) No. MIC
84199
plaintiff, )
) SECOND SUPPLEMENT TO
v. )
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
)
DOLSON
DEFENSE IS PROVEN
ROGER W. KNIGHT, )
)
defendant. )
____________________________________)
Comes now ROGER W. KNIGHT, defendant, to supplement for the
second time his motion for dismissal of the Complaint.
DOLSON DEFENSE IS
PROVEN
On
After
the hearing, he went into the Law Office of Paul H. King to work. While there, he received the final
evidentiary piece of the puzzle of this case.
Attached as Exhibit C to the Fourth Declaration of Roger W. Knight in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Knight Declaration IV) is the letter
from Lawna M. Knight, Custodian of Records of the
Department of Licensing (DOL) dated
A
careful examination of the Lawna Knight letter admits
that Mr. Knight’s address was never updated from his old
Exhibit
A to Knight Declaration IV is the discovery package sent to Mr. Knight by the
Mercer Island City Attorney. The last
three documents in this discovery package are documents from the
DOL. The first document is a letter from DOL Custodian of Records Donna McGoldrick
dated
None
of the documents supplied to the defendant in discovery in this case, either by
the City Attorney or by the DOL indicate that any license
suspension notification document or any opportunity to be heard regarding such
suspension has been sent to:
(redacted
for this web site
(redacted
for this web site
Therefore, there is no evidence that the DOL complied with
RCW 46.20.205
and with Mr. Knight’s Constitutional right to due process of law. Per
State v. Dolson, (1999) 138
(1) Whenever any person
after applying for or receiving a driver's license or identicard
moves from the address named in the application or in the license or identicard issued to him or her, the person shall within
ten days thereafter notify the department of the address change. The
notification must be in writing on a form provided by the
department and must
include the number of the person's driver's license. The written notification,
or other means as designated by rule of the department, is the exclusive means
by which the address of record maintained by the department concerning the
licensee or identicard holder may be changed.
While the Legislative change of Laws of Washington
1996 c 30 §4 which added the language “or other means as designated by rule of
department” has not been affected by the 1998 and
1999 changes, the
Dolson criteria that a licensee has the right under
due process of law to rely upon the written notification that he provides
cannot be overridden by legislative act or administrative rule, where the
statute continues to provide the written notification procedure. Mr. Knight declared that he notified the DOL of his address change from (redacted),
Federal Way, Washington 98003 to (redacted), Seattle, Washington
98(redacted) on March 5, 2001, Knight Declaration I pages 2-3. The Vehicle Registration Certificate, Knight
Declaration I Exhibit D that he received that day lists “(redacted)
The DOL does not explain why the Vehicle Registration
Certificate and the Vehicle Renewal Notice listed and were sent to one address,
while the driver license suspension paperwork listed and were sent to another
address. The
DOL
does not set forth what rule it promulgated that provides for vehicle
registration notices to be sent to one address while license suspension notices
to be sent to another address when the licensee fills out the SAME form
with the title that declares that it is effective for both. Furthermore, the
DOL,
as of the date of this Second Supplement, has not complied with Mr. Knight’s
subpoena concerning the document that he filled out to notify the DOL of the change of address nor has it declared that such
document does not exist or no longer exists in the
DOL’s
archives.
Dolson at
138
Given that the Legislature has set out the exclusive
means for notification, we conclude that
DOL’s
repudiation of that procedure in favor of another was not reasonably calculated
to provide notice. Under
RCW 46.20.205, a driver has
the responsibility to ensure that
DOL’s records of
his address are correct. Along with this responsibility comes the assurance
that DOL will rely upon the address of record for the
mailing of all official documents. The statute affords licensees control over
the notification process by giving them exclusive authority to establish and
maintain the address of record. As amicus explains, this control is particularly
important to low income people who may have difficulty establishing permanent
housing.
Contrary to
the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, a notice procedure that contradicts a
licensee’s legal expectations cannot be reasonably calculated to provide
notice. DOL’s decision to send notification to an
address other than the address of record did not comply with the spirit of the
statute because it conflicted with the statutory objective to put control over
the notification process in the hands of the licensee.
The
change in 1996 to
RCW 46.20.205 does not change this
basic analysis. Any rule promulgated by
the DOL to allow the address of record to be changed
by a notification by another agency is not consistent with the licensee’s legal
expectations when he fills out a change of address form, or when he does not,
if such is a conscious decision.
EVEN
IF THE DOL PROVIDED NOTICE REASONABLY CALCULATED TO
APPRISE MR. KNIGHT, IT DID NOT MEET REQUIREMENT THAT HE BE GIVEN AN
The Documents attached to the McGoldrick Declaration, Knight Declaration IV Exhibit A, simply
announces that Mr. Knight’s license has been suspended. No driver improvement hearing as required by
RCW 46.20.322 and
RCW
46.20.323. Indeed, given the “Abstract
of Complete Driving Record” attached to the Lawna
Knight Letter, Knight Declaration IV Exhibit C, there is not any improvement to
be made. The exception to
RCW 46.20.322 set forth in
RCW
46.20.325 is not present in this case.
Mr. Knight’s record does not indicate that he presents a danger to the
safety of persons on the highway.
Indeed, if Mr. Knight relies upon other persons whose driving records he
cannot know, and such person’s driving records list serious traffic offenses,
the license suspension would work contrary to the public interest in the safety
of the highways. If
RCW
74.20A.320, referenced by
RCW 46.20.291(8), contains
a provision that a suspension for noncompliance with a child support order is
“mandatory” and therefore within the exception for “mandatory suspension” in
RCW 46.20.324(1), then the WorkFirst
Act is a bill of attainder that imposes its punishment without judicial trial
for those out of compliance with support orders when the WorkFirst
Act was passed in 1997. Mr. Knight fits
that description, Knight Declaration III.
If the noncompliance is thought of as a crime, then the WorkFirst Act is also an ex post facto law.
Whether the WorkFirst
Act is a bill of attainder or not, for license suspension or revocation, Mr.
Knight is entitled to opportunity to be heard as well as notice.
Dolson at 138
However, the due process
defect at issue here is the deprivation of his right to a hearing, not
the lack of notice of the fact of revocation. By law, Dolson
had 15 days to appeal the revocation.
RCW 46.65.065. Because of
DOL’s
error, Dolson never received notice of nor exercised
his right to request a hearing. Due process requires the opportunity to be
heard.
Baker is
State v. Baker, (1987) 49
And therefore, a void suspension
cannot support a conviction of driving while license suspended,
Dolson at 138
CONCLUSION
For
the reasons stated herein, the Motion should be granted and the Complaint should
be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of March 2002.
__________________________
Roger W. Knight, pro se
If the back button does not take you there, click Home to go to the Index page of this Antipeonage Act Website, click Enemies for the main Enemies page, click Letters for the Letters page, and click Allies for the Allies page. Click 84199 to get to the main page for this case. Or you can use the Antipeonage Act Site Map.