The potential for democratization in the arab world
has become a popular topic for academic and policy specialists alike.
Unfortunately, the subject's dramatic appearance of late has not meant
that its treatment has been comprehensive. One key ingredient in a more
satisfying treatment must be a comprehensive approach to the pressures and
obstacles present at all levels of analysis. Much of the work on Arab
World democratization tends to concentrate on capturing the internal
dynamics of reform and state/society relations which affect those
dynamics. Hence, this literature often gives scant attention to the roles
which external or international factors play. This is particularly
perplexing in the case of the Arab World since one of its defining
characteristics is national porousness and vulnerability to external
influences. A complete approach, therefore, must be cognizant of the
effects which higher levels of analysis (regional and international
systems) have on the dynamics at the state and society levels. Identifying
and categorizing the various external factors shaping current or potential
democratization is an important first step in achieving this.
This article will argue that in the Arab context, external pressures have
played key roles in setting and altering the environment (both positively
and negatively) in the struggle toward democratization. The intent here is
not to argue for the primacy of external factors, but rather to underscore
the extent to which they are an important component that has not
adequately been addressed to date. Moreover, such an approach is sensitive
to recent theoretical recognitions that contingency and chance may play a
greater role in democratic transformations than rigid theoretical
prerequisites for democratization. External factors reflect both
contingent and structural dynamics. Conceptualizing the external factors
at play in the Arab World draws on the broader theoretical work of
Laurence Whitehead and Phillipe C. Schmitter. Their investigations confirm
four general categories: control, contagion, consent, and
conditionality.[1] More specific categories are presented for the Arab
context:
(1) Cultural Diffusion and Demonstration Effects (2) Foreign Governmental
Policies and Aid (3) Non-Governmental Activities (4) Regional Security
Environment and Regional Actors (5) International Fiscal Environment and
Policy
By specifying the theoretical connection to domestic liberalization and
touching on some empirical evidence, each category will be examined in
order.
Additionally, it should be clarified what exactly these factors are
supposed to affect. Though there is some debate over this issue,
democratization and liberalization are taken to be separate concepts.[2]
Liberalization precedes full democratization by extending or redefining
rights which open up some public space for limited participation. At the
state level, democratization refers to a change in rules and procedures
which institute responsibility on the part of rulers. At the societal
level it involves a transformation of the individual from subject to
citizen. The point here, following Michael Hudson's work,[3] is to
envision a more elastic definition of the process of democratization while
retaining the analytically more useful Schumpeterian definition of
procedural democracy. The following ideal stages, points along which
external factors can impact, are envisioned: liberalization, regime
opening, democratic transition, and consolidation of the new democracy. Of
come, one can immediately discern a lack of such neat constructs in the
Arab World.
In possibly only two instances could recent events in the region
be stretched to suggest anything near the democratic transition stage,
Yemen and Algeria (prior to their instability). The rest of the region
falls at various points along the liberalization/regime opening stages. To
compensate for this narrow empirical target, this essay takes some liberty
in postulating the potential effect of external factors on the later, more
substantive phases of the democratization continuum. The works of Albert
O. Hirschman and Giuseppe Di Palma in this respect are particularly
applicable.[4] By pushing past the confines of structural and theoretical
obstacles, their collective scholarship stresses " possibilism"
in the cause for democratization.
CULTURAL DIFFUSION AND DEMONSTRATION EFFECTS
Cultural diffusion entails the travel of constituent ideas of an ideal
democratic polity through the myriad of today's communication mediums.
Demonstration effects, or "snowballing" as Samuel Huntington
terms it,[5] refer to the rippling effects from a nation or group of
nations undergoing significant liberalization or outright democratization.
Both factors, while conceptually distinct, share several characteristics
in the context of the Arab World that warrant their combined treatment.
First, both diffusion and demonstration effects can impact all levels of
society in a given Arab country, though demonstration effects tend to have
a more measurable impact on state elites. Second the factors tend to be
coupled in their impact, for often demonstration events amplify external
cultural values and prejudices. ]Effects of diffusion tend to fall
primarily at the later stages of transition and consolidation where some
semblance of a vigorous civil society is necessary to drive the process.
Demonstration effects, however, can impact all phases of transition
including the regime opening. Arab intellectuals and dissidents, prime
recipients of cultural diffusion and demonstration effects, would in all
likelihood play key roles in such a process.
Because cultural diffusion defies case study analysis, demonstration
effects will first be discussed within case examples and then the general
phenomenon of cultural diffusion in the Arab World will follow. While
possibly not exhaustive, the following dynamics are usually offered as
demonstration effects: the events of East Europe and the former USSR as a
demonstration in general; the effects of the failed Algerian experiment on
other Arab countries; and the experiments in Kuwait, Yemen, and Oman on
the rest of the Gulf.
The fact that the dramatic events in Eastern Europe and the former USSR
have had global impacts is obvious. On one level, the failure of state
socialism is a very powerful negative demonstration effect. The apparent
failure of viable alternatives to democracy around the world cannot go
unheeded. Even among the newly industrialized nations of Southeast Asia,
the model of economic progress through benign authoritarianism is coming
under increased pressure by a populace unsatisfied with just economic
growth without a voice in governance.6 The assumption is that increased
global democratization has helped advance an international consensus on
democracy, a consensus easily felt by the Arab populace and elites alike.
This is a consensus which argues not necessarily that democracy is a
panacea for all ills, especially economic, rather what "stands to
reason" in governance is no longer the coup or reversion to some
brand of authoritarianism but the methods of democratic bargaining where
competing groups have the best chance to secure some agreeable
compromise[7] The events in the former socialist bloc, in this sense, do
not necessarily hold up a paragon of democratization but rather debunk
alternatives to it. On another level, in the immediate aftermath of the
events of 1989 some Arab liberals were too quick in their optimism for a
democratic opening in the Arab World.[8] What was missed was the
possibility that while negative demonstration effects may structure a
consensus overtime, its effects are hardly immediate. For a time at least,
inaction can be a choice of regime elites.
The sad reality has been that overall the democratization of Eastern
Europe has had little impact in the form of a demonstration effect for the
Arab World. At the societal level, differences in the relation to the
state and lack of a sympathetic identity with East Europeans has proven an
obstacle to the democratic contagion. There was little societal contact
between the two regions prior to 1989 and hence little shared exchanges.
Moreover, because of structural and leadership in congruencies, the model
of democratic transformation presented by Eastern Europe has proved
generally useless as a strategy to those aspiring for such a
transformation in the Arab World.
In comparison to Eastern Europe, the events in Algeria and the ongoing
experiments in Yemen, Kuwait, and Oman have received little world
attention, but in the Arab context these phenomena have deep impacts. The
demonstration effect from Algeria cuts both ways, positively and
negatively. Clearly, one negative implication from Algeria's demonstration
is ruling elites cannot allow true democratization for it threatens their
hold on power and more importantly suggests the advent of a leadership
(Islamists) which might actually exact retribution for past oppression?
This interpretation is most evident among Tunisian, Moroccan, and Egyptian
elites, where shared concern and to some extent shared efforts against
Islamists have been the case. In a more positive light, Algeria's
experience shows Arab society that Arab elites can entertain democratic
experiments despite current obstacles. Additionally, the Algerian
demonstration may give other Arab democrats valuable lessons. Among the
most important is the need for restraint on the part of reformers; thus,
when the transition process nears it is best not to make calls for purging
the military, a point made by many theorists based on the lessons of
transitions in 'Latin America. Therefore, even if a demonstration ends in
a failure it may still play a vital role in a learning process for
aspiring democrats. Other more unambiguously positive demonstration
effects can be seen in the Gulf.
While the post-war reform efforts in Kuwait have received global coverage,
the extent and profoundness of Yemen's progression toward democratization
is hardly appreciated outside the Arab World. For a time among the Gulf
Arab states Yemen's free and outspoken press drove home the example of
this unprecedented electoral experiment in the Arab World. Much of its
role as a demonstration fell on its powerful northern neighbor, the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Parts
of the Kingdom receive televised broadcasts of Yemen's alarmingly free
(from a Saudi perspective) parliament proceedings.[10] Recent problems
between Yemen and Saudi Arabia over oil rights, border disputes, and the
expulsions of Yemeni migrant workers are, in the eyes of many Yemenis,
proof positive of a Saudi family fear of Yemeni democratization. While
these disputes reflect more than just a simple Saudi fear of Yemeni
freedom, these and other Saudi reactions nonetheless suggest the role of
intra-Arab demonstration effects.
By contrast, Kuwait's more gradual reform process may appear to convey a
"lighter" demonstration effect. In reality however, Saudi and
Gulf elites probably believe they have little to learn from underdeveloped
Yemen whereas Kuwait with its monarchy and shared oil history does present
an uncomfortable reflection.[11] In March 1992, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia
gave an unprecedented interview in a Kuwaiti newspaper. In the interview,
Fahd stated that despite his earlier announcement of the formation of a
60-member consultative council: "The democratic system prevailing in
the world does not suit us in this region [italics added] . . . . The
nature of our people is different. . . . We have our Islamic ideology. The
system of free elections is not part of Islamic ideology."[12] While
there is certainly a domestic aim in the King's comments, the facts that
the interview was given in a Kuwaiti newspaper and the term
"region" was used as opposed to "Saudi Arabia"
suggests that the Kuwaiti and Yemeni experiments have a definite impact on
elite perceptions.
Fahd's decision on 8 November 1990 to renew a promise for a consultative
council originally made in 1962 was preceded by Sultan Qabus' announcement
of an expanded council for Oman. Moreover, following the petition tactics
of intellectuals in these counties, Qatari intellectuals submitted their
own petition for free parliamentary elections in January 1992. 13
Admittedly, these represent limited moves toward liberalization, but they
reveal a shared concern over events outside one's borders within the Arab
Gulf. Also, it is apparent that renewed Kuwaiti rumblings for a free
parliament, once liberation from Iraq was achieved, contributed to the
external pressure and demonstrations for other Gulf opposition groups to
follow.
Successful demonstrations also communicate norms of behavior and
expectations stressing restraint, bargaining, and compromise. This invites
broader consideration of the effects of cultural diffusion, because
cultures are hardly impenetrable cocoons but are subject to various
external influences. At the elite level, cultural influences form the
backdrop to decision making and potential compromise with opposition
elements. At the mass level, expectations for reform can take root from
the influence of cultural biases. However as stated previously, cultural
diffusion is the most nebulous of the categories, both from a conceptual
and empirical point of view. It is impossible to determineb exactly which
altitudinal patterns are the result of which influence. Thus, one must be
satisfied simply to postulate the connection in the absence of accurate
measurement, taking account instead of the modes of cultural diffusion.
In his brief treatment of Arab-Islamic culture, Samuel
Huntington has rightly concluded that, "Islamic doctrine thus
contains elements that may be both congenial and uncongenial to
democracy."[14] Cultural diffusion can assist in a strengthening of
those positive elements. It is beyond the scope of this essay to examine
what cultural attitudes are best suited for democratization; rather the
emphasis is on how these attitudes are communicated to and within
Arab-Islamic society. Radio, television, and particularly the press are
all powerful modes of transmission. However the most immediate mode
resulting in very observable effects is education in the West and the
academic/intellectual exchange of ideas. "Westernized"
intellectuals, Islamic scholars, and commentators, continue to play key
roles in Arab political discourse. Leonard Binder highlights the role of
the French-educated, Moroccan intellectual Abdallah Laroui. Laroui and
others like him seek a dialogue with Western liberalism to reform
Arab-Islamic traditions in favor of democracy.[15] There are no guarantees
in what direction such a fusion would proceed, but undoubtedly diffused
norms will play a role.
Not only are intellectuals key bridges for diffusion but of growing
importance are the youth of the Arab World. Education abroad and exposure
to an international perspective are proving powerful forces in shaping the
next generation of Arab leaders.[16] Young Saudi women
rejecting arranged marriages[17] and the thoughtful eloquence of young
Arab scholars recorded in Kevin Dwyer's book Arab Voices testify to these
dynamics. Despite receiving little attention from a Western press more
interested in reporting the virulence of extremists, some of these
quarters have succeeded in organizing to press their ideas on society and
the government.[18] Given these observations on cub rural diffusion, two
points follow. First is the obvious conclusion that the battle over the
ideas of governance has already been joined not only within secular
circles but within religious ones as well. There are, in other words, a
plethora of "Arab voices" involved; extremist, restrained, and
traditional. A second point is to note the transmission of cultural ideas
need not imply convergence with ideals of Western liberalism but simply a
positive addition to the myriad of influences reshaping Arab attitudes
toward what is reasonable governance.[19]
To conclude, demonstrations and diffusion prove the weakest as they rarely
if ever spark a regime opening. It is of course possible that in the
future some dramatic intra-Arab demonstration (something akin to the fall
of the Berlin Wall) may prove powerful enough to spark other openings.
What is sure is that once a democratic opening has been forged, the
cumulative effect of these external forces can go a long way in
influencing the perceptions of those actors whose responsibility it is to
craft the rules and solidify the concessions which make democratization a
reality.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTAL POLICIES AND AID
Foreign policy in this instance refers to all the tools of the diplomatic
trade between nations, while aid refers more specifically to the financial
resources committed to that policy. In his recent book The Third Wave,
Samuel Huntington ascribes a significant role to policy pressures from the
West in many recent democratic transitions. These transitions for the most
pan occurred in Europe and Latin America, two regions particularly
vulnerable to Western, specifically American, pressure. Huntington goes on
to add that the comparatively distant position of the Arab World has meant
that such pressures were not felt there; and he further speculates if in
the wake of the Gulf War the U.S. were to station troop in the Gulf
"an external impetus to liberalization" would occur.[20]
Huntington of course misses the point that previous American policy for
democratization weakly affected the Arab World because it was not directed
at the Arab World. Conversely, it is an overstatement to charge, as did
Edward Said recently, "I know of no U.S. policy that supports local
human fights movements, feminists, or independent and critical
thinkers."[21]
Theoretical discussion of the possible role foreign pressure plays is
limited. In general, government policy is viewed as either too
ill-conceived to have a positive effect, or driven by other covert
interests not at all concerned with democratization. Still a contextually
sensitive policy and application can not only influence regime elites
seeking Western government goodwill but feasibly in some cases impart the
kinds of opposition skills desperately needed by groups in the Arab
World.[22] Withholding aid can also play a similar role. When considering
the effects, however, foreign policy pressure alone is certainly
insufficient to force a regime opening, but it can go a long way in
alleviating perceptions of hypocrisy in Western, principally American,
foreign policy toward the Arab World and thus create a more conducive
environment for future progress.
Of the many positive results from the end of the Cold War is the
rapid decline of the Third World as a stage of ideological superpower
conflict. Many former "hot spots" in the Third World have
therefore lost their appeal as a greater degree of "pluralization"
in foreign policy making is taking place in Washington.[23]There is the
hope then that in some instances U.S. policy may undertake a more forceful
stance in favor of democratization. Strands suggesting a more hopeful turn
began in 1983 with the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), an independent agency not formally part of the U.S. government but
which depends upon it for funding. The NED's charter is straightforward:
to assist the advancement of democracy around the world. Under the NED are
four core grantee, non-profit organizations. One of the four, the
International Republican Institute (IRI, tied to the Republican Party),
has been the most active in the Arab World.[24]
IRI activities in the Arab World consist of country reports examining the
pace of democratization, funding of regional groups dedicated to
democratization, and seminars in-country where opposition parties are
trained in campaigning, electoral strategies, and publicity. To date, the
IRI has conducted country surveys of Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan; provided
assistance funding to various groups in the Gulf and Kuwait; conducted
programs with opposition parities in Kuwait; monitored elections in Yemen;
supervised an exchange of Yemeni parliamentarians; and has currently
initiated programs in Morocco and Oman. These activities are all held with
the cooperation and sometimes insistence of the host regimes, but the
results are not always as expected.[25] IRI activities in post-war Kuwait
are a case at hand. In February 1991, the IRI concluded its report on
democratization in Kuwait, and at the request of prominent Kuwaiti
citizens, prepared for more substantial cooperation with Kuwaiti
opposition groups after liberation. The kick off for this project began
with a conference held in Washington in April 1991 on political
participation in Kuwait.[26] From this meeting, actual conferences and
workshops were planned. Three training workshops, entitled
"Democratic Development in Kuwait," took place in February 1992
with the cooperation of the Kuwaiti Graduates Society in preparation for
the October parliamentary elections. The IRI returned in May to host a
second round of seminars at which time the Kuwaiti government canceled the
meeting with no real explanation.[27] While the State Department
registered low-level discontent with the move, there was no strong, overt
U.S. reaction. Instead, over the next few months the U.S. Ambassador to
Kuwait, Edward Gnehm, stepped up his visits to evening diwaniyahs and
contacts with opposition groups. This eventually drew an angry response
from Abdul-Aziz Masaeed, an interim legislator, who complained in an
interview that the U.S. was interfering in Kuwaiti affairs. Most observers
believed that his attitude was shared by some in the royal family.[28]
Such reactions suggest that even these low-level activities in favor of
democracy were having an effect, at least in the eyes of the Kuwaiti
leadership. Of come, a paramount concern must be that such activities
--since they are taken up by government sponsored organizations, however
insulated from direct policy making -- be attentive as much as possible to
relations between internal actors. Without such careful consideration,
external agents can generate animosity against the very opposition forces
that are being aided by unknowingly having them identified as American or
Western agents. In addition, the U.S. political commitment toward
democratization in a strategically vital region is often less than
coherent. For instance, the U.S. was careful not to intensify the debate
once the Kuwaiti government made a stand. And in response to Saudi
Arabia's unveiling of its meek reforms in March 1992, the State Department
hailed it as "a very important step."[29] Moreover, unto
themselves the initiatives for democracy exhibit their own shortcomings.
Principally, there is no definition of what a democratic opposition party
is for the IRI, and so, often Islamist or perceived anti-American parties
are not invited to the workshops. Finally, there is the position that a
foreign policy interest in democracy should take a back seat to concerns
of strategic stability. Thus, Jonathan Paris argues, " A gradual
approach to democratization makes even more sense in those areas of the
Middle East where the United States has other vital interests. "[30]
The most effective response to this essentially realist approach comes
oddly enough from one of the keenest observers of power politics. Stanley
Hoffman makes the common sense observation, "We must remember the
connection between the way in which governments treat their own people and
the way in which they behave outside."[31] Policy shifts away from
support of undemocratic states does not sacrifice stability but rather
strengthens states by entreating them to deal with their people. Given the
recent review of U.S. foreign assistance programs, it is not unreasonable
to suspect greater moves toward a more central and coherent policy
regarding democratization in the Arab World.[32]
The narrower case of Kuwait demonstrates at once both the chance for
similar progress at affecting elite opinion in the Arab World and the
particular difficulties and sensitivities which such an endeavor entails.
Successful pressure helps raise the costs of internal repression, holds
out rewards for greater liberalization, and to a degree assists domestic
democrats in their struggle against anti-liberal elements.
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES
Human rights organizations are not new; however, their increased presence
and concern with the Arab World is a recent shift. In all, some dozen
international human rights organizations have departments committed to the
Middle East.[33] Pressure brought by such non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) on Arab states has a distinct advantage over that brought by agents
of Western governments -- a perceived purity of purpose. At the same time,
because such groups do not have the formalized support of a major Western
power, their activities are often circumscribed or restricted within the
country. Despite this constraint, NGOs pressing for human rights in the
Arab World have grown significantly over the last decade and the pressure
they bring to bear is not ignored by Arab regimes. Nor have their efforts
and effects been ignored by theorists.
The O'Donnell and Schmitter volume on transitions notes that
human rights groups "raise the perceived costs of repressive action
against them [regime opponents] and makes them feel that they are not
entirely isolated."[34] This dynamic goes some way in fulfilling
Robert Dahl' s maxim that a regime will entertain policy change when the
perceived costs of repression outweigh the perceived costs of toleration.
As a regime limits its repressive methods because of such pressure, the
way toward the democratic bargaining table may be made clear. Moreover,
external human rights pressure has assisted Arab human rights organizing.
This can result in pressure from below and above on regime elites to
entertain a new direction. Often this organizing is accomplished through
joint conferences held outside the Arab World with participants from
international organizations offering assistance to Arab human rights
activists.[35] Internal Arab organization further lends itself to the kind
of "social energy" at the grassroots level Albert Hirschman
identified with Latin American social movements.[36] Unmeasurable and
amorphous, this social inertia emboldens opposition groups to push the
limits of state-society relations, eventually turning and forcing the
regime back to the toleration/repression calculation and hopefully to the
bargaining table.
Human rights organizations operate on the conviction that bringing abuses
out into the light of day is the most powerful weapon in curbing such
actions. NGO activities in this area are conceptually akin to both foreign
policy factors and cultural diffusion. Sometimes NGO pressure is coupled
with foreign policy pressure.[37] Furthermore, born as it was of Western
concern and conviction, the human rights campaign itself is a form of
cultural diffusion. Often leaders of the Arab human rights organizations
are themselves educated in the West or have extensive contact with Western
groups. Arab human rights groups in addition agitate not only for basic
rights, but often their demands call for outright democratization.[38] In
the words of Bahey Eddin Hassan, secretary general of The Arab
Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) in Egypt: "I discovered that I
could not work to improve freedom of the press in Egypt without improving
the whole human rights situation. There is no way to improve one area and
leave the others. "[39] And though certain Arab circles may criticize
human rights organizations for a perceived imperialist, ethnocentric plot,
as will be shown below, few political leaders deny the efficacy of its
ethos and the validity of the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights upon which all human rights activities are based.
Observers of human rights activities in the Arab World concur on the
significant role international organizations have played in fomenting and
assisting the establishment of analogous groups in the individual
counties. In most instances, these organizations and local branches of
Amnesty International base their charier on international standards and
goals, implicitly "linking their cause with the international
one."[40] Between the international organizations and these
regionally based groups there is something of a symbiotic relationship.
International groups depend on local groups for the bulk of their
information, while local groups depend on the international for
publicizing their plight, assisting intra-Arab organization, and most
importantly, pressuring the Arab regime to lessen its repression when the
local group is persecuted. In raising the price of oppression,
international human rights actions often interject themselves on the side
of dissident groups battling for representation. This dynamic of external
involvement in state- society relations is one which receives little
analysis but there is evidence nonetheless, predominately in the Maghreb.
In the spring of 1989 King Hassan II of Morocco, after growing
international pressure, invited Amnesty International to send an official
delegation to his kingdom, a rare invitation among Arab leaders. Much to
his discomfort, the report later released by Amnesty detailed abuses of
the regime under garde-a-vue detention.[41] In response to the report and
other internal pressures, Hassan ran lengthy rebuttals in the world's
major newspapers and in May announced the foundation of a Royal
Organization of Human Rights. During his announcement Hassan noted his
government's sensitivity to international human rights pressure:
Morocco has always had the ambition to occupy a respectable place within
the international community . . . considering itself as living in a
civilized society side by side with advanced countries. I beseech you help
me restitute his right to he whose right has been violated and help me so
we can all raise our country to the rank of civilized nations where the
state of rights reigns.[42]
In December 1988, the Moroccan Human Rights Organization (OMDH) attempted
to hold its first public meeting. The group came under intense government
pressure to compromise and not hold the meeting. These government tactics
were meet with strong external pressure in the form of press coverage from
groups in France and elsewhere to allow the meeting to go forward. Under
the international glare Hassan backed down, and on 10 December (a day
coinciding with the fourteenth anniversary of the UN Deceleration of Human
Rights) the meeting was held and the OMDH was publicly founded.[43]
While changes in discourse do not always imply a change in policy, the
effort to bring human fights concerns to the forefront can have important
impacts later. If and when the democratic bargaining between and among
opposition groups and the regime occur, a common discourse, concern, and
awareness of human rights -- and its constituent democratic values -- may
ease that process since certain conceptual standards may already be set.
Clearly, human rights activities contribute to raising the cost of
repression through the glare of international publicity and its concurrent
effects on international relations and standing. To date, however, there
have been some setbacks; Algeria and Tunisia, once leaders in the Arab
human fights campaign, are now illegally imprisoning thousands of
Islamists. International organizers are aware of potential setbacks but
generally exude confidence: "It' s a worldwide trend . . . . The Arab
World has been late to come to it, but there is a recognition that human
rights are a critical element of the advancement that Arab countries
seek."[44]
REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND REGIONAL ACTORS
An insecure regional system or insecurity deriving from the policies of a
regional hegemon can negatively affect democratization. Excessive spending
on the military due to regional insecurity and conflict have warped
economic and political development in the Arab World.[45] This has been
manifest in two ways.
In the first instance, the familiar argument that excessive state spending
on the military takes away from funds spent on economic development
remains salient. A strong empirical correlation between robust,
decentralized economic development and the tendency toward more successful
democratization highlights the adverse effect of warped economic
development.[46] Sallow economic development or dislocation does not make
for hospitable socio-economic conditions for reform. The psychological and
political correlates of the response to an external threat, be it Israel
or other, likewise shifts emphasis away from debate over representation
and leads to a militarization of state-society relations. Survival of the
regime becomes paramount over creation of reliable state-society
mediation. The army as protector of the regime and prime institution of
socialization thus looms large in many Arab states, and often it is the
army that fears the potential instability of any democratization of
state-society relations. In the second instance, the policies of regional
powers can pressure a liberalizing state and externally impose higher
costs for further toleration and representation.
Though the military per se does not hinder economic development, it is the
type of investment which is of importance.[47] Generally, expenditures do
not involve capital investment in the private sector and instead take away
from public spending on areas of infrastructure and human capital. Lisa
Anderson's work highlights this disfiguring characteristic.
Government spending priorities in the Middle East reflected not only the
absolute number of local conflicts but also, and more importantly, the
willingness of both superpowers and the local regimes to deal in goods and
services that fostered those conflicts to the detriment of domestic
development programs and projects. Indeed, eventually civilian development
-infrastructure, industrial, even education - - was to be justified by its
contributions to the defense effort: "development" became
identified with "security."[48]
Excessive spending on defense can then result in a "crowding
out" of the private sector limiting the formation of independent
political spheres of power able to influence a regime opening.[49]
Moving from the regional security dynamic to the second instance of
external pressure -- regional actor pressure -- the most notable example
of late is Saudi Arabiar.[50] As discussed previously, Saudi Arabia' s own
external vulnerability has meant that its leadership is acutely aware of
the demonstration effects and cultural pressure wrought from regional
moves toward democratization. Ironically, the leadership also probably
realizes that such vulnerability is a two-way relationship due to
increased Arab interdependence over the years. Saudi Arabia is by far the
most important official aid donor in the Arab World, [51] and of course a
large source of worker remittance for poorer Arab nations. This fiscal
power gives Riyadh significant leverage to disrupt domestic economies and
endanger nascent moves toward democratization. A case at hand is Saudi
pressure on Yemen.
Prior to unification, the two Yemens were particularly dependent
on external aid and worker remittances (most of them from Saudi Arabia)
for a large portion of their GNP. Worker remittances alone over the period
1973-1989 accounted for a cumulative 18.0% of the GNP for Northern Yemen
and 34.9% for Southern Yemen.[52] Consequently, the Kingdom' s expulsion
of some 850,000 Yemeni workers during the second Gulf War dealt a severe
blow to an already weak post-unification economy. One U.N. study estimated
the cost of the Gulf War to the Yemeni economy as near 20% of its GNP.[53]
Saudi pressure is evident in other forms as well. Banking on eventually
increasing its oil production output from its current 200,000 bpd to
upwards of 800,000+ bpd, Sana'a is hoping that this will solve its
economic and political difficulties. Much of the hoped for oil however is
located in area along the Saudi- Yemeni border where Saudi Arabia brought
pressure on some oil companies to cease exploration. The Kingdom is also
suspected of arming tribes in the region to foment unrest, launching
several provocative military maneuvers in the area, and secretly agitating
growing tribal rivalries which have resulted in several assassinations
over the last two years. [54]
While Saudi pressure cannot fully account for Yemen's renewed civil
strife, the difficulties it caused during those opening stages of
democratization were crucial. Many theorists emphasize the importance of
the first open election as proof that engaging in a democratic bargain can
have real and unprejudiced results. Saudi pressure made those initial
domestic agreements between the North and South all the more tenuous and
fragile. Despite successful national elections, Yemeni elites were unable
to solidify further compromises toward a more secure democratic union.
Therefore, the increased cost from externally imposed instability cannot
be ruled out as contributing to Yemen's abandonment of democratic
bargaining in favor of a new civil war.
Given the two Gulf Wars, Iran's recent agitation in the Gulf, and Saudi
Arabia's new found preeminence, the negative impacts from the regional
security dynamics and would-be regional hegemons do not appear to be
subsiding. But while the adverse security environment will most likely
continue as a salient feature of the region, this factor need not be
decisive. An Ara Msraeli settlement could go a long way in casing at least
the most public justifications for societal militarization. Moreover,
existence in a highly insecure environment and vulnerability to bloated
military institutions does not rule out domestic reform. Both Taiwan and
South Korea arguably compare in both respects to the states of the Arab
World and yet they have begun nascent democratization. Comparative
analysis in this regard would be illuminating. A key contrast with the
Asian countries and much..of the Arab World is the greater degree of
economic growth and independence, and it is such economic factors to which
most scholars attach the greatest importance.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND POLICY
This section encompasses two distinct pressures which are argued to be the
most powerful external factors shaping democratization in the Arab World.
The first pressure to be felt is changes in the international economic
environment, specifically the construction of external rents. The second
pressure, a resulting dynamic of the first, is the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank policies tied to the loans which they
dispense. It is the question of impact around which much debate has
arisen; specifically whether MF/World Bank policies or the disequilibrium
of the international economic environment result in positive moves toward
economic liberalization and eventual democratization or whether these
policies hinder economic performance and cream contradictory circumstances
under which democratization is hardly possible and social breakdown more
likely.
The cases of Egypt and Algeria will suggest that while external economic
factors alone cannot affect change, there are grounds for hope.
Contradictions may arise from external economic pressure, but the
cumulative effect of international pressure (environmental and policy
driven) for reform can be shown to have pushed Arab elites toward granting
greater and greater economic participation, participation which holds out
the chance for greater political participation. Therefore, this analysis
falls in line with the liberal assumption that greater economic
privatization coupled with genuine economic freedom generally correlates
strongly with the evolution of a strong, pro-democratic middle class and
the formation of alternative centers of political power. From a
comparative perspective, such diversification of power stands as a vital
ingredient during the transition processes.
The language used here should convey that the links of causality are
hardly clear cut, such that economic liberalization has to lead
axiomatically to political liberalization. Much of this is dependent on
the extent of economic freedom and various internal variables such as
institutions. This in mind however, there is little persuasive discourse
in the literature today arguing for the converse, namely strong state
redistribution either prior to or parallel with democratization. The best
bets lie with the acknowledgement that economic
liberalization/privatization and democratization reinforce one another in
a variety of ways.55 The crux of the debate becomes then whether external
pressures can contribute positively to this dynamic.
Literature on the subject of political-economic development generally
concurs that the Arab state has pursued policies of state-led growth. This
was partly driven by the socialist ideology popular with decolonizing
Third World states of the day and also by a calculation that the private
sector was ill prepared to hake up risk and invest.[56] The resulting
reliance on state expansion and import substitution strategies led to
price distortions and ever increasing budget deficits. State expansion and
larger budget deficits were financed not through greater domestic revenue
gathering but rather through external rents derived from single exports
(i.e. oil), aid from superpower patrons, levies on transport, etc. Hence,
the well-known theoretical concept of the tentier state became a defining
characteristic of most of the Arab states. For the prospects of
democratization, this aloofness of the state means that demands for
greater participation are reduced, for the state does not rely on domestic
production for revenue.[57] Rent seeking as well means statism is
pervasive and this has equally deleterious implications for
democratization. Larry Diamond's assertion on this point, though not aimed
specifically at the Middle East, is worth recounting for its similarity to
development in the region particularly in the cases of Algeria and Egypt.
By crowding out economic competition firm the private sector, it [the
state] prevented the emergence of an autonomous, productive (rather than
parasitic) bourgeoisie. By subjecting virtually all developmental activity
to state mediation and control, it made community as well as individual
advancement dependent on control of the state, heightening inequality and
political tension between ethnic and regional groups. [58]
However, as the external environment shifts (constriction in trade, oil
price slump, superpower collapse) many Arab states became racked with
greater and greater debts adversely affecting the domestic economy and
forcing regime leaders to borrow abroad. Loans from private sources become
nearly impossible as the debt load begins to far outstrip payment
capacity. Taking for example the debt service ratio[59] of select Arab
countries in 1991 clarifies the problem: Algeria (53); Egypt (29); Jordan
(31); Tunisia (21); Morocco (30); and Yemen (19).[60] With fewer and fewer
external sources available, the rentier Arab states have three general
options:[61] (a) turn toward the West and the IMF/World Bank for debt
relief[62]; and/or (b) begin a shift toward greater internal revenue
enhancement; or (c) muddle through with half measures derived from the two
previous choices and barter political concessions with external actors for
economic gain. A positive and negative case for democratization can be
made for all three.
Although option (a) implies option (b), it is conceivable that a regime
(Rumania in the extreme case) may opt to pursue only option (b) without
international assistance. Risks in option (a) are two-fold: either policy
guidelines from the IMF/World Bank are insufficiently sensitive and thus
yield adverse political-economic results, or the policies are improperly
(deliberately or not) applied by the host regime resulting in further
economic stagnation. If option (b) is the case, the literature on the
rentier state argues that to garner greater domestic revenue the state
will have to grant greater participation and be "forced to face the
unpleasant prospect of holding themselves accountable to
taxpayers."[63] If option (c) is chosen, haft measures may go some
way in creating a revolution of growing expectations. It may as well
create increasing frustration and deadlock over the lack of progress in
any direction. Deadlock may act to undercut the conditions necessary for
successful reform, but a way out can be argued.
A new way may emerge of looking at the costs of toleration versus those of
resistance and repression. Toleration may still seem costly, but if
resisting change tams out, by its total ineffectiveness, to be
incomparably more costly, then toleration may invite a second look. [64]
Possibly as well, the state may, because of bureaucratic ineptness, simply
and incrementally back itself into genuine liberalization. Temporary
reforms may create their own movement eventually outstripping the ability
of elites to control them adequately. All of these potentialities augur
well for the possibility of regime opening and democratic bargaining. The
case of Algeria represents an initial pursuit of option (b) and a turn
later toward selected elements of option (a), while Egypt has clearly
chosen to pursue option (c). For Algeria the connection between external
economic forces and internal political liberalization is stronger than in
the Egyptian case where important internal variables have distorted the
connection. Nevertheless, contrasting the two cases is insightful in
demonstrating the case of direct positive potentialities from external
economic pressure (Algeria) and the case where despite resulting deadlock
a way out can be envisioned (Egypt).
With the death of President Boumedienne in 1978, his successor Chadli
Benjadid quickly became familiarized with the trappings of a massive
rentier state loosing its grip. In the late 1970s the Algerian state could
invest the equivalent of 25-30% of its GDP annually, but with declining
oil reserves and sluggish commodity prices, external debt was increasing
rapidly as the state borrowed from private creditors to maintain that
level of state investment.[65] Constraints on external economic resources
did not improve and by 1986 Algeria was viewed as a poor risk by private
international lenders.[66]
Eschewing restructuring assistance from the IMF (which would to Algerian
leaders mean a surrendering of sovereignty), Algeria nonetheless began an
aggressive liberalization program to expose operations of the state to
market forces. By the summer of 1988, Benjadid extended reforms to curbing
imports (much in line with what IMF recommendations might have been) as a
way to ensure private creditors of his continued efforts and, by
extension, as a way to avoid facing IMF assistance.[67] During this period
of reduced investment social unrest grew; strikes, student protests, and
mass arrests signalled a growing discontent with disjointed measures and
no progress. After riots erupted in October 1988, Benjadid responded by
promising "greater democratization of political activity" and a
national referendum to approve a change in the constitution. [68]
Corresponding pressure from his private international creditors compelled
Benjadid to come to agreement with the IMF, and in May 1989 Algeria and
the MY agreed on a stand-by loan package. At this point Algeria can be
said to have moved into option (b), and interestingly this gave the regime
apparently greater leverage against anti-liberalizing elements, for now
the government could rely on an IMF "bad cop."
From this period the IMF worked closely with the Algerian government in
crafting even more extensive Fiscal reform and greater privatization. [69]
These aggressive policies won significant praise from IMF officials and
resulted in the extension of more loans in late 1989 and 1990. Unrest and
crackdowns on the FIS in June and July 1991 led to the formation of a new
government led by Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali. The pace of economic
liberalization picked up even more as elections within the next year
approached. To support Algeria's stability in the aftermath of the
June/July unrest, the EC drew up a rescue package of $906 million, and
France created its own bi-lateral aid package organized by Credit Lyonnais.[70]
Bolstered by renewed international support, Ghozali unveiled plans for an
extensive privatization of Algeria's oil industry, and most importantly,
introduced a new tax structure which for the first time included an income
tax, a corporation tax, and a value added tax.[71] True to form, the
constriction of external rents coupled with international creditor
pressures pushed the rentier state toward greater domestic revenue
collection and a concurrent increase in demands for political
participation. The election debacle in January 1992 aborted this progress,
but the prominent role played by external factors in guiding the regime
toward the precipice of true democratic bargaining was clear.
While the IMF played a belatedly prominent role in Algeria's reforms, the
Algerian government was careful to stay ahead of the IMF in proposing
reforms so that it would not be forced into another stand-by agreement
that would allow greater intervention by the international community.
Egypt presents an opposite case in that the IMP holds greater leverage due
to more outstanding IMF loans, but the result has not been greater or more
extensive reform.
The hypothesis of economic liberalization evolving into extensive
political liberalization has long been anticipated in the case of Egypt.
In the words of Raymond Hinnesbusch: "Although a massive bureaucratic
state is sure to dominate for a long time, centers of private economic
power should continue to expand under infitah (opening). In time this
trend is likely to give rise to a countervailing power, the social basis
for further political liberalization."72 Prior to 1987, policies of
infitah were primarily internally driven. After 1987 and the conclusion of
a stand-by agreement with the IMF, international creditors became more
significant players in Egyptian liberalization policies. Until the
intensification of the external constriction of revenues forced Cairo into
an agreement with the IMF, Egypt's infitah policies were hardly extensive.
"The country was opened up to investment, but very little was done to
dismantle or weaken state control over the economy. "[73]
By November 1988 the stand-by agreement had broken down with Egypt
receiving only the first of three instalment loans. At issue was the IMF's
assertion that Cairo was not moving seriously enough while Cairo believed
that the reforms called for were too drastic and would spark unrest. To
support his case, Mubarak toured European capitals and appealed to
Washington. At the same time, he engaged opposition groups to bolster his
cause at home. A sort of two-level game was becoming evident whereby
Mubarak played off domestic discontent over needed reforms against
international fears that his strategically important country, if pushed,
would collapse.[74] By 1989 this strategy was proving not entirely
successful, for IMF demands persisted. Mubarak moved cautiously enacting
reforms on price controls and the public budget but refraining from a full
implementation of IMF guidelines. For instance, despite unveiling a
privatization program in April 1990, there has been only one full
privatization of a state-owned enterprise.[75] In the midst of the Gulf
crisis, another IMF stand- by agreement was reached in May 1991. U.S.
pressure to win its ally favorable treatment is debatable for the
agreement was in most respects tough, predicating loan restructuring
disbursements on implementation of reforms. However, along with the
agreement Washington canceled some $7 billion in military debts with
Cairo, and both events brought Egypt's debt down from $46.6 billion to
$31.2 billion and with full application of the IMF restructuring agreement
down to a possible $21.1 billion.[76] It remains to be seen whether
Mubarak can keep up his two-level game and forestall serious reform. Of
late, the IMF has praised Cairo's efforts and in September 1993 concluded
a three- year loan agreement based on a continuation of the privatization
program and control of the budget deficit.[77]
Daniel Brumberg and other analysts may be right in their assertion that
too rapid and too unyielding a push from the IMF would bring the
democratic bargaining process down into chaos,[78] but it is debatable
whether Egypt has actually begun a bargaining process. The contrast with
Algeria here is key for unlike Chadli, Mubarak does not pursue concurrent
political liberalization while delivering the sour medicine of economic
reform. At the same time, the chance that the international community
would cut Egypt off is improbable because of Egypt's strategic
relationship with Washington and the extent to which Egypt and its
creditors are integrated. The same could not be said of Algeria in the
early stages. In light of such divergent cases, analysts are often apt to
discard the positive connection between external economic pressure and
internal liberalization. Admittedly, to the extent that internal variables
are at odds with external pressures, or even divided internally, the
connection between external and internal is hardly axiomatic. Extremist
violence and weak political institutions in Egypt play a key role in
distorting this influence. Consequently, it is likely that the tug-of-war
of option (c) in the Egyptian case will continue. As stated above, this
unto itself does not necessarily bode ill for democratization. Stagnation
and frustration over dine may force government "soft-liners" to
reassess the cost of inaction and press for negotiation on a genuine
democratic pact The above comparison also suggests that the fate of the
links between external economic pressures and internal liberalization may
vary with the type of rent which is constricted. With Algeria it was
primarily oil prices for which there was little recourse internationally.
Whereas for Egypt, the external rents are more varied and involve worker
remittances which can be relocated (to Saudi Arabia recently)
and superpower largesse which can be stretched out.
Both cases find room for the positive effect external economic
forces can play. For Algeria, external pressures converged over time to
contribute to sparking the opening, while for Egypt pressures have
admittedly resulted in only limited liberalization but may back Cairo into
more political liberalization through prolonged pressure and the costs of
stagnation. Unfortunately, both cases also point to a possible
contradiction, as of yet unaddressed: "The weakening of the state
power [through economic liberalization] also has a negative effect on
prospects for political liberalization. The state becomes less capable of
creating the conditions in which democracy can flourish. "[79]
Contradictions of this state-society variety reinvite consideration of the
dominant role of internal factors. Clearly, Algeria's ability to proceed
with aggressive liberalization policies in contrast to Egypt's caution can
be argued as partly an outcome of contextual differences in the structure
of state/society relations. Consequently, it is doubtful that external
economic policies, however sensitive, can fully ameliorate tensions
arising from economic liberalization and greater demands for political
participation. The cases analyzed suggest that unless progress toward
meaningful institutionalization of political participation takes place,
the opening sparked by external economics may fade. Eventually, internal
actors must engage one another at the bargaining table to determine the
future course of democratization. External economic pressure can best work
to expand elite options, make back-sliding more difficult, and hopefully
ease the entire transition period, but much remains in the hands of
leadership.
CONCLUSION
Much of this essay's focus argues against the neat distinction between
domestic and international politics prevalent in the realist tradition.
Analysis of domestic reform in the Arab World can only benefit from this
broader perspective. The risk of course is to sacrifice parsimony in an
effort to account for all factors at play. Consequently, and hopefully,
this article has contributed to the development of a more rigorous
framework for examining Arab democratization by advancing and explaining
five categories of external variables.
In line with Schmitter's conclusions on this subject,[80] the assumptive
beginnings have been to recognize the primacy of internal variables.
External factors display their relevance in setting constraints, providing
sufficient conditions for change, and acting cumulatively. Demonstration
effects most relevant for the Arab states have been intra-regional, where
both negative and positive demonstrations can be seen to convey important
lessons for future democratizers. Cultural diffusion presents the most
nebulous category but one whose effects at the elite level can be
observed. Attitudes and values are malleable and to the extent that
external conduits yield influences, new norms toward the democratic
bargain can result. Foreign governmental policies, principly U.S., toward
reform have not played significantly positive roles in the past. As the
most easily controllable variable, however, some change is under-way and
the impact on Arab elites can work to pressure stalled or limited reform.
By contrast, non-governmental pressure has greatly increased over the last
decade. By gaining the moral high ground, assisting internal Arab human
rights organization, and bringing unwanted attention to bear, the
international human rights cause contributes to making the costs of
repression unacceptable in comparison to the costs of liberalization.
The most negative variable remains the insecure and conflict prone
regional environment. The consequent militarization of state-society
relations in many Arab countries bodes ill for meaningful reform to take
hold. Massive coercive state apparatuses make the resort to repression an
all too easy option for state elites. Similarly, regional hegemons in fear
of domestic reverberations demonstrate the continued ability to exact
increasing costs on a would be democratizer. Finally, external economic
conditions represent the strongest factor examined. While contradictions
are evident, the constriction of external rents and the liberal policies
of the IMF/World Bank do condition elite propensities toward economic
liberalization. The outcome and degree to which political reform follows
depends predominately on internal variables mediating the tenuous
relationship between economic and political liberalization.
Recent setbacks in the Arab World reinforce the painful lesson that
democratization is hardly rapid or unilinear. This does not obviate but
rather strengthens the need for a more comprehensive theoretical approach
to understanding and accounting for these dynamics.
NOTES
1. Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of
Democratization," in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative
Perspectives, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillipe Schmitter, and
Lawrence Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1988); and
Phillipe C. Schmitter, "The International Context of Contemporary
Democratization," Stanford Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2,
Issue 1, (Fall/Winter 1993) pp. 1-34.
2. This distinction is taken from O'Donnell, et al. Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies,
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), pp. 9-11.
3. Michael Hudson, "The Democratization Process in the Arab World: An
Assessment," Paper presented at the August 1990 American Political
Science Association Conference (APSA), pp. 2-5.
4. See particularly: Hirschman, A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and
Latin America, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), Di Palma, To
Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990), and "Legitimation From The Top
To Civil Society: Politico-Cultural Change in Eastern Europe," WorM
Politics (October 1991), pp. 49-80.
5. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp.
100-106.
6. Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,
" The American Behavioral Scientist, (March/June 1992), p. 480.
7. Robert Rothstein, "Weak Democracies and the Prospects for Peace in
the Third World," in Resolving Third Worm Conflicts: Challenges for a
New Era, ed. by Sheryl Brown and Kimber Schraub, (Washington: U.S.
Institute of Peace, 1992), p. 37.
8. Many intellectuals stressed its potential impact both at the grass
roots level and on Arab leadership. The Egyptian writer Mohammed Sid-
Ahmed confidently proclaimed "There is no escaping democracy
now," and a front page editorial in the Kuwaiti paper Al-Siyassah
boldly stated: "The Middle East has seen some regimes that have
destroyed their people, killed personal initiative in them, and destroyed
their economic resources. . . . It appears that the time for punishment
has arrived. The picture of Rumania is painful, but it is a warning for
those who take heed." ("Emboldened Dissents Are Warning Rulers,
" New York Times, 28 December 1989).
9. Hilal Khashan, "The Quagmire of Arab Democracy," Arab Studies
Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1 (Winter 1992) p. 29.
10. Simon Edge, "Yemen Copes in Adversity," MEED, 28 August
1992, p. 3.
11. John Townsend, "The Inevitability of Change: the Undertow of
Political Tides in the Gulf," in Global Interests in the Arab Gulf,
edited by Charles Davies (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1992), pp.
373- 374.
12. Cited in MEED, 10 April 1992, p. 22.
13. FBIS-NESA, 22 January 1992, p. 25.
14. Samuel Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," The Journal of
Democracy (Spring 1991), p. 28. Huntington notes that much the same
observation was made of Catholicism thirty years ago.
15. Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development
Ideologies. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). See also,
Mohamed El-Sayed Said, "Western Democracy, Or No Democracy At All,
" Al-Ahram, 6 May 1992.
16. One of the more interesting exchanges on this front is the National
Council on U.S.-Arab Relations' project bringing cadets from the U. S.
federal military academies to the Arab World for a better understanding of
the region. Opportunities in the near future entail full scale exchange
programs with some Arab military academies and the Virginia Military
Institute in Lexington, Virginia, Cultural diffusion can then be a
fruitful two-way street.
17. Townsend, p. 369.
18. Emile Nakhleh's work on the "Muntada al-Tanmiya" groups in
the Gulf examines the strategies of these Western-educated elites: Emile
Nakhleh, "Muntada al-Tanmiya: Indigenous Scholarship on Development
in the GCC Countries," Paper presented to the November 1990 Middle
East Studies Association (MESA) Conference.
19. Charles D. Smith, "The Intellectual, Islam, and Modernization:
Haykal and Shari'ati," Comparing Muslim Societies: Knowledge and
State in a Worm Civilization, edited by Juan R. I. Cole (Ann Arbor:.
University of Michigan Press, 1993).
20. Huntington, The Journal of Democracy, p. 15.
21. Although probably by Said's definition any individual accepting
support from the U.S. government would not be an independent or critical
thinker. Edward Said, "The Phony Islamic Threat," The New York
Times Magazine 21 November 1993, p. 65.
22. There is a growing literature on this aspect of U.S. foreign policy,
much of it regarding policy toward Latin America in the 1980s. For more
optimistic accounts: Ralph M. Goldman and William A. Douglas editors,
Promoting Democracy: Opportunities and Issues (New York: Praeger, 1988);
Brad Roberts editor, The New Democracies: Global Change and U.S. Policy
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990); Larry Diamond editor, The Democratic
Revolution: Struggles far Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing Worm
(New York: Freedom House, 1992). For more cautious accounts: Abraham
Lowenthal editor, Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin
America, Volumes I & II (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1991); and Peter J. Schraeder, Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign
Policy in the Third Worm (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989).
23. Neil S. MacFarlane, "The Impact of Superpower Collaboration on
the Third World," in Third Worm Security in the Post-Cold War Era,
edited by J. Weiss and M. Kessler (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 131.
24. The level of funding however is determined by an independent
panel of private citizens and business leaders not any of the foreign
policy arms of the Federal Government. The IRI takes money which it
receives from the NED and either appLies it to specific projects in the
region or awards the money to groups from the region with which the IRI is
working. In this way the Federal Government has a buffer of sorts from
activities which regime leaders may find disturbing, while at the same
time claiming a foreign poLicy concern with democracy; an attempt,
although transparent, at plausible denial. See Larry Diamond,
"Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy, No. 87, (Summer 1992),
pp. 38-40.
25. Notes taken by author from 30 June 1992 meeting of IRI Working Group
on Democracy in the Middle East, Washington, D.C. and more recent
discussions with IRI officials.
26. Political Participation and Constitutional Democracy in Kuwait, edited
transcript in author's possession, 29 April 1991.
27. Caryle Murphy, "Kuwait Bars Workshop on Democracy," The
Washington Post, 20 May 1992.
28. Caryle Murphy, "Kuwaiti Criticizes U.S. Envoy," The
Washington Post, 5 June 1992.
29. Speech before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Edward Djerejian,
17 March 1992, cited in U.S. Department of State Dispatch (23 March 1992);
see also Empty Reforms: Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws, Middle East Watch
(May 1992).
30. Jonathan S. Paris, "When to Worry in the Middle East," Orbis,
vol. 37, no. 4 (Fall 1993), p. 560.
31. Stanley Hoffman, Duties Beyond Borders: On the Limits and
Possibilities of Ethical International Politics, (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1981), p. 110.
32. Recently, the Clinton Administration has announced an overhaul of U.S.
aid programs to stress promotion of democracy. Interestingly, aid programs
to Egypt and Israel would be exempted from the new guidelines (The
Washington Post, 27 November 1993).
33. Some of the larger organizations include: Amnesty International (AI),
Middle East Watch (MEW), The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ),
and the Federation International des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH). MESA
regularly dedicates a panel to human fights in the Arab World, presses
governments directly on issues of academic freedom, and the Ford
Foundation commits funding for regionally-based human rights efforts.
Locally organized Arab organizations include: AOI-IR rounded in 1983 with
offices in Geneva and Cairo; The Arab Institute of Human Rights, rounded
in 1989 and based in Tunisia; The Moroccan Human Rights Organization (OMDH),
rounded in 1988; The Ligues Algeriennes des Droits de l'Homme, and the
Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), founded in 1977. Recently, Jordan
announced formation of a human rights groups as did Arafat for Gaza and
Jericho.
34. O'Donnell, et al., Tentative Conclusions, p. 51.
35. One such Conference, "Human Rights in the Arab World," was
held at Oxford University in July 1988 sponsored by the Association of
Arab American University Graduates. (Middle East International, 26 August
1988, p. 18).
36. Albert Hirschman; Getting Ahead Collectively (New York: Pergamon
Press, 1984), pp. 95-101.
37. Toward the end of the Bush Administration human rights activists
commented favorably on visits by Richard Schifter, assistant secretary of
state for human fights and humanitarian affairs, to Cairo. State
Department reports on human rights abuses in many Arab states continue to
be critical (cited in Caryle Murphy, "Arab States Challenged by
Emboldened Human Rights Groups," Washington Post, 1 June 1992). And
since the advent of the Clinton Administration, negative reactions from
the Egyptian leadership because of this pressure have become more public.
38. A recent underground human fights group in Syria was jailed because
among other crimes it criticized participation in the false referendum
which gave Assad another term as President. Cited in Murphy, "Arab
States Challenged."
39. Murphy, "Arab States Challenged."
40. Susan Waltz, "Human Rights and Practical Ideology in North
Africa, With Particular Attention lo the Case of Morocco," Paper
presented to 1990 MESA Conference, p. 30.
41. Waltz, pp. 27-29.
42. FBIS-NESA, 10 May 1990, p. 16.
43. Waltz, pp. 14-17.
44. Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Wan:h, cited in Murphy, "Arab States
Challenged."
45. In line with opening assumptions, internal factors cannot be
discarded. There is ample evidence from a simple analysis of the ethnic
and religious make up of military forces, their geographic basing, and
lack of serious combat training to suggest that domestic coup fears play a
role in determining defense budgets. This line of reasoning, however,
cannot fully account for particular purchasing strategies, their levels,
or their timing.
46. See Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered.
"
47. Allan Richards and John Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle
East {Boulder. Westview Press, 1990), in their treatment of the issue find
that military spending does not appear to have adversely affected economic
growth, but that "the military has done more to build state
apparatuses than to create strong economies." p. 373.
48. Lisa Anderson, "Remaking the Middle East: Prospects for Democracy
and Stability," Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 6 {1992), p.
169.
49. Robert Looney, "The Economic Impact of Defense Expenditures in
the Middle East," Naval Postgraduate School, (1990), pp. 16-17. Paper
in author's possession.
50. Other potential examples of this category could be regional pressure
from Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco on Algeria's leadership to abandon its
electoral experiment.
51. The Saudi percentage of total Arab aid rose from 51% in the period
1973-1979 to over 73% between 1983-1989. For the entire period (1973-
1989) the Saudi government dispersed some $60 billion in aid to other Arab
countries. Unofficial Saudi aid, from crude "cash in a bag
gifts" to arms purchases for allies, would greatly increase this
figure. See Pierre Boogaerde, Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and
Arab Regional Institutions, IMF Washington, D.C. (September 1991), p. 11;
and Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 July 1992, p. 18.
52. IMP World Outlook, Washington, D.C., May 1992, p. 84.
53. Cited in "Yemen Copes in Adversity," MEED, 28 August 1992,
p. 3.
54. "San'a Rules Out War with Riyadh," Middle East Mirror, 28
May 1992; The Estimate, Washington, D.C., 7 May 1992, p. 12; and The New
York Times, 4 June 1992.
55. Iliya Harik, "Privatization: The Issues, The Prospects, and The
Fears," in Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East,
edited by Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan (1992), p. 21.
56. Said El-Naggar, "Privatization and Structural Adjustment: The
Basic Issues," in Privatization and Structural Adjustment in the Arab
Countries, IMF (1989), p. 2. A notable reaction against this thesis has
been eloquently presented by Kiren Aziz Chaudhry in "The Myths of the
Market and the Common History o+.3f Late Developers," Politics and
Society, vol. 21, no. 3 (September 1993), pp. 245-274.
57. Giacomo Luciani, "Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical
Framework," in The Arab State, edited by G. Luciani (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990) pp. 65-85.
58. Diamond "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,"
p. 482.
59. This ratio, measuring actual principle plus interest payments as a
share of exports of goods and services, is a common indicator of a
developing country's ability to repay its debt. A percentage above 40 is
generally taken as nearing a dangerous level, however given greater and
greater IMF debt funding this ratio can be overstated.
60. "Trends in LDC External Debt, 1985-1991," Directorate of
Intelligence, Central InteLligence Agency (March 1992).
61. This is not to imply that state elites are monolithic in their
reaction to external resource constriction. Some may welcome genuine
decentralization as a way to realize the competitive advantages of their
own industries in the regional market, while others may wish to retain
state patronage to protect their own inefficient industries.
62. Briefly, IMF/World Bank policies involve first the conclusion of a
"stand-by agreement" with the state to provide hard currency for
immediate debt relief. With this agreement to stabilize, certain
guidelines have to be agreed upon by the state involving modest economic
reform. Later stabilization is coupled with "structural
adjustment" meaning stronger guidelines required to push the state
toward acceptance of more significant structural reform aided by longer
term loans.
63. Anderson, "Remaking the Middle East," p. 171.
64. DiPalma, p. 163.
65. Richards and Waterbury, p. 199.
66. Tim Niblock, "International and Domestic Factors in the Economic
Liberalization Process in Arab Countries," Symposium Paper, Exeter
University, September 1991, p. 22.
67. Niblock, p. 24.
68. New York Times, 7 and 13 October 1988.
69. Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Algeria, (EIU Report) no.
3, 1992, p. 12.
70. MEED, 6 March 1992, p. 8; 12 July 1991, p. 15; and 9 August 1991, p.
8.
71. MEED, 16 August 1991, p. 9, and 20 December 1991, p. 9.
72. Cited in Michael Hudson, "The Democratization Process in the Arab
World: An Assessment," Paper delivered to the 1990 Meeting of the
APSA, p. 9.
73. Niblock, p. 8.
74. Sullivan, pp. 2-3; Niblock, pp. 10-12; and Daniel Brumberg,
"Democratic Bargains and the Politics of Economic
Stabilization," 1989 MESA Conference Paper, pp. 32-34.
75. Reuter's News Service, 27 November 1993; MEED 10 December 1993, p. 19.
76. MEED, 7 June 1991, p. 24.
77. MEED, 5 March 1993, pp. 19-20; and 24 December 1993, p. 11.
78. Daniel Brumberg, "Democratic Bargains and the Politics of
Economic Stabilization," 1989 MESA Conference Paper, pp. 32-34.
79. Niblock, p. 5.
80. Schmitter, "The International Context," p. 19.
By Pete W. Moore Pete W. Moore is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of
Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada. The author would
like to thank Dr. Rex Brynen for his invaluable assistance in the drafting
of this article. Research and financial resources for this project were
generously provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Arab Studies,
Montreal.