Extra(5) B. R. Ambedkar's commentary on
Communal representation in federal
and provincial legislatures from 1909-1947
Tables included
From Pakistan or the Partition of India, B.R. Ambedkar, available online at http://www.ambedkar.org/pakistan/
Comment
Except for Muslim majority provinces Punjab and Bengal, the weightage given to Muslim representation at central and provincial levels was in excess of their population percentage. One context of B.R. Ambedkar's assessments which can not be ignored in understanding the evolution of the legislatures is that any weightage demanded by or granted to Muslims in excess of their population ratio would squeeze the seats granted not only to the Hindu majority but also to other minorities. Minorities such as the Scheduled Castes, of whose interests B.R. Ambedkar was a prominent and vocal representative, would have to depend even more on the good will of the squeezed Hindu majority to concede from the Hindu majority's own reduced share, their own fair share of representation.
From B.R. Ambedkar's Pakistan or the Partition of India, Chapter XI
Though, to start with, the suggestion of separate representation came from the British, the Muslims did not fail to appreciate the social value of separate political rights with the result that when in 1909 the Muslims came to know that the next step in the reform of the Legislative Councils was contemplated, they waited of their own accord in deputation upon the Viceroy, Lord Minto, and placed before him the following demands :—
(i) Communal representation in accordance with their numerical strength, social position and local influence, on district and municipal boards.
(ii) An assurance of Muhammadan representation on the governing bodies of Universities.
(iii) Communal representation on provincial councils, election being by special electoral colleges composed of Muhammadan landlords, lawyers, merchants, and representatives of other important interests, University graduates of a certain standing and members of district and municipal boards.
(iv) The number of Muhammadan representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council should not depend on their numerical strength, and Muhammadans should never be in an ineffective minority. They should be elected as far as possible (as opposed to being nominated), election being by special Muhammadan colleges composed of landowners, lawyers, merchants, members of provincial councils, Fellows of Universities, etc.
(1) the right to elect their representatives,
(2) the right to elect their representatives by separate electorates,
(3) the right to vote in the general electorates as well, and
(4) the right to weightage in representation.
...
The provisions were applied to all Provinces except the Punjab and the C. P. It was not applied to the Punjab because such special protection was considered unnecessary for the Musalmans of the Punjab and it was not applied to the C. P. because it had no Legislative Council at the time.
Comment
From Stanley Wolpert in Jinnah of Pakistan
..The legislative council reforms proposed by Morley and Minto initially provided for four separately elected Muslim members on the expanded Imperial Council of theViceroy. By the time the Indian council's bill was finished in 1909, however, no fewer than six such seats were reserved on a central legislative council of sixty, more than half of whom remained British officials. Minto, moreover, had promised to "appoint" at least two additional Muslim members as nominees off his own bat if they were not elected by special constituences such as landholders or municipalities, raising Muslim membership to eight out of twenty-eight non-official members on the viceroy's council, more than the actual ratio of India's Muslim minority to the total population of the subcontinent. By 1909 even Minto complained of "the excess of representation granted to Mahomedans." Morley retorted, "It was your early speech about their extra claims that started the M.[Muslim] hare." The secretary of state was by then convinced that "It passes the wit of man to frame plans that will please Hindus without offending Mahometans, and we shall be lucky if we don't offend both."
(end quote from Wolpert)
Ambedkar writes in Chapter XI:
In October 1916, 19 members of the Imperial Legislative Council presented the Viceroy (Lord Chelmsford) a memorandum demanding a reform of the Constitution. Immediately the Muslims came forward with a number of demands on behalf of the Muslim community. These were :—
The negotiations following upon these demands resulted in agreement between the Hindus and the Muslims which is known as the Lucknow Pact. It may be said to contain two clauses. One related to legislation, under which it was agreed that :—
The other clause related to the proportion of Muslim representation. With regard to the Imperial Legislative Council the Pact provided :—
The Lucknow Pact was adversely criticized by the Montagu Chelmsford Report. But being an agreement between the parties Government did not like to reject it and to substitute in its place its own decision. Both clauses of the agreement were accepted by Government and embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919. The clause relating to legislation was given effect to but in a different form. Instead of leaving it to the members of the Legislature to oppose it, it was provided that legislation affecting the religion or religious rites and usages of any class of British subjects in India shall not be introduced at any meeting of either Chamber of the Indian Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General.
The clause relating to representation was accepted by the Government, though in the opinion of the Government the Punjab and Bengal Muslims were not fairly treated.
The effect of these concessions can be seen by reference to the composition of the Legislatures constituted under the Government of India Act, 1919, which was as follows :—
Comment
Note that in the Legislative Assembly, elected Muslims had seats equal to the number of elected Non-Muslims. This was at a time when the Muslim population percentage was 25-27% of the total.
(end comment)
They were in the following terms :—
These new demands are self-explanatory except perhaps 1, 4 and 5. The object of demands 1 and 4 was to place, in four provinces, the Muslim community in a statutory majority where it had only communal majority, as a force counteracting the six provinces in which the Hindu community happened to be in a majority. This was insisted upon as a guarantee of good treatment by both the communities of its minorities. The object of demand No. 5 was to guarantee Muslim rule in Sind, N.-W. F. P., the Punjab and Bengal. But a Muslim majority rule in these Muslim Provinces, it was feared, would not be effective if they remained under the control of the Central Government which could not but be in the hand of the Hindus. To free the Muslim Provinces from the control of the Hindu Government at the Centre was the object for which demand No. 5 was put forth.
These demands were opposed by the Hindus. There may not be much in this. But what is significant is that they were also rejected by the Simon Commission. The Simon Commission, which was by no means unfriendly to the Muslims, gave some very cogent reasons for rejecting the Muslim demands. It said :—
By a Notification in the Gazette of India 25th January 1932 the Government of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 52 of the Government of India Act, 1916, declared that the N.-W. F. Province shall be treated as a Governor's Province. By an Order in Council, issued under the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 289 of the Government of India Act of 1935, Sind was separated from Bombay as from 1st April 1936 and declared to be a Governor's Province to be known as the province of Sind.
By the Resolution issued by the Secretary of State for India and published on 7th July 1934 the Muslim share in the public services was fixed at 25 per cent. of all appointments Imperial and Provincial. With regard to residuary powers, it is true that the Muslim demand that they should be vested in the Provinces was not accepted. But in another sense the Muslim demand in this respect may be deemed to have been granted. The essence of the Muslim demand was that the residuary powers should not be vested in the Centre, which, put in different language, meant that they should not be in the hands of the Hindus. This is precisely what is done by section 104 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which vests the residuary powers in the Governor-General to be exercised in his discretion.
The demand for 33 1/3 per cent. representation in the Cabinets, Central and Provincial, was not given effect to by a legal provision in the Act. The right of Muslims to representation in the Cabinets was however accepted by the British Government and provision for giving effect to it was made in the Instruments of Instructions issued to the Governors and Governor-General.
As to the remaining demand which related to a statutory majority in the Punjab and Bengal, the demand was given effect to by the Communal Award. True, a statutory majority in the whole House has not been given to the Muslims and could not be given having regard to the necessity for providing representation to other interests. But a statutory majority as against Hindus has been given to the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal without touching the weightages obtained by the Muslim minorities under the Lucknow Pact.
(a) The composition of the bodies through which election to these seats will be conducted, though in most cases either predominantly European or predominantly Indian, will not be statutorily fixed. It is, accordingly, not possible in each Province to state with certainty how many Europeans and Indians respectively will be returned. It is, however, expected that, initially, the numbers will be approximately as follows: Madras 4 European, 2 Indians; Bombay(including Sind), 5 Europeans, 3 Indians; Bengal, 14 Europeans, 5 Indians; United Provinces, 2 Europeans, 1 Indian; Punjab, 1 Indian, Bihar and Orissa, 2 Europeans, 2 Indians; Central Provinces (including Berar), 1 European, 1 Indian; Assam, 8 Europeans, 3 Indians; Bombay(without Sind), 4 Europeans, 3 Indians; Sind, 1 European, 1 Indian.
(b) Seven of these seats will be reserved for Mahrattas.
(c) As explained in paragraph 9 of the statement, the number of special Depressed Class seats in Bengal- which will not exceed 10-has not yet been fixed. The number of General seats will be 80, less the number of special Depressed Class seats.
(d) One of these seats is a Tumandar's seat. The four Landholders' seats will be filled from special constituencies with joint electorates. It is probable, from the distribution of the electorate, that the members returned will be one Hindu, one Sikh and two Mohammedans.
(e) This woman's seat will be filled from a non-communal constituency at Shillong.
Under the Poona Pact the numbers for Depressed Classes were changed as follows(as was the mode of election)
"(1) There shall be seats reserved for the Depressed Classes out of the general electorate seats in the Provincial Legislatures as follows:÷
Madras 30: Bombay with Sind 15; Punjab 8; Bihar and Orissa 18; Central Provinces 20; Assam 7; Bengal 30; United Provinces 20; Total 148..."
Comment:
Under the Poona Pact, separate electorates for Scheduled Castes were withdrawn and their representatives would henceforth be elected under joint electorates with Hindus. However, in return, as can be seen above, reserved seats for Scheduled Castes were granted in excess of those awarded under the 1932 Communal Award.
...To sum up this discussion of the Communal Award, it may be said that, as a solution of the Communal Question in its " lesser intent", there is no inequity in the Award on the ground that it gives weightage to the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces. For, it gives weightage also to Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces. Similarly, it may be said that there is no inequity in the Award, on the ground that it gives a statutory majority to the Muslims in Muslim Provinces in which they are a majority. If there is any, the statutory limitation put upon the Muslim number of seats, also gives to the Hindus in Hindu Provinces a statutory majority. But the same cannot be said of the Award in the matter of the electorates. The Communal Award is iniquitous inasmuch as it accords unequal treatment to the Hindu and Muslim minorities in the matter of electorates. It grants the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces the right of self-determination in the matter of electorates, but it does not grant the same right to the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces. In the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minority is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it wants and the Hindu majority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. But in the Muslim Provinces, it is the Muslim majority which is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it prefers and the Hindu minority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. Thus, the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces having been given both statutory majority and separate electorates, the Communal Award must be said to impose upon the Hindu minorities Muslim rule, which they can neither alter nor influence.
This is what constitutes the fundamental wrong in the Communal Award. That this is a grave wrong must be admitted. For, it offends against certain political principles, which have now become axiomatic. First is, not to trust any one with unlimited political power. As has been well said,
"If in any state there is a body of men who possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule can never be free. For, the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably poisonous to those who possess it. They are always tempted to impose their canon of good upon others, and in the end, they assume that the good of the community depends upon the continuance of their power. Liberty always demands a limitation of political authority..."
The second principle is that, as a King has no Divine Right to rule, so also a majority has no Divine Right to rule. Majority Rule is tolerated only because it is for a limited period and subject to the right to have it changed, and secondly because it is a rule of a political majority, i.e., majority which has submitted itself to the suffrage of a minority and not a communal majority. If such is the limited scope of authority permissible to a political majority over a political minority, how can a minority of one community be placed under the perpetual subjection of a majority of another community? To allow a majority of one community to rule a minority of another community without requiring the majority to submit itself to the suffrage of the minority, especially when the minority demands it, is to enact a perversion of democratic principles and to show a callous disregard for the safety and security of the Hindu minorities.
As an instance, one may refer to the demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India. In 1929, the Muslims insisted that in allotting seats in Legislatures, a majority shall not be reduced to a minority or equality. This principle, enunciated by themselves, it is now demanded, shall be abandoned and a majority shall be reduced to equality. The Muslims in 1929 admitted that the other minorities required protection and that they must have it in the same manner as the Muslims. The only distinction made between the Muslims and other minorities was as to the extent of the protection. The Muslims claimed a higher degree of protection than was conceded to the other minorities on the ground of their political importance. The necessity and adequacy of protection for the other minorities the Muslims never denied. But with this new demand of 50 per cent. the Muslims are not only seeking to reduce the Hindu majority to a minority but they are also cutting into the political rights of the other minorities. The Muslims are now speaking the language of Hitler and claiming a place in the sun as Hitler has been doing for Germany. For their demand for 50 per cent. is nothing but a counterpart of the German claims for Deutschland Uber Alles and Lebenuraum for themselves, irrespective of what happens to other minorities.
Their claim for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India is equally extravagant. Urdu is not only not spoken all, over India but is not even the language of all the Musalmans of India. Of the 68 millions of Muslims only 28 millions speak Urdu. The proposal of making Urdu the national language means that the language of 28 millions of Muslims is to be imposed particularly upon 40 millions of Musalmans or generally upon 322 millions of Indians.
It will thus be seen that every time a proposal for the reform of the constitution comes forth, the Muslims are there, ready with some new political demand or demands. The only check upon such indefinite expansion of Muslim demands is the power of the British Government, which must be the final arbiter in any dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims. Who can confidently say that the decision of the British will not be in favour of the Muslims if the dispute relating to these new demands was referred to them for arbitration ? The more the Muslims demand the more accommodating the British seem to become. At any rate, past experience shows that the British have been inclined to give the Muslims more than what the Muslims had themselves asked. Two such instances can be cited.
One of these relates to the Lucknow Pact. The question was whether the British Government should accept the Pact. The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report were disinclined to accept it for reasons which were very weighty. Speaking of the weightages granted to the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact, the authors' of the Joint Report observed:—
" Now a privileged position of this kind is open to the objection, that if any other community here after makes good a claim to separate representation, it can be satisfied only by deducting the non-Muslim seats, or by a rateable deduction from both Muslim and non-Muslim ; and Hindu and Muslim opinion are not likely to agree which process should be adopted. While, therefore, for reasons that we explain subsequently we assent to the maintenance of separate representation for Muhammadans, we are bound to reserve our approval of the particular proposals set before us, until we have ascertained what the effect upon other interests will be, .. and have made fair provision for them."
The Lucknow Pact was based upon the principle, now thrown to the winds, that a community as such was not entitled to political protection. A community was entitled to protection when it was in a minority. That was the principle underlying the Lucknow Pact. The Muslim community in the Punjab and Bengal was not in a minority and, therefore, was not entitled to the same protection which it got in other Provinces where it was in a minority. Notwithstanding their being in a majority, the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal felt the necessity of separate electorates. According to the principle underlying the Pact they could qualify themselves for this only by becoming a minority which they did by agreeing to a minority of seats. This is the reason why the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab did not get the majority of seats they were entitled to on the population basis.
The proposal of the Government of India to give to the Bengal Muslims more than what they had asked for did not go through. But the fact that they wanted to do so remains as evidence of their inclinations.
The second occasion when the British Government as an arbiter gave the Muslims more than they asked for was when the Communal Decision was given in 1932. Sir Muhammad Shafi made two different proposals in the Minorities Sub-Committee of the R. T. C. In his speech on 6th January 1931, Sir Muhammad Shafi put forth the following proposal as a basis for communal settlement :—
(end quote)
Comment
The Communal Award 1932 was used as basis for assigning seats in the Government of India Act 1935.
Comment:
When in 1939, M.A. Jinnah demanded 50% representation for 25% Muslims on the basis of the two-nation theory, as can be seen in Table 7, in the Federal Assembly operating under the Government of India Act 1935, the number of Muslim seats already constituted 80% of the number of Hindu seats.
Tables included
- Legislative Councils (Act of
1909): Communal Proportion between Hindus and Muslims
- Representation of Muslims According to the Lucknow Pact, 1916
- Actual Weightage of Muslims According to the Lucknow Pact
- Communal Composition of the Legislatures, 1919
- Communal Award 1932 Allocation
of Seats in Provincial Legislatures (Lower House only)
- Allocation of Seats under the Government of India Act, 1935, for the Lower House of the Federal Legislature for British India, by Province and by Community
- General and Muslim Distribution of Seats by Number and Percentages in the Federal Legislature under Government of India Act 1935
From Pakistan or the Partition of India, B.R. Ambedkar, available online at http://www.ambedkar.org/pakistan/
Comment
Except for Muslim majority provinces Punjab and Bengal, the weightage given to Muslim representation at central and provincial levels was in excess of their population percentage. One context of B.R. Ambedkar's assessments which can not be ignored in understanding the evolution of the legislatures is that any weightage demanded by or granted to Muslims in excess of their population ratio would squeeze the seats granted not only to the Hindu majority but also to other minorities. Minorities such as the Scheduled Castes, of whose interests B.R. Ambedkar was a prominent and vocal representative, would have to depend even more on the good will of the squeezed Hindu majority to concede from the Hindu majority's own reduced share, their own fair share of representation.
From B.R. Ambedkar's Pakistan or the Partition of India, Chapter XI
Though, to start with, the suggestion of separate representation came from the British, the Muslims did not fail to appreciate the social value of separate political rights with the result that when in 1909 the Muslims came to know that the next step in the reform of the Legislative Councils was contemplated, they waited of their own accord in deputation upon the Viceroy, Lord Minto, and placed before him the following demands :—
(i) Communal representation in accordance with their numerical strength, social position and local influence, on district and municipal boards.
(ii) An assurance of Muhammadan representation on the governing bodies of Universities.
(iii) Communal representation on provincial councils, election being by special electoral colleges composed of Muhammadan landlords, lawyers, merchants, and representatives of other important interests, University graduates of a certain standing and members of district and municipal boards.
(iv) The number of Muhammadan representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council should not depend on their numerical strength, and Muhammadans should never be in an ineffective minority. They should be elected as far as possible (as opposed to being nominated), election being by special Muhammadan colleges composed of landowners, lawyers, merchants, members of provincial councils, Fellows of Universities, etc.
(1) the right to elect their representatives,
(2) the right to elect their representatives by separate electorates,
(3) the right to vote in the general electorates as well, and
(4) the right to weightage in representation.
...
The provisions were applied to all Provinces except the Punjab and the C. P. It was not applied to the Punjab because such special protection was considered unnecessary for the Musalmans of the Punjab and it was not applied to the C. P. because it had no Legislative Council at the time.
Table
1. Legislative
Councils (Act of
1909): Communal Proportion between Hindus and Muslims
| Province | Ex-officio Members |
Elected Members |
Nominated Members |
Total Strength |
||
| Total |
Non-Muslim |
Muslim |
||||
| India |
8 |
27 |
22 |
5 |
33 |
68 |
| Madras |
4 |
21 |
19 |
2 |
24 |
49 |
| Bombay |
4 |
21 |
17 |
4 |
24 |
49 |
| Bengal |
4 |
28 |
23 |
5 |
22 |
54 |
| Bihar |
4 |
21 |
17 |
4 |
20 |
45 |
| U.P |
1 |
21 |
17 |
4 |
28 |
50 |
| Punjab |
1 |
8 |
8 |
none |
18 |
27 |
| Burma |
1 |
1 |
1 |
none |
16 |
18 |
| Assam |
1 |
11 |
9 |
2 |
14 |
25 |
Comment
From Stanley Wolpert in Jinnah of Pakistan
..The legislative council reforms proposed by Morley and Minto initially provided for four separately elected Muslim members on the expanded Imperial Council of theViceroy. By the time the Indian council's bill was finished in 1909, however, no fewer than six such seats were reserved on a central legislative council of sixty, more than half of whom remained British officials. Minto, moreover, had promised to "appoint" at least two additional Muslim members as nominees off his own bat if they were not elected by special constituences such as landholders or municipalities, raising Muslim membership to eight out of twenty-eight non-official members on the viceroy's council, more than the actual ratio of India's Muslim minority to the total population of the subcontinent. By 1909 even Minto complained of "the excess of representation granted to Mahomedans." Morley retorted, "It was your early speech about their extra claims that started the M.[Muslim] hare." The secretary of state was by then convinced that "It passes the wit of man to frame plans that will please Hindus without offending Mahometans, and we shall be lucky if we don't offend both."
(end quote from Wolpert)
Ambedkar writes in Chapter XI:
In October 1916, 19 members of the Imperial Legislative Council presented the Viceroy (Lord Chelmsford) a memorandum demanding a reform of the Constitution. Immediately the Muslims came forward with a number of demands on behalf of the Muslim community. These were :—
(i)
The
extension of the
principle of separate representation to the Punjab and the C. P.
(ii) Fixing the numerical strength of the Muslim representatives in the Provincial and Imperial Legislative Councils.
(iii) Safeguards against legislation affecting Muslims, their religion and religious usages.
(ii) Fixing the numerical strength of the Muslim representatives in the Provincial and Imperial Legislative Councils.
(iii) Safeguards against legislation affecting Muslims, their religion and religious usages.
The negotiations following upon these demands resulted in agreement between the Hindus and the Muslims which is known as the Lucknow Pact. It may be said to contain two clauses. One related to legislation, under which it was agreed that :—
" No
Bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a
resolution introduced by a nonofficial affecting one or other community
(which question is
to be determined by the members of that community in the Legislative
Council concerned)
shall be' proceeded with, if three-fourths of the members of that
community in the
particular Council, Imperial and Provincial, oppose the Bill or any
clause thereof or the
resolution."
The other clause related to the proportion of Muslim representation. With regard to the Imperial Legislative Council the Pact provided :—
"That
one-third of the Indian elected
members should be Muhammadans, elected by
separate electorates in the several
Provinces, in the proportion, as nearly as might be, in which they were
represented on the
provincial legislative councils by separate Muhammadan electorates."
Table 2.
Representation of Muslims
According
to the Lucknow Pact,
1916
| Legislative
Body |
Percentage
of Muslims to total population of the electoral area(1921 Census) |
Percentage
of Muslim Members to total number of Members |
Percentage
of elected Muslim Members to total number of elected Indian members* |
Percentage
of Muslim Members to total Members in seats filled by election from
Indian general(communal) constituencies |
Lucknow
Pact Percentage |
| Punjab |
55.2 |
40 |
48.5 |
50 |
50 |
| United Provinces |
14.3 |
25 |
30 |
32.5 |
30 |
| Bengal |
54.6 |
30 |
40.5 |
46 |
40 |
| Bihar and Orissa |
10.9 |
18.5 |
25 |
27 |
25 |
| Central Provinces |
4.4 |
9.5 |
13 |
14.5 |
15 |
| Madras |
6.7 |
10.5 |
14 |
16.5 |
15 |
| Bombay |
19.8 |
25.5 |
35 |
37 |
33.3 |
| Assam |
32.2 |
30 |
35.5 |
37.5 |
No
provision |
| Legislative Assembly |
24.0 |
26 |
34 |
38 |
33.3 |
* Column 3 includes Indians
elected by special constituencies, e.g. Commerce, whose communal
proportions
may of course vary slightly from time to time. Similarly column 2,
including
also officials and nominated non-officials, will show slightly
different
results at different periods.
While allowing this proportion of
seats to the
Muslims, the right to second vote in the general electorates which they
had under the
arrangement of 1909 was taken away.
...
This table does not show quite clearly the weightage obtained by the Muslims under the Lucknow Pact. It was worked out by the Government of India in their despatch on the Report of Franchise Committee of which Lord Southborough was the Chairman. The following table is taken from that despatch which shows that the Muslims got a weightage under the Lucknow Pact far in excess of what Government gave them in 1909.
Table 3. Actual Weightage of Muslims According to the Lucknow Pact
| Muslim
percentage of population |
Percentage
of Muslim seats proposed |
Percentage
(2) of (1) |
|
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
|
| Bengal |
52.6 |
40 |
76 |
| Bihar
and Orissa |
10.5 |
25 |
238 |
| Bombay |
20.4 |
33.3 |
163 |
| Central
Provinces |
4.3 |
15 |
349 |
| Madras |
6.5 |
15 |
231 |
| Punjab |
54.8 |
50 |
91 |
| United
Provinces |
14.0 |
30 |
214 |
The Lucknow Pact was adversely criticized by the Montagu Chelmsford Report. But being an agreement between the parties Government did not like to reject it and to substitute in its place its own decision. Both clauses of the agreement were accepted by Government and embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919. The clause relating to legislation was given effect to but in a different form. Instead of leaving it to the members of the Legislature to oppose it, it was provided that legislation affecting the religion or religious rites and usages of any class of British subjects in India shall not be introduced at any meeting of either Chamber of the Indian Legislature without the previous sanction of the Governor-General.
The clause relating to representation was accepted by the Government, though in the opinion of the Government the Punjab and Bengal Muslims were not fairly treated.
The effect of these concessions can be seen by reference to the composition of the Legislatures constituted under the Government of India Act, 1919, which was as follows :—
Table 4. Communal
Composition of the
Legislatures, 1919
| Legislative Body |
Elected Members |
Nominated Members |
Total |
||
| Total |
Muslims |
Non-Muslims |
|||
| Legislative Assembly |
104 |
52 |
52 |
41 |
145 |
| Council of State |
33 |
11 |
22 |
27 |
60 |
| Madras Provincial Council |
98 |
13 |
85 |
34 |
132 |
| Bombay Provincial Council |
86 |
27 |
59 |
28 |
114 |
| Bengal Provincial Council |
114 |
39 |
75 |
26 |
140 |
| U.P Provincial Council |
110 |
29 |
71 |
23 |
123 |
| Punjab Provincial Council |
71 |
32 |
39 |
23 |
94 |
| Bihar Provincial Council |
76 |
18 |
58 |
27 |
103 |
| C.P Provincial Council |
55 |
7 |
48 |
18 |
73 |
| Assam Provincial Council |
39 |
12 |
27 |
14 |
53 |
Comment
Note that in the Legislative Assembly, elected Muslims had seats equal to the number of elected Non-Muslims. This was at a time when the Muslim population percentage was 25-27% of the total.
(end comment)
Ambedkar writes:
In 1927 the British Government announced the appointment of the Simon Commission to examine the working of the Indian Constitution and to suggest further reforms. Immediately the Muslims came forward with further political demands. These demands were put forth from various Muslim platforms such as the Muslim League, All-India Muslim Conference, All-Parties Muslim Conference, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Khilafat Conference. The demands were substantially the same. It would suffice to state those that were formulated by Mr. Jinnah on behalf of the Muslim League.They were in the following terms :—
- The form of the future
Constitution should be
federal with residuary powers vested in the provinces.
- A uniform measure of
autonomy should be granted
to all provinces.
- All legislatures in the
country and other
elected bodies should be reconstituted on the definite principle of
adequate and effective
representation minorities in every province without reducing the
majority of any
province to a minority or even equality.
- In the
Central Legislature, Muslim
representation should not be less than one-third.
- The representation of
communal groups should
continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present, provided
that it should be
open to any community at any time to abandon its separate electorate in
favour of joint
electorates.
- Any territorial redistribution that might at any time be necessary should not in any way affect the Muslim majority in the Punjab, Bengal and North-West Province.
- Full religious liberty, that is, liberty of belief, worship, observances, propaganda, association and education should be guaranteed to all communities.
- No bill or resolution, or any part thereof, should be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such bill or resolution or part thereof on the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or, in the alternative, such other method as may be devised or as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.
- Reforms
should be introduced in the North-West Frontier
Province and Baluchistan on the same footing as in other provinces.
- Provision
should be made in the Constitution giving the
Muslims an adequate share along with other Indians in all the Services
of the State and in
self-governing bodies, having due regard to the requirements of
efficiency.
- The
constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the
protection of Muslim religion, culture and personal law, and the
promotion of Muslim
education, language, religion, personal laws, Muslim charitable
institutions, and for
their due share in grants-in-aid given by the Stale and by
self-governing bodies.
- No
Cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed
without there being a proportion of Muslim Ministers of at least
one-third.
- No
change
to be made in the Constitution by the Central
Legislature except with the concurrence of the States constituting the
Indian Federation.
That
in
the present circumstances the representation of
Musalmans in the different legislatures of the country and of the other
elected bodies
through separate electorates is inevitable, and, further, Government
being pledged not to
deprive the Musalmans of this right, it cannot be taken away without
their consent, and so
long as the Musalmans are not satisfied that their rights and interests
are safeguarded in
the manner specified above (or herein) they would in no way consent to
the establishment
of joint electorates with or without conditions.
Note:—The question of
excess representation of
Musalmans over and above their population in the provinces where they
are in minority to
be considered hereafter.
This is a consolidated statement of Muslim
demands. In it there are some which are old, and some which are new.
The old ones are
included because the aim is to retain the advantages accruing
therefrom. The new ones are
added in order to remove the weaknesses in the Muslim position. The new
ones are five in
number: (1) Representation in proportion to population to Muslim
majorities in the Punjab
and Bengal, (2) One-third representation to Muslims in the cabinets
both Central and
Provincial, (3) Adequate representation of Muslims in the Services, (4)
Separation of Sind
from the Bombay Presidency and the raising of N.-W. F. P. and
Baluchistan to the status of
self-governing provinces, and (5) Vesting of residuary powers in the
provinces instead of
in the Central Government.These new demands are self-explanatory except perhaps 1, 4 and 5. The object of demands 1 and 4 was to place, in four provinces, the Muslim community in a statutory majority where it had only communal majority, as a force counteracting the six provinces in which the Hindu community happened to be in a majority. This was insisted upon as a guarantee of good treatment by both the communities of its minorities. The object of demand No. 5 was to guarantee Muslim rule in Sind, N.-W. F. P., the Punjab and Bengal. But a Muslim majority rule in these Muslim Provinces, it was feared, would not be effective if they remained under the control of the Central Government which could not but be in the hand of the Hindus. To free the Muslim Provinces from the control of the Hindu Government at the Centre was the object for which demand No. 5 was put forth.
These demands were opposed by the Hindus. There may not be much in this. But what is significant is that they were also rejected by the Simon Commission. The Simon Commission, which was by no means unfriendly to the Muslims, gave some very cogent reasons for rejecting the Muslim demands. It said :—
"
This claim goes to the length of seeking
to preserve the full security for representation now provided for
Muslims in these six
provinces and at the same time to enlarge in Bengal and the Punjab the
present proportion
of seats secured to the community by separate electorates to figures
proportionate to
their ratio of population. This would give Muhammadans a fixed and
unalterable majority of
the general constituency seats in both provinces. We cannot go so far.
The continuance of
the present scale of weightage in the six provinces could not—in the
absence of a new
general agreement between the communities—equitably be combined with so
great a
departure from the existing allocation in Bengal and the Punjab.
" It would be unfair that Muhammadans should retain the very considerable weightage they enjoy in the six provinces, and that there should at the same time be imposed, in face of Hindu and Sikh opposition, a definite Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the electorate........ "
Notwithstanding the opposition of the
Hindus
and the Sikhs and the rejection by the Simon Commission, the British
Government when
called upon to act as an arbiter granted the Muslims all their demands
old and new." It would be unfair that Muhammadans should retain the very considerable weightage they enjoy in the six provinces, and that there should at the same time be imposed, in face of Hindu and Sikh opposition, a definite Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the electorate........ "
By a Notification in the Gazette of India 25th January 1932 the Government of India, in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 52 of the Government of India Act, 1916, declared that the N.-W. F. Province shall be treated as a Governor's Province. By an Order in Council, issued under the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of section 289 of the Government of India Act of 1935, Sind was separated from Bombay as from 1st April 1936 and declared to be a Governor's Province to be known as the province of Sind.
By the Resolution issued by the Secretary of State for India and published on 7th July 1934 the Muslim share in the public services was fixed at 25 per cent. of all appointments Imperial and Provincial. With regard to residuary powers, it is true that the Muslim demand that they should be vested in the Provinces was not accepted. But in another sense the Muslim demand in this respect may be deemed to have been granted. The essence of the Muslim demand was that the residuary powers should not be vested in the Centre, which, put in different language, meant that they should not be in the hands of the Hindus. This is precisely what is done by section 104 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which vests the residuary powers in the Governor-General to be exercised in his discretion.
The demand for 33 1/3 per cent. representation in the Cabinets, Central and Provincial, was not given effect to by a legal provision in the Act. The right of Muslims to representation in the Cabinets was however accepted by the British Government and provision for giving effect to it was made in the Instruments of Instructions issued to the Governors and Governor-General.
As to the remaining demand which related to a statutory majority in the Punjab and Bengal, the demand was given effect to by the Communal Award. True, a statutory majority in the whole House has not been given to the Muslims and could not be given having regard to the necessity for providing representation to other interests. But a statutory majority as against Hindus has been given to the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal without touching the weightages obtained by the Muslim minorities under the Lucknow Pact.
Table
5. Communal
Award 1932 Allocation
of Seats in Provincial Legislatures (Lower House only)
| Provinces |
General |
Depressed
Classes |
Rep.s
from Backward Areas |
Sikh |
Moha- mmedan |
Indian
Christian |
Anglo- Indian |
European |
Comm.
and Industry, Mining and Planting Special(a) |
Land- holders, Special |
Univer- sity, Special |
Labour
Special |
Total |
| Madras |
134 |
18 |
1 |
0 |
29 |
9 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
1 |
6 |
215 |
| Bombay(incl
Sind) |
97(b) |
10 |
1 |
0 |
63 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
8 |
3 |
1 |
8 |
200 |
| Bengal |
80(c) |
(c) |
0 |
0 |
119 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
19 |
5 |
2 |
8 |
250 |
| United
Provinces |
132
|
12 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
1 |
3 |
228 |
| Punjab |
43
|
0 |
0 |
32 |
86 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5(d) |
1 |
3 |
175 |
| Bihar and
Orissa |
99 |
7 |
8 |
0 |
42 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
1 |
4 |
175 |
| Central
Provinces (incl. Berar) |
77 |
10 |
1 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
112 |
| Assam |
44(e) |
4 |
9 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
108 |
| North-West
Frontier Province |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
| Bombay
(without Sind) |
109(b) |
10 |
1 |
0 |
30 |
3 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
2 |
1 |
7 |
175 |
| Sind |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
60 |
(a) The composition of the bodies through which election to these seats will be conducted, though in most cases either predominantly European or predominantly Indian, will not be statutorily fixed. It is, accordingly, not possible in each Province to state with certainty how many Europeans and Indians respectively will be returned. It is, however, expected that, initially, the numbers will be approximately as follows: Madras 4 European, 2 Indians; Bombay(including Sind), 5 Europeans, 3 Indians; Bengal, 14 Europeans, 5 Indians; United Provinces, 2 Europeans, 1 Indian; Punjab, 1 Indian, Bihar and Orissa, 2 Europeans, 2 Indians; Central Provinces (including Berar), 1 European, 1 Indian; Assam, 8 Europeans, 3 Indians; Bombay(without Sind), 4 Europeans, 3 Indians; Sind, 1 European, 1 Indian.
(b) Seven of these seats will be reserved for Mahrattas.
(c) As explained in paragraph 9 of the statement, the number of special Depressed Class seats in Bengal- which will not exceed 10-has not yet been fixed. The number of General seats will be 80, less the number of special Depressed Class seats.
(d) One of these seats is a Tumandar's seat. The four Landholders' seats will be filled from special constituencies with joint electorates. It is probable, from the distribution of the electorate, that the members returned will be one Hindu, one Sikh and two Mohammedans.
(e) This woman's seat will be filled from a non-communal constituency at Shillong.
Under the Poona Pact the numbers for Depressed Classes were changed as follows(as was the mode of election)
"(1) There shall be seats reserved for the Depressed Classes out of the general electorate seats in the Provincial Legislatures as follows:÷
Madras 30: Bombay with Sind 15; Punjab 8; Bihar and Orissa 18; Central Provinces 20; Assam 7; Bengal 30; United Provinces 20; Total 148..."
Comment:
Under the Poona Pact, separate electorates for Scheduled Castes were withdrawn and their representatives would henceforth be elected under joint electorates with Hindus. However, in return, as can be seen above, reserved seats for Scheduled Castes were granted in excess of those awarded under the 1932 Communal Award.
Ambedkar writes in Chapter VI:
...To sum up this discussion of the Communal Award, it may be said that, as a solution of the Communal Question in its " lesser intent", there is no inequity in the Award on the ground that it gives weightage to the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces. For, it gives weightage also to Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces. Similarly, it may be said that there is no inequity in the Award, on the ground that it gives a statutory majority to the Muslims in Muslim Provinces in which they are a majority. If there is any, the statutory limitation put upon the Muslim number of seats, also gives to the Hindus in Hindu Provinces a statutory majority. But the same cannot be said of the Award in the matter of the electorates. The Communal Award is iniquitous inasmuch as it accords unequal treatment to the Hindu and Muslim minorities in the matter of electorates. It grants the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces the right of self-determination in the matter of electorates, but it does not grant the same right to the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces. In the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minority is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it wants and the Hindu majority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. But in the Muslim Provinces, it is the Muslim majority which is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it prefers and the Hindu minority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. Thus, the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces having been given both statutory majority and separate electorates, the Communal Award must be said to impose upon the Hindu minorities Muslim rule, which they can neither alter nor influence.
This is what constitutes the fundamental wrong in the Communal Award. That this is a grave wrong must be admitted. For, it offends against certain political principles, which have now become axiomatic. First is, not to trust any one with unlimited political power. As has been well said,
"If in any state there is a body of men who possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule can never be free. For, the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably poisonous to those who possess it. They are always tempted to impose their canon of good upon others, and in the end, they assume that the good of the community depends upon the continuance of their power. Liberty always demands a limitation of political authority..."
The second principle is that, as a King has no Divine Right to rule, so also a majority has no Divine Right to rule. Majority Rule is tolerated only because it is for a limited period and subject to the right to have it changed, and secondly because it is a rule of a political majority, i.e., majority which has submitted itself to the suffrage of a minority and not a communal majority. If such is the limited scope of authority permissible to a political majority over a political minority, how can a minority of one community be placed under the perpetual subjection of a majority of another community? To allow a majority of one community to rule a minority of another community without requiring the majority to submit itself to the suffrage of the minority, especially when the minority demands it, is to enact a perversion of democratic principles and to show a callous disregard for the safety and security of the Hindu minorities.
Ambedkar writes in Chapter XI:
After taking into account what the
Muslims
demanded at the R. T. C. and what was conceded to them, any one could
have thought that
the limit of Muslim demands was reached and that the 1932 settlement
was a final
settlement. But, it appears that even with this the Musalmans are not
satisfied. A further
list of new demands for safeguarding the Muslim position seems to be
ready. In the
controversy that went on between Mr. Jinnah and the Congress in the
year 1938, Mr. Jinnah
was asked to disclose his demands which he refused to do. But these
demands have come to
the surface in the correspondence that passed between Pandit Nehru and
Mr. Jinnah [Nehru's reply to
Jinnah in Extra (4B)]
in the
course of the controversy and they have been tabulated by Pandit Nehru
in one of his
letters to Mr. Jinnah. His tabulation gives the following items as
being matters of
disputes and requiring settlement :—
(1)
The fourteen points formulated by the
Muslim League in 1929.
(2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism.
(3) The share of the Muslims in the state services should be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.
(4) Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute.
(5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the Mosque.
(6) The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
(7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter.
(8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial re-distribution or adjustments.
(9) The ' Bande Mataram' song should be given up.
(10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.
(11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate electorates and population strength.
(12) The tricolour flag should be changed or alternately the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance.
(13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims.
(14) Coalition Ministries should be formed.
With this new
list, there is no knowing where
the Muslims are going to stop in their demands. Within one year, that
is, between 1938 and
1939, one more demand and that too of a substantial character, namely
50 per cent. share
in every thing, has been added to it. In this catalogue of new demands
there are some
which on the face of them are extravagant and impossible, if not
irresponsible.(2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of nationalism.
(3) The share of the Muslims in the state services should be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.
(4) Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute.
(5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Shahidganj Mosque and should use its moral pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the Mosque.
(6) The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.
(7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter.
(8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial re-distribution or adjustments.
(9) The ' Bande Mataram' song should be given up.
(10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.
(11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal Award, that is, separate electorates and population strength.
(12) The tricolour flag should be changed or alternately the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal importance.
(13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims.
(14) Coalition Ministries should be formed.
As an instance, one may refer to the demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India. In 1929, the Muslims insisted that in allotting seats in Legislatures, a majority shall not be reduced to a minority or equality. This principle, enunciated by themselves, it is now demanded, shall be abandoned and a majority shall be reduced to equality. The Muslims in 1929 admitted that the other minorities required protection and that they must have it in the same manner as the Muslims. The only distinction made between the Muslims and other minorities was as to the extent of the protection. The Muslims claimed a higher degree of protection than was conceded to the other minorities on the ground of their political importance. The necessity and adequacy of protection for the other minorities the Muslims never denied. But with this new demand of 50 per cent. the Muslims are not only seeking to reduce the Hindu majority to a minority but they are also cutting into the political rights of the other minorities. The Muslims are now speaking the language of Hitler and claiming a place in the sun as Hitler has been doing for Germany. For their demand for 50 per cent. is nothing but a counterpart of the German claims for Deutschland Uber Alles and Lebenuraum for themselves, irrespective of what happens to other minorities.
Their claim for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India is equally extravagant. Urdu is not only not spoken all, over India but is not even the language of all the Musalmans of India. Of the 68 millions of Muslims only 28 millions speak Urdu. The proposal of making Urdu the national language means that the language of 28 millions of Muslims is to be imposed particularly upon 40 millions of Musalmans or generally upon 322 millions of Indians.
It will thus be seen that every time a proposal for the reform of the constitution comes forth, the Muslims are there, ready with some new political demand or demands. The only check upon such indefinite expansion of Muslim demands is the power of the British Government, which must be the final arbiter in any dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims. Who can confidently say that the decision of the British will not be in favour of the Muslims if the dispute relating to these new demands was referred to them for arbitration ? The more the Muslims demand the more accommodating the British seem to become. At any rate, past experience shows that the British have been inclined to give the Muslims more than what the Muslims had themselves asked. Two such instances can be cited.
One of these relates to the Lucknow Pact. The question was whether the British Government should accept the Pact. The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report were disinclined to accept it for reasons which were very weighty. Speaking of the weightages granted to the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact, the authors' of the Joint Report observed:—
" Now a privileged position of this kind is open to the objection, that if any other community here after makes good a claim to separate representation, it can be satisfied only by deducting the non-Muslim seats, or by a rateable deduction from both Muslim and non-Muslim ; and Hindu and Muslim opinion are not likely to agree which process should be adopted. While, therefore, for reasons that we explain subsequently we assent to the maintenance of separate representation for Muhammadans, we are bound to reserve our approval of the particular proposals set before us, until we have ascertained what the effect upon other interests will be, .. and have made fair provision for them."
" The
Muhammadan representation which they
the authors of the Pact propose for Bengal is manifestly
insufficient. It is questionable
whether the claims of the Muhammadan population of Eastern Bengal were
adequately pressed
when the Congress-League compact was in the making. They are
conspicuously a backward and
impoverished community. The repartition of the presidency in 1912 came
as a severe
disappointment to them, and we should be very loath to fail in seeing
that their interests
are now generously secured. In order to give the Bengal Muslims a
representation
proportionate to their numbers, and no more, we should allot them 44
instead of 34 seats
[due to them under the Pact]."
This enthusiasm for the Bengal
Muslims shown by
the Government of India was not shared by the British Government. It
felt that as the
number of seats given to the Bengal Muslims was the result of an
agreement, any
interference to improve the bargain when there was no dispute about the
genuineness of the
agreement, could not but create the impression that the British
Government was in some
special sense and for some special reason the friend of the Muslims. In
suggesting this
augmentation in the seats, the Government of India forgot to take note
of the reason why
the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal were not given by the Pact seats
in proportion to
their population.The Lucknow Pact was based upon the principle, now thrown to the winds, that a community as such was not entitled to political protection. A community was entitled to protection when it was in a minority. That was the principle underlying the Lucknow Pact. The Muslim community in the Punjab and Bengal was not in a minority and, therefore, was not entitled to the same protection which it got in other Provinces where it was in a minority. Notwithstanding their being in a majority, the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal felt the necessity of separate electorates. According to the principle underlying the Pact they could qualify themselves for this only by becoming a minority which they did by agreeing to a minority of seats. This is the reason why the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab did not get the majority of seats they were entitled to on the population basis.
The proposal of the Government of India to give to the Bengal Muslims more than what they had asked for did not go through. But the fact that they wanted to do so remains as evidence of their inclinations.
The second occasion when the British Government as an arbiter gave the Muslims more than they asked for was when the Communal Decision was given in 1932. Sir Muhammad Shafi made two different proposals in the Minorities Sub-Committee of the R. T. C. In his speech on 6th January 1931, Sir Muhammad Shafi put forth the following proposal as a basis for communal settlement :—
" We
are prepared to accept joint
electorates on the conditions named by me : Firstly, that the rights at
present enjoyed by
the Musalmans in the minority Provinces should be continued to them;
that in the Punjab
and in Bengal they should have two joint electorates and representation
on a population
basis; that there should be the principle of reservation of seats
coupled with Maulana
Mahomed Ali's condition."
In his speech on 14th January 1931
before the
same Committee he made a different offer. He said :—"
To-day I am authorized to make this offer
: that in the Punjab the Musalmans
should
have through communal electorates 49 per cent. of the entire number of
seats in the whole
House, and should have liberty to contest the special constituencies
which it is proposed
to create in that Province : so far as Bengal is concerned that
Musalmans should have
through communal electorates 46 percent, representation in the whole
House, and should
have the liberty to contest the special constituencies which it is
proposed to create in
that Province; in so far as the minority Provinces are concerned, the
Musalmans should
continue to enjoy the weightage which they have at present through
separate electorates,
similar weightage to be given to our Hindu brethren in Sind
and to our Hindu and Sikh brethren in the North-West
Frontier Province. If at any time hereafter of
the representatives of any
community in any Provincial Legislative Council or in the Central
Legislative Council
desire to give up communal electorates and to accept joint electorates
then there after
the system of joint electorates should come into being."
(end quote)
Comment
The Communal Award 1932 was used as basis for assigning seats in the Government of India Act 1935.
Table 6.
Allocation of Seats under
the
Government of India Act,
1935, for the Lower House of the Federal Legislature for British India,
by Province and by Community
| Province |
Total Seats |
General Seats |
Sikh Seats |
Maho- mmedan |
Anglo Indian |
European |
Indian Christian |
Rep.s of commerce/ Industry |
Land- holders |
Rep.s of labour |
Women's Seats |
|
| Total |
Scheduled
Castes reserved |
|||||||||||
| Madras |
37 |
19 |
4 |
-- |
8 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
| Bombay |
30 |
13 |
2 |
-- | 6 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
| Bengal |
37 |
10 |
3 |
-- | 17 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
| United Prov. |
37 |
19 |
3 |
-- | 12 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
-- |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| The Punjab |
30 |
6 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
-- |
1 |
1 |
-- |
1 |
-- |
1 |
| Bihar |
30 |
16 |
2 |
-- | 9 |
-- |
1 |
1 |
-- |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Central
Provinces/Berar |
15 |
-- |
2 |
-- | 3 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Assam |
10 |
4 |
1 |
-- | 3 |
-- |
1 |
1 |
-- |
-- |
1 |
-- |
| North-West Frontier
Prov. |
5 |
1 |
-- |
-- | 4 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| Orissa |
5 |
4 |
1 |
-- | 1 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| Sind |
5 |
1 |
-- |
-- | 3 |
-- |
1 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| British Baluch. |
1 |
-- |
-- |
-- | 1 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| Delhi |
2 |
1 |
-- |
-- | 1 |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| Ajmer-Merwara |
1 |
1 |
-- |
-- | -- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| Coorg |
1 |
1 |
-- |
-- | -- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
| Non-provincial |
4 |
-- |
-- |
-- | -- |
-- |
-- |
-- |
3 |
-- |
1 |
-- |
| Total |
250 |
105 |
19 |
6 |
82 |
4 |
8 |
8 |
11 |
7 |
10 |
9 |
Table 7. General and Muslim Distribution
of Seats by Number and Percentages in the Federal Legislature under
Government of India Act 1935
| Name
of Chamber |
Distribution in Numbers |
Distribution by Percentage |
|||
| Total seats |
Non-Muslim (Hindu) seats |
Muslim seats |
Percentage of Muslim seats to Hindu seats |
Percentage of Muslim seats to total seats |
|
| Council of State |
150 |
75 |
49 |
66 |
33 |
| Federal Assembly |
250 |
105 |
82 |
80 |
33 |
Comment:
When in 1939, M.A. Jinnah demanded 50% representation for 25% Muslims on the basis of the two-nation theory, as can be seen in Table 7, in the Federal Assembly operating under the Government of India Act 1935, the number of Muslim seats already constituted 80% of the number of Hindu seats.
Update
in 08/09:
www.geocities.com is closing down in end-October 2009. The new location of this website is:
http://sites.google.com/www.geocities.com is closing down in end-October 2009. The new location of this website is:
site/cabinetmissionplan/
Home
Page 2
Secondary sources on Page 3
CMP(2)
- The Congress League positions on 12 May 11946
CMP(3) - The Cabinet Mission Plan 16 May 1946<
CMP(3) - The Cabinet Mission Plan 16 May 1946<
CMP(8)
- More exchanges on parity during Simla Connference meeting 11 May
1946
CMP(9)- Jinnah's Conversations with Major Wyatt(1) on Pakistan and the Cabinet Mission Plan , 8 January and 25 May 1946
CMP(10) - Jinnah's Conversations with Major Wyatt(22) on the interim government, 11 June 1946
CMP(9)- Jinnah's Conversations with Major Wyatt(1) on Pakistan and the Cabinet Mission Plan , 8 January and 25 May 1946
CMP(10) - Jinnah's Conversations with Major Wyatt(22) on the interim government, 11 June 1946
CMP(12)-
Congress Working Committe resolutions, May-June 1946
CMP(12A) Congress and the Cabinet Mission's arguments over inclusion of a Congress Muslim in the Interim Government June 12 and June 23 1946
CMP(13)- Jawaharlal Nehru's press conference on the Plan, 10 July 1946
CMP(14) - League withdrew from Plan, called Direct Action, Viceroy Wavell talked to Nehru, July-August 1946
CMP(15) - The Viceroy tried to strong-arm Nehru andd Gandhi on compulsory grouping, Pethick Lawrence to Attlee, August-September 1946
CMP(12A) Congress and the Cabinet Mission's arguments over inclusion of a Congress Muslim in the Interim Government June 12 and June 23 1946
CMP(13)- Jawaharlal Nehru's press conference on the Plan, 10 July 1946
CMP(14) - League withdrew from Plan, called Direct Action, Viceroy Wavell talked to Nehru, July-August 1946
CMP(15) - The Viceroy tried to strong-arm Nehru andd Gandhi on compulsory grouping, Pethick Lawrence to Attlee, August-September 1946
CMP(16)- Intelligence
assessment on Jinnah's options and threat of civil war, September 1946
CMP(17)- The League's boycott of the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah and Wavell, Mission insisting on compulsory grouping, etc October 1946-January 1947
CMP(17)- The League's boycott of the Constituent Assembly, Jinnah and Wavell, Mission insisting on compulsory grouping, etc October 1946-January 1947
CMP
(A1) - Additional material - Some Plain speaking from Sir Khizr Hayat,
Abell on the Breakdown plan, Viceroy to Jinnah
CMP(A2) North West Frontier Province, October-November 1946 and February-March 1947
CMP(A3) Bengal and Bihar, August - November 1946
CMP(A4) Punjab, February - March 1947
CMP (18) - My take
CMP (19) - What did parity and communal veto mean in numbers?
CMP(20) Another summary /take on the Cabinet Mission Plan-with links to the above reference material
CMP(21) Mountbatten discusses the Cabinet Mission Plan with Sardar Patel and M. A. Jinnah, 24-26 April 1947
CMP(22) A reply on the Cabinet Mission Plan
Extra(1) - Speech by Jinnah in March 1941 outlining the case for an independent sovereign Pakistan
Extra(1A) Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1941-1942
Extra(1B) Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1938-1940
Extra(1C) Jinnah's speeches and Statements from 1943-45
Extra(2) - Jinnah's letter to Gandhi during Gaandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944 on defining Pakistan
Extra(3)- B.R. Ambedkar quoted from his book 'Pakistan or the Partition of India'
CMP(A2) North West Frontier Province, October-November 1946 and February-March 1947
CMP(A3) Bengal and Bihar, August - November 1946
CMP(A4) Punjab, February - March 1947
CMP (18) - My take
CMP (19) - What did parity and communal veto mean in numbers?
CMP(20) Another summary /take on the Cabinet Mission Plan-with links to the above reference material
CMP(21) Mountbatten discusses the Cabinet Mission Plan with Sardar Patel and M. A. Jinnah, 24-26 April 1947
CMP(22) A reply on the Cabinet Mission Plan
Extra(1) - Speech by Jinnah in March 1941 outlining the case for an independent sovereign Pakistan
Extra(1A) Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1941-1942
Extra(1B) Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1938-1940
Extra(1C) Jinnah's speeches and Statements from 1943-45
Extra(2) - Jinnah's letter to Gandhi during Gaandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944 on defining Pakistan
Extra(3)- B.R. Ambedkar quoted from his book 'Pakistan or the Partition of India'