I.          STATEMENT CONCERNING REPLY BRIEF

            Since this is a Reply Brief, the appellant formats this brief somewhat along the lines of the Brief of Respondent.

II.         AS TO STATE’S STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

            A.  Res Judicata.  This issue was thoroughly briefed on pages 3-9 of the Brief of Appellant.  This Reply Brief will address this issue only to the extent necessitated by the Brief of Respondent.

            B.  Reopening Previous Case.  Subsequent published opinion can justify reopening a case, unless the case is moot.

            C.  Article II Section 19 and Laws of Washington 1997 Chapter 58 (WorkFirst Act).  This issue was thoroughly briefed on pages 9-31 of the Brief of Appellant.  This Reply Brief will address this issue only to the extent necessitated by the Brief of Respondent.

III.       AS TO STATE’S STATEMENT OF THE CASE

            The State is placing legal and emotional arguments into the part of its brief that should be limited to relevant facts.  The State complains that it is unsuccessful in enforcing Mr. Knight’s child support obligation since he was laid off from The Boeing Company in 1995.  Brief of Respondent pages 1-2, 4-5.  Then the State admits that this fact is irrelevant to the Constitutional issue raised in this appeal.  Brief of Respondent page 11.

            The State can just as easily complain that those who advocated “extraordinary remedies that encroach upon the liberty of freemen”[1] beyond such remedies already enacted against noncustodial parents, were unable to get the license suspension bill through the 1995 and 1996 Legislature.  Brief of Appellant page 13, CP 42.  What happened is that noncustodial parents have as much right as everyone else to participate in the political process.  A group of Republicans in the House stopped the license suspension bill cold.  Noncustodial parents helped vote the GOP into control of both Houses of the Washington Legislature in the 1996 election.  Then in 1997 these Republicans allowed themselves to be logrolled into approving a license suspension provision in the welfare reform bill by the perceived need to accept federal funding for DSHS.  Brief of Appellant  page 14, CP 43.

            That is what is at issue here.  If we are to allow the State’s claimed interest in the welfare of our children, given how well the State has pursued that interest in Wenatchee and with Za’Nyia Johnson (Error.  I intended to refer to Zy'Nyia Nobles) and many other cases, to justify denying noncustodial parents the same rules of fairness in the political process that we enforce for everyone else, then we destroy Washington State democracy and leave the noncustodial parents with the stark choice of continuing to accept the situation or to take more drastic measures.

            It is true that as responsible parents, the noncustodials helped remove control of the Legislature from the Republicans in 1998 because they proved that they could not handle the responsibility.  Elected officials cannot sell the licenses of their citizens for a bag of federal money and not expect an angry response at election time.  The purpose of Article II Section 19 is to prevent legislators from having to choose between funding and their citizens’ rights.

            In addition to the $505.59 seized from a bank account by the DSHS, CP 7, 15, the State also collected $2,000 from a bail forfeiture.  The money was supplied by Mr. Paul H. King and by Mr. Knight’s relatives; it was not his money.  Mr. Knight is currently litigating on appeal, in Knight v. Maleng, 9th Cir. No. 00-35625, the issue of whether such contempt proceedings, when used to coerce employment, is a violation of the Antipeonage Act, 18 U.S.C. §1581 and 42 U.S.C. §1994, and therefore criminal bad faith on the part of the state officers involved, which would include Ejigayehu Yitref[2], though she is not named in the federal case.  Previous appeals involving Antipeonage Act challenges to contempt for nonsupport proceedings have resulted in unpublished opinions that cannot be cited as precedent under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.  However, in late August 2000 the Eighth Circuit may have upset that applecart with its decision in Anastasoff v. United States, (8th Cir. 2000). 22_ F. 3d. _____.  The concurring opinion suggested an en banc hearing to resolve published and unpublished opinions on the issue in question.

            As for the hearing before Judge Harriet Cody on May 12, 2000, Mr. Knight did not appear because he believed Paul H. King, WSBA #7370, was going to appear to represent him.  Mr. King contacted the clerk for Judge Cody,[3] CP 297.

IV.       UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT RESTRICTED STATE’S

            INTEREST IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT

 

            In Troxel v. Granville, (2000) 147 L. Ed. 2d. 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 Justice O’Connor found:

In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.

 

And struck down RCW 26.10.160(3) which provided that nonparents may bring action in the state’s Superior Courts to establish visitation orders.          Justice O’Connor also found at 120 S. Ct. 2061:

Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.

 

That is an eye opener.  To the extent that “adequately cares for his or her children” can be reduced to the monetary expense of supporting her children, then what the parent does with the rest of her money IS NONE OF THE STATE’S BUSINESS.  Noncustodial parents are also protected by substantive due process in their fundamental rights, Zablocki v. Redhail, (1978) 434 U.S. 374, 384-386, 54 L. Ed. 2d. 618, 98 S. Ct. 673.

            Under Troxel, there is no legitimate or compelling interest of government beyond the minimum level of support necessary to “adequately care for his or her children” that can justify the modification of a Constitutional right[4].  That is regardless of the parent’s wealth and income.  Chapter 26.19 RCW, upon which the child support order of $851.76 per month is based, CP 6, 12, is unconstitutional on its face to the extent that it is based upon the Legislative intent not only to provide the minimum level of support necessary to adequately care for the child, but “to provide additional child support commensurate with the parents’ income, resources, and standard of living.” RCW 26.19.001.  Standard of living is a parental decision, not a state decision.

            The mathematical effect of the support schedule in RCW 26.19.020 and the rules for applying it is that even if the custodial parent has substantial resources and income, more than enough to “adequately care for his or her children”, the reduction in the obligation imposed upon the noncustodial parent is small.

            Example 1: Noncustodial earns net income (after federal taxes) of $1,800 per month and is responsible for three children under age 12.  Custodial earns no income.  Combined income is $1,800 per month.  Support obligation, RCW 26.19.020, $251 per month per child, is $753.00 per month.  Noncustodial is responsible for all of the support obligation.

            Example 2: Noncustodial earns net income of $1,800 per month.  Custodial earns net income of $3,000 per month.  Combined income: $4,800 per month.  Combined support obligation, $463 per month per child, is $1,389 per month.  Noncustodial’s portion: 1800/4800 X $1,389 = $520.88 per month.

            The large increase in income earned by the custodial leads to a small decrease in obligation by the noncustodial.  The custodial parent’s PRESUMED portion of the obligation, 3000/4800 X $1,389 = $868.12, is more than sufficient to “adequately care for his or her children”.  Thus, under Troxel, the State has NO interest of government that justifies imposing ANY support order upon the noncustodial parent.  The noncustodial MAY still contribute to the support of the child, the two parents MAY work things out in some other way, but the State MUST stay out of it as long as the child is adequately supported.

            There is one other consideration.  Noncustodial parents do not enjoy their “fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children”.  Whatever their objections to how their money is spent, this State’s courts have heretofore not recognized their right to suspend payment.  Ordinarily, a college student dependent upon parental support will pursue a degree that the parent is willing to pay for.  But if there is a support order involved, she does not have to, whatever her divorced parent thinks of her course of study.[5]

            A fact that must be presumed because no allegation to the contrary has ever been made by any person to the best of Mr. Knight’s knowledge: Mrs. Royanne Schmitz has adequately cared for the children involved in this case since 1995, without receiving child support from Mr. Knight with the above mentioned exceptions and without receiving public assistance.  Therefore, under the Troxel decision, the State does not have an interest.

V.        AS TO STATE’S ARGUMENT

A.        Res Judicata Does Not Bar No. 99-2-22195-8 KNT.

            The State cites Deja Vu, Inc. v City of Federal Way, (1999) 96 Wash. App. 255, 979 P. 2d. 464 and Rains v. State, (1983) 100 Wash. 2d. 660, 674 P. 2d. 165 to argue that the second action, No. 99-2-22195-8 KNT is barred by the doctrine of res judicata by reason of the first action, No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT.  The key problem for the State in making this argument is the passage of time between the two transactions that gave rise to the two lawsuits.  The earlier case arose from a License Suspension Warning Letter dated August 15, 1997, CP 20, and the second lawsuit arose from a License Suspension Warning Letter dated September 23, 1999, CP 3, more than two years later.  In both Rains at 100 Wash. 2d. 664 and Deja Vu at 96 Wash. App. 262, four criteria were established concerning res judicata: Whether rights or interests established in prior judgment be destroyed or impaired by second litigation, whether substantially same evidence is presented in the two actions, whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right, and whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.

            First, consider the value to the State of the rights and interests established in the summary judgment granted in No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT.  Because Mr. Knight was unable to litigate his appeal of that case due to his inability to timely raise $250.00 for the filing fee after the state Supreme Court denied him leave to appeal in forma pauperis without explanation, no precedent was established.  CP 32, 34.  Therefore, the State only obtained a ruling against one person who was unable to pay a filing fee.  The State waited over two years before sending another License Suspension Warning Letter.

            The key consideration is whether two License Suspension Warning Letters separated by more than two years can be considered the same transactional nucleus of facts.  Deja Vu at 96 Wash. App. 262 cited Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, (9th Cir. 1982) 681 F. 2d. 1199, 1201-1202 which found the four criteria and that whether the two lawsuits arise from the same cause of action founded upon the same transactional nucleus of facts is the most important of these criteria.

            In turn Costantini at 681 F. 2d. 1202 n. 7 found that identity of causes of action “cannot be determined precisely by mechanistic application of a single test.” citing Abramson v. University of Hawaii, (9th Cir. 1979) 594 F. 2d. 202, 206, which in turn cited Expert Electric Inc. v. Levine, (2d Cir. 1977) 554 F. 2d. 1227, 1234, cert. den. 434 U.S. 903.  Expert Electric at 554 F. 2d. 1234 found:

before res judicata can attach and conclusive effect be given . . . it must be found that causes of action . . . and the nucleus of facts that underlay them, were identical.

 

and cited Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, (1948) 333 U.S. 591, 597, 92 L. Ed. 898, 68 S. Ct. 715.

            Sunnen determined in no uncertain terms that res judicata does not bar successive actions based upon different tax years, however similar the facts and the law applied to the facts.  This is exactly like Illustration 9 of the Restatement, Judgments §24(2) part d.  See Brief of Appellant pages 4-5.  If this state is to align itself with federal findings as to res judicata while being more lenient for practice in the state courts concerning state law, then Sunnen mandates that the two year separation between the License Suspension Warning Letters lifts the bar of res judicata.

            The State argues that the underlying nucleus of facts is the title and contents of the WorkFirst Act, the actual License Suspension Warning Letters being merely incidental.  Brief of Respondent page 13.  But absent the License Suspension Warning Letters, Mr. Knight does not have standing to challenge the validity of the WorkFirst Act.  Casebere v. Clark County Civil Service Comm., (1978) 21 Wash. App. 73, 76, 584 P. 2d. 416: person whose only interest is that shared by citizens in general lacks standing, citing Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, (1974) 418 U.S. 208, 41 L. Ed. 2d. 706, 94 S. Ct. 2925.  DeFunis v. Odegaard, (1973) 82 Wash. 2d. 11, 24, 507 P. 2d. 1169, vacated on grounds of mootness, 416 U.S. 312, 40 L. Ed. 2d. 164, 94 S. Ct. 1704, on remand 84 Wash. 2d. 617, 529 P. 2d. 438: citing State ex. rel. Hays v. Wilson, (1943) 17 Wash. 2d. 670, 137 P. 2d. 105, “one seeking relief must show a clear legal or equitable right and well grounded fear of invasion of that right.”[6]  DeFunis at 82 Wash. 2d. 24 quoted State v. Human Relations Research Foundation, (1964) 64 Wash. 2d. 262, 269, 391 P. 2d. 513:

A litigant who challenges the constitutionality of a statute must claim infringement of an interest peculiar and personal to himself, as distinguished from a cause of dissatisfaction with the general framework of the statute.

 

which in turn cited State v. Lundquist, (1962) 60 Wash. 2d. 397, 401, 374 P. 2d. 246.  The findings in DeFunis as to standing were not disturbed by the United States Supreme Court in finding mootness because law student was admitted and will be allowed to complete studies regardless of outcome of case at that point, or by the Supreme Court of Washington on remand in refusing to convert to class action.

            Mr. Knight is dissatisfied with the general framework of the WorkFirst Act: it contains more than one subject.  But absent the Letters, he cannot show a well grounded fear of invasion of his rights.  To challenge the constitutionality of the WorkFirst Act he must claim infringement of an interest peculiar and personal to himself.  In this case his license to operate a motor vehicle which he is qualified to hold absent any application to him personally of the WorkFirst Act.  The Letters are not incidental, they are the transactions from which the two lawsuits arise.

            Sunnen at 333 U.S. 598 allows that when litigation arises from different tax years, then collateral estoppel, which can be thought of as a narrow form of res judicata, may apply.  Therefore, the State has a better claim for collateral estoppel than it does for res judicata.  But Sunnen at 333 U.S. 599-600 set forth limitations to the application of collateral estoppel:

But a subsequent modification of the significant facts or a change or development in the controlling legal principles may make that determination obsolete or erroneous, at least for future purposes. If such a determination is then perpetuated each succeeding year as to the taxpayer involved in the original litigation, he is accorded a tax treatment different from that given to other taxpayers of the same class. As a result, there are inequalities in the administration of the revenue laws, discriminatory distinctions in tax liability, and a fertile basis for litigious confusion. . . . Such consequences, however, are neither necessitated nor justified by the principle of collateral estoppel. That principle is designed to prevent repetitious lawsuits over matters which have once been decided and which have remained substantially static, factually and legally. It is not meant to create vested rights in decisions that have become obsolete or erroneous with time, thereby causing inequities among taxpayers.

            And so where two cases involve income taxes in different taxable years, collateral estoppel must be used with its limitations carefully in mind so as to avoid injustice. It must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all respects with that decided in the first proceeding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain unchanged. . . . If the legal matters determined in the earlier case differ from those raised in the second case, collateral estoppel has no bearing on the situation. . . . And where the situation is vitally altered between the time of the first judgment and the second, the prior determination is not conclusive. . . . As demonstrated by Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 9, 57 S.Ct. 330, 331, 81 L.Ed. 465, a judicial declaration intervening between the two proceedings may so change the legal atmosphere as to render the rule of collateral estoppel inapplicable. . . . the supervening decision cannot justly be ignored by blind reliance upon the rule of collateral estoppel.

 

Applying these principles to the present case, the two intervening decisions interpreting Article II Section 19, Washington State Legislature, et al. v. State of Washington, et al., (1999) 139 Wash. 2d. 129, 985 P. 2d. 353, and the King County Superior Court decision concerning Initiative 695, Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 et al. v. State of Washington, No. 99-2-27054-1 SEA, pending Supreme Court of Washington decision in No. 69433-8, eliminate any conclusive effect of the earlier decision in No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT would have on No. 99-2-22195-8 KNT.  There is no question that if the Supreme Court affirms Judge Alsdorf’s decision, then its decision will certainly defeat any State’s claim to collateral estoppel in this case under the Sunnen rules.

            The Sunnen concern with applying one set of rules to a taxpayer by virtue of that taxpayer having already litigated his issues when a subsequent judicial declaration mandates a different set of rules upon other taxpayers similarly situated results in the rule that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel shall be applied where it will work injustice.  This rule is adopted by this state in Deja Vu, supra, at 96 Wash. App. 258 citing Garcia v. Wilson, (1991) 63 Wash. App. 516, 518, 820 P. 2d. 964, and the decisions cited in the Brief of Appellant on pages 7-8.

            Thus Sunnen at 333 U.S. 601-602 further found:

But if the relevant facts in the two cases are separable, even though they be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which recur in the second case.  Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from, the one dealt with in the first proceeding. In that situation, a court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. It may then reach a different result or, if consistency in decision is considered just and desirable, reliance may be placed upon the ordinary rule of stare decisis.  Before a party can invoke the collateral estoppel doctrine in these circumstances, the legal matter raised in the second proceeding must involve the same set of events or documents and the same bundle of legal principles that contributed to the rendering of the first judgment.

. . .

It is readily apparent in this case that the royalty payments growing out of the license contracts which were not involved in the earlier action before the Board of Tax Appeals and which concerned different tax years are free from the effects of the collateral estoppel doctrine.  That is true even though those contracts are identical in all important respects with the 1928 contract, the only one that was before the Board, and even though the issue as to those contracts is the same as that raised by the 1928 contract. For income tax purposes, what is decided as to one contract is not conclusive as to any other contract which is not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be.

 

Sunnen points to a conclusion that two License Suspension Warning Letters, necessary to establish standing on the party to whom they are sent to challenge the validity of the statute which authorizes them, particularly when more than two years pass between them, and that State did not follow up its first letter and the earlier determination of the King County Superior Court, must constitute separate transactions not bound by res judicata or collateral estoppel.

            Therefore the decision by the Superior Court in No. 99-2-22195-8 KNT, CP 297-298, item 5) handwritten by Judge Cody finding that it is barred by res judicata, is an abuse of discretion by error of law.

B.         Previous Case, No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT, Should be Reopened,

            Order Granting Summary Judgment Therein Vacated, Unless

            Subsequent Events Rendered it Moot.

            If the previous case does not create a bar of res judicata or collateral estoppel upon the present case, then it affects only the first License Suspension Warning Letter.  As the State failed to follow up upon this letter, the previous summary judgment granted by the Superior Court is moot.  In DeFunis supra, the United States Supreme Court found mootness grounds for vacation of Supreme Court of Washington decision.

            Mootness can either be grounds for ignoring a judgment or for vacating it.  The State asserts that a final order can only be set aside if it can be vacated pursuant to CR 60, citing Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, (1979) 92 Wash. 2d. 576, 582, 599 P. 2d. 1289.  Brief of Respondent page 15.  Griggs does not say that a judgment can only be vacated pursuant to CR 60, what it said is that grounds and procedures for a motion to vacate are set forth in CR 60.  The State argues that CR 60 provides the exclusive grounds and procedures that must be utilized to vacate an order.  Mr. DeFunis found out that a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court can be a method of vacating an order.  CR 60(c) provides that there is no limitation of the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.

            The State argues that Mr. Knight has not brought an action to vacate a final order under CR 60 or asserted the existence of a legal ground for vacating a final order.  There is plenty of case law to the effect that even if a rule is not cited, the court is free to consider a motion as having been brought under the rule.  The court can even enter an order advising the parties that it is considering the motion as such and to submit supplemental pleadings on that basis.  As far as a legal ground:

            CR 60(b)(6) provides that if a prior judgment upon which an order is based is reversed or otherwise vacated, the order can be vacated.  It also provides for vacation if it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.  In the Author’s Comments on this rule, 4 Orland and Tegland 720, such equitable relief from a final judgment under CR 60(b)(6) or other proceeding, could be had as a result of a change in decisional law, citing Toussaint v. McCarthy, (9th Cir. 1986) 801 F. 2d. 1080, 1090, cert. den. 481 U.S. 1069.

            The State argues that a decision rendered after an action is fully adjudicated is not a basis to vacate a final judgment, citing Shum v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, (1991) 63 Wash. App. 405, 408, 819 P. 2d. 399.  Shum did not say that.  It did not consider the effect of judicial decisions rendered subsequent to the entering of a final order.

            The State makes this argument:

Civil Rule 42(a) does not authorize a trial court to consolidate Mr. Knight’s prior action since it was no longer pending at the time he brought his motion.

 

Brief of Respondent page 17.  That is why the two License Suspension Warning Letters are separate transactions.  But if the prior judgment was vacated and the case reopened, then it would again be pending before the Superior Court, which could then consolidate under CR 42(a).

            A vacated judgment has no collateral estoppel or claim preclusion effect, Sutton v. Hirvonev, (1989) 113 Wash. 2d. 1, 9, 775 P. 2d. 448.

C.        WorkFirst Act Violates Article II Section 19.

            Mr. Knight respectfully requests that he be allowed to file a supplemental brief after the Supreme Court of Washington publishes its opinion on Initiative 695 in Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 et al. v. State of Washington, No. 69433-8.  If he is so allowed, it follows that the State should also be allowed to file a supplemental brief.

            The argument presented by the State is that if the Legislature titles a bill with a statement that it is to implement an Act of Congress, then that is one subject regardless of how Congress structured the Act.  Congress is under no restriction similar to Article II Section 19.  It can combine funding measures with substantive rights provisions.  It can attach “riders” completely unrelated to the rest of a bill to pass into law a provision that would not pass on its own.  Logrolling is a time honored tradition of Congress.  Even the fairly simple Antipeonage Act of 1867 contains a civil provision, 42 U.S.C. §1994, and a criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. §1581.  If the Washington Legislature decided to enact a state version of the Antipeonage Act, Article II Section 19 would require it to pass two separate bills, one for the civil right and one to define the crime and the penalties for the crime.  See Brief of Appellant pages 30-31, Firewall Between Civil Obligation and Penalty.

            Thus the argument presented by the State does not make any sense.

            If implementing an Act of Congress is the goal of the Legislature, then it must pass as many separate bills as necessary to avoid violating Article II Section 19 and each legislator is thus accountable to the voters for his vote on each such bill.  This is more so if compliance is voluntary, as the State admits on pages 20, “A state that elects to receive a TANF block grant” and on pages 22-23 of its Brief of Respondent.  Breaches in the firewalls set up by Article II Section 19 cannot be cured by listing the provisions on the opposite sides of each firewall in the title.  Lack of rational unity between different provisions is not cured by listing all such provisions in the title.

            On page 22 of the Brief of Respondent the State argues:

            While Mr. Knight may be correct that the license suspension provisions would not have passed if this were not a requirement for the continued receipt of federal funding,

 

            That is logrolling.  The license suspension provisions did not pass when they weren’t a requirement for continued federal funding.  The State continues:

He has provided no authority suggesting that the legislature was not empowered to pass legislation enabling this state to qualify for federal funds.

 

That is because this is a case of first impression.  There are no published opinions on whether Article II Section 19 prohibits the Legislature from selling its citizens’ substantive rights for federal funds in one bill.  But the tradition that the purpose of Article II Section 19 is to prevent logrolling suggests that is exactly what it prohibits.

            The State’s argument that Section 321 of the WorkFirst Act is not a funding measure but is a substantive provision is a whopper.  Funding bills do direct departments on how they may expend funds to accomplish certain goals.  The Legislature usually does not grant a department the privilege of spending the taxpayer’s money any way it pleases, it can provide direction without creating, modifying, restricting, or repealing any substantive right that a CITIZEN may have.  It can direct a department to spend funds to enforce a statute providing or restricting such substantive rights as long as the substantive rights are defined in separate bills.  What Article II Section 19 prohibits is the combining of a funding provision with provisions providing or restricting substantive rights of the citizenry or of any group within the citizenry.  Please see Brief of Appellant pages 20-23.

            By itself Section 321 voids the entire WorkFirst Act because it breaches the firewall between funding and substantive rights measures.

            The State makes no mention of Section 1011 in its Brief.  Please see Brief of Appellant pages 23-24.  It is obvious why the State had nothing to say.

            It all comes down to a matter of representative democracy.  Noncustodial parents are affected by the bills passed by the Legislature, even while it seems that they are not affected by the Washington Constitution passed in 1889 and amended since.  However the courts view the constitutional rights of noncustodial parents versus the State’s claimed interest in enforcing child support however it may have been modified by Troxel, supra, the courts must affirm that noncustodial parents have as much right to participate in the political process as every other citizen.

            The United States came into existence over the issue of citizens being governed by a British Parliament in which they had no representation.  When General Gage tried to enforce Parliament’s will upon a Massachusetts that had no representation in Parliament, violence was the only response Massachusetts had.

            The Fifteenth Amendment was passed with the recognition that if we are to free the slaves, and expect them to be bound by the same laws as everyone else, then it was incumbent to allow them the same participation in the political process as everyone else.  The Nineteenth Amendment was passed in recognition that women cannot be expected to be bound by laws passed by legislatures they did not elect.  The Twenty-Fourth Amendment was passed with the same recognition for those who could not afford to pay poll taxes for the right to vote.

            Noncustodial parents stopped a bill offensive to their rights in 1995 and 1996.  Article II Section 19 prohibits the logrolling of that offensive provision in a welfare reform bill to qualify for federal funds.

IV.       CONCLUSION

            For the reasons stated herein, this Court should reverse or vacate the Order Granting Summary Judgment, declare that Laws of Washington 1997 Chapter 58, the Washington WorkFirst Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Act of 1997 violates Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution, enjoin the enforcement and operation thereof, and remand to superior court for further proceedings consistent with such decision.

Dated this 27th day of September, 2000

                                                            Respectfully submitted,

 

                                                ____________________________________

                                                            Roger W. Knight, pro se