Target: Saddam

There can't be much doubt left that the best solution to the problem of Iraq is the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Contrary to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's frequent assertions, he does not seem to be in much of a "box."

UN weapons inspections have now been suspended for over 50 days, and American policy on Iraq is badly adrift. As Paul Wolfowitz, former undersecretary of state for defense, recently testified before Congress, "The United States is unable or unwilling to pursue a serious policy in Iraq, one that would aim at liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam's tyrannical grasp and free Iraq's neighbors from Saddam's murderous threats."

It was certainly the expectation of the Bush administration that Saddam Hussein would be soon be history after Iraq's disastrous rout in the Persian Gulf war in 1991. And he nearly was. The majority of Iraq's provinces rose up in rebellion, only to find themselves abandoned by our side when they needed our active support. The decision to allow Saddam Hussein the use of his helicopters sealed their fate.

And the Revolutionary Guard, which was no good against superior American forces, turned out to be quite capable of brutally crushing badly armed lraqi insurgents. This American decision was based on the reasoning in the White House that a much anticipated palace coup was preferable to a break-up of Iraq. Maybe it would have been.

But as time showed, it was never really an option. When it comes to palace coups--both how to carry them out and how to squash them--Saddam is the hands-down expert. The alternative, therefore, has to be to build internal opposition to Saddam's regime. In a promising move, both the House and the Senate this week passed similar versions of the "Iraq liberation Act of l998" authorizing $97 million in aid, including broadcasting equipment and military training to Iraqi dissidents.

The bill also calls for an international tribunal on war crimes committed by Saddam, and it asks the president within 90 days to designate which groups should receive the funding. At least Congress seems to be ready to exert some constructive leadership where the administration is failing miserably.

It is, of course, not the first time this approach has been tried. Following the Gulf War; the CIA spent somewhere between $60 million and $70 million to put together a viable domestic force to fight Saddam, operating out of the protected area of northern Iraq. Reassured by American promises of air support, the anti-Saddam forces launched an offensive against him in 1996. Turns out they miscalculated American commitment again.

National Security Adviser Anthony Lake called off U.S. air cover for the operation, hundreds of people were killed and some 30,000 opposition troops had to flee Iraqi advances through Turkey. If we are not exactly trusted in this part of the world, it is not so strange.

Just how the money is spent will be important, and we have already seen a certain tug of war between the administration and Congress on this question over the summer. As it is, $5 million was appropriated for activities to build a democratic opposition and another $5 million for broadcasting in the 1999 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill. As Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott remarked on introducing the new bill, this money is nowhere near enough to make a difference.

And when it comes to naming beneficiaries, the State Department has been making strange noises, proposing funding for such organizations as the National Endowment for Democracy--a fine institution but hardly one to oust Saddam Hussein--as well as a myriad of groups, some so small as to consist of just one person. Very simply, a lack of seriousness has been in evidence from the administration.

The organization most likely to benefit from renewed American commitment is the Iraqi National Congress, a London-based umbrella group that has been successful in the past coordinating the activities of various Iraqi dissident groups.