I. Questions
Presented For Review
A. Where the
court of appeals
and the district court relied upon a previous
Washington court decision
deciding an issue of Washington law, App. pp. 3 and
9-10, to find federal law
claims in a subsequent federal court action barred by collateral estoppel, does
Washington collateral estoppel practice control, and if so, does Washington
collateral estoppel practice limit the application of the doctrine to allow
subsequent consideration of federal claims unnecessary for the adjudication of
the previous Washington law claim?
B. Does
42 U.S.C. §1994, the Antipeonage
Act, by its inclusion of the word “orders”, create a statutory exception to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
28 U.S.C.
§1738, res judicata, collateral estoppel, claim preclusion, issue preclusion,
and 28 U.S.C. 2283, and does it provide the federal courts jurisdiction
independent of any other statute?
C. Are any attempts to coerce, by license
suspension, a non-custodial parent’s consent to a “repayment agreement” when he
possesses wealth insufficient to comply with the support order without
employment, and the state statute,
RCW 74.20A.320, that provides for such
coercion, declared null and void by
42 U.S.C. §1994?
D. As
RCW 74.20A.320(3) prohibits consideration
of inability to comply with a support order, is it a bill of attainder against
parties unable to comply with such support orders prohibited by
Article I
Section 10 clause 1 of the Constitution?
E. Can the litigation bar,
App. pp. 17-20,
affirmed App. p. 4, prohibiting new complaints by Mr. Knight challenging the
child support order and statutory scheme while acting pro se in the federal
courts based on frivolousness of claim be sustained after the
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