Judge Robert S. Lasnik

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

 

ROGER W. KNIGHT,                                    )

                                                                        )           No.  C02-879L

                                    plaintiff,                        )

            v.                                                         )           PROPOSED ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S

                                                                        )           MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, ALAN            )           JUDGMENT

MERKLE, Mayor of Mercer Island, RON       )

ELSOE, Chief of Mercer Island Police,             )

LONDI K. LINDELL, Mercer Island City       )

Attorney, WAYNE STEWART, Assistant        )

Mercer Island City Attorney, FRED                  )

STEPHENS, Director of Department of            )

Licensing, DENNIS BRADDOCK, Secretary   )

of Department of Social and Health Services,    )

GARY LOCKE, Governor of Washington,       )

and SUPERIOR TOWING, a corporation        )

doing business in the State of Washington,         )

                                                                        )

                                    defendants.                   )

____________________________________)

 

            THIS MATTER came before the Court on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.  The Motion was filed on June 5, 2002.

            The Court considered the pleadings filed herein and the following evidence and pleadings:

            Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

            Declaration by Roger W. Knight in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

            Having reviewed the foregoing, the Court finds that:

            Plaintiff is entitled to a partial summary judgment finding:

            That the impoundment of Mr. Knight’s automobile was an unreasonable seizure that violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.  His claim for damages due to this seizure was not an issue in any Washington court proceeding and does not implicate any previous Washington court judgment and is therefore not barred in this action.  Mr. Knight is entitled to damages in the amount of $205.74 for the cost of recovering his automobile from defendant SUPERIOR TOWING, and for $50.00 damages for the inconvenience of the one day loss of his vehicle and as nominal damages under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the deprivation of property without due process of law. Defendants CITY OF MERCER ISLAND and SUPERIOR TOWING are jointly and severally liable for these damages.  Mr. Knight is also entitled to his costs as the prevailing party.

            The Antipeonage Act, 42 U.S.C. §1994, provides this Court with jurisdiction independent of any other statute to enforce the rights it declares.  These rights include the right to not have established, maintain, or enforced, a person’s service or labor as a peon in liquidation of a debt or obligation, or otherwise, and therefore to have declared null and void any act, law, resolution, regulation, usage, or ORDER of a State to the extent that such orders violate the rights declared by the Antipeonage Act.  The language in the Antipeonage Act specifically listing orders creates a statutory exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which applies to 42 U.S.C. §1983, which does not include “orders” in its list of state law elements.

            The language of the Antipeonage Act, “debt or obligation, or otherwise” clearly includes child support or any other duty to provide for a child however it may be manifested in the acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of a State or Territory.  It is undisputed that Mr. Knight lacks wealth sufficient to allow his compliance with the support order without employment.  Requiring Mr. Knight to sign a “repayment agreement” with which he may comply only by employment as a condition for restoration of his driver’s license is an attempt by virtue of the acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, and usages of the State of Washington to establish, maintain, or enforce his service or labor as a peon in liquidation of a debt or obligation, or otherwise which is declared null and void by the Antipeonage Act.

            Based upon the foregoing findings, it is hereby ORDERED:

            Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

            Damages are awarded to the plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT payable by defendants CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, and SUPERIOR TOWING in the amount of $205.74 + $50.00 = 255.74.  Plaintiff is allowed his costs.

            The suspension of the driver’s license held by plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT, by defendants FRED STEPHENS, DENNIS BRADDOCK, and GARY LOCKE; the prosecution for DWLS in King County District Court, Bellevue Division, Nos. MIC 84199 and MIC 84268, by defendants CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, ALAN MERKLE, RON ELSOE, LONDI K. LINDELL, and WAYNE STEWART; the provisions of the WorkFirst Act, Laws of Washington 1997 chapter 58 §801 et seq., RCW 74.20A.320 under which the plaintiff’s license was suspended, and any effect of any previous Washington court order or judgment to the extent that is allows for the suspension of the plaintiff’s license for nonpayment of child support are declared null and void by the Antipeonage Act, 42 U.S.C. §1994.  The provisions of the WorkFirst Act other than §801 et seq. are not affected by this summary judgment.

            Defendants FRED STEPHENS, DENNIS BRADDOCK, and GARY LOCKE shall restore the driver’s license held by plaintiff ROGER W. KNIGHT without requiring a reissue fee and they and their successors in the offices of Director of Department of Licensing, Secretary of Department of Social and Health Services, and Governor of Washington shall not suspend his license for noncompliance with a child support order.  Defendants FRED STEPHENS and GARY LOCKE and their successors in their offices may suspend Mr. Knight’s license for reasons other than noncompliance with the support order as provided by Washington state law not affected by the WorkFirst Act, Laws of Washington 1997 chapter 58, §801 et seq., RCW 74.20A.320 et seq.

            Damages for violation of the Antipeonage Act by the defendants to the extent not immune, including where immunity is waived by criminal bad faith, remain to be determined in subsequent proceedings.

            DONE IN OPEN COURT THIS _________ day of ____________________ 2002.

 

                                                                        ________________________________

                                                                        JUDGE ROBERT S. LASNIK

Presented by:

By ____________________________________

            Roger W. Knight, plaintiff pro se

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