In Knight v. Department of Social and Health Services, Division of Child Support, No. 99-2-22195-8 KNT, the King County Superior Court granted respondent’s motion for summary judgment of dismissal, denied appellant’s motion to reopen prior case, Knight v. DSHS, No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT, and did not reach a decision on the appellant’s motion for summary judgment. Order Granting Summary Judgment attached to Notice of Appeal, CP 297-298. The court erred in refusing to reopen the prior case based upon change of circumstances resulting from subsequent published opinions interpreting Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution and Initiative 695 and the court erred in finding that the subsequent case was barred by res judicata. Having done so, the court erred in failing to enjoin the enforcement and operation of Laws of Washington 1997 Chapter 58, the Washington WorkFirst Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Act of 1997 on the grounds that it violates Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 28, 1999, Mr. Knight received in the mail a “License Suspension Warning Letter”, CP 3. Mr. Knight was threatened with the suspension of all of his licenses issued by the State of Washington.
On September 29, 1999, Mr. Knight filed his Complaint in King County Superior Court, Kent Division, No. 99-2-22195-8 KNT. CP 1-3.
On March 20, 1999, the Department of Social and Health Services, Division of Child Support (DSHS), through Assistant Attorney General Lianne Malloy, moved for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint. CP 5, Motion for Summary Judgment, CP 6-36, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. It was noted for hearing on May 12, 2000.
On March 21, 2000, Mr. Knight filed his Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen Previous Case, No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT and consolidate with this Action and Motion for Summary Judgment in this Action Granting Relief and Reversing Summary Judgment in No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT Based on Subsequent Court Decisions, CP 287-289. The supporting Memorandum and its attachments is CP 37-286. He noted his Motion for Hearing on May 12, 2000, the same day that DSHS’ Motion was noted for hearing.
On May 12, 2000, the hearing on motions was held before Judge Harriet M. Cody. Mr. Knight believed that Paul H. King, WSBA #7370, would stand in for him and give oral argument. But Mr. King had a prior commitment in Everett and his attempt at communication with Judge Cody’s chambers was not as successful as would be hoped. Nevertheless, Judge Cody granted the DSHS’ Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed the Complaint. CP 297-298.
On June 5, 2000, Mr. Knight filed the Notice of Appeal, CP 296, and had Sonja Anderson serve it upon the Attorney General’s Office at 900 Fourth Avenue, Seattle, Washington that same day. Mr. Knight mailed another copy of the Notice of Appeal directly to Lianne Malloy in Olympia.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Res Judicata Does Not Bar No. 99-2-22195-8 KNT.
The previous King County Superior Court case, No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT, arose from a License Suspension Warning Letter dated August 15, 1997 and received by Mr. Knight on August 18, 1997. This is more than two years before Mr. Knight received the subsequent License Suspension Warning Letter dated September 23, 1999, on September 28, 1999, CP 3.
Separate transactions more than one year apart, however identical they may be, do not implicate the bar of res judicata. The federal courts with territorial jurisdiction over Washington view res judicata as follows: In Western Systems, Inc. v. Ulloa, (9th Cir. 1992) 958 F. 2d. 864, 871 the Ninth Circuit found that:
The test for whether a subsequent action is barred is whether it arises from the same “transaction, or series of transactions” as the original action. Restatement (Second) Judgments § 24(1) (cited with approval in Nevada, 463 U.S. at 130-31 n. 12). Whether two events are part of the same transaction or series depends on whether they are related to the same set of facts and whether they could conveniently be tried together. Restatement § 24(2)
Nevada is Nevada v. United States, (1983) 463 U.S. 110, 77 L. Ed. 2d. 509, 103 S. Ct. 2906. In the Restatement, Judgments §24(2), there is part d, Successive acts or events as transaction, or connected series; considerations of business practice.
The key consideration is the passage of time between successive events. A daily trespass upon property on successive days is actionable as one transaction. A suit involving one trespass could bar action on the other trespasses because all of the trespasses could easily have been litigated in one action. But when one year or more passes between transactions, a suit on the first does not bar a suit on the second. Particularly relevant to this action is Illustration 9, which concerns taxes that are paid each year, are separate transactions, for which separate suits for refund of each year’s taxes can be had without one suit barring another suit. In such a tax case, the parties can be identical and the issues raised can be identical, but an intervening published opinion can affect the outcome.
More than one year has passed between the transaction, Letter dated: August 15, 1997, that gave rise to No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT and the transaction, Letter dated: September 23, 1999, that gave rise to No. 99-2-22195-8 KNT. Because of the passage of more than one year, these successive events cannot be properly considered one transaction.
Our state has its own standards for res judicata that are not inconsistent with the federal standard except to the extent that this state is more lenient in allowing subsequent civil action to be heard. The issues of this case are important: welfare reform, child support enforcement and the rights of noncustodial parents, license suspension, teen pregnancy, qualification for federal funds and acceptance of such federal funds, and the integrity of the legislative process as affected by logrolling and Article II Section 19. Subsequent Washington Supreme Court decision, Washington State Legislature, et al. v. State of Washington, et al., (1999) 139 Wash. 2d. 129, 985 P. 2d. 353, and King County Superior Court decision concerning Initiative 695, Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 et al. v. State of Washington, No. 99-2-27054-1 SEA, pending Supreme Court of Washington decision in No. 69433-8, represent a change of circumstances since the litigation of No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT. These decisions were not available for consideration during the previous case, and because they involve interpretation of Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution, these two subsequent decisions have direct bearing on this case.
Restatement, Judgments §24(2), part f, speaks to this situation:
Material operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first. See illustrations 10-12. Where important human values - such as the lawfulness of a continuing personal disability or restraint - are at stake, even a slight change of circumstances may afford a sufficient basis for concluding that a second action may be brought.
Illustration 11 is a case where custody of a child is awarded to the wife when she is found suitable as a mother. Upon subsequent experience, she is found to be unsuitable, custody may be awarded to the husband.
Important human values, such as the lawfulness of a personal disability, in this case the threatened suspension of licenses for which Mr. Knight otherwise is qualified to hold, are at stake in this action. The specific license in question is Mr. Knight’s license to operate a motor vehicle. Therefore, even a slight change in circumstances, in this case subsequent court decisions, should afford a sufficient basis for concluding a second action may be brought.
Res judicata should not be applied where it works injustice. In re Metcalf, (1998) 92 Wash. App. 165, 174, 963 P. 2d. 911 citing Henderson v. Bardahl International Corp., (1967) 72 Wash. 2d. 109, 119, 431 P. 2d. 961. Collateral estoppel should not be applied where it works injustice. Metcalf, at 92 Wash. App. 174 citing State v. Williams, (1997) 132 Wash. 2d. 248, 254, 937 P. 2d. 1052. Metcalf’s issues were important, therefore collateral estoppel and res judicata did not apply. Metcalf, at 92 Wash. App. 176, citing Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Commission, (1989) 113 Wash. 2d. 413, 418-9, 780 P. 2d. 1282 citing Kennedy v. City of Seattle, (1980) 94 Wash. 2d. 376, 379, 617 P. 2d. 713. Res judicata is not intended to deny a litigant his day in court, Schoeman v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1986) 106 Wash. 2d. 855, 860, 726 P. 2d. 1, citing Luisi Truck Lines, Inc. v. Utilities and Transportation Commission, (1967) 72 Wash. 2d. 887, 894-7, 435 P. 2d. 654. Res judicata is not to be applied so rigidly as to deny litigant his day in court, primary purpose of courts is to administer justice.
The dismissal in superior court denied the Mr. Knight his day in court to argue that the subsequent decisions point to a different outcome than the previous litigation. This works injustice, because Mr. Knight has to rely on a different party to bring up the same issues to obtain the same result that could be obtained in this present litigation. The delay caused by waiting for a different noncustodial parent who was not in privity with Mr. Knight to raise this issue, as such parent would not be barred by res judicata, Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc. (1995) 125 Wash. 2d. 759, 764-9, 887 P. 2d. 898, to cite the same subsequent decisions and to obtain the same result that can be obtained here and now, is an injustice. Different plaintiffs can raise the same issue. To bar them without chance to litigate denies due process of law. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of Illinois, (1971) 402 U.S. 313, 329, 28 L. Ed. 2d. 788, 91 S. Ct. 1434 citing Hansberry v. Lee, (1940) 311 U.S. 32, 40, 85 L. Ed. 22, 61 S. Ct. 115.
B. Previous Case, No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT, Should be Reopened,
Order Granting Summary Judgment therein Vacated.
For the reasons stated herein above in Part A of this Argument, the previous King County Superior Court case, No. 97-2-21231-6 KNT should be reopened and the order granting summary judgment of dismissal therein should be vacated.
C. WorkFirst Act Violates Article II Section 19.
1. Introduction., Request for Leave to File Supplemental Brief
To support the injustice argument herein above made in Part A of this Argument, Mr. Knight presents his argument that the WorkFirst Act embraces more than one subject and thus violates Article II Section 19. Mr. Knight respectfully requests that he be allowed to file a supplemental brief after the Supreme Court of Washington publishes its opinion on Initiative 695 in Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 et al. v. State of Washington, No. 69433-8.
During the 1995 and 1996 sessions of the Legislature, bills were introduced that would have provided for suspension of licenses for nonpayment of child support. These bills did not pass. In 1997, a provision for such license suspensions was included in the WorkFirst Act that was passed. CP 61-286. The Governor signed this bill into law with partial vetoes. CP 56-60. He did not veto the license suspension for nonpayment of child support provisions.
Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution reads:
No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.
2. Firewall Between Funding and Substantive Rights
We are also asked to determine if a provision in an omnibus appropriations or operating budget bill is substantive law so as to violate art. II, sec. 19 of the Washington Constitution. We hold the Governor’s veto of a portion of the Laws of 1997, ch. 454, sec. 204(6) was ineffective because the Governor did not veto the full appropriations item as he must under his constitutional line item veto authority. We also hold the inclusion of provisions in sec. 204(6) pertaining to a child care copayment schedule was improper because such provisions were substantive law in an operating budget bill and void under art. II, sec. 19. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand this case to the Thurston County Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
and the Supreme Court stated its reasons at 139 Wash. 2d. 144-148: Citing Washington State Legislature v. Lowry, (1997) 131 Wash. 2d. 309, 328 n. 11, 931 P. 2d. 885, which found that placing a proviso without a dollar amount into an omnibus budget bill risks having the proviso invalidated. The Legislature may not abolish or adopt substantive law in an appropriations bill. Citing State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, (1959) 54 Wash. 2d. 545, 551, 342 P. 2d. 588, legislation of a general and continuing nature cannot come under the subject of appropriations, because Article VIII Section 4 of the Washington Constitution requires that all expenditures of moneys appropriated be made within one calendar month of the end of the fiscal biennium. Omnibus budget bills provide too tempting a target for logrolling. Issues that failed on their own merits may not be resurrected by their inclusion in an operating budget bill. Such an operating budget bill is essentially a compulsory outcome of any legislative session. Such horse trading is condemned citing Power, Inc. v. Huntley, (1951) 39 Wash. 2d. 191, 198-199, 235 P. 2d. 173. An appropriations bill cannot add restrictions to public assistance eligibility and still be said to define no rights, quoting Flanders v. Morris, (1977) 88 Wash. 2d. 183, 188, 558 P. 2d. 769. Citing Service Employees International Union, Local 6 v. Superintendent of Public Instruction, (1985) 104 Wash. 2d. 344, 351, 705 P. 2d. 776, Article II Section 19 serves a dual purpose: to prevent logrolling and to assure that legislators and the public know what is in a bill. Thus inclusion of a copayment provision in a budget bill violated Article II section 19.
As inclusion of a substantive law provision in an appropriations bill is a violation of Article II Section 19, it follows that inclusion of an appropriations measure, including the authorization of state agencies to accept federal funds, whether implied or express, in a bill with numerous substantive law provisions, is also a violation of Article II Section 19. This is one of the firewalls that Article II Section 19 places upon legislation.
Rational basis and interest of government analysis does not apply to claims under this provision because it governs the legislative process. It is up to the Legislature to define the interest of government to be addressed by the bill. Any interest of government may be pursued by the introduction of a separate bill for each subject, which would then have to pass on its own merits. The merits of suspending licenses for failure to comply with support orders are thus irrelevant to a claim that it was passed as part of a bill that embraced more than one subject.
Prior to the passage of the WorkFirst Act in 1997, Senate Bill 5375 and Senate Bill 6062 were proposed and did not pass in the years prior to 1997. Senate Bill 5375 would have provided for suspending licenses for failure to pay child support. Senate Bill 6062 declared a public policy to require able bodied citizens to engage in employment[1] and to institute license suspension for failure to engage in employment to provide child support. The House did not pass either bill[2].
Nevertheless, many of the same legislators who opposed these two previous bills felt compelled to vote for the 1997 bill that contained the license suspension provision because they could not be seen as opposing “welfare reform”. This was particularly true of Republicans, as the Party made “welfare reform” a major part of its “Contract With America” theme.[3]
Flanders, supra at 88 Wash. 2d. 187-188, found:
Article 2, section 19 of our state constitution has a dual purpose: (1) to prevent “logrolling”, or pushing legislation through by attaching it to other necessary or desirable legislation, and (2) to assure that the members of the legislature and the public are generally aware of what is contained in proposed new laws. In State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 54 Wn. 2d 545, 550-51, 342 P. 2d 588 (1959), we quoted language which explains the need for this constitutional provision:
“. . . there had crept into our system of legislation a practice of engrafting upon measures of great public importance foreign matters for local or selfish purposes, and the members of the legislature were often constrained to vote for such foreign provisions to avoid jeopardizing the main subject or to secure new strength for it, whereas if these provisions had been offered as independent measures they would not have received such support . . .” Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm, (1946), 48 A. (2d) 593, 598, 599.
Without the protection created by the constitutional requirement . . . appropriation bills would be peculiarly vulnerable to this legislative evil.
(Italics ours)
In the 1959 Toll Bridge case we held that the inclusion in an appropriations act of a provision authorizing the State Highway Commission to annually divert proceeds from a certain excise tax to the Toll Bridge Authority was violative of both article 2 section 19, and article 2 section 37, of our state constitution. We reasoned that the provision was an amendment to existing law, and also that it was legislation of a general and continuing nature lasting beyond the biennium, which went beyond limiting disbursements or qualifying the appropriations. We found it to be a substantive enactment which did not constitutionally belong in an appropriations bill as follows, quoting from State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 272, 148 P. 28 (1915):
“. . . An appropriation bill is not a law in its ordinary sense. It is not a rule of action. It has no moral or divine sanction. It defines no rights and punishes no wrongs. It is purely lex scripta. It is a means only to the enforcement of law, the maintenance of good order, and the life of the state government. Such bills pertain only to the administrative functions of government. . .”
State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 54 Wn. 2d 545, 551, 342 P. 2d 588 (1959).
An appropriations bill which “defines no rights” certainly cannot abolish existing law. It cannot add restrictions to public assistance eligibility and still be said to define no rights. The proper legislative procedure is to enact separate, independent, properly titled legislation.
The firewall between appropriations and substantive rights is affirmed in State v. Broadaway, (1997) 133 Wash. 2d. 118, 124, 942 P. 2d. 363 and State v. Waggoner, (1971) 80 Wash. 2d. 7, 9-10, 490 P. 2d. 1308. Logrolling with federal funds is as much a danger to Washington democracy as logrolling with appropriations of the state’s own money.
On page 5 of the Partial Veto Message of Governor Gary Locke, CP 60, he explained his partial veto of license suspension provisions for violating court ordered visitation. It reads:
I fully support vigorous collection of all the child support to which families are entitled. Parental responsibility should replace public responsibility for families. However, the bill also contains measures relating to loss of licenses that are not required by PL 104-193, and do not promote the achievement of economic independence. These sections are intended to cause parents who have violated ordered visitation to lose licenses, including drivers, professional, recreational and other licenses.
The merits of connecting visitation issues and license loss could be debated and should be. What is not debatable is that this subject is not relevant in a welfare reform bill. To provide for an opportunity for public debate on this issue, I am vetoing sections 886 and 887. I am incidentally vetoing subsection 802(7)(f), since that subsection is a reference to section 887 and is rendered a manifestly obsolete reference.
The Governor is right about one thing: suspending licenses to enforce a court order is not relevant to welfare reform, and it should be vigorously debated on its own merits. It was vigorously debated on its own merits in previous sessions and did not pass. But his partial veto does not save this bill from an Article II Section 19 challenge because legislators have no way of predicting which sections will be vetoed.
In his veto message, the Governor mentioned a requirement by a federal statute. Attachment B to Mr. Knight’s memorandum is a copy of the Engrossed House Bill 3901 as passed by the Legislature and sent to the Governor, CP 61-286. It became Laws of Washington 1997 Chapter 58. On the front page, CP 61, is the title of the bill:
FEDERAL PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996 - - IMPLEMENTATION
It is the clear purpose of this bill to implement in Washington State law the law popularly known as “welfare reform” passed by Congress and approved by President Clinton. Unlike the Washington Constitution, the United States Constitution does not limit Congress to one subject in each bill.[5] Thus logrolling and the mixing of funding and substantive law in one bill are common practices in Congress. If the Washington Legislature wishes to implement an Act of Congress, then it must pass as many separate bills as necessary to avoid violating Article II Section 19. That means each “subject” must be voted on its own merits and each legislator is thus accountable to the voters, including noncustodial parents, in his or her district for that vote.
On pages 32-33 of the bill, CP 92-93, is its Section 319:
*Sec. 319. RCW 74.04.050 and 1981 1st ex.s. c 6 s 3 are each amended to read as follows:
(1) The department shall serve as the single state agency to administer public assistance. The department is hereby empowered and authorized to cooperate in the administration of such federal laws, consistent with the public assistance laws of this state, as may be necessary to qualify for federal funds for:
(((1))) (a) Medical
assistance;
(((2) Aid to dependent children)) (b) Temporary assistance for needy
families;
(((3))) (c) Child
welfare services; and
(((4))) (d) Any other
programs of public assistance for which provision for federal grants or funds
may from time to time be made.
(2) The state hereby accepts and assents to all the present provisions of the federal law under which federal grants or funds, goods, commodities and services are extended to the state for the support of programs administered by the department, and to such additional legislation as may subsequently be enacted as is not inconsistent with the purposes of this title, authorizing public welfare and assistance activities. The provisions of this title shall be so administered as to conform with federal requirements with respect to eligibility for the receipt of federal grants or funds.
The department shall periodically make application for federal grants or funds and submit such plans, reports and data, as are required by any act of congress as a condition precedent to the receipt of federal funds for such assistance. The department shall make and enforce such rules and regulations as shall be necessary to insure compliance with the terms and conditions of such federal grants or funds.
(3) The department may contract with public and private entities for administrative services for the following programs and functions: (a) Temporary assistance for needy families; (b) general assistance; (c) refugee services; (d) facilitation of eligibility for federal supplemental security income benefits; (e) medical assistance eligibility; and (f) food stamps.
This provision was partial vetoed by Governor Locke. However, it clearly re-enacted a provision providing for the acceptance of federal funding. If a Governor’s partial veto is allowed to save a bill from being invalid as violation of Article II Section 19, then the Governor can play the logrolling game. He could allow legislators to horse trade provisions they dislike for provisions they like, and then he can double cross legislators by partial vetoing some of the provisions, leaving intact other provisions that might not have been approved on their own merits.
On pages 33 and 34 of the bill, CP 93-94, are the following parts of Section 321:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 321. FUNDING RESTRICTIONS. The department of social and health services shall operate the Washington WorkFirst program authorized under sections 301, 302, 307, 308, 310 through 318, 323 through 326, and 401 through 403 of this act, RCW 74.13.0903 and 74.25.040, and chapter 74.12 RCW within the following constraints:
(1) The full amount of the temporary assistance for needy families block grant, plus qualifying state expenditures as appropriated in the biennial operating budget, shall be appropriated to the department each year in the biennial appropriations act to carry out the provisions of the program authorized in sections 301, 302, 307, 308, 310 through 318, 323 through 326, and 401 through 403 of this act, RCW 74.13.0903 and 74.25.040, and chapter 74.12 RCW.
(2) The department may expend funds defined in subsection (1) this section in any manner that will effectively accomplish the outcome measures defined in section 702 of this act. No more than fifteen percent of the amount provided in subsection (1) of this section may be spent for administrative purposes. For the purpose of this subsection, “administrative purposes” does not include expenditures for information technology and computerization needed for tracking and monitoring required by P.L. 104-193. The department shall not increase grant levels to recipients of the program authorized in sections 301, 302, 307, 308, 310 through 318, and 323 through 326 of this act and chapter 74.12 RCW.
(3) The department shall implement strategies that accomplish the outcome measures identified in section 702 of this act that are within the funding constraints in this section. Specifically, the department shall implement strategies that will cause the number of cases in the program authorized in sections 301, 302, 307, 308, 310 through 318, and 323 through 326 of this act and chapter 74.12 RCW to decrease by at least fifteen percent during the 1997-99 biennium and by at least five percent in the subsequent biennium. The department may transfer appropriation authority between funding categories within the economic services program in order to carry out the requirements of this subsection.
(4) The department shall monitor expenditures against the appropriation levels provided for in subsection (1) of this section. The department shall quarterly make a determination as to whether expenditure levels will exceed available funding and communicate its finding to the legislature. If the determination indicates that expenditures will exceed funding at the end of the fiscal year, the department shall take all necessary actions to ensure that all services provided under this chapter shall be made available only to the extent of the availability and level of appropriation made by the legislature.
This Section was not partial vetoed by Governor Locke. It is clearly an appropriations measure. Section 321(3) mentions specific bienniums, this in a bill that includes substantive law that shall remain in effect long after these bienniums unless either the courts invalidate this bill or the Legislature changes or repeals these substantive law provisions. This is exactly what the Supreme Court of Washington found to be offensive to Article II Section 19 in Legislature v. State, supra, at 139 Wash. 2d. 145 citing Toll Bridge, supra of 1959.
Section 321(1) makes specific assignment of the federal temporary assistance for needy families block grant and of state expenditures as appropriated in the biennial operating budget. Section 321(2) directs the DSHS to make expenditures as necessary for technology and computerization for tracking and monitoring required by P.L. 104-193, another way of referencing the Act of Congress that provides the funding which motivated the Legislature.
If there is any doubt that the purpose of all of these substantive law provisions were to qualify for federal funds, that the Legislature was selling the sovereignty this state has over many of these substantive law matters under the United States Constitution for these federal funds, Section 1011 on page 215 of the bill, CP 275, should clear that up. It reads:
NEW SECTION. Sec. 1011. If any part of this act is found to be in conflict with federal requirements that are a prescribed condition to the allocation of federal funds to the state, the conflicting part of this act is inoperative solely to the extent of the conflict and with respect to the agencies directly affected, and this finding does not affect the operation of the remainder of this act in its application to the agencies concerned. The rules under this act shall meet federal requirements that are a necessary condition to the receipt of federal funds by the state. As used in this section, “allocation of federal funds to the state" means the allocation of federal funds that are appropriated by the legislature to the department of social and health services and on which the department depends for carrying out any provision of the operating budget applicable to it.
The Legislature thus authorized the DSHS to ALTER THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW within this act to the extent necessary to QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL FUNDS, without further actions by the Legislature or by the courts!
Many politicians lie to their voters and claim that offensive provisions are “mandated” by federal law. Unless the Act of Congress is within a power specifically granted to it by the United States Constitution, no state is under such a mandate by reason of the Tenth Amendment. There is nothing in Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution that grants Congress power over welfare, child support or other issues of family law. Therefore, if this state chooses not to accept money that is provided in a federal law concerning these issues, it cannot be bound by any such federal enactment.
Federal laws that require certain child support enforcement activities to qualify states to receive certain federal funds do not create a right to vigorous enforcement of support orders that can be enforced under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the only enforcement mechanism in these statutes provide that the Secretary of Health & Human Services can cut off funds. Blessing v. Freestone, (1997) 520 U.S. 329, 343-344, 137 L. Ed. 2d. 569, 117 S. Ct. 1353. In concurrence Justice Scalia found that a state agreeing to provide certain services to private individuals in return for federal funds is in the nature of a contract. Id. at 349. Therefore, the state can choose not to receive federal funds and thereby not be bound by the contractual obligation tied to such funds. If Congress cannot require local sheriffs to perform background checks on every person who purchases a gun, Printz v. United States, (1997) 521 U.S. 898, 138 L. Ed. 2d. 914, 117 S. Ct. 2365 it cannot force the sheriffs to accept federal funds to pay for such background checks.
Because the clear purpose of the WorkFirst Act is to qualify for federal funds, it is an appropriations bill. It therefore violates Article II Section 19 by combining appropriations with sections affecting substantive rights, including license suspension for nonpayment of child support and limits on the time a person can receive public assistance.
3. Rational Unity of Substantive Rights Provisions
In addition to concerns about logrolling and the firebreak between funding measures and substantive rights, the central issue to be resolved in determining whether a proposed law covers more than one subject is whether there is a “rational unity” among the provisions of the proposed law, even if the general subject contained incidental subjects. Water Dist. 105 v. State, (1971) 79 Wash. 2d. 337, 341-342, 485 P. 2d. 66; Kueckelhan v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co., (1966) 69 Wash. 2d 392, 403, 418 P. 2d. 443; and Robison v. Dwyer, (1961) 58 Wash. 2d. 576, 580, 364 P. 2d. 443.
The WorkFirst Act contains seven subjects, each of which could be better debated in its own separate bill:
Immigrant Protection
Washington WorkFirst
Child Care
Teen Parents
Illegitimacy Prevention and Abstinence
DSHS Accountability
License Suspension, Child Support Enforcement
There is no rational unity among these provisions. It would defeat the purpose of Article II Section 19 if legislators could declare the subject in the title to be “Life, the Universe, and Everything” and call that “one subject”. For this reason the Supreme Court of Washington analyzes the one subject test separately from the subject expressed in title test. Patrice v. Murphy, (1998) 136 Wash. 2d. 845, 852, 966 P. 2d. 1271 and In re Boot, (1996) 130 Wash. 2d. 553, 566-568, 925 P. 2d. 964.
The first test for rational unity is if the bill is a comprehensive redraft of a particular area of law. Fritz v. Gorton, (1974) 83 Wash. 2d 275, 290-291, 517 P. 2d. 911, assuming arguendo that Article II Section 19 applied to Initiatives, upheld a public disclosure law containing many subparts relating to elections, candidates, funding, and reports as a unified campaign reform measure. The child support enforcement provisions of the WorkFirst Act do not rewrite many of the key elements of child support law in the State. There is no rewrite of the contempt provisions of chapter 26.18 RCW. There is no rewrite of the Support Schedule Table, RCW 26.19.020, or the provisions for implementing it. The primary substantial effect of these provisions is to enable the DSHS to suspend licenses of noncustodial parents. By themselves, these child support enforcement provisions might meet the comprehensive redraft of a particular area of law test, but not when included in a bill that also affects welfare benefits, teen pregnancy, illegitimacy prevention, and abstinence.
The second test of rational unity: Does one provision naturally imply the other? Is either provision naturally included within or subsumed by the other? In Washington Toll Bridge Auth. v. State, (1956) 49 Wash. 2d 520, 523-6, 304 P. 2d. 676 the Supreme Court held an entire act to be unconstitutional where it was to have involved the following two subjects: a permanent agency to establish and operate toll roads, and the construction of a specific toll road from Tacoma to Everett. In State ex. rel. Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, (1948) 32 Wash. 2d. 13, 27, 200 P. 2d. 467 toll bridges and ferries are not a single subject even though both relate to a transportation system.
Child support enforcement through license suspension, welfare reform by easing welfare recipients off public assistance and into gainful employment, teen pregnancy, and illegitimacy prevention may have links to each other. A rational link is not the same as rational unity. Not one of these provisions naturally lead to another, not one of these provisions are naturally included within or subsumed by the other. Each one stands on its own and could be the subject of a bill solely devoted to it.
If the standard permitted these four topics to be considered as one, one could link almost any combination of otherwise disparate concepts by using a broad generalized term such as “welfare” or “family law” or “equity” or “fairness” even when there is no comprehensive rewrite of a particular area of law. If that could be done, the constitutional requirement of a single subject would be reduced to a hollow exercise in semantics, a mockery of any real or effective constitutional standard. There is no rational unity in the WorkFirst Act under the second test.
The third test for rational unity is whether the all of the subsections of the bill serve a common purpose. State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Auth. v. YelIe, (1962) 61 Wash. 2d 28, 36-37, 377 P. 2d. 466 establishing revenue account system for various forms of transportation is a single subject. The only common purpose of the provisions of the WorkFirst Act is to qualify for federal funds, which when combined with provisions affecting substantive rights, breaches the firewall between funding measures and substantive rights measures.
4. Firewall Between Civil Obligation and Penalty
State v. Tiemann, (1903) 32 Wash. 294, 298, 73 P. 375 found a civil provision for enforcing child support for illegitimate child cannot be properly included in a criminal bastardy statute. Defining an action to establish a civil liability as a criminal procedure embraced two subjects. Child support is charged against the property, not the person. It is therefore not a penalty for wrongdoing, but merely a civil liability.
Similarly, State ex rel Henry v. MacDonald, (1901) 25 Wash 122, 126, 64 P. 912 found that a criminal provision for failing to send a child to school cannot be properly included within the General and Uniform Public School Act. There were two subjects in the bill and the failure to embrace the criminal provision in the title.
It is clear that Article II Section 19 raises a firewall between civil obligations and penalties for wrongdoing just as it raises a firewall between provisions affecting substantive rights and funding measures.
Suspension of licenses is a substantial penalty for the “wrongdoing” of failure to comply with a support order. It is therefore a different subject than the rest of the WorkFirst Act, which deals with matters of a civil nature: i.e. redefining rights of individuals who qualify for public assistance and establishing limits on the time during which such assistance may be received. The provisions pertaining to public assistance in no way establishes any penalty for wrongdoing whatsoever. Therefore, the firewall between civil obligations or rights not related to wrongdoing and criminal penalty is breached, without the protection of the criminal trial and the reasonable doubt standard.
Because of this, this Court should hold the entire WorkFirst Act invalid.
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should reverse or vacate the Order Granting Summary Judgment, declare that Laws of Washington 1997 Chapter 58, the Washington WorkFirst Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Act of 1997 violates Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution, enjoin the enforcement and operation thereof, and remand to superior court for further proceedings consistent with such decision.
Dated this 2d day of August, 2000
Respectfully submitted,
____________________________________
Roger W. Knight, pro se
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[1] Legally requiring able bodied citizens to engage in employment violates the Thirteenth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. §1584, United States v. Kozminsky, (1988) 487 U.S. 931, 101 L. Ed. 2d. 788, 108 S. Ct. 2751. To find a noncustodial parent in contempt for willful unemployment violates the Thirteenth Amendment and the Antipeonage Act, 18 U.S.C. §1581 and 42 U.S.C. §1994, Brent Moss v. Superior Court, (1996) 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 864, 868-870.
[2] 54th Legislature, Legislative Digest and History of Bills, Vol. 1, Ed. 3, Final Ed., pp. 182-183, 469-471.
[3] This legislative history can also show a lack of rational unity. Power, Inc., supra at 39 Wash. 2d. 198.
[4] In evaluating a bill’s merits, an elected official has every right and duty to consider whether his support for it endangers his re-election or ability to be elected to any other office he wishes to run for. That is the essence of American democracy. Noncustodial parents have every right to condition their support of an elected official on his opposition to bills that affect their interests.
[5] But Congress was unwilling to grant the same power to the Territorial Legislature. Article II Section 19 of the Washington Constitution was derived from the Act of Congress establishing Washington Territory, PL 32-90 §6, 10 STAT 175.