Judge John C. Coughenour

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

 

ROGER W. KNIGHT,                                    )

                                                                        )

                                    plaintiff,                        )           No.  C02-1641C

            v.                                                         )

                                                                        )           DECLARATION BY ROGER W.

RONAL W. SERPAS, Chief of the                  )           IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S

Washington State Patrol, NESSAN                  )           SUPPLEMENT TO RESPONSE TO

MITCHELL, Trooper of the Washington          )           ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

State Patrol, FRED STEPHENS, Director        )

of Department of Licensing, DENNIS               )

BRADDOCK, Secretary of Department           )

of Social and Health Services,                          )

GARY LOCKE, Governor of Washington,       )

and BETHEL G. & LOUISE CLARK, d.b.a.   )

CLARK’S TOWING, a sole proprietor           )

doing business in the State of Washington,         )

                                                                        )

                                    defendants.                   )

____________________________________)

 

            I ROGER W. KNIGHT, declare that:

            Attached as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of the Decision on RALJ Appeal entered on October 31, 2002 in City of Mercer Island v. Knight, King County Superior Court No. 02-1-01137-0 SEA.

            After reading the briefs and listening to oral argument, Judge Michael Trickey determined that he did not believe that in a criminal Driving While License Suspended (DWLS) case, a court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the WorkFirst Act on its face or as applied to me.  However, he also determined that State v. Dolson, (1999) 138 Wash. 2d. 773, 982 P. 2d. 100 mandated that when the Legislature sets forth a requirement for notice and opportunity to be heard before any license suspension, then a court in a subsequent criminal DWLS case has the jurisdiction to determine if the licensing agencies complied with the statutory notice requirements.  Because the King County District Court, Bellevue Division in City of Mercer Island v. Knight, Nos. 84199 and 84268 erroneously found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the notice requirements set forth in RCW 74.20A.320(1) were met, Judge Trickey reversed the convictions for DWLS and remanded the case for hearing on whether these notice requirements were met, and if not, that the complaints should be dismissed.

            As I wrote the Decision, I wrote the cite for the state Court of Appeals decision in Dolson, 91 Wash. App. 187 instead of the state Supreme Court decision at 138 Wash. 2d. 773.  This error does not change the effect of the King County Superior Court decision, the ultimate result in Dolson was the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision to reinstate Whatcom County Superior Court’s reversal of Whatcom County District Court’s conviction of Mr. Dolson of DWLS in the 1st degree.  This is what Judge Trickey found to mandate the reversal of my convictions for DWLS in the King County District Court, Bellevue Division.

            After I wrote out this Decision, and after counsel for Mercer Island and myself signed it, Judge Trickey crossed out the language where I wrote that in addition to dismissing the complaint upon a finding that the notice requirements of RCW 74.20A.320(1) were not met, that appropriate equitable relief should be entered.  Judge Trickey explained that he did not believe that a court in a criminal DWLS case could mandate that the Department of Licensing restore the license.  In the event of that the King County District Court finds that the statutory notice requirements were not met, the complaints for DWLS are dismissed, but the license is not ordered restored.

            I believe that the City of Mercer Island has until November 30, 2002, 30 days after the entry of this Decision on RALJ Appeal, to file a petition for discretionary review with either the Court of Appeals of the State of Washington, Division One, or with the Supreme Court of Washington.  Such a petition is governed by Washington Rules for Appeal of Decisions of Courts of Limited Jurisdiction (RALJ) 9.1(h), Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 2.3(d), and Titles 4 and 5 of the RAP.  To the best of my knowledge they have not yet done so.

            I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 4th day of November, 2002, in Seattle, Washington respectfully submitted,

 

                                                            ____________________________________

                                                                        Roger W. Knight, pro se

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