contract through 1998.
If anything, Vinnell's fortunes may improve in the short term,
now that King Fahd has stepped aside for health reasons, leaving the reins
of government in the hands of his brother, Crown Prince Abdullah ibn
Abdulaziz, who also happens to run the National Guard. Jane's Defence
Weekly has speculated that the guard may be built up even faster now as a
way of enhancing Crown Prince Abdullah's personal power base, which will
no doubt mean bigger contracts for Vinnell as well.
But is what's good for the Saudi monarchy and Vinnell
good for the people of the United States or Saudi Arabia? The short
answer is no, but the U.S. government has exerted considerable energy
trying to persuade us that we're all in this mess together and that
Americans have no choice but to support the Saudi monarchy.
It's true that the Saudi regime provides a wide array of
economic and political services to the U.S. government and U.S.
corporations, but these services have little to do with promoting either
democracy or prosperity for the citizens of the United States or Saudi
Arabia. The Saudis provide access to their oil resources to
U.S. firms on extremely favorable terms, and adjust their pricing policies
within OPEC in ways that support U.S. interests. For years, a significant
portion of Saudi "petrodollar" revenues have been
invested in U.S. government bonds, helping to ease the burden of the
growing U.S. budget deficit. (In exchange, U.S. taxpayers have been asked
to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to build a U.S. military force
that can get to the Middle East on short notice to defend regimes such as
the Saudi monarchy from threats from without or within.)
In the realm of secret wheeling and dealing, the Saudis have
not shied from putting up money for joint covert operations with the
United States, from arming the Afghan rebels to providing funds to Oliver
North's Iran-contra "enterprise." According to The Washington
Post, the most recent joint secret initiative was to provide more than
$300 million for covert weapons supplies to the Bosnian government during
the period of the U.N. embargo on that nation.
Saudi Arabia will be approached about providing funds to
train Bosnian Muslim forces as part of the current NATO intervention in
Bosnia. A source with contacts within the Vinnell Corporation has
indicated that the State Department encouraged Vinnell to bid on the
contract to train the Bosnian forces. Vinnell's parent company, BDM, which
bought the firm in 1993 to expand its market niche in military training
services, already has a contract to provide 500 translators for NATO
peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.
The policy of using Vinnell trainers and U.S. arms suppliers to
keep the Saudi monarchy in power can't go on forever. For one
thing, the money is running out. The lavish social programs that have been
used to buy off dissent are being cut sharply to make room for continuing
expenditures on advanced American, French, and British weaponry. A number
of security analysts are beginning to speak of Saudi Arabia as the
"next Iran"--a top-heavy, corrupt regime that is in danger of
being overthrown by its own people if it fails to implement major reforms
soon.
The people of Saudi Arabia will eventually demand some
say in how their government is run. Whether that change comes about
through a revolution led by Islamic fundamentalists or an evolution toward
democracy will depend in significant part on whether U.S. policy continues
to back the monarchy to the hilt.
If the Saudi regime is overthrown, will Vinnell be put in
charge of "cleaning up" all the sensitive U.S.-built military
and intelligence facilities in Saudi Arabia as it was during the
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam? Or will the American public head off that
day by demanding that our government get out of the dictator-protection
racket and allow the possibility of genuine democratic development in Saudi
Arabia?