KING COUNTY DISTRICT COURT,
) No.
plaintiff, ) Citation No. MIC 84199
)
v. ) MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT
)
ROGER W. KNIGHT, )
)
defendant. )
____________________________________)
The
Complaint should be dismissed on the following four grounds: 1) Lack of notice
to defendant that license to operate a motor vehicle is to be suspended and
therefore no opportunity to be heard before loss of both property and liberty
interest, 2) the statute that provided for the suspension of licenses in this
case, Laws of Washington 1997 Chapter 58, the Washington WorkFirst Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families Act of 1997 (WorkFirst Act), is unconstitutional
on the grounds that it covers more than one subject in violation of
Article II
Section 19 of the Washington Constitution, 3) application of
DWLS statute to
the defendant in this case is unconstitutional because it does not serve any
legitimate interest of government, either for public safety because
non-custodial parents behind in compliance with child support orders are no
more likely to cause traffic accidents than other persons and Mr. Knight’s
driving record does not indicate a danger to the public, and it does not
support any state interest in the collection of child support because license
suspension does not improve a noncustodial parent’s ability to comply with such
an order, and absent a showing that the children in question are not adequately
cared for absent the payment of child support as ordered, there is no state
interest that overcomes the non-custodial parent’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights
to make decisions concerning the custody, care, and control of his children, at
least with respect to how his money is spent in the care of his children, and
4) the support order and this attempt to enforce the support order are declared
null and void by 42 U.S.C. §1994.
LACK OF NOTICE INVALIDATES
CRIMINAL CHARGE OF DRIVING WHILE LICENSE SUSPENDED
State v. Baker, (1987) 49
Baker
and
Bell v. Burson are part of a long
line of cases that define notice to be required by due process. These cases include but are not limited to:
Baldwin v. Hale,(1864) 68 U.S.(1 Wall.)
223, 233, 17 L. Ed. 531;
Grannis v.
Ordean, (1914) 234 U.S. 385, 394, 58 L. Ed. 1363, 34 S. Ct. 779;
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co., (1950) 339 U.S. 306, 313-314, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652;
Armstrong v. Manzo, (1965) 380 U.S. 545,
552, 14 L. Ed. 2d. 62, 85
Since
Baker, the Legislature revised
RCW 46.20.205 to effectively
overturn
Baker.
State v.
RCW 46.20.205 impliedly overruled
Baker
because it made revocation of a driver’s license effective if notice is mailed
to a licensee’s address of record even if that notice is not received by the
licensee. Accordingly, responsibility
for ensuring that a notice is received at the correct address rests upon the
licensee, who must comply with the statutory requirement of notifying the
Department in writing on an approved form of the licensee’s “old and new addresses.”
State v. Dolson, (1999)
138
Dolson also found, at 138
In the present instance, Mr. Knight
received two “License Suspension Warning Letters” (Letters) from the
Department
of Social and Health Services (DSHS), on
The Letters only informed Mr. Knight
that the DSHS may send a “formal notice telling you that we will ask the
licensing authorities to suspend or not renew your licensee.” Neither Letter met the requirement set forth
in
RCW 46.20.322 and
RCW 46.20.323 that Mr. Knight be informed that he appear
for a driver improvement interview within 10 days. Both Letters specifically state that they are
“only a warning”. Mr. Knight exercised
the only right to be heard that he could derive from these Letters, which is to
challenge the validity of the underlying statute in
King County Superior
Court. As the second Letter followed the
first Letter by over two years, and that no effort to actually suspend Mr.
Knight’s licenses appears to have been commenced during those two years, Mr.
Knight reasonably presumed that he would be afforded a notice of impending or
actual license suspension that went beyond the terms of these Letters. Mr. Knight is currently unaware of any such
notice, Knight Declaration, page 4.
As to the change of address since
the issuance of these two Letters, Mr. Knight declares on pages 2-3 of his
Declaration:
On
I was under the impression that I
had notified the Department of Licensing of my new address for both my vehicle
license tab and my motor vehicle operator’s license. I thus expected that any further
correspondence with respect to my vehicle operator’s license would be mailed to
RCW
46.16.210 provides a similar requirement for changing the address on a vehicle
license renewal. As Mr. Knight was
making a good faith effort to comply with this statute and with
RCW 46.20.205,
he was relying upon the employee of the DOL to provide him with the correct
form in response to his request to make it effective for both vehicle license
renewal and motor vehicle operator license purposes. As Mr. Knight filled out the form provided by
the DOL, he was in strict as well as constructive compliance with
RCW
46.20.205. If this form has subsequently
been lost by the DOL or the
DOL provided the wrong form in error, then its
failure to send notice of the pending license suspension to the current address
is not due to Mr. Knight’s good faith effort to notify it of his change of
address by the means provided by statute.
On
The same
DOL has sent Mr. Knight a
Vehicle Renewal Notice to his present address at
During the police stop on
Badge
Number 118, of the Mercer Island Police Department told Mr. Knight that the
notice of suspension was sent to his address in
Therefore, charging the defendant
with driving while license suspended after he met the requirements of
RCW
46.16.210 and
RCW 46.20.205 with notice and opportunity to be heard insufficient
to meet the requirements of
RCW 46.20.322 and
RCW 46.20.323, violates those
statutes, and violates
Article I Section 3 of the
Washington Constitution and
the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
LACK OF NOTICE THAT LICENSE
IS ACTUALLY SUSPENDED OR WILL ACTUALLY BE SUSPENDED DISPROVES ONE ELEMENT OF
CRIME DEFINED BY
RCW 46.20.342
RCW
46.20.342(1) specifically provides that “Any person who has a valid
Because Mr. Knight never received
notice from the DOL required by
RCW 46.20.322 and
RCW
46.20.323
to report within ten days for driver improvement hearing, he has a valid
If the WorkFirst Act is
unconstitutional for having more than one subject in violation of
Article II
Section 19, Mr. Knight has a valid
WORKFIRST
ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, MORE THAN ONE SUBJECT
The “Rules of statutory construction
apply to initiatives.” as it applies to acts of the Legislature.
It
is not the prerogative nor the function of the judiciary to substitute what
they may deem to be their better judgment for that of the electorate in
enacting initiatives . . . unless the errors in judgment clearly contravene
state or federal constitutional provisions.”
Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wn. 2d 275, 287, 517 P. 2d 911 (1974). Nor is
it the province of the courts to declare laws passed in violation of the
constitution valid based upon considerations of public policy.
The
Supreme Court of Washington has
eliminated all distinctions between how
Article II Section 19 applies to
initiatives and how it applies acts of the Legislature. Thus all standards applied in
Amalgamated Transit to Initiative 695
apply equally to the WorkFirst Act.
One consideration used to determine
how liberally to construe
Article II Section 19 in favor of the legislative act
is whether the title was “general” or “restrictive”. A bill or initiative with a general title
that encompasses all of its provisions is given the rational unity test for
determining if its provisions cover a single subject or separate subjects.
Amalgamated
Transit at 142
Initiative 695 had a general title.
However,
there is no rational unity between the subjects of I-695. Similar to the act in
Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. State[6],
I-695 also has two purposes: to specifically set license tab fees at $30 and to
provide a continuing method of approving all future tax increases. Further, neither subject is necessary to
implement the other. I-695 violates the
single-subject requirement of
art. II, § 19 because both its title and the body
of the act include two subjects: repeal of the MVET and a voter approval
requirement for taxes.
The WorkFirst Act contemplates at
least seven different subjects for which there is no rational unity: 1)
Immigrant Protection, 2) Washington WorkFirst, 3) Child Care, 4) Teen Parents,
5) Illegitimacy Prevention and Abstinence, 6) DSHS Accountability, and 7)
License Suspension, Child Support Enforcement.
The
provisions concerning child care are not necessary to implement child support
enforcement through license suspension.
The provisions concerning Washington WorkFirst, which reforms public
assistance and provides for helping recipients of public assistance into the
job market and off of public assistance and imposes time limits for receiving
public assistance, are not necessary for illegitimacy prevention and for
promoting abstinence. Under the tests
applied to Initiative 695 by
Amalgamated
Transit, the WorkFirst Act is clearly in violation of the
Single Subject
Clause. Subsequent to
Amalgamated Transit,
City of
ANY SUSPENSION OF MR.
KNIGHT’S LICENSE AND ANY PROSECUTION IN THIS CASE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE
IT IS NOT RATIONALLY RELATED TO ANY LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF GOVERNMENT.
State’s
Interest in Public Safety on the Roads and Highways
The
state laws for suspending licenses of drivers have been defended in the
newspapers and talk radio on the grounds that those who have their licenses
suspended are more likely to be involved in accidents and to be at fault for
such accidents. This argument can be
made where the drivers have had their licenses suspended for driving while under
the influence, failure to pay or otherwise deal with notices of infractions,
and for being habitual traffic offenders.
None of these grounds apply to Mr. Knight. The most recent moving violation for which
Mr. Knight was convicted was speeding, 80 mph in a 70 mph zone on Interstate 5
near Kelso during 1997. Mr. Knight was
convicted by a jury of reckless driving in
Renton District Court in 1991. Mr. Knight completed all terms of that
sentence and has had his license restored at that time. Mr. Knight paid any and all fines for any and
all convictions of traffic and parking infractions. Mr. Knight has had no moving violations or
misdemeanor charges or convictions since 1997, except the Seattle case recently
dismissed and the present infraction case for driving without proof of
insurance (Mr. Knight has current insurance, but for some reason the proof was
not in the envelope he handed to the Mercer Island police officer on January
21, 2002) and this present case. Mr.
Knight has never been charged with nor convicted of any felony. Knight Declaration page 4.
Therefore,
the DOL does not have any lawful authority to suspend Mr. Knight’s driver’s
license for traffic violations. The
authority that the DOL may claim is in
RCW 74.20A.320,
RCW 46.20.291(8), and
RCW 46.20.311(1)(a) which provide for suspension of driver’s licenses for
failure to comply with a child support order.
These statutory provisions are part of WorkFirst Act, and if the WorkFirst Act contains more than one subject, than these are not valid statutes
and Mr. Knight possesses a valid
No
evidence can be set forth that noncustodial parents who have not fully complied
with support orders are more likely cause traffic accidents than noncustodial
parents who are in compliance with such orders, or with persons who are not
under such support orders.[7] It is no more rationally related to the
interest that the state has in public safety of the roads than would qualifying
drivers based upon race, religion, blood type, gender, sexual orientation, political
party affiliation, or which astrological sign they were born under.
Therefore,
the suspension of driver’s licenses is not rationally related to any legitimate
interest the state may claim for the safety of the roads.
State’s
Interest in the Collection of Child Support
The State
may claim that suspension of driver’s licenses for failure to pay child support
is rationally related to its interest in the enforcement of child support. However,
Bell
v. Burson, supra, at 402
If
the purpose is to coerce him to seek a livelihood that is sufficient to enable
him to comply with the support order, whether it is possible for him to do so
or not, it is declared null and void by
42 U.S.C. §1994 and constitutes the
crime defined by 18 U.S.C. §1581.
The
State may claim that it has a legitimate interest in the support of its
children. However,
Troxel v. Granville, (2000) 530
In light of this extensive
precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.
And struck down
RCW
26.10.160(3) which provided that nonparents may bring action in the state’s
Superior Courts to establish visitation orders.
The extensive precedent cited:
Meyer
v. Nebraska, (1925) 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625;
Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, (1925) 268 U.S. 510, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct. 571;
Prince v. Massachusetts, (1944) 321 U.S.
158, 88 L. Ed. 645, 64 S. Ct. 438;
Stanley
v. Illinois, (1972) 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d. 551, 92
Justice O’Connor also found at
120
Accordingly, so long as a
parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there
will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the
best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.
To the extent that
“adequately cares for his or her children” can be reduced to the monetary expense
of supporting her children, then what the parent does with the rest of her
money is none of the government’s business.
The Supreme Court has recognized that noncustodial parents are also
protected by substantive due process in their fundamental rights,
Zablocki v. Redhail, (1978) 434
Under
Troxel, there is no legitimate or compelling
interest of government beyond the minimum level of support necessary to
“adequately care for his or her children” that can justify the modification of
a Constitutional right.
Chapter 26.19
RCW, upon which the child support order is based, is unconstitutional on its
face to the extent that it is based upon the Legislative intent not only to
provide the minimum level of support necessary to adequately care for the
child, but “to provide additional child support commensurate with the parents’
income, resources, and standard of living.”
RCW 26.19.001.
In
addition to invalidating the statute,
Troxel
mandates that the State or the custodial parent prove that the child will not
be adequately supported absent the payment of child support, or the payment of
any portion of the support order and that the noncustodial parent is unwilling
to accept custody of the child to support it directly or that he is an unfit
parent, in order to establish, maintain, or continue the enforcement of any
support order. It must be established
that every dollar required by the support order is necessary to enable the
custodial parent to adequately support the child and that the custodial is
spending every dollar collected or will spend every dollar collected for the
basic needs of the children.
Mr.
Knight asserts that it cannot be done because Royanne Schmitz is employed or has
been employed at (redacted for this website). She is married to Charles Schmitz, he is
employed. They qualified to purchase a
home, located at (redacted for this website), after Mr.
Knight was laid off by The Boeing Company in May 1995 and before contempt
proceedings were commenced in January 2000.
Mr. Knight did not pay child support during that time except for a
seizure of about $500 from a bank account in 1999. Yet Royanne Schmitz and her husband
adequately cared for six children and purchased a home.
Therefore,
pursuant to
Troxel, the support order
and any enforcement of the support order does not serve legitimate interest of
government and it violates Mr. Knight’s fundamental right under the
Fourteenth
Amendment to make decisions as to the care of his children, particularly how
his money beyond what is necessary to adequately care for his children is to be
spent for their benefit.
THE SUPPORT ORDER AND THIS
PROSECUTION ARE DECLARED NULL AND VOID BY THE ANTIPEONAGE ACT
The
pleadings and other arguments in these cases are available on the Internet at
www.geocities.com/rogerwknight/. The
index page titled: “Antipeonage Act Website”.
CONCLUSION
For
the reasons stated herein, this Motion should be granted and the Complaint should
be dismissed.
Respectfully
submitted this 25th day of January 2002.
__________________________
Roger
W. Knight, pro se
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[1] However,
Anastasoff
v.
[2] The pending
criminal charge of driving while license suspended, City of
[3] Mr. Knight works in the Law Office of Paul H. King,
located at
[4] P.L. 106-386, 114 Stat 1486.
[5] “Where a general title is used, all that is required is rational unity between the general subject and the incidental subjects.”
[7]
RCW 26.23.080 prohibits discrimination in employment
on the basis of a child support wage garnishment. Presumably a requirement to pay child
support, however behind the noncustodial parent may be, does not disqualify the
parent from performing the essential functions of his job.
[8]
Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., (1923) 263