Judge John C. Coughenour

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

 

ROGER W. KNIGHT,                                    )

                                                                        )

                                    plaintiff,                        )           No.  C02-1641C

            v.                                                         )

                                                                        )           PLAINTIFF’S SUPPLEMENT TO

RONAL W. SERPAS, Chief of the                  )           RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW

Washington State Patrol, NESSAN                  )           CAUSE

MITCHELL, Trooper of the Washington          )

State Patrol, FRED STEPHENS, Director        )

of Department of Licensing, DENNIS              )

BRADDOCK, Secretary of Department           )

of Social and Health Services,                           )

GARY LOCKE, Governor of Washington,       )

and BETHEL G. & LOUISE CLARK, d.b.a.   )

CLARK’S TOWING, a sole proprietor           )

doing business in the State of Washington,         )

                                                                        )

                                    defendants.                   )

____________________________________)

 

SUPPLEMENT TO RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

            On October 31, 2002, Judge Michael Trickey of the King County Superior Court reversed the convictions of Mr. Knight of Driving While License Suspended, City of Mercer Island v. Knight, King County Superior Court No. 02-1-01137-0 SEA reversing King County District Court, Bellevue Division Nos. 84199 and 84268.  Please see Declaration by Roger W. Knight in Support of Plaintiff’s Supplement to Response to Order to Show Cause (Knight Declaration II) and its Exhibit J, Decision on RALJ Appeal.  During the hearing, Judge Trickey found that he did not believe that a court in a criminal DWLS case could hear a challenge to the validity of the WorkFirst Act, either on its face, or as applied to Mr. Knight.  Having said that, the court does have jurisdiction to determine if there was notice sufficient to meet the statutory requirements of RCW 74.20A.320(1).  After the Decision was presented to the judge, he crossed out language mandating the King County District Court to enter appropriate equitable relief in addition to dismissing the complaints if it is found that the requirements of RCW 74.20A.320(1) were not met.  He explained that he did not believe that a court in a criminal DWLS case could order the state agencies to restore the license.

            This does not alter the Younger abstention posture of this case.  As previously argued in the Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause, Younger abstention is based on the availability of adequate remedy at law in an ongoing state court proceeding at the time the Complaint is filed.  However, this does have some interesting Rooker-Feldman and Full Faith and Credit considerations.  Rooker-Feldman doctrine and 28 U.S.C. §1738 work to preserve state court decisions in favor of Mr. Knight as well as those decisions against Mr. Knight.  However, any finding that the state court finds itself unable to make or relief unable to grant is not covered by Rooker-Feldman and Full Faith and Credit.  If on remand, the Bellevue District Court finds that the requirements of RCW 74.20A.320(1) were not met, it would dismiss the DWLS complaints as mandated by King County Superior Court.  This Court is prohibited from making any determination different then any such determination by the state court.  However, if the state court finds it cannot order equitable relief to restore the license or award damages for depriving Mr. Knight of his driver’s license, a well recognized property and liberty interest covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides a court with the authority to grant equitable relief and to award damages for violating a civil right guaranteed by federal law.  The void for vagueness doctrine is that constitutional due process requires that criminal statutes clearly define what is illegal, and that a person has the right to rely upon the language of the statute.  In non-criminal statutes, such as statutes that regulate licensing, a person with a property and liberty interest in a license has as much due process right to rely upon the language of the statute, such as RCW 74.20A.320(1).

            Should the state court system decide that defendants FRED STEPHENS and DENNIS BRADDOCK, through their agencies, failed to meet the requirements of RCW 74.20A.320(1) before suspending the plaintiff’s license, this Court will have the jurisdiction to order the appropriate equitable relief and to award any damages found to result from the unlawful suspension of license.

            RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, November 4, 2002.

 

                                                            ____________________________________

                                                            Roger W. Knight, plaintiff

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