KING COUNTY DISTRICT COURT,
SOUTH DIVISION
STATE OF
) No. CQ54646KC
plaintiff, )
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
v. ) OF DENIAL OF OR SUPPLEMENT TO
ROGER W. KNIGHT, )
)
defendant. )
____________________________________)
MOTION
Comes
now ROGER W. KNIGHT, defendant, to move for reconsideration of the denial of
his Motion to Dismiss Complaint tentatively made orally by the
Honorable Judge
Steve Bochon, pro tem, on
SUPPLEMENTAL
ARGUMENT
Mr.
Knight
moved for dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of collateral estoppel. The key case he cited is
Shuman
v. Dept. of Licensing,
(2001) 108
A party seeking to invoke
the doctrine of collateral estoppel must prove: '(1) the issue decided in the
prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the second action;
(2) the prior adjudication must have ended in a final judgment on the merits;
(3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with
the party to the prior adjudication; and (4) application of the doctrine does
not work an injustice.'
Thompson v. Dep't
of Licensing, 138 Wn.2d 783, 790, 982 P.2d 601 (1999).
Shuman dealt with the fourth element of
collateral estoppel, that the application of the doctrine does not work
injustice. Where a prosecuting authority
in a criminal case had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue of fact
relevant to the outcome of the criminal charge, and chose not to, it is not an
injustice to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent a licensing
agency from relitigating the identical issue of fact for the purposes of
suspending a license.
However,
Shuman, at the footnote on 108
The question before
this Court in
this action is whether the City of
This question is answered for
Division one of the Court of Appeals in
Gray
v. City of Des Moines, (1997) 87
Pursuant to
Barlindal,
as long as all four elements of collateral estoppel are met in Gray's case, Judge Alumbaugh's determination that
the seizure was constitutional will serve to bar Gray from challenging the
forfeiture on that ground. As to the first element of collateral estoppel, the issue in this case is identical to the
issue in the suppression hearing. As to the third element, although the parties
are not the same, in that the State prosecuted Gray in the
criminal proceeding whereas the City of
Barlindal is
Barlindal v. City of Bonney Lake, (1996) 84
Privity denotes a mutual or successive relationship to
the same right or property.
Owens v. Kuro,
56
Wn.2d 564,
354 P.2d 696 (1960). Our analysis leads us to hold that
Both
Both participated in the acquisition of a search warrant
and the subsequent search;
Both had a unity of purpose in securing Barlindal's
conviction with lawfully obtained evidence;
Either
Both the State and
The State would have benefited by receiving 10 percent of
the net proceeds from forfeitures sought by
Bonney Lake;
Bonney Lake would have
benefited from the forfeitures by retaining 90 percent of the net proceeds; and
The proceeds would have benefited law enforcement
activity in
These factors demonstrate that
Both
City of Mercer Island and
King
County on behalf of the State were acting on authority of state law, have a
unity of purpose in securing convictions of Mr. Knight of Driving While License
Suspended (DWLS) and in enforcing the State’s suspension of his license on
September 16, 2001 for child support, and both would have benefited financially
from fines assessed against Mr. Knight upon conviction of DWLS. That the
King County Prosecutor did not
control the
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the
Motion to Dismiss should be granted and the Complaint should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this 30th day
of December, 2003.
__________________________
Roger
W. Knight, pro se