I.       REPLY TO MERCER ISLAND’S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO STAY

          OF JUDGMENT IMPOSING LITIGATION BAR PENDING APPEAL

 

          Now comes the appellant, Roger W. Knight, to respond to Mercer Island’s response to his motion for stay of the judgment below imposing litigation bar, Order Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment, Document No. 65, pages 11-14, ER 25-28.

          The litigation bar does not affect any claim that Mr. Knight may have, presently or in the future, to challenge the reasonableness of any seizure of his automobile under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, Order, Document No. 65, page 13, ER 27.  The City of Mercer Island, through its agent, Wayne Stewart, moved to dismiss their prosecution in the state court Driving While License Suspended DWLS case from which this litigation arose, and the dismissal was granted with prejudice, Supplemental Declaration by Judith Calhoun (Calhoun Declaration III), Document 74, ER 31-32, and Second Supplemental Declaration by Roger W. Knight (Knight Declaration VII), Document 75, ER 29-30.   The Mercer Island appellees no longer have standing to defend Mr. Knight’s claims against the suspension of his driver’s license and the Washington WorkFirst Act, Laws of Washington 1997 chapter 58, and RCW 74.20A.320.  These are the issues affected by the litigation bar.  The State Officers have such standing, but not Mercer Island.

          DeFunis v. Odegaard, (1974) 416 U.S. 312, 316-320, 40 L. Ed. 2d. 164, 94 S. Ct. 1704 found that question presented became moot and Mr. DeFunis ceased to have standing in federal court under Article III when he was in his final quarter of law school and would be allowed to complete his studies and graduate with a juris doctor degree regardless of the outcome.

          While the Mercer Island appellees may claim to have an interest in possible criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §1581 should there be an ultimate determination that the Antipeonage Act, 42 U.S.C. §1994, covers child support and its enforcement, they otherwise “do not have a dog in this fight”.

          It appears that Jayne Freeman and Keating, Bucklin & McCormack intend to draft and file a brief for their clients in this case.  For this decision to be economically feasible, they must be charging the Mercer Island taxpayers a most reasonable rate indeed.  Mr. Knight would stipulate to releasing the City and its officers from this lawsuit and appeal for a settlement that includes the following:

          $50.00 already awarded to Mr. Knight by King County Superior Court for his successful appeal of the criminal DWLS case.

          $50.00 claimed by Mr. Knight for the loss of his automobile for one day.

          $205.74 for the cost to Mr. Knight to recover his automobile from Superior Towing.

          $150.00 for the filing fee paid by Mr. Knight to file the case in district court.

          $7.61 for the costs of printing an extra four pages in his Brief of Appellant, pages 6-10, to cover the issue of the reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, of the seizure of his legally parked automobile.  As argued on page 10 of the Brief, Mercer Island tried this issue by express or implied consent when it briefed it on pages 6-12 of its Mercer Island Motion, Document 42.

          The total cost to Mercer Island to settle Mr. Knight’s remaining claim against the City is $50.00 + $50.00 + $205.74 + $150.00 + $7.61 = $463.35.  Mercer Island need only supply Mr. Knight the stipulation paperwork and a check for $463.35 and Mr. Knight will agree to release the City of Mercer Island, Alan Merkle, Ron Elsoe, Londi K. Lindell, Wayne Stewart, and Superior Towing from this appeal, leaving only Fred Stephens, Dennis Braddock, and Gary Locke as parties to this appeal.

          As to the litigation bar, if Roger Redhail can in good faith bring an argument that the disability imposed by Wisconsin law arising from his child support obligation prohibiting him from marrying offended his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, then Roger Knight can in good faith bring arguments against the disability imposed by the WorkFirst Act prohibiting him from operating a motor vehicle for noncompliance with a pre-existing child support order.  Zablocki v. Redhail, (1978) 434 U.S. 374, 384-386, 54 L. Ed. 2d. 618, 98 S. Ct. 673, noncustodial parent’s argument found meritorious.

          Should the Washington Legislature, pass a bill imposing a prohibition of marriage against noncustodial parents unable to comply with their support orders, the litigation bar prohibits Mr. Knight from bringing an action in federal court challenging it on the basis of Zablocki.

II.      CONCLUSION

          For the reasons stated herein, this Appellant’s Motion for Stay of Judgment Imposing Litigation Bar Pending Appeal should be granted.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of March, 2003,

 

                                                _________________________________

                                                          Roger W. Knight, appellant pro se

 

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